My reminiscences of East Africa;

Reminiscences of East Africa

General von Lettow-Vorbeck.

REMINISCENCES
OF EAST .AFRICA ..

General von Lettow-Vorbeck

With Portrait, 22 Maps and Sketch-Maps,

and 13 'Drawings
*By General von Lettow-Vorbeck s Adjutant

31- 3

LONDON: HURST AND BLACKETT, LTD.
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, L.C.

PREFACE

IN all the German colonies, though but a few decades old, a life
full of promise was discernible. We were beginning to under-
stand the national value of our colonial possessions ; settlers and
capital were venturing in ; industries and factories were beginning
to flourish. Compared with that of other nations, the colonizing
process of Germany had progressed peacefully and steadily, and the
inhabitants had confidence in the justice of German administration.
This development had barely commenced when it was destroyed by
the world war. In spite of all tangible proofs to the contrary, an
unjustifiable campaign of falsehood is being conducted in order to
make the world believe that the Germans lacked colonizing talent
and were cruel to the natives.

A small force, mainly composed of these very natives, opposed this
development. Almost without any external means of coercion, even
without immediate payment, this force, with its numerous native
followers, faithfully followed its German leaders throughout the whole
of the prolonged war against a more than hundredfold superiority.
When the armistice came it was still fit to fight, and imbued with the
best soldierly spirit. That is a fact which cannot be controverted,
and is in itself a sufficient answer to the hostile mis-statements.

It has not been possible for me to give an exhaustive account of the
operations of the German East African Protective Force. The
existing material is insufficient, much has been lost, and even now I
am unacquainted with various events, the actors in which have not
yet returned home. My own records have for the most part been lost,
and I had not the leisure to prepare a detailed description of the cam-
paign in East Africa in addition to my other duties. My account is
therefore necessarily incomplete. In the main I must rely upon my
memory and on my personal experiences. Errors in detail are un-
avoidable.

But in spite of this, the following account may not be without value,
nor perhaps without interest, since it shows how what is up to the
present the greatest drama in our colonial history was enacted in the
head of him who was destined to conduct the military side of it. I
have endeavoured to set down my recollections of East Africa as they
actually are, and thus at least to present what is subjectively corteet

CONTENTS

PART I

EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE

SOUTH AFRICANS

PAGE
CHAPTER I. : BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR ... 3

Reflections on the duties and purpose of the Protective Force.
Details of the defensive capacity of the Colony. Distribution,
armament and training of the Force. Military employment and
mental attitude oj_thena.tives. Economic value of the country, and
furtherance of the economic poorer of the natives. Horse-breeding
and hunting. Several tours of inspection. National propaganda
on the part of subsequently hostile Missions in the neighbouring
territories.

CHAPTER II. : THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR 18

Arrival of news of mobilization. Participation in the war or
neutrality ? The strength of the Protective Force and the English
casualties. The English Consul and his activity. The Governor of
the Colony, the supreme military authority, and the defence of the
coastal towns. Preparations for mobilization. Lines of com-
munication, maintenance and supplies. Sanitation. Malaria.

CHAPTER III. : THE FIRST ACTIONS 27

Bombardment of the wireless tower at Dar-es-Salaam. Negotia-
tions for capitulation by the civil authorities. The Konigsberg
and the Move. Capture of Taveta. Transfer of the main body
to the Northern Railway. New telegraphic communications. Bom-
bardment of Bagamoyo. Attack on the British Uganda Railway.
Attacks on British Karunga on Lake Xyassa. Guerilla warfare in
the North.

CHAPTER IV. : THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA . . 35

Reconnaissances at Tanga. Appearance of an English landing
corps. Concentration of all available troops. First combats at
Ras-Kasone. Reconnaissance in abandoned Tanga. The sur-
roundings of the probable field of battle. Disposition of the com-
panies. The hostile landing. The attack. Unfavourable situa-
tion of the defenders. Counter-attack by the reinforcements.
Headlong flight of the enemy. Failure of the pursuit. Harass-
ing the enemy at the landing-place. Enormous English losses.
The trained bees. Negotiations for release of the wounded.
Great booty. Our own losses. In the hospitals. Simultaneous
events at Longido Mountain.

CHAPTER V. : AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS ... 49

Withdrawal of the troops to New Moshi. Work at Head-
quarters. Motor transport versus carriers. Reconnaissances
by motor. Supply and transport. Roads on the lines of com-
munication. The burden of work and the joy of work. Abundant
supplies. The starving Lieutenant. The joys of Sunday sport.
Meat supply for the troops.

CONTENTS

PAGE

CHAPTER VI. : FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-
EAST 56

Advance of hostile forces at JasSiui. Reconnaissance in view
of a possible battle. Advance of the German Companies against
the English positions. Surprise and surrounding of the entrenched
enemy. Bad fighting of the Arab Corps. Gallant defence by the
enemy. Difficult situation of the attackers. The enemy hoists the
white flag.

CHAPTER VII. : GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER

PREPARATIONS 63

Necessity for economizing men and stores. Care of the wounded.
A wireless message from home. Raids in the Longido district.
" A damned good piece of work." Despatch of patrols to destroy
the railway. Suffering and death in the steppe. Arrival of a relief
ship. Feverish manufacture of ammunition. An advance near
Oldorobo Mountain. Abundance of raw material and lack of
finished articles. New industries to supply our needs. Road-
making. Increase in numbers and fighting value of the troops.

CHAPTER VIII. : AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE.

ENERGETIC USE OF THE TIME AVAILABLE 73

CHAPTER IX. : THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR.
GUERILLA WARFARE ASHORE AND AFLOAT UNTIL NEW
YEAR, 1916 82

Hostile Masai attack on Lake Victoria. The Konigsberg on the
Rufiji. Her glorious end. Another success near Kilimandjaro.
Determined attacks on the English railway. Attack and occupa-
tion of the English Camp on Kasigao Mountain. The enemy's
measures for protecting the railway. Fighting in the bush. Con-
sideration of the possibility of resisting an attack by large hostile
forces. Preparations for retiring to the South. Removal of stores.
Determined defence of the position on Oldorobo Mountain. The
new Mungu.

PART II

THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES

From the arrival of the South African Troops to the loss of the

Colony)

CHAPTER I. : THE ENEMY'S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUN-
TAIN 103

Several advances by the enemy. The fantastic armoured cars.
The artillery combat. The South African troops. Alleged cruel
orders by the enemy. Reinforcement of the enemy near Mount
Longido. Fight with an Indian patrol. Chivalry of the white
officers. Our brave Askari and the misleading of the English.

CHAPTER II. : FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY AND THE
ACTION AT REATA 108

Spies at work. The routes of the enemy's advance. Possibilities
of defence. The enemy attacks at Kitovo Mountain. The strong

CONTENTS x-

PAGS

position on the line Reata-Kitovo. The Konigsberg's gun.
Reconnaissance by hostile cavalry. The enemy's attack and
attempt to surround us. Occupation of new defensive positions.
The enemy's withdrawal to Taveta. After the battle. Renewed
forward movement by the enemy. Headquarters at Neusteglitz.
A second relief ship.

CHAPTER III. : RETREAT BEFORE OVERWHELMING HOSTILE

PRESSURE 119

Plans and considerations. Active attempts at reconnaissance by
the enemy. Preparations for fighting. An attack on the hostile
screen of patrols. Heavy losses. Fresh heavy attacks by the
enemy (2ist March). Failure of the counter-attack. An alarmist
report : the enemy behind us. Retreat to Kissangire. The
alarmist report proves to be false. Good spirits of the troops.
Condition of the civilian population. Combat and surrender of the
28th Company at Lokisale (5th April). Bringing up auxiliaries.
Concentration of the troops on the Central Railway.

CHAPTER IV. : THE ENEMY'S ADVANCE IN THE AREA OF THE

NORTHERN RAILWAY 129

Departure for Korogwe. At Handeni. News from Germany.
Obstacles on the road. The swollen river. On horseback and by
light railway to Kimamba. Reconnaissance south of Kondoa.
Lines of communication and commissariat. In touch with the
enemy. In position. The enemy seems to be evacuating his
positions. An unexpected fight in the night. Our heavy losses.
Successful patrols. Artillery duels. Obtaining supplies from the
country. Failure of an attack by the enemy.

CHAPTER V. : BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL

RAILWAYS 140

The enemy advances on the whole northern front. Simultaneous
attacks from the South. Slipping away and outflanking the
enemy. Looking for the enemy's weakest point. The smart
patrol leader. The enemy's aerial activity increases. Further
advance to the South by General van Deventer. Weak German
forces resist on a long line. Fighting near the Central Railway.
Reconnaissances. Heavy fighting with the advancing enemy.
On the Wami River.

CHAPTER VI. : CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI . 149

Hostile attacks from the south-west. What will the enemy do ?
An attempt to surround us. The action at Mlali. Retreat to
Kissaki. The moral effect of our retreat. The Boma of Kissaki.
Securing our cattle supply. Defeat of the enemy on the 7th Sep-
tember. Annihilation of another hostile detachment. German
humanity — English gratitude. A surprise attack at Dutumi (gth
September). Dutumi must be abandoned.

CHAPTER VII. : HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF

THE COLONY 159

Our unfavourable position at Kilwa. Futile attacks by the
enemy at Kissangire. Fat obtained from hippo and elephants.
At Mpaganya. A pessimist sent about his business. Advance
on Kissangire. The lost patrol. Successes at Kissangire. The
Portuguese defeated at Xewala. In Utete Camp. In a strong
position at Kibata. Artillery preparations. Effect of heavy
shell. An unsuccessful infantry attack. The military situation
at the end of 1916. Powerful enemy attacks at Dutumi and
Kissaki. The enemy fails to get behind us.

xii CONTENTS

PAGE

CHAPTER VIII. : ANXIETIES AND HARDSHIPS DURING OUR

STAY IN THE RUFIJI COUNTRY 173

The march through the Pori. Camp at Ungwara. The troops
lose their way. Useless mouths. Steps to remedy the threatening
shortage of food. Reduction in the number of carriers. Reduc-
tion of rations. Obstruction. The Askari women. Maize our
help in trouble. A supply branch of the commissariat. Minor
actions in the bush at Ungwara. The commencement of the rains.
Measures for the protection of women and children. The troops
continue their march to the South.

CHAPTER IX. : THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE

SUBSIDIARY THEATRES 182

On the Ruhuje and Ruaha Rivers. A hostile attack and its
sudden cessation. The enemy's mistake. Surrender of Major
Grabert. Division of General Wahle's force. The march to
Tabora. Back to Kilima Njaro. Major Kraut's march to the
Rovuma. Supply difficulties and plans for the future. In the rich
Portuguese territory. Patrols towards Kilva. A heavy defeat
of the enemy. Experiments with bread-substitute. Primitive
boots. The crowing cocks. Salt, fat and sugar. The medical
service. " Lettow - Schnaps." Bandages. Operations with
primitive appliances.

CHAPTER X. : LINDI AND KILWA 190

Hostile reinforcements from the direction of Lindi. Flood of the
Mbemkuru. German advance on Lindi. The enemy penetrates
into the German camp at Lutende. A smart counter-attack.
Further minor actions near Ulindi. We march off to the North.
At Narungombe. Another victory. Too late ! Enemy spies
under the white flag. An Imperial greeting from home. The
attack at Narunyu. The bomb in the dentist's study. Removal
of women and children to Lindi.

CHAPTER XI. : IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY. 207

Concentric advance of the enemy. At Ruponda and Likangara.
The enemy's uncertainty. Rumours. Action at Mahiva. A
brilliant victory. Changing the plan of attack. The tactics of the
enemy commander. The end of the battle. Losses and booty.
Another action at Lukuledi. Guerilla warfare.

CHAPTER XII. : THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY . 216

Consultation with the Governor. Considerations. Departure
from Lukuledi. Minor actions in the bush. Shortage of ammu-
nition and its consequences. Continuous advance of the enemy
to Chivata. We avoid the blow by moving to Nambindinga.
Schemes for voluntarily restricting the strength of the troops.
On the Makonde Plateau. Shortage of water and food. Whither ?
Reorganization of the Force at Newala. The hostile patrol and its
letter. At them ! Out of sight of the enemy.

PART III

FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL
(From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice)

CHAPTER I. : ACROSS THE ROVUMA 229

Crossing the river. The enemy's camp at Ngomano. Assault
on the Portuguese defences. The " Day of the old guns." Rich

CONTENTS xiii

PAGE

booty. Continuing the march up the Lujenda. Looking lor
supplies. A transparent offer by the enemy. News of the sur-
render of Captain Tafel. Partition of the Force. Difficulties and
unpleasantness. Capture of several Portuguese camps. Heroic
action of Lieutenant Kempner. At Xangvare. Buffalo fat and
forest fruits. Abundant supplies at Chirumba. Patrols.
Approach of the enemy. Skirmishes. Enemy propaganda.
Fresh courage and confidence.

CHAPTER II. : EAST OF THE LUDJENDA . . . .245

Supply questions. In the rain. Tobacco. At Xanungu.
Building pontoons. Patrols across the Msalu River. News of
events in Europe. A pause in the fighting. Patrols to the coast.
The precious Pori-pig. A new hostile deployment. The patriotic
English. Defeat of the enemy at Mahue. Continual skirmishes.
Against the enemy at Kireka^Mountain. An action in the bush.
A wrong report and its consequences. Casualties on both sides in
the last actions. Captain Koehl's successes. Continuation of
the march to Koroma Mountain. A surprise. The Governor in
danger. Unpleasant losses.

CHAPTER III. : IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO

RIVERS 259

On the road to Keriva. The sick and wounded. Camp on the
Lurio. Muller's detachment captures the Boma of Malema.
Hostile forces approach from various sides. In a rich country.
General Edwards' precautions. Fighting in the bush. The
march continued to Alto Moloque. The Orange-Boma. Con-
tinuous fighting by patrols. Nampepo Station and other settle-
ments. On the Likunga River. Rich booty. The native-
powers of estimation.

CHAPTER IV. : ON TO THE SOUTH 270

Where is the enemy's ammunition dump ? Looking for it.
Awkwardness of long columns. Kokosani-Xamekurra. Across
the Lukungo. A success. At Xamekurra. The fortified rail-
way station. Artillery' preparations and assault. Flight of
enemy across the Namacurra River. The casualties on both sides.
Extraordinary quantities of supplies and ammunition captured.

CHAPTER V. : BACK NORTH TO THE XAMACURRA RIVER . 278

Obstacles in the way of continuing the march to the South.
The enemy's operations and our own plans. Back across the
Likungo. Marching in several parallel columns. A remark-
able military situation. Looking for booty. At Ociva. The
English and Portuguese prisoners. Capture of the Boma of Tipa.
March to Xamirrue. Reconnaissance of enemy's position on the
rocky mountain. Another enemy appears. Victorious battle
with him at night. Confusion of the enemy's columns. Fruit-
less pursuit of the fleeing enemy. The trench mortar and its effect,
ault of the rocky mountain. We march away to Pekera.
Rest in the camp at Chalau.
•

CHAPTER VI. : BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER . . .289

At Chalau. An English flag of truce. Approach of the enemy.
Withdrawal across the Ligonja. At Hi. March to Numarroe.
Preparing bread for the prisoners. A breakfast in the bush.
Boma of Xuinarroe. Success of Goering's detachment. Capture
of the Boma. Casualties on both sides. On over the mountains
to Rigona. Skirmishes. What next ? Heavy fighting at
Lioma. Heavy losses. No prospect of greater success. On to the

xiv CONTENTS

PAGE

North. Confusion of the detachments. A difficult march through
the mountains. On the Lurio. Bad health of the troops. Heavy
casualties on both sides. The influenza epidemic.

CHAPTER VII. : ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE . . . 303

Rapid march to the North. Across the Lujenda. A rest-day
at Mwemba. Hostile spies. Distant reconnaissance by patrols.
To Ssongea. Homesickness of the Samarunga. Pangire Mission
Station. Change of direction. Grave news from Europe. At
Mbozi Mission Station. Patrol reports.

CHAPTER VIII. : THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA . 309

On the march to Fife. The enemy in a fortified position.
Fruitless bombardment and continuation of the march. Patrol
fighting. Abundant supply of quinine captured. Studying the
map. By forced marches into Rhodesia. Kajambi Mission
Station and its frightened inhabitants. Capture of Kasawa.
Natives pillaging by order of the English. On towards the
Zambesi.

CHAPTER IX. : THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME . 315

The lost English motor-cyclist. Armistice. By cycle to the
Chambezi ferry. Conditions of the Armistice. Conference with
the British Commissioner. Situation in Germany. The Armistice
and the situation of our troops. Release of the prisoners. Diffi-
culties in paying off the Askari. March to Abercorn. " Surren-
der " and " Evacuation." With General Edwards. Handing
over arms. Fruitless opposition to English interpretation of agree-
ment. By ship to Kigoma. Belgian hospitality. By rail to Dar-
es-Salaam. Internment. Influenza and its victims. The loyal
Askari. Endeavours to protect private property. Embarkation
for home. At Rotterdam and at home. Retrospect and a glance
at the future.

LIST OF MAPS

PAGE

Figs. i. and iii. Kilima Njaro . ...... 5

Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway ... 5

Fig. iv. Battle of Tanga 37

Fig. v. The Northern Railway 37

Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916 ... 83

Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini) 105

Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert .... 105

Fig. ix. Battle of Reata 105

Fig. x. Battle of Kahe 105

Fig. xi. Invasion of German East Africa by Belgian and British

columns, middle of 1916 ..... 131

Fig. xii. Retreat of German Main Force, August, 1916 . . 131

Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi .... 161
Fig. xiv. March of German Main Force, September, 1916, to

June, 1917 161

Fig. xv. March of Major-General Wahle in the West . .183
Fig. xvi. March of Main Force during operations on interior

lines west of Lindi, June to November, 1917 . 191

Fig. xvii. Battle of Mahiwa 191

Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mountains . . . 257

Fig. xix. The Action at Namirrue, July 23rd, 1918 . . . 285

Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa .... 297
Fig. xxi. The March into Rhodesia . . . . .

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

General von Lettow-Vorbeck ..... Frontispiece

General Map ........ Facing p. 32

The Fallen ........ ,, 33

Native Women ....... ,, 96

Natives Bringing Food ...... , , 97

Masai ......... „ 128

European Dinner-time . . . . . . ,, 129

Askari. A Halt ....... „ 160

The Banyan Tree ....... ,, 161

Native Types (i) ....... ,, 192

Native Types (2) ,, 193

Native Types (3) . . . . . . . ,, 224

Native Types (4) ... ... „ 225

Native Types (5) . . , 256

Native Types (6) .... . „ 257

PART I

EVENTS PREVIOUS TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE
SOUTH AFRICANS

My Reminiscences of East Africa

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

WHEN I landed at Dar-es-Salaam in January, 1914, I hardly
suspected the nature of the task that was to confront
me in a few months' time. But during the past ten years the
universal war had more than once seemed so imminent that I
was obliged seriously to consider whether the force under my
command would be called upon to take any part in that con-
flict, and, if so, what its task might be. Owing to the position
of the Colony and the weakness of the existing forces — the peace
establishment was but little more than two thousand — we could
only play a subsidiary part. I knew that the fate of the colonies,
as of all other German possessions, would only be decided on the
battlefields of Europe. To this decision every German, regard-
less of where he might be at the moment, must contribute his
share. In the Colony also it was our duty, in case of universal
war, to do all in our power for our country. The question was
whether it was possible for us in our subsidiary theatre of war
to exercise any influence on the great decision at home. Could
we, with our small forces, prevent considerable numbers of the
enemy from intervening in Europe, or in other more important
theatres, or inflict on our enemies any loss of personnel or war
material worth mentioning ? At that time I answered this
question in the affirmative. It is true, however, that I did not
succeed in interesting all authorities in this idea to such an

3 i*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

extent as to cause all preparations which a war of this kind
rendered desirable to be carried out.

It was to be considered that hostile troops would allow them-
selves to be held only if we attacked, or at least threatened, the
enemy at some really sensitive point. It was further to be
remembered that, with the means available, protection of the
Colony could not be ensured even by purely defensive tactics,
since the total length of land frontier and coast-line was about
equal to that of Germany. From these considerations it followed
that it was necessary, not to split up our small available forces
in local defence, but, on the contrary, to keep them together,
to grip the enemy by the throat and force him to employ his
forces for self-defence. If this idea could be successfully carried
out, we should at the same time protect our coast and our infi-
nitely long land frontier in the most effective manner.

In examining the question where to find a point so vital to the
enemy as to afford us the prospect of a successful attack, or, at
any rate, of a threat of such an attack, one thought at once of
the frontier between German and British East Africa. Parallel
with it, at a distance of a few marches, runs the main artery of
the British territory, the Uganda Railway, an object which, with
a length of quite 440 miles, was extremely difficult for the enemy
to protect, and would, therefore, if effectively threatened, require
a large part of his troops for the purpose.

On my first journey of reconnaissance and inspection, com-
menced in January, 1914, I went by sea from Dar-es-Salaam
to Tanga, thence to Usambara, and then on into the country
round Kilima Njaro and Meru Mountain. At Usambara I met
an old friend whom I had known well since our military college
days (Kriegschule) , Captain von Prince (retired). He was an
enthusiastic supporter of the idea that, in case of a war with
England, we East Africans should not remain idle spectators,
but should take a hand if there should be even a trace of a
prospect of relieving the pressure in Europe. At the same
time, he was in a position to inform me that in the Usambara
country, round Kilima Njaro, and near Meru Mountain, Volunteer
Rifle Corps were^being formed, which in a short time would

4

Before the Outbreak of War

probably include all the Germans capable of bearing arms in
these northern territories. In view of the density of the settle-

Fig, i.

Fig. iii.

^v" j^v

f

'• «.1»i

Fig i. and iii. Kilima Xjaro.

Fig. ii. German East Africa. The Central Railway.

ments in those parts, this was a fact of great importance. The
main contingent of the three thousand Europeans whom we

My Reminiscences of East Africa

were able to enrol in the Protective Force during the course
of the war was furnished from these very territories lying along
the Usambara Railway. It was, indeed, difficult to introduce
a workable military organization among these voluntary asso-
ciations, and to make effective use of their abundant good will.
Still, it was, on the whole, successfully arranged that all, even
those not legally obliged to do so, should be ready in case of war
to act under the orders of the Protective Force. The District
Commissioners also manifested the greatest sympathy ; but
they also expressed the, unfortunately well-founded, doubt
whether, in a universal war which could certainly cut us off
completely from the home country and leave us to our own
resources, such voluntary organizations would possess the
requisite cohesion. The armament was also in a bad way ;
although almost every European possessed a useful sporting
rifle, the variety of patterns and the consequent difficulty of
ammunition supply had not yet been remedied. The proposals
for arming these rifle clubs with a uniform military weapon
were still pending, and remained undecided until the outbreak
of war.

At Wilhelmstal I found a detachment of native police under
an efficient sergeant-major, who came from Ditmarschen.
Whereas the Protective Force proper was under the Commandant,
the various police detachments were under the civil authorities,
and so each District Commissioner had under his orders a detach-
ment of one hundred to two hundred men, for the purpose of
collecting taxes and supporting his authority. There prevailed
a constant tendency to increase this police force more and more,
to the detriment of the Protective Force. In this manner,
alongside of the latter, a second force of the same strength had
come into being which was in its very nature a travesty of a
military organization, and could hardly be anything better.
The District Commissioner, a civil official, often understood
little of military matters, and handed over the training and
command of his Police-Askari to a sergeant-major of police.
The latter often worked zealously, with the old non-commissioned
officer's usual devotion to duty ; but he seldom received any

6

Before the Outbreak of War

guidance from a military superior, since the police inspector, an
officer, could only visit each district from time to time. So the
Police-Askari often became slack, and lacked the strict discipline
necessary to keep them fit for their duties, which demanded
reliability. To this was added a further defect which ought to
have been avoided. The police were partly recruited from the
native N.C.O.'s of the Protective Force. The latter was thereby
deprived of its best elements, who, after joining the police, lost
their good military qualities. This, of course, did not obtain
in all cases. But, generally speaking, it was the case that,
in order to obtain a police force of inferior military value which
in the circumstances could never be of any real use, the quality
of the Protective Force was steadily impaired.

From New Moshi, the terminus of the Usambara Railway,
I proceeded via Marangu, where an English planter lived and
where I met the English Consul King, of Dar-es-Salaam, to the
Kilima Njaro country, and thence to Arusha. Several German
planters, some of them former officers, whom I visited at their
estates during the march, assured me that the German settlers
in those parts formed a valuable source of military power.

At that time I made the acquaintance of the charming estate
of Commander Niemeyer (retired), whose wife entertained us
with excellent home-grown coffee. Later on she rather hin-
dered us on one occasion : when, during the war, her husband
was in Engara-Nairobi Camp, north-west of Kilima Njaro, we
had temporarily lent her a telephone, so that she could call
up her husband. Immediately afterwards the whole telephone
service stopped, and after a long, long search, we at last dis-
covered that our kind former hostess had not switched off her
instrument and displayed no intention of doing so.

Close by was the plantation of Lieutenant-Commander Schoen-
feld (retired), who hospitably offered us a glass of very fine
Moselle wine, and did so with a military tone like a word of
command which even then characterized him as the energetic
leader who was later to defend the mouth of the Rufiji River
against a superior enemy with such stubbornness. Just short
of Arusha we came to the coffee-plantation of my old brother-

7

My Reminiscences of East Africa

cadet Freiherr von Ledebur, where at table I met the charming
old retired Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Bock. We talked
about the Volunteer Rifle Corps which were being formed near
Meru Mountain, and I did not dream that a few months later this
old gentleman of over sixty would be one of our toughest patrol
leaders on the east side of Kilima Njaro, and would often with
his few men, who were mostly recruits, successfully engage
several companies of the enemy. His true chivalry and fatherly
care soon won him the hearts of his black comrades, to such a
degree that he was in their eyes the bravest of all Germans, and
they clung to him with touching loyalty.

At Arusha the first inspection of a company of Askari was
held. The spirit and discipline of the black unit revealed the
admirable education they had received at the hands of my
predecessor, Colonel Freiherr von Schleuntz ; but, in accordance
with the hitherto accepted principles of their employment, their
training for fighting against an enemy with modern armament
had been developed to a lesser degree. Like the majority
of the Askari companies, this company was still armed with the
old 1871 pattern rifle, using smoky powder. The opinion was
widely held that for black troops this was more suitable than a
modern rifle with smokeless powder, for they had hitherto never
been employed against an opponent with modern armament,
but only in native warfare, where the larger calibre is an advan-
tage, while the disadvantage of smoke is of no consequence-
After the outbreak of war, indeed, the enthusiastic supporters
of the 1871 rifle changed their minds. Against an enemy pro-
vided with modern smokeless equipment the smoky rifle was,
not only at the long ranges obtaining in the open plain, but also
in bush-fighting, where the combatants are often but a few paces
apart, decidedly inferior. The man using smokeless powder
remains invisible, while the cloud of smoke betrays the enemy
with rapidity and certainty, not only to the sharp eye of the native
Askari, but even to the European accustomed to office work.
Thus, at the beginning of the war, the greatest reward which
could be earned by an Askari was to give him a modern captured
rifle in place of his old smoky one.

8

Before the Outbreak of War

In distributing the force by companies throughout the country
it had been necessary to accept the disadvantage that in many
cases it \vas impossible to employ them in large formations, or
to train the senior officers in this respect. It was evident that
in war the movement and leading in battle of forces greater than
a company would be attended with great difficulty and friction.
According to my view, the force had the double duty of preparing
to meet an enemy from outside with modern armament, as well
as a native enemy within our borders ; their training for battle
had therefore to take account of two distinct sets of conditions.
The exercises in native warfare presented a spectacle which
differed widely from our European inspections. At Arusha,
on this occasion, the company marched through thick bush,
the " Pori," and was in native fashion surprised on the march.
The enemy was represented by Meru warriors, who, arrayed in
full war-dress, with spears and head-dress of ostrich feathers,
remained concealed, and then at only a few paces distance fell
upon the Safari, the column of route, with loud war cries. A
fight at such close quarters, like the one in which Zelewski's
expedition had been overwhelmed in 1891 at Iringa, is decided
at short range and in a very few minutes. The troops quickly
rally round their leaders and rush the enemy. In accordance
with this whole character of native warfare, careful and thorough
musketry training in the modern sense had hitherto been unneces-
sary. It was, indeed, at a pretty low level, and it may interest
the soldier to hear that in some companies the average at two
hundred yards standing without rest barely attained Ring 3,
and that only a few companies got beyond Ring 5. Neither
did the nature of native warfare provide a sufficient inducement
for thorough training with the machine gun. Fortunately,
however, I soon discovered among all Europeans of the force
a complete understanding of the importance of this arm, in
particular in modern battle. In spite of this not particularly
high standard of training, the results of field-firing, even at long
ranges, were not unsatisfactory, and in this the Askari profited
in a high degree by his sharp eyesight, which enabled him to
observe his fire and correct his aim accordingly.

9

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The journey was continued via Ufiome Mission, where the
excellent Father Diirr was settled, to Kondoa-Irangi, Kilimatinde
and back to Dar-es-Salaam. The impression left by this first
inspection was that from a military point of view there was still
a great deal to be done if we wished to be properly prepared
in case the English should make war on us. Unfortunately I
did not succeed in arousing sufficient interest in the matter on
the part of the authorities. The ruling opinion was that we
were on exceptionally good terms with the English, and that
a war, if it came at all, was still in the distant future. Thus it
happened that when war actually did break out but a few months
later we were unprepared.

For me, a new-comer in East Africa, the journey had not only
been of military interest. At Boma la Ngombe, a place between
Moshi and Arusha, a number of old Askari had been settled by
the late Lieutenant-Colonel Johannes ; they were mainly engaged
in cattle-dealing, and had become well-to-do. The news of my
coming had preceded me, and the people appeared in full strength
to greet me on my arrival. I had the impression that this was
not a mere show of loyalty ; the people not only told me enthu-
siastically of Germans under whom they had previously served,
but after the outbreak of war, unasked and without the slightest
pressure, they placed a large sum of money at our disposal to
help the force. In that district I also saw the first Masai, who,
in contrast to the majority of the East African tribes, are pure
Hamites, and live in a special reservation. It may be mentioned
that Merker, the best authority on the Masai,* considers them to
be the original Jews. They possess to a marked degree the
characteristics of the pure inhabitant of the prairie. Occasionally,
one of these tall, slim, and very swift men acted as my guide on
hunting expeditions ; their vision and skill as trackers are
astonishing. In addition, the Masai is intelligent, and, at any
rate towards strangers, an extraordinary liar. He lives in
closed villages of mud huts, and, like all nomads, wanders with
his herds over the prairie. He seldom enlists in the force.
In agriculture the Masai engages hardly at all, whereas among

* M. Marker, " Die Masai," Berlin, 1904 (2nd Edition, 1910).

10

Before the Outbreak of War

the other tribes this forms the chief occupation and is a neces-
sary condition for close settlement. Thus the banana districts
on the eastern slopes of Kilima Njaro support a native Wajagga
population of some twenty-five thousand souls, and this number
could easily be increased. The great wealth of cattle in the
neighbourhood of Arusha, on the Masai prairie, and near Kondoa-
Irangi, showed me that the tse-tse fly, the principal enemy of
African cattle, is comparatively rare in those parts. As a com-
parison, I may state that the cattle in the single district of Arusha
are estimated to be more numerous than in the whole of South-
West Africa. At Kondoa-Irangi and Singida the people had
come from a great distance, and had lined the road to greet me.
No traveller who visits these countries can fail to observe that
in the fertile, elevated interior there is room for the settlement of
hundreds of thousands of Europeans. Here I would like to
record an impression which I only obtained later, during the
war. At times we passed through fertile districts which were
completely forsaken by the inhabitants, but which were known
not to have been occupied even hi the previous year. They had
simply moved away, had settled somewhere else in the abun-
dantly available, empty and fertile country, and had there begun
to cultivate fresh fields. If the country capable of cultivation
were fully utilized, it would probably be possible to support
in German East Africa, which has hitherto been inhabited by
about eight millions only, a population barely less than that of
Germany. An Englishman captured during the war at Mahenge
remarked that it would be possible to make East Africa into a
second India, and I think he was right. My experience hi the
war has confirmed my opinion that there exist many possibilities
of economic development, of which we had hardly an inkling
before the war.

At Singida I saw one of the stud-farms of the country. For
breeding purposes there were two horse stallions, no mares, a
few Muscat donkey stallions, and mainly country-bred donkey
mares. Of the objects it was sought to attain I could get no
clear idea ; in any case, the crossing of horse stallions and
donkey mares had produced no results. But the district is

ii

My Reminiscences of East Africa

extraordinarily suitable for horse-breeding, and the Govern-
ment Veterinary Officer Hiffmeister, who was stationed there,
was very inclined to settle in the country as a private farmer and
horse-breeder. Similar stud-farms existed at Kilimatinde,
Iringa and Ubena. From Singida to Kilimatinde I followed
the Mpondi River ; the sportsman will be interested to know
that this is the district in which the best buffaloes in East Africa
are said to be found. A few days before I had successfully hunted
buffalo, but I had not succeeded in getting a shot at a powerful
bull, and so, as far as time permitted, I was out for buffalo.
Besides a native boy, I had as trackers two excellent Askari
of the Konda Company. As soon as I arrived in camp at the
end of a march and dismounted from my mule, I would ask
Kadunda, one of these Askari, who had done the march on foot,
whether he was ready to hunt. He always agreed with the
greatest enthusiasm, and away we went through the bush,
which was sometimes so dense that one had to crawl under the
branches in order to get through at all. For the European not yet
accustomed to the African climate it is extraordinarily fatiguing
to follow a trail through dense bush and high grass reaching over
one's head for hours on end in the blazing sun. The wounded
buffalo is considered to be the most dangerous game in East
Africa ; he often charges at once with great determination.
At Mpondi, a short time before, a wounded buffalo had attacked
a hunter so suddenly that the latter did indeed find himself
seated on its neck, but would hardly have escaped with his life
unless at the critical moment his sun-helmet had fallen off. The
animal then proceeded to attack the helmet, and the man
managed to get a shot at its heart. From this and similar tales
it will be understood that as the trail gets warmer and warmer,
one's excitement becomes intense and one's senses more acute.
But although I often heard the buffalo breathing only a few paces
from me, the bush was so thick that I could not get a shot. I
had already abandoned all hope of success and had marched off
with my caravan for good and all, when at seven in the morning
we crossed a perfectly fresh buffalo trail. At this point the forest
was clearer, and the guides seemed keen to follow the tracks.

12

Before the Outbreak of War

So we let the caravan go on, and after four hours of exhausting
tracking got a sight of the buffalo. In a clearing, at one
hundred yards, I raised my rifle, but Kadunda would not allow
it, and insisted on our stalking the quarry, which was passing
us in quite open wood without undergrowth, up to within thirty
yards. Luckily the bullet cut the main artery ; the buffalo fell at
once, and so any further possible developments of the episode
were cut short. As often happens, we discovered in the animal's
body a bullet from a native gun. Besides this buffalo I had got
a large number of antelope and gazelle of various kinds ; lions
we often heard, but never caught sight of.

On this march through the " Pori " I learned, to my astonish-
ment, that even in the interior of Africa it is no easy matter to
disappear without a trace. I had marched off without leaving
word what road I intended to take. Suddenly, in the heart of
the bush, a native met us on the march, and handed me the
oversea mail. The fact is that in their interchange of informa-
tion the inhabitants tell each other everything that happens
in their vicinity. Calls, fire signals, and the signal drums serve
to exchange and quickly spread all news. The incredible way
in which the innumerable rumours spread abroad, with which
I became acquainted later on, is mainly due to this communi-
cativeness.

After returning to Dar-es-Salaam from the first journey of
inspection, I immediately made arrangements for re-arming
three more companies ; up to date only three companies had
been equipped with modern rifles. It subsequently became a
factor of the greatest importance that, at any rate, these arms,
with the necessary ammunition, reached the Colony just in time
for the outbreak of war.

During a tour of inspection in April to Lindi, where I saw the
Third Field Company, I fell into a rocky hole and got water on
the knee so that I could not start my next long journey till
the end of May. Although the Central Railway was open for
public traffic only as far as Tabora, the construction had pro-
ceeded so far that I could reach Kigoma (on Lake Tanganyika)
by rail, and was thus already enabled to acquire a superficial

13

My Reminiscences of East Africa

knowledge of this important means of communication which

connected our coast directly with the Lake and the rich countries

bordering on it, and indirectly with the Congo basin. At Kigoma

the steamer Coetzen was still building, and to reach Bismarckburg

I made use of the small steamer Hedwig von Wissman. At Bau-

douinville, in the Congo Territory, I paid a short visit to the

Bishop of the White Fathers, without suspecting how soon we

would be at war with that country. The wonderful church

would be an ornament to any of our towns. It had been built

by the Fathers themselves and the interior was decorated with

rich carvings. Extensive, splendid orchards surround the

station. The plague of lions must, however, be very great ;

the Fathers told me that a short time before a lion had one night

jumped the wall into the court and killed an ox.

Our reception was very friendly, and we were made welcome
with a glass of fine Algerian wine. We were also well received
at Mwasyl Mission Station in German territory, where there
were also White Fathers mostly Belgians. During the war,
however, we captured correspondence which proved that the
French missionaries, who also lived at stations in the Tangan-
yika country, by no means confined themselves to spreading
Christianity but intentionally carried on a national propaganda
as well. One missionary's letter defines the difference between
a missionnaire catholique and a missionnaire frangais, remarking
that the latter is bound, in addition to spreading the Christian
faith, to cany on French national propaganda. It is well known
that this national propaganda is a work from which the German
missionaries generally refrained.

These missions, which are naturally to be found in the densely
populated and well-cultivated countries, exercise a remarkable
influence on the education of the natives. The missionary is
mostly the only permanently settled white man ; he becomes
well acquainted with the country and people, and wins their
confidence. The missions have deserved extremely well by
introducing European handicrafts ; everywhere one finds car-
penters' shops, shoemakers' shops and brickworks.

My later tours disclosed that the extremely fertile country

14

Before the Outbreak of War

around Langenburg and Ssonga, where there are many wheat-
fields (the density of population is indicated even on the map
by the numerous mission stations), was protected by only
one company, which was not even connected by a direct wire.
A telegram could only reach Langenburg from Dar-es-Salaam
by the English line through South Africa. The communication
by heliograph from Iringa to Langenburg was too unreliable
to be considered an efficient substitute. It may be mentioned
that in that country the natives have not only been educated up
to agriculture by the Missions and by the German Administration,
but that considerable native industries have been indigenous
there for a long time past. Where iron occurs one finds numerous
forges, the bellows being made in the primitive manner out of
hides and perforated branches. Very beautiful are the native
weavers' products ; basket-work is also done here as almost
everywhere else in the Colony, and the work not only shows
good taste, but is so close that the natives use wickerwork cups
for drinking. The large herds owned by a few European
farmers suffered, owing to the poorly developed communica-
tions, from the difficulty of reaching a market ; this is
especially the case with Mbeya Farm, between Lake Nyassa
and Tanganyika.

I camped at Mbosi Mission, and the local missionary, Bachmann,
who had known the country and the people intimately for many
years past, told me that a striking change was taking place in
the views of the natives. Foreign Arabs and Swahili were
appearing in the country, and were teUing the people that the
Germans would soon be going, and that the English would take
possession of the land ; that was in June, 1914.

The continuation of my journey to Iringa brought me to the
places where the great chief Kwawa had defied the Germans
in the early days, and at Rugeno some of the many assembled
natives were able to relate to me what they had witnessed of the
annihilation of Zelewski's expedition on the spot.

In the short period of peace-work that was vouchsafed to me,
my endeavours to obtain a thorough grip of all my duties hi East
Africa could not produce results sufficient to secure me great

15

My Reminiscences of East Africa

personal authority among Africans of long standing. I was still
considered a raw hand. All the same, my career in the service
had prepared me to some extent for the work that Fate had in
store for me.

It was probably about the time when, as a cadet who had been
transplanted at an early age from my home in Pomerania, I was
studying Caesar's Gallic War, that the German Fatherland
was presented by Bismarck with its first colonies. In the year
1899-1900, when employed on the General Staff, I studied our
own colonies as well as many foreign ones. During the troubles
in China (1900-1901) I made the acquaintance, both officially
and socially, of all the contingents engaged with us in East
Asia, particularly the English. The Herero and Hottentot
Rebellion in South-West Africa (1904-1906) introduced me to
the peculiarities of bush warfare. At that time I gained abun-
dant personal experience, not only of natives, but also of Boers,
both on the Staff of General von Botha and as an independent
Company and Detachment Commander. The excellent qualities
of this Low German race, that had for generations made its home
on the African veld, commanded my respect. That the Boers
would later take a decisive — and in a sense tragic — part in
anglicizing the German part of Africa I never dreamt.

In 1906, in South- West Africa, I was wounded. This brought
me to Cape Town, so that I also acquired a superficial know-
ledge of Cape Colony. On my return journey I also touched at
the future scene of my work, German East Africa, for the first
time.

Later, my position as Commander of the Marine Battalion at
Wilhelmshaven afforded me an insight into the inner life of our
thriving and growing navy, which was so closely connected with
German work overseas. I took part in exercises and cruises
on large and small ships, in naval manoeuvres, and in a visit by
the Fleet to Norway, during which new views of general and
military life continually presented themselves.

Even after my return to the Army the alternation between
regimental and staff employment afforded me much induce-
ment and opportunity for comparison. In this manner my

16

Before the Outbreak of War

development had rendered me capable of rapidly accommodating
myself to new conditions. Grateful as I was for every expansion
of my horizon, I owe the best of all to the Army at home, in which
I had the privilege, under the guidance of admirable com-
manders, of learning to know the spirit of military life and true
discipline, a spirit which was then properly understood.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

T~^ARLY in August, 1914, when on my way via the helio-
£_-/ graph station of Kidodi towards Kilossa, a special
messenger brought me a telegram from the Governor, to say I
was to return immediately to Dar-es-Salaam ; and on the follow-
lng day I received the news that His Majesty had ordered
mobilization, but that the state of war did not extend to the
overseas possessions. A telegram from the Secretary of State
of the Imperial Colonial Office called upon us to reassure the
settlers.

In contrast to this a wireless message from the Admiralty
Staff mentioned England also among our probable enemies.

At Kilossa I managed to catch a goods train, and so arrived
at Dar-es-Salaam on the 3rd August. Here everyone was busy •
the declaration of war had arrived in the middle of the prepara-
tions for a big exhibition, in the programme of which was in-
cluded the ceremonial opening of the Tanganyika Railway ;
numerous Germans had come on a visit to Dar-es-Salaam and
were now unable to get away. In order to assist in the pre-
parations for the exhibition, Captain von Hammerstein, com-
manding the 6th Field Company in Ujiru, had also arrived there,
and it was very fortunate that I was able at once to employ
this energetic officer, who not only shared my views, but to
whom I was also cordially attached, for the work of mobilization.

The question which immediately forced itself upon us was
whether, in the now obviously imminent universal war in which
England would almost certainly join, the Colony would remain
neutral or not. As I have already explained, I considered it
to be our military object to detain enemy, that is English

18

The Beginning of the War

forces if it could by any means be accomplished. This, how-
ever, was impossible if we remained neutral. In that case the
situation would be that we, who did not command the sea, would
have to remain inactive, with a force which, though small at
the moment, had behind it a loyal, very efficient population of
eight millions suitable for military service. England, on the
other hand, would have no need to employ a single man in East
Africa on our account ; it would be able to take away the very
last fit Askari, after providing for internal security, for employ-
ment in other theatres more important than East Africa. It
would, therefore, obviously have been an advantage for England
if any agreement had existed which condemned us to neutrality.
But this was not the case : the Congo Act, which deals with the
Equatorial territories, only says that in case of conflict between
two of the Powers concerned, a third Power may offer its good
services as a mediator. But as far as I know this step was not
taken by any Power. We were therefore not obliged to restrict
our operations out of regard for any agreement. From a military
point of view it was a disadvantage, not for us, but for England,
if war occurred in East Africa. The fact that we were not
obliged to remain neutral enabled us to make use of our favour-
able coast as a base and refuge for the German cruiser operations
in the Indian Ocean. But, above all, we were able, with our
few thousand men, to contain throughout the whole duration
of the war an enormously superior force of the enemy.

At the outbreak of war the Protective Force consisted of
216 Europeans (from whom a part must be deducted as on leave)
and 2,540 Askari ; there were, further, hi the Police Force, 45
Europeans and 2,154 Askari ; these were later increased by the
ships' company of the Konigsberg (which had put to sea), 322 men,
and of the Move, 102 men. The total numbers enrolled in the
Force during the war were about 3,000 Europeans and 11,000
Askari.

These figures include all non-combatants, such as those
employed on police duty, medical personnel, supply and mainte-
nance services, etc. How many milliards it cost to try and
crush our diminutive force the English themselves will pre-
19 2*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

sumably some day tell us. We, on the other hand, could
probably have continued the war for years to come.

For the hostile strengths no authentic figures are at my dis-
posal; I quote from the statements of English officers and
Press reports, and they must bear the responsibility for them.
According to them over 130 Generals took the field against us,
the total strength of the hostile troops was about 300,000, the
losses in European and Indian dead amounted to 20,000 ; horses
and mules, 140,000. These numbers, especially those of the
General Officers, seem even to me rather exaggerated ; I can
therefore only repeat that they are taken from English sources.
In any event, however, their losses were very considerable ; and
considering that the number of black soldiers who were killed
or died is not given, the total number of enemy dead can hardly
be under 60,000.

We should have been compelled, if a cruiser had sought
shelter in our harbours, to refuse to admit her, by reason of our
neutrality, whereas the favourable position and coastal develop-
ment of East Africa made it the natural hiding-place in cruiser
warfare in the Indian Ocean. As regards the agreements laid
down in the Congo Act, it should be borne in mind what it
would have meant for our Navy if our colonies had been declared
neutral.

At Dar-es-Salaam it was very interesting during those days
of tension to watch the proceedings of the English Consul King.
He was to be seen everywhere, either in the Officers' Club at a
game of bridge, or at the Post Office where our telegrams were
handed in. The standing orders of the English Expeditionary
Force, which were subsequently captured at Tanga, and which
were mainly based on King's reports, showed how active this
man had been in the time before the war, and how excellently
he was informed as to the internal conditions in our Colony.
His judgment on relevant matters extended so far that he even
compared the relative fighting value of the Europeans in different
districts, and credited those of Dar-es-Salaam with little
" stomach for fighting." To be honest, it must be admitted
that in the case of a large number of the Germans in that place

20

The Beginning of the War

(and even of the local Government authorities) it actually did
take some time before they were imbued with that warlike
spirit without which the fulfilment of our task was simply
impossible.

Very difficult was the position of the coast towns, which were
inhabited by numerous Europeans (among them many women
and children), and which were of course exposed to bombard-
ment by English men-of-war at any minute. The Governor
maintained that such a bombardment must be avoided under
all circumstances. According to an ordinance, which certainly
did not contemplate the case of foreign war, the supreme
military power in the Colony was in the hands of the Governor,
and communication with home having ceased, it was anyhow
physically impossible to get this altered. So I was obliged to
make the best of this, from a military point of view, very serious
difficulty and to reckon with the possibility that, if the Governor's
instructions were faithfully executed, Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga
for instance, the termini of our railways and the obvious bases
for hostile operations from the coast towards the interior, would
fall into the enemy's hands without a struggle.

My view was that we would best protect our colony by
threatening the enemy in his own territory. We could very
effectively tackle him at a sensitive point, the Uganda Railway,
and one might almost say that the numerous German settlers
in the country traversed by our Northern Railway (Tanga-Moshi)
were already deployed for this object. The Governor, however,
did not agree with the proposal I had already previously put
forward in case of war, namely, to concentrate our forces in
the North near 'Kilima Njaro. But, hi order to act at all, it
was obviously necessary to collect our troops, who were scattered
all over the country. As this could not be effected in the Kilima
Njaro country, as I wished, the concentration took place on
the heights of Pugu, a day's march west of Dar-es-Salaam. At
this place the Dar-es-Salaam Company met those from Kili-
matinde, Tabora, Ujiji, Usambara and Kissendji, which came
partly by march routes and partly by rail. The Police, who, in
accordance with the scanty preparations already made, were to

21

My Reminiscences of East Africa

join the Protective Force immediately, were in part, at any
rate, placed at my disposal, a number of old Askari were called
up, and in this way four new companies (No.'s 15 to 18) were
at once formed. The German Reservists were mobilized as
required, and each company was brought up to an establishment
of about 16 Europeans, 160 Askari and 2 machine guns.

In some cases difficulties occurred in calling the Europeans
to the colours. By mistake, the crews of a few ships of the
East African Line, lying in the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were
informed, in response to their application, by the Officer in
Command at the Railway Station, that there was no room for
them in the Protective Force. Then, at the suggestion of the
Governor's representative, a declaration was submitted to them,
according to which they were to engage in writing to remain
neutral during the war. Later on the men saw that this con-
stituted an offence against the law relating to liability for ser-
vice, and their own sound feeling was opposed to it. They
appealed to me, setting forth the circumstances ; I had had no
inkling of these proceedings, and fortunately, as the declaration
had not yet fallen into the hands of the enemy, the intended
decision could be reserved.

The number of carriers allotted to each company varied, and
may have averaged about 250. The stores of arms, ammuni-
tion and other war-material, which were lying unprotected in
the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam, were distributed among various
places in the interior along the railway, where depots were estab-
lished. The training of the troops was at once vigorously pro-
ceeded with, and even then we realized the value of rendering
our head-dress unrecognizable by means of grass and leaves,
a measure proposed by a practical Company Commander, Captain
Tafel. The question of course was whether we, with our Askari,
would be able to fight modern troops ; it was denied by many
an experienced hand. But from what I had seen during the
revolt in South-West Africa, from 1904 to 1906, I believed that
courage and military efficiency could be awakened in the East
African native also, who belongs to that same great family
the Bantu, as the Herero. That certainly was a proof ; but the

22

The Beginning of the War

matter was greatly simplified by the fact that there was no
possible alternative.

All questions of organization, which are usually carefully
prepared and considered in time of peace, had now to be dealt
with and decided on the spur of the moment. One of them was
the extraordinarily important one of establishing a service of
subsistence and a complete system of supply from the rear.
The main point was to consider, in the first place, the main roads,
which were also important in a military sense. Which roads
might these be ? It was immediately found how disadvantageous
was the absence of railway communication between the Central
and Usambara Railways. In time of peace, communication
had been effected by sea between Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga ;
this was now impossible. Obviously the importance of a military
use of the lines had not been thought of. As a substitute, we had
to develop a road between Morogoro and Korogwe, on the
Northern Railway. The second road ran past the western side
of the Masai Reservation, from Dodoma via Kondoa-Irangi,
and Ufiome to Arusha, and the third from the rich district of
Tabora, the capital of the Wanyamwesi country, to Muansa,
on Lake Victoria, into the country of the Wassukume, who
were recognized even by Consul King as the most important
of our tribes. This road was also valuable because by it we
could draw on the rice crops of Lake Victoria as well as on tnc
abundant stocks of cattle. Other roads connected Kilossa with
the rich territory of Mahenge, Iringa, and even Langenburg,
which last provided us with a large part of our requirements
in wheat flour.

The provisional organization of the supply system having
been fixed in broad and general outline, it was not possible for
the details of its development to be worked out at Headquarters.
Someone had to be found whose past military career rendered
him capable of working the system, not only from the adminis-
trative point of view, but also in accordance with the sometimes
very urgent military requirements, and of adapting it to them.
Major-General Wahle, a retired officer, who happened to have
arrived on the 2nd August, on a visit to his son, and to see the

23

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Dar-es-Salaam Exhibition, at once placed himself at the disposal
of the Force, and at my request took charge of the Lines of
Communication. His task was particularly difficult, because
where there were no railways, the bulk of the work had to be
performed by native carriers. I have at my disposal no figures
showing the total number of carriers employed for the service
of the troops, and it is very difficult to arrive at it at all
definitely. It included men who only carried the loads from
one place to another before the permanent carriers took them
over, but I am sure I do not exaggerate in saying that, on the
whole, hundreds of thousands of carriers worked for the troops ;
and all of them had to be fed and medically looked after.

Of our many other difficulties one of a special nature may
here be mentioned. The peace-time existence of the Europeans
in tropical colonies had, even for reasons of health, accustomed
them to a certain degree of comfort. When on safari (a journey)
in East Africa, it is generally impossible to buy European food ;
but few Europeans had learnt to live on the vegetable products
supplied by the natives or by Nature. Shelter is rarely to be
had. Against mosquitos it is, however, imperative to protect
oneself. So the white official or soldier seldom travelled with
less than eleven carriers, who, besides his tent, camp-bed and
clothing, also carried a considerable quantity of food. Such
large numbers of carriers were, however, impossible for a force
which was to be mobile. Another difficulty was that nearly
every Askari had a boy. With these simple people, whose
predilection for their ancient traditions and customs is further
confirmed by Islam, and who are besides very proud and vain,
it is particularly difficult to interfere with such Dusturis (customs).
In individual cases it was not always easy for a Company Com-
mander to find the happy mean.

In the tropical warfare which was before us medical care is
one of the most important factors. Generally speaking, the
native is in a great measure immune against malaria, and it
does not often happen that an Askari gets really ill with it ;
some tribes, however, like the Wajagga, on Kilima Njaro, who
inhabit elevated, non-malarial districts, and are therefore not

The Beginning of the War

immune from early youth, suffer severely from malaria as soon
as they come down to the plains. From the evening until wel
into the morning mechanical protection against the malaria
mosquito (anopheles), by means of a mosquito net, was strictly
enforced for every European. For many months I slept on the
ground, and even then the mosquito-net afforded me a high
degree of protection ; even so I had malaria ten times, for in
the field it is not always possible to employ preventive measures
to the extent that is desirable from a hygienic point of view.
In our endeavour to attach a medical officer to every company
we received most welcome assistance from the fact that there
was a considerable number of them on Lake Tanganyika, and
in the Southern territories on the Rovuma, who had come out
to study and combat sleeping-sickness.

The work entailed by all this business of mobilization not
only kept us going day and night, but also the native telephonist
at Pugu, and it was extraordinary to see the skill with which
the black man worked his instrument, both there and elsewhere.
His great technical talent proved of the greatest value to us.
Of difficulties there was, of course, an infinity. During the
early days it happened that cattle coming from the country
north of Tabora for the civilian population at Dar-es-Salaam
met other cattle going in the opposite direction to feed the
troops. To this day I feel something of a physical shock when
I think of a collision at Pugu, between a train laden with the
finest show cattle going at full speed, and another one, which
nearly produced a serious reduction in the personnel required
for working out our mobilization scheme.

Our place of concentration at Pugu is some twelve miles
inland from Dar-es-Salaam. Our camp was situated on the
slopes of the Pugu Mountains. The forest is extremely thick,
and the country densely covered by plantations of natives and
Europeans. In spite of its somewhat elevated position, Pugu
is quite in the hot coastal area, and although in August we were
still in the cold season, the temperature was still what we
describe as " tropical ; " it is that oppressive, somewhat damp
heat, which makes long marches so exhausting for the European.

25

My Reminiscences of East Africa

At that time we had tents for the Europeans and a camp-bed
with the inevitable mosquito net for everyone, so that in this
respect there were no difficulties. In case of sickness we had
established a provisional field hospital in the neighbouring
Wichmann Plantations. Our horses did not suffer unduly.
But one after another all our animals went down with tse-tse.
In camp it was not possible to provide them, as we could at
Dar-es-Salaam, with tse-tse proof stables, fitted with wire
gauze similar to fly-proof windows.

CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ACTIONS

IN this manner we were fully employed in the camp at Pugu,
when, on the morning of the 8th August, we heard heavy
artillery fire from the direction of Dar-es-Salaam. According
to reports which soon reached us, it emanated from two English
light cruisers, Astrxa and Pegasus, who were aiming at the wire-
less tower. This tower had been erected in this exposed position
because on the coast it could reach further out to sea ; it was
of importance to us because the high-power station at Tabora
was not yet finished, and the two smaller ones at Muansa and
Bukoba were of only local use. The tower was not hit by the
English, but blown up by us, from a rather excessive fear of its
falling into the enemy's hands. A short time later an observa-
tion officer reported that the enemy was apparently preparing
to land at Konduchi, a day's march north of Dar-es-Salaam.
The formation of the coast rendered it not unlikely. I therefore
immediately ordered the seven companies of Askari* available
to march off, so as to seize the favourable opportunity of sur-
prising the enemy in the act of landing.

Before they marched off I had a conversation at Pugu Station
with the Governor, Dr. Schnee, who was passing through by
train to Morogoro. He seemed quite surprised by the English
hostilities, and entirely agreed with my proposal to attack them
at Konduchi. On the way there I met two gentlemen belonging
to the Government at Dar-es-Salaam, who showed me a docu-
ment dealing with negotiations for surrendering Dar-es-Salaam
to the English. As the Governor had said nothing to me about
it, and I was also rather in a hurry, I only glanced superficially

* Askari are " soldiers," not a distinct tribe.
27

My Reminiscences of East Africa

at it. It did not occur to me that this might be any kind of
agreement drawn up with the consent of the Governor. But
when, during the night, the force had reached a mountain ten
miles north of Dar-es-Salaam, and on the next morning we
obtained a view of the harbour and the English cruisers lying
off it, it became clear that the report of an attempted landing
at Konduchi was a mistake. We were able to establish the fact
that the English ships had communicated with the shore, and
now it did appear to me probable that negotiations with the
enemy had taken place. I now advanced on the town, and,
as I could not but fear that in the confusion of the moment a
disadvantageous agreement might be concluded at Dar-es-
Salaam, I sent Captain Tafel on ahead. He was to announce
that I was taking over the executive power, and that negotia-
tions with the enemy must be conducted through me alone. It
was only from Captain Tafel that I learned that by order of the
Governor negotiations for surrender had actually taken place.
My intervention was not approved by the Governor, in whose
hands, according to a Protective Force Ordinance intended to
meet quite different conditions, supreme military power was
actually placed. For the moment this had no practical con-
sequences. Only a few English Marines had landed, and had
already gone on board again. But for a soldier it was not
inspiring to find that here, under the very eyes of a thousand
good troops, an agreement had been concluded which forbade us
to undertake any hostile act in Dar-es-Salaam, while the enemy
was not so bound, and that we had received no information of a
step of such great military importance.

The Konigsberg had already put to sea from Dar-es-Salaam
several days before, and the surveying vessel Move, which was
in harbour, had been blown up by us on the Qth August. This
brought the land forces a valuable military increase, as the
captain of the Move, Lieut. -Commander Zimmer, now came under
my orders. Lieutenant Horn at once proceeded with a few
seamen to Kigoma, where he manned and armed the small
steamer Hedwig von Wissmann. On Lake Tanganyika he chased
the Belgian steamer Delcommune, which he surprised and shot

28

The First Actions

to pieces after a few days, thereby securing to us the extremely
important command of the lake. The ability rapidly to transfer
troops from the Central Railway towards Bismarckburg or
Usambara depended entirely upon unimpeded transport on
Tanganyika, and played a part in the later course of the
operations.

In the north of the Colony, the ist Company at Arusha had
been reinforced by the I3th Company, coming by rapid marches
from Kondoa, and by another company formed at Moshi from
Police Askari. Further, a large part of the Europeans of the
northern districts had combined to form a detachment under
Captain von Prince. Most of those troops were in the neigh-
bourhood of Moshi. Taveta, which lies to the eastward, in
English territory, was held by the enemy, who thereby secured
a valuable sally-port against our European settlements in the
north ; it was, therefore, an urgent matter for us to capture this
important point without delay. It took considerable time
before we were able to set/the force in motion for this purpose.
Many people believed that on the strength of the Congo Act
we were bound to remain neutral, and naturally had little con-
fidence in the instructions they received from the new Com-
mandant. It was not until the I5th August that the weakly-
held place was taken. The course of the fight proved that the
force still required much further training to render it fit to
carry out combined operations in unison in the dense bush. In
this area the command was assumed by Major Kraut, who hap-
pened to be in the north-eastern frontier district for the purpose
of frontier delimitations. During the next few days the holder
of the supreme military power was successfully persuaded to
agree to moving the bulk of our forces to the Northern Railway.
Simple as was this movement in itself, under the conditions
then existing, it required considerable preparations. There
were few Germans to be found who were so well acquainted with
the whole country between Dar-es-Salaam and Morogoro on one
side, and Tanga and Mombo on the other, that they could give
reliable information about roads and conditions of subsistence
It was necessary to send out reconnaissance officers in order to

29

My Reminiscences of East Africa

determine the roads on which a suitable quantity of supplies
could be found. But we could not afford to await the results of
all these reconnaissances ; the marches had to be begun. Accord-
ing to European ideas the country was sparsely populated ;
and on the existing maps the only notes as to water and food
showed whether the supplies available would suffice for bodies
of a strength equal to a company at most. Without prepara-
tion one could therefore hardly put more than one company on
each road without distribution in depth ; the training and skill
in the collection of supplies which the force had acquired by
the end of the war were at that time non-existent. Taking it
all round, it came to this, that the march and supply of a single
company in the conditions there prevailing required about the
same consideration as would a division in Germany. It was also
necessary in this move to take into account the risk arising from
the fact that companies would for a prolonged period be out of
reach of orders. The only telegraphic communication between
the Central Railway and the north ran close along the coast, and
could therefore be interrupted whenever the enemy intended
to do so.

However, the Director of the Postal Service, Rothe, and
Secretary Kriiger displayed such adaptability in meeting the
wishes of the troops, and such energy in starting work on the
new line Morogoro-Handeni-Korogwe, and, under the pressure
of circumstances, temporarily overcame the normal torpor of the
Tropics with such success, that the line was completed in only a
few weeks. Owing to the destructiveness of the termites (white
ants) it is the rule in time of peace to employ iron telegraph
poles, which, owing to the prevalence of giraffe in this particular
district, have to be very tall and carry very heavy conductors.
In the first instance, however, the construction in this case had
to be of a provisional nature, and this, and the use of cable, caused
continual breakdowns and repairs.

In the meantime I received reports of the advance of small
hostile detachments at Jassini, two marches north of Tanga, and
this confirmed me in the belief that the enemy intended to land
in that district, and would then rapidly advance into the interior

30

The First Actions

along the Northern Railway. Consequently, the various com-
panies had marched off from different points on the line Dar-es-
Salaam-Mpapua, and were for the most part converging on
Handeni, while some were directed on other points on the line
Tanga-Korogwe, when I was called up on the telephone at
Pugu on the afternoon of August 23rd, by Lieutenant von
Chappuis, who was encamped at Bagamoyo with the I7th Field
Company. He reported that an English light cruiser was lying
off Bagamoyo, and had called upon the local Civil Administrator
to destroy the telegraph station, threatening to bombard the
place in case of refusal. I ordered him to assume control of the
executive and to prevent a hostile landing by force of arms. A
boat from the man-of-war that attempted to land under the
white flag was therefore sent back, and the place was bombarded
in consequence, to the great amusement of the company and
the native inhabitants, since the enemy scored practically no
hits.

At the end of August, Headquarters moved by rail to Kirnamba,
near Morogoro. On the way, General von Wahle, who was direct-
ing the service on the Lines of Communication from Morogoro,
wished me the best of luck in the decisive action which we
expected in the neighbourhood of Handeni, and to which his
son was also proceeding. From there Headquarters travelled
on towards Handeni in two requisitioned motors. After about
twenty miles we had to leave them, as the improvement of this
road had not been completed beyond that point. Captain von
Hammerstein and I went on on bicycles, and gradually caught
up the companies on the march. The anticipated landing of
the enemy did not take place, and early in September we reached
Korogwe. In the meantime an English cruiser had appeared at
Tanga and towed away some lighters lying there.

Our next duty was to organize the supply and transport
services in the north. Captain Schmid, who had until then
directed them as Field Intendant, had become sick, and it was
difficult to find a suitable successor. Fortunately we dis-
covered one in Captain Feilke, of the Landwehr, who had for
many years directed the Prince Albrecht Plantations in Usam-

My Reminiscences of East Africa

bara, a man of great experience. He was at the time in the
vicinity of Tanga, and had placed himself at the disposal of the
force. He had formerly been Adjutant of the 8th Jager Batta-
lion, was fifty-two years of age, a man of much knowledge of
the world and a skilful officer ; he thus combined in the happiest
manner the military knowledge and business talent necessary
for the difficult post of Intendant. He came immediately,
and we drove to New Moshi together. There I met Captain Kraut.
On Kilima Njaro preparations had been made for guerilla war-
fare by establishing supply depots, our patrols were pushing
beyond Taveta towards the British Uganda Railway, and
numerous minor encounters had already taken place. At that
time, however, the force lacked the experience necessary for
carrying out distant patrols like those which at a later stage
led so successfully to interruptions of the line. The first patrols
had arrived at the Uganda Railway in a half-starved condition
and had been captured. From New Moshi I went to Himo Camp,
where Captain von Prince was holding a fortified position. He
accompanied me to Taveta, which was held by an advanced
post under an officer. Now we could discuss on the spot the
problem of transferring the main body of the Northern Force to
Taveta. The local native population was very numerous and
placed entire confidence in the European administrators
appointed by the force : they continued to sell their products
in the market, and our mutual relationship was completely
satisfactory.

Directly war broke out the fear of a native rising had been
expressed in many quarters. Along the Central Railway there
were wild rumours about a revolt of the Wahehe — the warlike
tribe who had so long defied German authority in the Iringa
country — and around Kilima Njaro a rising of the Wajagga was
feared. The authorities also thought that the large number of
black labourers on the European settlements in the north were
unreliable on account of difficulties of subsistence. But none of
these fears turned out to be justified. Later, a very intelligent
captured Belgian Askari told me outright : ' You know quite
well that the natives always side with the stronger party," and

32

General Map of the Campaign in East Africa.
— ^— Track of the German Main Force, 1916-1913.

[To face p. 32.

The Fallen.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant. >

The First Actions

an English Masai admitted frankly : " It is all the same to us
whether the English or the Germans are our masters."

It was not till later, after the enemy had penetrated the
country, that the native became a real danger to us : and then
it was, indeed, very great. The native has a fine sense of the
transfer of real power from one hand to the other.

After returning for a short time to Korogwe, Headquarters
moved to New Moshi, and shortly afterwards to Taveta. Three
companies who had reached the Northern Railway from the
Central Railway were concentrated at Tanga, the remaining five
were moved into the Kilima Njaro country. \t Dar-es-Salaam
there remained for the moment only Captain von Kornatzki
with the newly-formed i8th Field Company.

During the following period several enterprises were carried
out by flying columns, of the strength of one company each, the
intention being to drive away the hostile detachments who were
reported to be guarding the watering-places in the adjoining
English territory, to inflict losses upon them, and so to open the
way for our patrols to operate against the Uganda and Magad
Railway. Thus, at the end of September, Captain Schulz had
marched with his company from Kilima Njaro down the Tsavo
River to the Uganda Railway, where he had met an enemy
detachment of several companies, who had probably been con-
centrated by means of the railway. North of Kilima Njaro
Captain Tafel had with his company and a detachment of fifty
Europeans pursued a column of English Horse, but had then)
been attacked by the latter in his camp in the dense bush on/
Engito Mountain. This was the first serious engagement fought
by our Askari in the north. Although the enemy consisted of
English and Boer farmers, who were therefore good horsemen
and good shots, our Askari attacked them with the bayonet
with such dash, that out of a strength of eighty Europeans some
twenty dead were left behind, and their total casualties may
therefore be estimated at half their number.

In the same way the expeditions undertaken by Captain
Baumstark, who commanded the three companies at Tanga,
led to fighting in the frontier districts between Jassini and

33 3

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Mombasa. An equally important object of all these enter-
prises was to secure the most indispensable information about
this theatre of operations, as it had not been reconnoitred in
time of peace, and the conditions as to water-supply and cultiva-
tion were unknown to us. In this manner we gradually obtained
a clear idea of the country and its inhabitants. Along the coast
the English frontier district was well settled and highly culti-
vated. Further inland it is a dry desert covered with thorn
scrub and partly with thick bush. Out of the desert rise a number
of mountain ranges, which often attain the character of steep
masses of rock. The troops were quartered in several fortified
camps east of Kilima Njaro, but, owing to the difficulty of com-
munication from Taveta, Headquarters were moved back to
Moshi. Later, when the Director of the Field Postal Service
arrived, and I asked him what he thought of the line between
Moshi and Taveta, he could only describe it as " pretty." The
insulators were made from knocked off bottle-necks, fastened to
poles or branches of trees, the wire had been taken from the
fences of the plantations. But the breakdowns really were
so frequent that the great volume of reports and information in
connection with the working of Headquarters could not have
been carried on this line for a prolonged period.

Since the outbreak of war our communication with the outside
world had been to all intents and purposes cut off ; at first,
indeed, we did pick up wireless messages from Kamina (in Togo),
and then occasionally, under favourable weather conditions,
from Nauen (Germany) ; but otherwise we had to depend for
fresh news on picking up enemy wireless mesasges, or on obtaining
possession of enemy mails or other papers.

34

CHAPTER IV

THE NOVEMBER ACTIONS AT TANGA

/r~"AAPTURED English newspapers stated that it would be
\^-s particularly painful to Germany to lose her beloved
colonies, its " little chicks," and that German East Africa was
the most valuable mouthful. Captured mails spoke of an im-
pending attack by an Indian expeditionary force of 10,000
men, and, as I had from general considerations always expected
a hostile attack on a large scale in the neighbourhood of Tanga,
I went there at the end of October, drove all over the country
in a car I had brought with me, and discussed the matter on
the spot with Captain Adler, commanding the ijth Company,
and with District Commissioner Auracher. I was pleased to
find that the latter was of my opinion that, in the event of
Tanga being seriously threatened, the prime necessity would
be unity of action, and I assured him that I would, of course,
undertake the responsibility for any consequences that might
ensue. This was particularly important for the reason that,
according to the Governor's instructions, a bombardment of
Tanga was to be avoided under all circumstances. Opinions
as to what should be done or left undone in any given case might
therefore differ very widely.

On the 2nd November, a few days after my return to New
Moshi, a wire from Tanga informed me that fourteen hostile trans-
ports and two cruisers had appeared off the place. They de-
manded unconditional surrender of the town ; the negotiations
were protracted, as District Commissioner Auracher, who had
gone on board, pointed out that he must obtain special instruc-
tions, and prevented the threatened bombardment by remarking
that Tanga was an open and undefended place. Captain Baum-

35 3*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

stark, who was with two companies in the frontier district north
of Tanga, was at once moved off towards Tanga. Similarly
the two companies of Europeans and the Askari companies were
moved by forced marches from near Taveta and Kilima Njaro
to New Moshi. Two lorries which were employed on supply
work between New Moshi and Taveta rendered valuable service
in this move. My intention to collect all available troops as
rapidly as possible, to meet the obviously impending landing at
Tanga, could only be executed, in spite of the long marches
expected of the troops, if the Northern Railway exerted its capa-
city to the utmost limit, and this, with only eight locomotives,
was asking a great deal. The railway is a narrow gauge line of
190 miles, on which, in a fully-loaded train of 24 to 32 axles,
only one company could be carried with complete baggage,
or two companies without either baggage or carriers. That
the transport of the troops could be carried out at all is entirely
due to the willingness of all those connected with it — I specially
mention Railway Commissary Krober, who had been called up to
the Force as a 2nd Lieutenant, and the traffic director Kiihlwein
—who at Tanga conducted the trains up on to the actual battle-
field under fire. As early as the 2nd November the troops
actually at New Moshi, one and a half companies, were pushed
off by train, followed on the morning of the 3rd by Head-
quarters and another company. Three other companies followed
later. Similarly, all the smaller detachments employed on
railway protection duty were moved to Tanga. The spirit of the
departing troops was magnificent, but this may have been due,
not so much to the fact that the Askari clearly understood
the gravity of the situation, as that for him a trip in a railway
train is at all times a great delight.

Headquarters reached Korogwe in the evening of the 3rd
November. I went to the hospital that had been established
there and talked to the wounded who had come in from the
action at Tanga on the 3rd. One of them, Lieutenant Merensky,
of the Landwehr, reported to me that on the 2nd November,
outpost and patrol encounters had taken place near Ras-Kasone,
and that on the 3rd the enemy, apparently several thousand

36

The November Actions at Tanga

i-Bay

Fig. IT.

Fig. v.

Fig. iv. Battle of Tang*. Fig. v. The Northern Railway.

37

My Reminiscences of East Africa

strong, who had landed at Ras-Kasone, had attacked the
Company east of Tanga. The latter, reinforced by the Euro-
peans and Police Askari from Tanga under Lieutenant Auracher,
had withstood the attack until the first one and a half companies
coming from New Moshi joined in, rushing at once to attack the
left flank of the enemy and driving him back. Lieutenant
Merensky had the impression that the enemy was completely de-
feated, and that the attack was unlikely to be repeated. The tele-
grams coming in piecemeal during the railway journey had not
afforded me a clear idea of the situation, when at 3 a.m. on the 4th
November, Headquarters left the railway four miles west of Tanga,
where we met Captain Baumstark. He had formed a different
estimate of the situation, and believed that, owing to the great
superiority of the enemy, Tanga could not be held against another
attack. He had, therefore, on the evening of the 3rd November,
collected his own two companies coming from the north, and
the troops who had that day been in action at Tanga, at a point
four miles west of the town, leaving patrols only in the place itself.
Whether Tanga was held by the enemy or not was not certain.
Strong officers' patrols were at once pushed forward beyond
Tanga towards Ras-Kasone. Luckily Headquarters had brought
a few bicycles, and so, in order to satisfy myself quickly by personal
observation, I was able to go off at once with Captain von
Hammerstein an<i Volunteer Dr. Dessel to the railway station
at Tanga, where I found an advanced post of the 6th Field
Company. They, however, could give no accurate information
about the enemy, and so I rode on through the empty streets
of the town. It was completely deserted, and the white houses
of the Europeans reflected the brilliant rays of the moon into
the streets which we traversed. So we reached the harbour
at the further edge of the town. Tanga was therefore clear of
the enemy. A quarter of a mile out lay the transports, a blaze
of lights, and full of noise : there was no doubt that the landing
was about to commence at once. I much regretted that our
artillery — we had two guns of 1873 pattern — was not yet up.
Here, in the brilliant moonlight, at such close range, their effect
swould have been annihilating, the hostile cruisers notwithstanding.

38

The November Actions at Tanga

We then rode on towards Ras-Kasone, left our bicycles in the
German Government Hospital, and went on foot to the beach,
close to which, right in front of us, lay an English cruiser. On
the way back, at the hospital, we were challenged, apparently
by an Indian sentry — we did not understand the language —
but saw nothing. We got on our cycles again and rode back.
Day began to break, and on our left we heard the first shots.
This was the officers' patrol under 2nd Lieutenant Bergmann,
of the 6th Field Company, who had met hostile patrols west of
Ras-Kasone. One of my cyclists now brought Captain Baum-
stark the order to advance at once with all the troops to Tanga
Station. For the manner in which I proposed to fight the
action, which was now to be expected with certainty, the nature
of the country was one of the decisive factors. In the north,
the houses of the European town at the harbour provided
cover from view, and therefore also from the fire of the cruisers
close by. The town was surrounded by continuous cocoanut
and rubber plantations, which extended almost to Ras-Kasone,
and in which, besides the native town, a few native patches of
cultivation were scattered about. Undergrowth occurred along
a few points and the ground was absolutely flat. It was probable
that the enemy, whether he landed at Ras-Kasone only, or simul-
taneously at several points, such as Mwambani, for instance,
would press upon our south, or right, wing. Here, to the south
of Tanga, the ground afforded us also the prospect of greater
power of manoeuvre. I decided to meet the attack, which I
expected with certainty, on the eastern edge of Tanga, and to
echelon strong reserves behind our right wing for a counter-
attack against the enemy's flank.

In allotting the various duties it was necessary to consider
the peculiarities of the different units. At that time each
company had different characteristics, according to its com-
position and its state of training. The good 6th Field Company,
which had in time of peace received a careful training at Ujiji
with both rifle and machine-gun, was ordered to hold the eastern
edge of Tanga on a broad front. On its right rear, outside Tanga,
was echeloned Baumstark's battalion, consisting of the i6th

39

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and I7th Companies, formed from the Police, and several small
units amalgamated into one company. To the right rear again,
on the telegraph-road Tanga-Pangani, I kept three good com-
panies at my own disposal, the 7th and 8th Rifle Companies, with
three machine-guns, composed of Europeans, and the I3th Field
Company with its four machine-guns. Headquarters remained
for the present on the Tanga-Pangani road and connected up
to the telegraph line there. The 4th and gth Field Companies
and the two field guns (Captain Bering's Battery) were still on
the way, and the time of their arrival was uncertain. So the
situation remained essentially until the afternoon. In the hot
sun of the Coast area we suffered not a little from thirst, but
quenched it with the milk of the young cocoanuts. There were
other drinks as well in Tanga at that time ; we still had wine and
soda-water. Master-butcher Grabow even brought the troops
hot sausages.

The proceedings on board the hostile ships were kept under
constant close observation. We saw every boat that left them,
and its load. I estimated the total troops landed up to mid-day
at 6,000. But even on this too low estimate I had to ask myself
whether I dared risk a decisive engagement with my thousand
rifles. For various reasons I decided that I would do so. It was
too important to prevent the enemy from gaining a firm footing
in Tanga. Otherwise we should abandon to him the best base
for operations against the Northern territories ; in his advance
the Northern Railway would afford him an admirable line of
communication, and he would be enabled continually to surprise
us by bringing up and pushing forward fresh troops and stores.
Then it was certain that we would be unable to hold the Northern
Railway any longer and that we would be obliged to abandon
our hitherto so successful method of warfare. Against these all-
important practical reasons, limited considerations such as the
Governor's order to avoid a bombardment of Tanga under all
circumstances could not prevail.

A few circumstances there were that favoured us. For one
thing, from personal experience in East Asia, I knew the
clumsiness with which English troops were moved and led in

40

The November Actions at Tanga

battle, and it was certain that in the very close and completely
unknown country in which the enemy would find himself directly
he landed, these difficulties would grow to infinity. The slightest
disorder was bound to have far-reaching consequences. With my
troops, of whom the Europeans were well acquainted with the
country round Tanga, while the Askari were at home in the
bush, I had a reasonable prospect of taking advantage of the
enemy's weak points by skilful and rapid manoeuvre.

On the other hand, if the affair miscarried, it would be a bad
business. Already my method of waging active war had met with
disapproval. If on top of that we were to suffer a severe defeat
the confidence of the troops would probably be gone, and it was
certain that my superiors would place insuperable difficulties
in the way of my exercising command. My decision was not
easy, and as if the military situation alone did not render it
difficult enough, it was made unnecessarily harder by the fact
that the regulations did not allow sufficient freedom to the
responsible commander. But there was nothing for it : to gain
all we must risk all.

The same morning I personally ordered Captain von Prince
to move into Tanga with his two companies of Europeans, so
that, in case of an attack on the Askari Company holding the
eastern edge of the place, he could intervene rapidly without
orders. I had already begun to doubt whether the enemy
would attack at all on the 4th November, when at 3 p.m. an
Askari reported to me in his simple, smart way : " Adui tayari."
(The enemy is ready.) Those two short words I shall never
forget. The next moment the rifle fire opened along the whole
front, and one could only judge of the rapid development and
the ebb and flow of the action from the direction of the firing.
One heard the fire draw in from the eastern edge of the town
to the middle : so the 6th Company had been driven back at
this point. The enemy, with odds twenty to one in his favour,
had penetrated close up to the station and into the town. Cap-
tain von Prince had immediately rushed up his two companies
of Europeans and at once prevailed upon the brave Askari to
stand and then to advance once more. The British North

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Lancashire Regiment, consisting only of long-service Europeans,
800 strong, was driven back with heavy losses, and the houses
captured by the Indian Brigade (Kashmir Rifles), who were
advancing between that regiment and the beach, were re-taken
in stubborn street-fighting. But on the south side of Tanga
Captain Baumstark had also brought his companies into action
on the front, and after about one hour's fighting I observed the
Askari at this point retiring through the palm-trees to the
Tanga-Pangani road. The European members of Headquarters
at once ran there and stopped them. To this day I can see the
fiery and determined Captain von Hammerstein, full of fury,
throwing an empty bottle at the head of a retreating Askari.
After all, they were for the most part young companies, only
just formed, who were fighting at this point, and they had been
staggered by the intensity of the enemy's fire. But when we
Europeans got in front of them and laughed at them they quickly
recovered themselves and saw that every bullet did not hit.
But on the whole the pressure on our front was so strong that I
thought I could not delay the decision any longer and must
start my counter-stroke. For this I had now but one company
available, but it was the good I3th Field Company. The 4th
Company, whose arrival I was most anxiously awaiting every
minute, had not yet arrived.

The course of the action up till now had shown that the
enemy's front, of which the flank was unprotected, did not reach
further south than the right wing of our own. Here, therefore,
the counter-stroke must prove annihilating, and no witness will
forget the moment when the machine-guns of the I3th Company
opened a continuous fire at this point and completely reversed
the situation. The whole front jumped up and dashed forward
with enthusiastic cheers. In the meantime the 4th Company
had arrived ; although, in consequence of a misunderstanding,
it did not prolong the outer flank of the I3th, but pushed in
between the latter and our front, still it did take an effective
part in the battle before dark. In wild disorder the enemy
fled in dense masses, and our machine-guns, converging on them
from front and flanks, mowed down whole companies to the

42

The November Actions at Tanga

last man. Several Askari came in beaming with delight with
several captured English rifles on their backs and an Indian
prisoner in each hand. The handcuffs, however, which we
found in their possession for use with German prisoners, were
not used on them by any of us.

At this time, in the dense forest, all units, and in many in
stances friend and foe, were mixed up together, everybody was
shouting at once in all sorts of languages, darkness was rapidly
setting in ; it is only necessary to conjure up this scene in imagina-
tion in order to understand how it was that the pursuit which I
set in motion failed completely. I had been stationed on the
right wing, and had quickly despatched such units as were
within reach at the moment to push with energy towards Ras-
Kasone. Then I had gone to the left wing. There I found hardly
any of our people at all ; it was not till some time afterwards,
in the night, that I heard the sound of the nailed boots of a party
of Askari. I was glad at last to have a force in hand, but was
somewhat disappointed to find it was a detachment of the
right wing, under 2nd Lieutenant Langen, who had missed the
way to Ras-Kasone and had thus got on to our left wing. But
even these difficulties were not all. In some inexplicable way
the troops imagined a Headquarter order had been issued that
they were to return to their old camp west of Tanga. Only
during the course of the night, at Tanga Railway Station, did it
become clear to me that nearly all the companies had marched
oft" for that destination. Of course they were ordered to return
at once. But unfortunately this caused so much delay that it
was impossible to bring Hering's Battery, which had arrived
later, into action by moonlight against the ships.

The troops, whose great exhaustion was quite comprehensible,
did not get back to Tanga until the morning of the 5th November,
and occupied essentially the same position as the day before.
It was not now advisable to advance with all our forces against
the enemy, who was re-embarking at Ras-Kasone, as the country
there was entirely open, and commanded by the cruisers lying in
its immediate vicinity. All the same, the strong patrols and
individual companies, who advanced towards Ras-Kasone, in

43

My Reminiscences of East Africa

order to harass the enemy, succeeded in surprising him
by machine-gun fire directed on various detachments, a few boats,
and even the decks of the cruiser lying close to the hospital.
During the day, the impression that the enemy had suffered a
tremendous defeat grew stronger and stronger. It is true, the
full extent of his losses did not become known to us all at once ;
but the many places where hundreds and hundreds of dead were
piled up in heaps, and the smell of putrefaction which the tropical
sun brought out all over the district, gave us some indication.
Very cautiously we estimated the killed at about 800, but I believe
this number to be far too low. A senior English officer, who
had accurate knowledge of the details, told me later, on the occa-
sion of an action in which he stated the English casualties to have
been 1,500, that the losses at Tanga had been considerably
greater. I now think that even 2,000 is too low an estimate.
Even greater was the enemy's loss in moral. He almost began
to believe in spirits and spooks ; years afterwards I was asked
by English officers whether we had used trained bees at Tanga^
but I may now perhaps betray the fact that at the decisive
moment all the machine-guns of one of our companies were put
out of action by these same " trained bees," so that we suffered
from this new " training " quite as much as the English.

The enemy felt himself completely defeated, and he was.
His troops had fled in wild confusion and thrown themselves
head over heels into the lighters. The possibility of renewing
the attack was not even considered. From prisoners' statements
and captured official English documents it was ascertained that
the whole Anglo-Indian Expeditionary Force of 8,000 men had
been thus decisively beaten by our force of little more than 1,000
men. Not till the evening did we realize the magnitude of this
victory, when an English officer, Captain Meinertshagen, came
under a flag of truce to negotiate with Captain von Hammerstein,
my representative, for the handing over of the wounded. Captain
von Hammerstein proceeded to the hospital, which was full
of severely wounded English officers, and in my name agreed
to their being removed by the English on giving their word
of honour not to fight against us again in this war.

44

The November Actions at Tanga

The booty in arms enabled us to re-arm more than three
companies with modern weapons, for which the sixteen machine-
guns were particularly welcome. The moral of the force and its
confidence in its leaders had enormously increased, and at one
blow I was delivered from a great part of the difficulties which
so greatly impeded the conduct of operations. The continuous
fire of the ships' guns, which the closeness of the country had
rendered ineffective, had lost its terrors for our brave blacks.
The quantity of stores captured was also considerable ; besides
600,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition the enemy had left
behind the whole of his telephone gear and such quantities of
clothing and equipment that we were able to meet all our re-
quirements, especially in warm coats and blankets, for at least
a year. Our own losses, painful though they were, were numeric-
ally insignificant. About fifteen (?) Europeans, among them the
splendid Captain von Prince, and fifty-four (?) Askari and
machine-gun carriers, had fallen. The Europeans were buried
in a worthy warriors' grave in the shade of a fine Buyu tree,
where a simple memorial tablet is inscribed with their names.
The work of clearing up the battle-field and burying the dead
meant several days of most strenuous work for the whole force,
as the streets were literally strewn with dead and badly wounded.
In unknown tongues they begged for help which, with the best
will in the world, could not always be accorded at once.

At our main dressing station, in Tanga itself, our male and
female nursing personnel had conscientiously cared for friend and
foe even under the fire of the heavy guns of the ships. As re-
cently as the evening of the 4th November I had been to see the
wounded. I little thought that Lieutenant Schottstaedt, who
was sitting there on a chair with a severe wound in the chest,
had but a few minutes to live. The English Lieutenant Cook,
of the loist Indian Grenadiers, lay there with a bad gun-shot
wound in the leg. This bright young officer, who had fallen into
our hands in the hottest part of the fight on the Indian left wing,
maintained his cheerfulness in spite of his wound. With the
bulk of the other wounded, he was treated for nine months in
the Field Hospital at Korogwe by our best surgeon, Stabsarzt

45

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Dr. Mtiller. He was already walking about once more, when
an unfortunate fall on the stairs caused his death.

The fighting at Tanga was the first occasion on which heavy
demands were made on our arrangements for the care of the
wounded. For this purpose, hospitals had been established at
Korogwe and at various other points on the Northern Railway,
to which the sick could be taken by rail without being trans-
ferred from one method of transport to another. No special
hospital arrangements of a permanent nature had been made for
transport, but we never had any difficulty in improvising what
was necessary.

In spite of their undoubted defeat at Tanga it was probable
that British determination would not accept this decision as
final. Even after his defeat the enemy was still several times
as strong as we were, and would not improbably attempt another
landing elsewhere. But a cycle ride on the 6th November to
Mansa Bay, in the North, convinced me that the hostile ships had
run in there only for the purpose of attending to their wounded
and burying their dead and had no intention of landing. And
the ships actually did steam off towards Zanzibar soon after.
At that time it was interesting to me to visit our Government
Hospital near Ras-Kasone, which had in the meantime been
evacuated by the English wounded released on parole. Among
others I saw here two German officers who had been wounded
at Tanga on the 3rd November, and others who had been wounded
in an earlier action ; from the hospital they had been able to
observe events behind the English front on the 4th November,
the day when the principal fighting took place. With the greatest
excitement they had watched the landing at Ras-Kasone and the
advance on Tanga ; in the afternoon they had heard the opening
of our decisive machine-gun fire and the bombardment by the
ships' guns, and had then witnessed the wild flight of the enemy
close by the hospital. The numerous shells that had fallen
near the hospital had fortunately done no damage. Quite
early on the 5th November they had suddenly heard guns firing
again, this time from the direction of Tanga ; they realized
that they must be German guns. They were in fact our two

46

The November Actions at Tanga

1873 pattern field-guns, which, though too late to deal with the
English transports by moonlight, had at least managed to secure
a few hits after daybreak. A prolonged fire for effect was now
unfortunately impossible, as the smoke disclosed the positions
of the guns at once and drew the fire of the ships.

In the meantime it had become evident that the attack at
Tanga was not an isolated enterprise, but had been intended to
form part of a simultaneous operation on a large scale. Suddenly
in the morning mist, on the 3rd November, English troops appeared
north-west of Kilima Njaro, at Longido Mountain, which was
held by Captain Kraut with three Companies of Askari and a
Mounted Company of Europeans. Just as orders reached
Longido Mountain by heliograph directing Captain Kraut to
move off to Moshi, the first shell arrived. The enemy, about
1,000 strong, had ascended the great mountain, which lies by
itself in the open plain, at several points, being guided by Masai,
who called out to the outposts : " We belong to Captain Kraut's
men." But our three Field Companies deployed rapidly and
succeeded in working round the enemy detachment in the rocky
ground and quickly repelled them. A hostile detachment of
mounted Europeans who became visible in the plain at the foot
of the mountain, and apparently intended to ascend it from the
south, or to act against our communications, was fired upon
with effect and quickly driven off.

Probably in connection with these events on the Northern
Railway, hostile enterprises took place on Lake Victoria. At
the end of October numerous Waganda warriors had penetrated
from the North into the Bukoba district. To meet this menace,
a force of 570 rifles, 4 machine-guns, and 2 guns left Muanza
on the 3 ist October on board the small steamer Muanza, with
2 tugs and 10 dhows (boats). Soon after the landing these
transports were attacked by English steamers, but got back
to Muanza without damage. An English attempt to land at
Kayense, north of Muanza, broke down under the fire of our
detachment posted there.

Thus, at the beginning of November we were confronted with
a concentric attack on our Colony, planned on a large scale.

47

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Its failure made everyone expect that we would be able to hold
our own as long as the home country could do so. But such
scanty information as we could get from there gave us confidence.
At the time of the action at Tanga we had, indeed, not heard
the name of Hindenburg ; but on the other hand we knew nothing
of our reverse on the Marne, and were still buoyed up by the im
pression created by our victorious invasion of France.

48

CHAPTER V

AWAITING FURTHER EVENTS

danger threatening the Kilima Njaro country appeared
1 to me to be by itself a sufficient reason for rapidly moving
the troops back to the vicinity of New Moshi after the decisive
success of Tanga, which in any event could not be further ex-
ploited. The joy of the Northern settlers, who, it should be
noted, had furnished the bulk of the Europeans who fought at
Tanga, was indescribable. The first train, which carried the
European Company, returned to New Moshi bedecked with flowers.
I myself had still enough to do at Tanga, and did not follow the
troops to New Moshi for several days, where Headquarters was
reopened. Shortage of personnel prevented us from having
separate people for each duty. Officers of Headquarters had
sometimes in an emergency to act as riflemen or cyclists, the
Intendant occasionally did duty as an orderly, the clerk went
into action with a rifle and acted as orderly hi battle. The work
was greatly facilitated by the fact that the railway station p
constructed on European lines, afforded us accommodation which,
in spite of being rather small, enabled us to settle most matters
affecting the Staff only by word of mouth. We had good tele-
phone and telegraph installations, and were situated centrally
as the telephone and road systems, which we had either made or
perfected, and which led out in both directions towards Tanga,
Taveta, East Kilima Njaro, West Kilima Njaro and Longido,
as well as to Arusha. Sometimes the work would go on for a
week at a time almost as in peace, although the volume of work
to be dealt with was greater. But although hardly anybody
at Headquarters was either trained or prepared for his functions,
harmonious and successful co-operation was secured. It was

49 4

My Reminiscences of East Africa

based upon the best spirit, devotion to the cause, and the support
of good comradeship.

I myself went by car — for we had made a motor-road right up
to Longido Mountain — to the Engare-Nairobi (cold river), a
small stream rising on the northern slopes of Kilima Njaro,
and flowing between it and Longido through the prairie in a
north-westerly direction. In this country a number of Boer
families were settled on farms. Kraut's detachment had moved
their camp there, as their supplies, if they had remained on
Longido Mountain, would have had to make a two-days' march
across the prairie, where they could not be protected, and were,
therefore, too uncertain. I satisfied myself that there was at
this time no opportunity for any enterprises north of Kilima
Njaro, and returned to New Moshi. The distance from New
Moshi, where we collected a large proportion of the supplies
coming from Usambara and the country further south by rail
to Taveta, is thirty miles. Although we had available only a
few motors, namely, three cars and three lorries all told, they
were in the circumstances a considerable help. The road being
well made, the three-ton lorries could do the trip out and back
in one day in dry weather. As carriers took at least four days
for the same journey a calculation showed that one lorry could
do the work of six hundred carriers, who required subsistence in
addition. The principle, later maintained by the English, of
replacing carriers and pack-animals by mechanical transport,
is further supported by the fact that men and animals suffered
severely from tropical diseases, whereas mosquitos are power-
less against automobiles. We, however, could not derive full
benefit from this advantage, since we had so few motors. Even
in this period, which, as far as transport was concerned, was one
of quiet and regularity, we had constantly to fall back upon
carriers. To this day I remember the joy of the Intendant
when a column of six hundred Wassukuma carriers arrived at
New Moshi from about Muanza ; they brought rice, which was
urgently needed, from Lake Victoria, via Kondoa-Irangi to
Kilima Njaro. If one remembers that this march required at
least thirty days, that the carrier needs one kg. (two Ibs.)

50

Awaiting Further Events

of food a day, and that his maximum load is twenty-five
kg. (fifty-five Ibs.), it is clear that these marches have to be
arranged with great care and directed through well populated
and fertile districts if this method of transport is to be of any
value. If, in spite of these disadvantages, carrier transport
had to be resorted to on a large scale, it only shows up the supply-
difficulties we had to contend with. The Intendant, Captain
Feilke, was, however, a past master in handling the men and
looking after them. The carriers felt that they were well cared
for, and the word " Kommando," which some of them took as
a personal name, became quite common. I myself was able,
by means of the motors, to carry out many reconnaissances
and inspections of the troops. I could reach Taveta, to which
place some of the troops from Tanga returned, in two hours from
New Moshi ; this would otherwise have taken four days ; later
on I drove in one day from New Moshi to the Engare-Nairobi,
round the west side of the whole of Meru Mountain, and back
to New Moshi, a journey which could hardly have been accom-
plished with carriers in less than ten days.

The success at Tanga called forth and revived the deter-
mination to resist all over the Colony.

At Morogoro, on the 26th November, the Inspector of Lines
of Communication, Major-General Wahle, succeeded in obtaining
the Governor's consent to the defence of Dar-es-Salaam in case
of attack. As luck would have it, this consent was given just
in time. On the 28th, two men-of-war, a transport and a tug,
appeared off Dar-es-Salaam, and demanded to inspect our ships
lying in the harbour. Among others, there was the Tabor a,
of the German East African Line, which had been converted
into a hospital-ship. As the English had on a previous occasion
declared that they did not consider themselves bound by any
agreement about Dar-es-Salaam, fresh negotiations would have
been necessary every tune we wanted to escape a threatened
bombardment. Thus an endless screw was created. I now
wired that the entry into the harbour of a pinnace, demanded
by the English, was to be resisted by force of arms. Unfor-
tunately, however, it had been conceded by the German civil

5i 4*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

authority, against my opinion, and the Senior Officer present at
Dar-es-Salaam felt himself bound. The English, however,
came in, not with the one pinnace which had been agreed to,
but with several small vessels, and then proceeded to carry
out demolitions on board the Tabora, and even took some of
her crew prisoners. This made it only too evident, even to those
who had hitherto been doubtful, how misplaced our previous
compliance had been. Captain von Kornatzky was just in time
to open effective machine-gun fire on the small English vessels as
they passed out by the narrow English harbour entrance. Un-
fortunately, on this occasion, one of the German prisoners was
also hit. The necessary defensive measures had simply not been
adopted in time. This is a small example of the dangers and
disadvantages that arise when, in time of war, the military com
mander is constantly interfered with in his decisions, and in
the execution of operations which are in the nature of things
inevitable.

And, after all, the subsequent bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam
did no harm worth mentioning, for the damage done to a few
houses can hardly be considered as serious.

During the time of comparatively sedentary warfare at New
Moshi the material side of life was also pleasant. The Euro
peans, who mostly belonged to the settler community of the
northern territories, provided most of their subsistence them-
selves ; abundant supplies of rice, wheat-flour, bananas, pine-
apples, European fruit, coffee and potatoes, came in from the
plantations. Sugar was provided by the numerous factories,
and our principal supply of salt came from the Gottorp salt works,
on the Central Railway, between Tabora and Lake Tangan-
yika. Many plantations devoted themselves entirely to supply-
ing the troops, and, owing to the abundant labour available
this change in production caused no difficulties. But the trans-
port system had also to work at high pressure. The great road
leading from Kimamba to Mombo and Korogwe, on the Northern
Railway, was continuously improved, so as to carry the transport
of the products from the area of the Tanganyika Railway and
further South, to the North. On this line alone at least eight

52

Awaiting Further Events

thousand carriers were continuously employed. It soon proved
to be practical not to make the carriers do the whole distance of
a hundred and ninety miles, but to distribute them on different
stages. This made it possible to quarter them permanently
and to look after their health. Experts hi hygiene travelled up
and down the road, and did what was humanly possible for the
health of the carriers, especially against dysentery and typhoid.
In this manner we established along this very frequented route
permanent carrier-camps a day's march apart, in which the
men were accommodated at first in extemporized huts, which
were later properly completed. Camp discipline was strictly
regulated. In order to provide also for the many Europeans
passing through, small houses with concrete floors were put
up ; and individuals were enabled to subsist on the supplies
held on the line of communication, without having to burden
themselves with provisions to last for a prolonged period, as is
customary on journeys in Africa. The work on this line of
supply was the object of constant attention. Both Europeans
and natives had still to learn how to ensure the co-operation of
such masses of men, and to understand the importance of order
and discipline in the working of the transport for the health of
all concerned.

At New Moshi Station both telephone and telegraph were
working day and night. Where the whole organization had to
be improvised friction was not altogether unavoidable. All
the members of Headquarters were extraordinarily hard-worked.
But we did have bright intervals during the strenuous work.
The abundance of creature comforts enjoyed by the Europeans
in the North was shared by us at Headquarters. We were
literally spoilt by the number of gifts sent us by private in-
dividuals. If one of us travelled on the Northern Railway,
on which in time of peace it was difficult to obtain a little food
for love or money, he was now cared for by someone at almost
every station. I remember when Lieut. Freiherr von Schroetter
returned to New Moshi, very famished, after carrying out some
very exhausting patrols in the country north of Erok Mountain.
After having, according to normal ideas, been thoroughly well

53

My Reminiscences of East Africa

fed from seven o'clock till eleven, he shyly asked if he might
have some supper. The next morning he started on fourteen
days' leave to his plantation in Usambara, in order to recuperate
and attend to his business. After breakfast we gave him coffee,
bread, butter and meat, to take with him in the train, and had
warned the various railway stations to look after this completely
famished patroller. So, after half an hour, the station guard
at Kahe offered him another breakfast, at Lembeni the charming
wife of the Station Commandant had baked him a cake, and at
Lame he was looked after by the commander of the local Recruit
Depot, Sergt. -Major Reinhardt. At Makanya the guard, Planter
Baroy, who belonged to the country, brought him home-made
chocolate and bullocks' hearts — a fruit the size of a melon —
at Buiko the hospitable traffic manager of the Northern Rail-
way, Kuehlwein, who had so often entertained us in passing
through, had prepared him a delicate meal. At Mombo, where
the supplies from the Usambara Mountains were collected, and
where we had established most of our work-shops, our protege
was met by Warrant Officer Meyer, of the Navy, with a sustain-
ing supper. But then we got a telegram : " Please do not
order any more, I can't eat any more."

Although this continuous feeding shows a spirit of sym-
pathetic chaff at the expense of the starving subaltern, it also
proves, better than any theoretical dissertations, how intimately
all classes of the population of the northern districts worked in
with the troops, and how they tried to anticipate our every
wish. This co-operation continued as long as the troops remained
in the North.

Whenever duty gave us a chance we arranged for change and
recuperation. On Sundays we often went out together near
New Moshi for a cheery day's shooting. Both carriers and
Askari soon picked up their business as beaters, and drove the
game towards us in exemplary order, with loud shouts of
" Huyu, huyu : " " There he is." For variety of game the
country provided more than one would be likely to find any-
where in Europe : hare, various dwarf antelopes, guinea-fowl
several relatives of the partridge, duck, bush-buck, water-buck

54

Awaiting Further Events

lynx, several kinds of wild boar, small kudu, jackal and many
other kinds of game abounded. Once, I remember, to my
astonishment, a lion silently appeared fifteen paces in front of
me. Unfortunately I had my gun in my hand, and before I
could put up my rifle, which was on my knees, he had as silently
disappeared. In the teeming Kilima Njaro country, and even
more east of Taveta, our shooting expeditions provided a wel-
come increase to our meat supply. But in the main this depended
on the cattle which the Masai brought us from the Kilima Njaro
and Meru country, but which also came from far away near
Lake Victoria.

55

CHAPTER VI

FURTHER HEAVY FIGHTING IN THE NORTH-EAST

BY the time we kept Christmas in the Mission Church at
New Moshi, and afterwards in our mess in the Railway
Station, the military situation north of Tanga had become
sufficiently acute to indicate that decisive events in this quarter
were probable. During the last days of December, our patrols,
who in that district were on British territory, had been gradually
pushed back, and had concentrated south of Jassini, on German
territory. The combined force amounted to two companies and
a corps of some two hundred Arabs. The enemy had obviously
been reinforced, and occupied the buildings of the German
plantation of Jassini. It looked as though he intended to push
gradually forward along the coast to Tanga, securing the occupied
country by a system of block-houses. In order to investigate
matters on the spot, I travelled early in January with Capt.
von Hammerstein to Tanga, and thence by car to Capt. Adler's
camp at Mwurnoni, using the newly-completed coast road to
the north, a distance of thirty-eight miles. Lieut. Bleeck, of
the Reserve, whose numerous successful patrols in that country
rendered him particularly suitable for the purpose, accompanied
me on my reconnaissance, from which I learned that the country
for miles round Jassini consisted principally of a cocoanut
plantation belonging to the German East African Company,
which was also planted with sisal, a species of agave with sharp
thorns. This sisal, which formed a dense undergrowth among
the palms, was in many places so interlaced that one could only
force one's way through by enduring a quantity of very un-
pleasant pricks. It is, of course, always difficult to make plans
for an action in country so totally unknown to one without

56

Further Heavy Fighting in the North -East

the aid of a map, and relying only on the reports of patrols.
In this case we got over the difficulty as Lieut. Schaefer, of the
Reserve, who had been called to the colours, had for years held
the post of Assistant on this plantation, and could therefore
furnish exact information. A tolerably accurate sketch was
prepared, and the battle-names allotted to various localities
were entered on it. The general situation appeared to be that
Jassini was an advanced post, and that the main body of the
enemy was in fortified camps further north. It was to be
assumed that an attack on the advanced post of Jassini would
entice the main body to leave its camps and fight hi the open
(sic !). My plan was to take advantage of this possibility. In
order to engage the enemy while hurrying from his places of
assembly to the assistance of the advanced post, in favourable
tactical conditions, I intended to place my troops in readiness
on his probable lines of advance, in such a manner that he would
have to run up against them.

In this closely-settled country supply presented no difficulty,
and the necessary carriers could be provided by the numerous
European plantations. So the companies ordered up by tele-
graph from New Moshi had only to be accompanied by their
machine-gun and ammunition carriers, a considerable advantage
in arranging for their railway journey. This was accom-
plished rapidly and without friction, thanks to the proved
capacity of the Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber,
retired, of the Landwehr, and the understanding and consuming
zeal with which the whole personnel of the railway bore the un-
avoidable strain without a murmur.

By the i6th January the companies from New Moshi had de-
trained a couple of miles west of Tanga, and at once marched off
towards Jassini, as well as the troops from Tanga, for the imme-
diate protection of which only one company was left behind.
On the evening of the I7th January the force of nine companies,
with two guns, was assembled at Totohown plantation, seven
miles south of Jassini, and orders for the attack were issued for
the following morning. Major Kepler, with two companies, was
directed to attack the village of Jassini, working round by the

57

My Reminiscences of East Africa

right, and Captain Adler, with two more companies, had a
similar task on the left. To the north-west, on the road from
Semanya, was posted the Arab corps. Captain Otto, with the
gth Company, advanced frontally by the main road on Jassini,
followed immediately by Headquarters and the main body,
consisting of the European Company, three Askari Companies,
and two guns. The marches were so arranged that the attacks
on Jassini should take place simultaneously at daybreak, and
that all columns should mutually support each other by pushing
on with energy. Even before daybreak the first shots fell in the
vicinity of Kepler's column, a few minutes later firing began in
front of us with Otto's column, and then became general. It
was impossible in the endless dense palm forest to obtain an
even approximate idea of what was really happening. We were,
however, already so close up to the hostile position at Jassini,
that the enemy seemed to be surprised, in spite of his excellent
intelligence service. This supposition was afterwards, in part
at least, confirmed. Of our rapid concentration south of Jassini,
and our immediate attack with such strong forces, the enemy
had actually had no idea.

Otto's column quickly drove back an entrenched post in its
front, and Headquarters now made a circuit to the left through
the forest, where first one, and then two more companies, were
put in so as to outflank Jassini. What seemed curious was
that in this move we came under a very well-aimed fire at short
range, possibly no more than 200 yards ; and it was not till much
later that we learned that the enemy had not only a weak post
in Jassini, but that four companies of Indians were also estab-
lished there in a strongly constructed and excellently concealed
fort. Suddenly Captain von Hammerstein, who was walking
behind me, collapsed ; he had been shot in the abdomen.
Deeply as this affected me, at the moment I had to leave my
badly-wounded comrade in the hands of the doctor. A few days
later the death of this excellent officer tore a gap in the ranks of
our Staff which was hard to fill.

The fighting had become very hot. Two companies, although
their commanders, Lieuts. Gerlich and Spalding, had fallen

58

Further Heavy Fighting in the North -East

had quickly captured the fortified buildings of Jassini by a
brilliant charge, and had now established themselves close in
front of the enemy's position. Soon the intervention of the
enemy's main force made itself felt. From the direction of
Wanga, in the north-east, strong hostile columns arrived and
suddenly appeared close in front of our companies, lying close
to the fortifications of Jassini. The enemy made three strong
attacks at this point and was each time repulsed. Hostile
columns also arrived from the north and north-west. Against
that from the west the Arab corps had done badly ; the day
before many of them had urgently demanded their discharge.
Now, when they were to lie in ambush on the enemy's road of
advance, the tension became too great for them. Instead of
surprising the enemy by an annihilating fire, they fired blindly
into the air and then bolted. But luckily these hostile columns
then came on Captain Adler's two companies, and were repulsed
with slaughter. Up till then the whole action had been in the
nature of an energetic assault ; even the last reserve, the
European Company, had, at its urgent request, been sent into
action. Towards noon the fighting had everywhere become
stationary before the strong defences of the enemy. We had, as
a matter of fact, no means of making a sufficient impression on
them, and even our field-guns, which we placed in position at
two hundred yards, produced no decisive effect. The heat was
insupportable, and, as at Tanga, everyone quenched his thirst
with young cocoanuts. I myself went with Lieut. Bleeck to
the right wing, to find out how things were going with Major
Kepler's column. At that time I had not yet obtained a clear
idea of the enemy's defences, and so, on the sands of a clear and
open creek, which was then dry, we again came under a very
well-aimed fire. From a distance of five hundred yards the
bullets fell close to us, and the spurts of sand they threw up
made correction easy. The sand was so deep and the heat so
great that one could only run, or even walk quickly, for a few
paces at a time. Most of the time we had to walk slowly across
the open and bear the unpleasant fire as best we could. Fortu-
nately it did no serious harm, although one bullet through my

59

My Reminiscences of East Africa

hat and another through my arm showed that it was well meant.
On the way back from the right wing our thirst and exhaustion
were so great that several gentlemen, who were usually by no
means on bad terms with each other, had a serious difference of
opinion about a cocoanut, although it would not have been
difficult to get more from the countless trees all round us.

Headquarters had now returned to the Totohown-Jassini
road. Along this ran a light railway for the work of the plan-
tation, the wagons of which were now continuously employed
in taking wounded back to Totohown, where a hospital had been
established in the European buildings. Ammunition — of which
the Askari carried about 150 rounds — began to run short, and
reports from the firing line that they could not hold on longer
became more frequent. Slightly wounded who had been tied
up and a mass of stragglers collected at Headquarters, whole
platoons had completely lost themselves, or had for other reasons
left the places assigned to them. All these men were collected
and re-organized, and thus a fresh reserve was made available.
The ammunition in the machine-gun belts was to a great extent
expended, and fresh supplies came up from Totohown by the
light railway. The belt-filling machines were fixed to the palm-
trees and kept incessantly at work. It was evident that we had
already suffered considerable casualties. A few wished to
break off the action, as there seemed no prospect of capturing
the enemy's defences. But the thought of the unpleasant
situation of the enemy, shut up in his works, without water, and
having to carry on all the occupations of daily existence in a
confined space, in a burning sun and under hostile fire, made it
appear that if we only held on with determination we might
yet achieve success. The afternoon and night passed in incessant
fighting ; as is always the case in such critical situations, all
sorts of rumours arose. It was said that the garrison of the
enemy's works consisted of South African Europeans, who were
excellent marksmen ; some people even declared they had under-
stood their speech perfectly. It was indeed still very difficult
to form a clear idea. My orderly, Ombasha (Lance-Corporal)
Rayabu, at once volunteered to make a close reconnaissance,

60

Further Heavy Fighting in the North-East

crawled close up to the enemy's line, and was killed there. The
native, who is at all times easily excitable, was doubly so in this
critical situation at night, and I frequently had to take the men
severely to task for firing blindly into the air.

Early on the igth January the fire broke out again with the
greatest intensity. The enemy, who was surrounded on all sides,
made a sortie, which failed, and soon after hoisted the white flag.
Four Indian companies, with European officers and N.C.O.'s,
fell into our hands. We all remarked the warlike pride with
which our Askari regarded the enemy ; I never thought our
black fellows could look so distinguished.

Both friend and foe had been in an unpleasant situation, and
were near the end of their nervous strength. That is usually
the case with any soldier who takes his duty seriously. But the
Askari now learned that one must overcome one's own feelings
in order to obtain the superior moral force necessary for victory.

I estimated the enemy's casualties at 700 at least ; the captured
documents gave a clear indication of his strength, which was
more than double our own. According to them, General Tighe,
commanding the troops in British East Africa, who had landed a
short time before at Wanga, had more than twenty companies
assembled at and near Jassini, most of whom had come by
march route along the coast from the direction of Mombasa.
They were to push forward towards Tanga.

With the aid of the mechanical transport and the rickshaws
which worked between the Field Hospital at Totohown and
Tanga, the wounded were moved from Jassini to the hospitals
on the Northern Railway quite easily in a few days. These
rickshaws, small spring-carts (like dog-carts), drawn by one
man, which take the place of cabs at Tanga, had been requisi-
tioned for carrying wounded by the Senior Medical Officer. The
enemy had withdrawn into his fortified camps north of the
frontier, and a fresh attack on them did not seem to me very
promising. We immediately commenced patrol operations, as
a support to which we left a detachment of a few companies at
Jassini ; the bulk of the troops was moved off again to the

61

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Kilima Njaro country. On the march to the entraining station
on the Northern Railway the troops passed through Amboni
Plantation. There the inhabitants of Tanga had voluntarily
provided food and refreshments ; and after the tremendous
exertions entailed by the expedition to Jassini, with its con-
tinuous forced marches, the exhausting heat, and the unin-
terrupted fighting by day and night, the sulphur-laden Sigi
stream was soon alive with white and black bathers. All our
toil was forgotten, and our spirits rose to the highest pitch on
receiving at this very moment, after a rather long interval,
another wireless message from home. It indicated that news
of the fighting at Tanga had probably just reached Germany,
and contained His Majesty's appreciation of the success we had
gained there.

CHAPTER VII

GUERILLA WARFARE AND FURTHER PREPARATIONS

T~\OCUMENTS which we captured later proved by figures
±-J that the enemy moved troops from Lake Victoria towards
Kilima Njaro. So the battle actually did relieve other, far
distant theatres. This observation bore out the original con-
tention that the best protection of the whole territory consisted
in taking a firm hold of the enemy at one point. Whether the
remainder of the Colony was also locally protected with energy
was not as important. All the same, I was greatly rejoiced when
in February, 1915, the Governor was persuaded to issue the order
that the coast towns were to be defended if threatened by the
enemy. The successes obtained hitherto had demonstrated that
this local defence was not hopeless, even against the fire of ships'
guns.

Although the attack carried out at Jassini with nine companies
had been completely successful, it showed that such heavy losses
as we also had suffered could only be borne in exceptional cases.
We had to economize our forces in order to last out a long war.
Of the regular officers, Major Kepler, Lieuts. Spalding and
Gerlich, Second-Lieuts. Kaufmann and Erdmann were killed ;
Captain von Hammerstein had died of his wound. The loss of
these professional soldiers — about one seventh of the regular
officers present — could not be replaced.

The expenditure of 200,000 rounds also proved that with the
means at my disposal I could at the most fight three more actions
of this nature. The need to strike great blows only quite excep-
tionally, and to restrict myself principally to guerilla warfare,
was evidently imperative.

63

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The guiding principle of constantly operating against the
Uganda Railway could, however, be resumed, as here it was in
any case impossible to act with larger forces. For it was neces-
sary to make marches of several days' duration through the
great, waterless and thinly populated desert, which provided
little sustenance beyond occasional game. Not only food, but
water had to be carried. This alone limited the size of the
force to be employed. Such expeditions through districts pro-
viding neither water nor food require a degree of experience on
the part of the troops which could not possibly exist at that stage
of the war. A company even was too large a force to send across
this desert, and if, after several days of marching, it really had
reached some point on the railway, it would have had to come back
again, because it could not be supplied. However, these condi-
tions improved as the troops became better trained, and as our
knowledge of the country, which was at first mainly tena incognita,
increased.

So there was nothing for it but to seek to attain our object
by means of small detachments, or patrols. To these patrols
we afterwards attached the greatest importance. Starting from
the Engare-Nairobi, small detachments of eight to ten men,
Europeans and Askaris, rode round the rear of the enemy's camps,
which had been pushed up as far as the Longido, and attacked
their communications. They made use of telephones we had
captured at Tanga, tapping in on the English telephone-lines ;
then they waited for large or small hostile detachments or columns
of ox- wagons to pass. From their ambush they opened fire on
the enemy at thirty yards' range, captured prisoners and booty,
and then disappeared again in the boundless desert. Thus, at
that time, we captured rifles, ammunition, and war material of
all kinds. One of these patrols had observed near Erok Moun-
tain that the enemy sent his riding-horses to water at a certain
time. Ten of our horsemen at once started out, and, after a
two days' ride through the desert, camped close to the enemy.
Six men went back with the horses ; the four others each took a
saddle, and crept at a distance of a few paces past the enemy's
sentries close up to the watering-place, which lay behind the

Guerilla Warfare and Further Preparations

camp. An English soldier was driving the horses, when suddenly
two men of our patrol confronted him out of the bush and
covering him with their rifles ordered " Hands up ! " In his
surprise he dropped his clay pipe out of his mouth. At once he
was asked : " Where are the missing four horses ? " for our
conscientious patrol had noticed that there were only fifty-seven,
whereas the day before they had counted sixty-one ! These
four needed light treatment and had been left in camp. The
leading horse and a few others were quickly saddled, mounted,
and off they went at a gallop round the enemy's camp towards
the German lines. Even in the captured Englishman, who had
to take part in this safari on a bare horse, without much comfort,
the innate sporting instinct of his nation came out. With great
humour he shouted : "I should just like to see my Captain's
face now ! " and when the animals had arrived safely in the
German camp he remarked : "It was a damned good piece of
work."

This capture, increased by a number of other horses and
mules we had picked up, enabled us to form a second mounted
company. We now had two mounted companies, composed of
Askari and Europeans mixed, an organization which proved
successful. They provided us with the means of sweeping the
extensive desert north of Kilima Njaro with strong patrols who
went out for several days at a time ; they penetrated even as far
as the Uganda and Magad Railways, destroyed bridges, surprised
guards posted on the railways, mined the permanent way and
carried out raids of all kinds on the land communications between
the railways and the enemy's camps. In these enterprises our
own people did not get off scot free. One patrol had brilliantly
surprised two companies of Indians by rifle fire, but had then
lost their horses, which had been left behind in hiding, by the fire
of the enemy ; they had to make their way back across the
desert on foot, which took four days, and they had no food.
Luckily they found milk and cattle in a Masai kraal, and later on
saved themselves from starvation by killing an elephant. But
success whetted the spirit of adventure, and the requests to be
sent on patrol, mounted or on foot, increased.

65 5

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The patrols that went out from the Kilima Njaro in a more
easterly direction were of a different character. They had to
work on foot through the dense bush for days on end. The
patrols sent out to destroy the railway were mostly weak : one
or two Europeans, two to four Askari, and five to seven carriers.
They had to worm their way through the enemy's pickets and
were often betrayed by native scouts. In spite of this they
mostly reached their objective and were sometimes away for
more than a fortnight. For such a small party a bit of game
or a small quantity of booty afforded a considerable reserve of
rations. But the fatigue and thirst in the burning sun were so
great that several men died of thirst, and even Europeans drank
urine. It was a bad business when an}^one fell ill or was wounded,
with the best will in the world it was often impossible to bring
him along. To carry a severely wounded man from the Uganda
Railway right across the desert to the German camps, as was
occasionally done, is a tremendous performance. Even the
blacks understood that, and cases did occur in which a wounded
Askari, well knowing that he was lost without hope, and a prey
to the numerous lions, did not complain when he had to be left
in the bush, but of his own accord gave his comrades his rifle and
ammunition, so that they at least might be saved.

The working of these patrols became more and more perfect.
Knowledge of the desert improved, and in addition to patrols
for destruction and intelligence work, we developed a system of
fighting patrols. The latter, consisting of twenty to thirty
Askari, or even more, and sometimes equipped with one or two
machine-guns, went out to look for the enemy and inflict losses
upon him. In the thick bush the combatants came upon each
other at such close quarters and so unexpectedly, that our
Askari sometimes literally jumped over their prone adversaries
and so got behind them again. The influence of these expeditions
on the self-reliance and enterprise of both Europeans and natives
was so great that it would be difficult to find a force imbued with
a better spirit. Some disadvantages were, however, unavoid-
able. In particular, our small supply of ammunition did not
enable us to attain such a degree of marksmanship as to enable

66

Guerilla Warfare and Further Preparations

us, when we did get the enemy in an unfavourable situation,
completely to destroy him. In technical matters we were also
busy. Skilled artificers and armourers were constantly engaged
with the factory engineers in the manufacture of suitable apparatus
for blowing up the railways. Some of these appliances fired
according as they were set, either at once, or after a certain number
of wheels had passed over them. With the latter arrangement
we hoped to destroy the engines, even if the English tried to pro-
tect them by pushing one or two trucks filled with sand in front
of them. There was abundance of dynamite to be had on the
plantations, but the demolition charges captured at Tanga were
much more effective.

We occasionally got German newspapers, but we had had no
private mails for a long time. On the I2th February, 1915, I
was sitting at dinner in the Railway Station at New Moshi, when
I got a letter from Germany. It was from my sister, who wrote
to say she had already repeatedly informed me of the death
of my brother, who had been killed on the Western Front at
Libramont on the 22nd August, 1914.

In April, 1915, we were surprised by the news of the arrival
of a store-ship. When entering Mansa Bay, north of Tanga,
she was chased and fired at by an English cruiser, and her captain
had to run her aground. Although during the ensuing weeks
we salved almost the whole of the valuable cargo, we found
that unfortunately the cartridges had suffered severely from
the sea-water. The powder and caps deteriorated more and
more, and so the number of miss-fires increased. There was
nothing for it but to break up the whole of the ammunition,
clean the powder, and replace some of the caps by new ones.
Luckily there were caps in the Colony, though of a different
pattern ; but for months all the Askari and carriers we could
lay hands on were employed at Moshi from morning till night
making ammunition. The serviceable cartridges we had left
were kept exclusively for the machine-guns ; of the re-made
ammunition, that which gave about 20 per cent, of miss-fires
was kept for action, while that giving a higher percentage was
used for practice.

67 5*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The arrival of the store-ship aroused tremendous enthusiasm,
since it proved that communication between ourselves and
home still existed. All of us listened with eagerness to the
stories of the Captain, Lieutenant Christiansen, when he arrived
at my Headquarters at New Moshi after his wound was healed.
The terrific fighting at home, the spirit of self-sacrifice and
boundless enterprise which inspired the deeds of the German
troops, awakened a response in our hearts. Many who had
been despondent now took courage once more, since they learned
that what appears impossible can be achieved if effort is sus-
tained by determination.

Another means of raising the spirit of the force was by pro-
motion. Generally speaking, I could only make promotions
to non-commissioned rank, and within the commissioned ranks ;
but the grant of a commission, which would in many cases
have been well-deserved, was beyond my power. Each case
was very carefully considered, so as to determine whether
really good work had been done. In this way unmerited pro-
motions, which ruin the spirit of the troops, were avoided. On
the whole, however, we had to cultivate the moral factors less
by rewards than by other means. Decorations for war service
were practically unknown among us. It was not personal
ambition to which we appealed ; we sought to arouse and main-
tain a real sense of duty dictated by patriotism, and an ever-
growing feeling of comradeship. Perhaps it was the very fact
that this lasting and pure motive remained unsoiled by any
other purpose that inspired Europeans and Askari with that
endurance and energy which the Protective Force manifested until
the end.

In the Kilima Njaro country the English were not inactive.
From Oldorobo Mountain, seven and a half miles east of Taveta,
which was held by a German detached post under an officer,
an attack by two Indian Companies was reported by telephone
one morning. Thereupon Captain Koehl and the Austrian
Lieutenant Freiherr von Unterrichter at once marched off from
Taveta ; the two companies had become immobilized on the
steep slopes of the mountain, and our people attacked them

68

Guerilla Warfare and Further Preparations

on both flanks with such vigour that they fled, leaving about
twenty dead behind, while one machine-gun and 70,000 rounds
fell into our hands. Other hostile expeditions were undertaken
along the Tsavo River to the north-east side of Kilima Njaro ;
they were based on Mzima Camp on the Tsavo, which was strongly
fortified and held by several companies. The patrol encounters
that took place north-east of Kilima Njaro all ended in our
favour ; even the young Askari of the Rombo Detachment,
which had a strength of sixty and was named after the mission
on the Eastern Kilima Njaro, had unbounded faith in their
commander, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock, who was over sixty
years old. I remember a wounded man who came from him
to New Moshi, with a report for me, and refused to be attended
to so as to lose no time hi getting back to his commanding officer.
In several fights, when the enemy occasionally amounted to
two companies, these young troops were victorious, and it is a
significant fact that among the English all manner of tales
were current about these actions. The British Commander-in-
Chief sent me a written complaint, saying that a German woman
was taking part in them, and perpetrating inhuman cruelties,
an idea which was, of course, without any foundation, and merely
served to show the degree of nerves with which the enemy
authorities had become afflicted.

Notwithstanding the great amount of booty taken at Tanga,
it was evident that, as the war seemed likely to be prolonged,
the stocks in the Colony would become exhausted. The natives
at New Moshi began all of a sudden to wear silk : this was by
no means a sign of special extravagance : the stocks of cotton
clothing in the Indian shops were simply coming to an end. \Ye
had seriously to think of starting manufactures ourselves, hi order
to convert the abundant raw material into finished products.
A curious existence now developed, reminding one of the industry
of the Swiss family Robinson. Cotton fields existed hi plenty.
Popular books were hunted up, giving information about the for-
gotten arts of hand spinning and weaving ; white and black
women took to spinning by hand ; at the missions and in private
workshops spinning-wheels and looms were built. In this

69

My Reminiscences of East Africa

manner, in a short time, the first useful piece of cotton cloth was
produced. After various trials, the most suitable dye was ob-
tained from the root of a tree called Ndaa, which imparted a
brownish-yellow colour, very inconspicuous both in the grass
and in the bush, and therefore specially suitable for uniforms.
The rubber gathered by the planters was vulcanized with sulphur,
and we succeeded in producing efficient tyres for motors and
bicycles. At Morogoro a few planters successfully produced a
motor-fuel from cocos, known as trebol, which was like benzol,
and was employed in the automobiles. As in former times,
candles were made out of tallow and wax, both by private persons
and by the troops, and also soap. Then again, the numerous
factories on the plantations in the northern territories and on the
Tanganyika Railway were adapted to produce various means of
subsistence.

A particularly important item was the provision of foot-wear.
The raw material was obtained from the plentiful skins of cattle
and game ; tanning materials from the mangroves on the coast.
In peace time the missions had already made good boots ; their
activity was now further developed, while the troops also estab-
lished tanneries and shoemakers' shops on a larger scale. It is
true some little time elapsed before the authorities complied with
the urgent and inevitable demands of the troops in an adequate
manner, and, in particular, before they placed at our disposal
the buffalo-hides necessary for making sole-leather. So the old
historic fight for the cow-hide revived again, mutatis mutandis, in
East Africa. The first boots made in any quantity were turned
out at Tanga. Although at first their shape needed improving,
they at any rate protected the feet of our white and black troops
when marching and patrolling in the thorn bush of the Pori.
For the thorns that fall to the ground bore into the feet again
and again. All the small beginnings of food-stuff production
that had already existed on the plantations in time of peace
were galvanized into more extensive activity by the war, and
by the need of subsisting large masses. On several farms in the
Kilima Njaro country butter and excellent cheese were produced in
great quantities, and the slaughter-houses round about Wilhelms

70

Guerilla Warfare and Further Preparations

tal could hardly keep up with the demands for sausages and other
smoked meats.

It was to be anticipated that quinine, which was so important
for the health of the Europeans, would soon become exhausted,
and that our requirements could not be met by capture alone.
So it was a matter of great importance that we succeeded in
producing good quinine tablets at the Amani Biological Institute
in Usambara out of bark obtained in the North.

The provision of proper communications for ox-wagons and
motors involved the construction of permanent bridges. En-
gineer Rentell, who had been called to the colours, built an
arched bridge of stone and concrete, with a heavy pier, over the
Kikafu torrent, west of New Moshi. During the rains, par-
ticularly in April, no wooden structure would have withstood
the masses of water coming down the steep river-bed, which was
nearly 70 feet deep.

These examples will suffice to show the stimulating influence
of the war and its requirements on the economic life of the Colony.

The organization of the Force was also constantly improved.
By transferring Europeans from the Rifle Companies, when they
were numerous, to the Askari Companies, the losses of Europeans
in the latter were made good ; Askari were enrolled in the Euro-
pean Companies. In this way the Field and Rifle Companies
became more similar in their composition, which during the
course of 1915 became identical. At Muansa, Kigoma, Bis-
marckburg, Lindi, Langenburg, and elsewhere, small bodies of
troops had been formed under various designations, of the exist-
ence of which in most cases Headquarters only became aware
after a considerable time. These units were also gradually
expanded into companies ; in this way, during 1915, the number
of Field Companies gradually rose to 30, that of the Rifle Com-
panies to 10, and that of other units of company strength to about
20. The maximum total attained was thus about 60 companies.
Owing to the limited number of suitable Europeans and of reliable
Askari N.C.O.'s, it was not advisable still further to increase
the number of companies : it would only have meant the creation
of units without cohesion. In order, however, to increase the

My Reminiscences of East Africa

number of combatants the establishment of the companies
was raised from 160 to 200, and the companies were allowed
to enrol supernumerary Askari. To some extent the companies
trained their own recruits ; but the great bulk of Askari rein-
forcements came from the Recruit Depots established in the
populous districts of Tabora, Muansa and the Northern Railway f
which also provided for local security and order. But owing
to the great number of newly-raised companies the depots
could not furnish enough men to bring them all up to their
establishment of 200. The maximum strength attained by the
end of 1915 was 2,998 Europeans and 11,300 Askari, including
Naval personnel, administrative staffs, hospitals and field postal
service.

How necessary were all these military preparations was proved
by the news received at the end of June, 1915, that General
Botha was coming to the East African theatre from South Africa
with 15,000 Boers. That this information was highly probably
correct had to be assumed from the outset. The scanty wireless
messages and other communications about events in the outside
world were yet enough to indicate that our affairs in South-
West Africa were going badly, and that the British troops em-
ployed there would probably become available for other purposes
in the immediate future.

72

CHAPTER VIII

AWAITING THE GREAT OFFENSIVE. ENERGETIC USE OF THE
TIME AVAILABLE

At first, it is true, the anticipated intervention of the South
Africans did not seem to be materializing ; the English were
evidently trying to subdue us with their own forces, without
their assistance. In July, 1915, they attacked the Colony at
several points. East of Lake Victoria large bodies of Masai,
organized and led by Englishmen, and said to number many
thousands, invaded the country of the German Wassukuma,
which was rich in cattle. However, in the matter of cattle-
lifting the Wassukuma stood no joking ; they gave our weak
detachments every assistance, defeated the Masai, recaptured
the stolen cattle, and, as a proof that they had " spoken
the truth," laid out the heads of ninety-six Masai in front of
our police station.

Against the main body of our force in the Kilima Njaro
country the enemy advanced in considerable strength. In order,
on the one hand, to ensure effective protection of the Usambara
Railway, and the rich plantations through which it passes, and,
on the other, to shorten the distance the patrols had to go to
reach the Uganda Railway, a detachment of three companies
had been pushed out from Taveta to Mbuyuni, a long day's
march east of Taveta. Another day's march to the east was
the well-fortified and strongly-held English camp of Makatan,
on the main road leading from Moshi, by Taveta, Mbuyuni,
Makatan, and Bura, to Voi, on the Uganda Railway. Vague
rumours had led us to surmise that an attack on a fairly large
scale in the direction of Kilima Njaro was to be expected from

73

My Reminiscences of East Africa

about Voi. On the I4th July a hostile brigade, under General
Malleson, appeared in the desert of Makatan, which is generally
covered with fairly open thorn-bush. The fire of a field battery,
which opened on the trenches of our Askari, was fairly ineffec-
tive, but the enemy's superiority of seven to one was so con-
siderable that our position became critical. Hostile European
horsemen got round the left wing of our own ; however, our
line was held by the loth Field Company, which had distin-
guished itself in the fighting near Longido Mountain, under
Lieutenant Steinhauser, of the Landwehr, and it is a credit to
this officer, who was unfortunately killed later, that he held
on, although our mounted troops fell back past his flank. Just
at the critical moment, Lieutenant von Lewinsky, who was
also killed later, immediately marched off to the scene of action,
arrived with a patrol, and took this dangerous flank attack in
rear. The English troops, consisting of natives, mixed with
Europeans and Indians, had very gallantly attacked our front,
over ground affording very little cover. The failure of the
English flank attack, however, set the seal on their defeat.
At New Moshi Station I was kept accurately informed of the
progress of the action, and thus, although at a distance, I shared
in all the excitement from the unfavourable period at the begin-
ning until complete success was assured.

This success, together with the considerable booty, still
further increased the spirit of adventure among both Europeans
and Askari. The experience and skill that had by now been
acquired enabled us henceforth to prosecute our plan of sending
out a continuous succession of fighting and demolition patrols.
I do not think I exaggerate in assuming that at least twenty
English railway trains were destroyed, or, at least, considerably
damaged. Picked up photographs and our own observation
confirmed the supposition that a railway was actually being
built from Voi to Makatan, which, being so easily accessible
to us, and so important, formed a glorious objective for our
patrols. The construction of this military line proved that an
attack with large forces was in preparation, and that it was to
be directed on this particular part of the Kilima Njaro country.

74

Awaiting the Great Offensive

The anticipated intervention of the South Africans was therefore
imminent. It was important to encourage the enemy in this
intention, in order that the South Africans should really come,
and that in the greatest strength possible, and thus be diverted
from other and more important theatres of war. With the
greatest energy, therefore, we continued our enterprises against
the Uganda Railway, which, owing to the circumstances, had
still to be mainly carried out by patrols, and could only excep-
tionally be undertaken by a force as large as a company.

Closer acquaintance with the desert country between the
Uganda Railway and the Anglo-German border had revealed
the fact, that of the various mountain groups rising abruptly
out of the plain, the Kasigao was well watered and moderately
populous. Being only from twelve to twenty miles from the
Uganda Railway, Kasigao Mountain was bound to afford a
favourably situated base for patrol work. The patrol of Lieut.
Freiherr Grote had already made a surprise attack on the small
Anglo- Indian camp situated half-way up its slopes. The rifle-
men of Grote's patrol had worked round the camp, which was
surrounded by a stone wall, and fired into it with effect from
the dominating part of the mountain. Very soon the white
flag appeared, and an English officer and some thirty Indians
surrendered. A part of the enemy had succeeded in getting
away to the mountain and fired on the patrol as it marched off.
It was then we suffered our only casualties, consisting of a few
wounded, among whom was a German corporal of the Medical
Corps. We had also, on one occasion, surprised the enemy's
post on Kasigao Mountain by the fire of a 2. 4-inch gun.

Towards the end of 1915, the enemy having in the meantime
shifted his camp on Kasigao Mountain, we attacked him once
more. During the night a German fighting patrol, under
Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, had ascended the mountain in
nine hours, and arrived rather exhausted near the enemy's work.
A second patrol, under Lieutenant Freiherr Grote, which was
co-operating with Ruckteschell 's, had been somewhat delayed
by the sickness and exhaustion of its commander. Lieutenant
von Ruckteschell sent a reliable old coloured N.C.O. to the

75

My Reminiscences of East Africa

enemy to demand surrender. He observed that our Askari was
cordially welcomed by the enemy ; he had found a number of
good friends among the English Askari. But, in spite of all
friendliness, the enemy refused to surrender. Our situation was
critical, in consequence of exhaustion and want of food. If
anything was to be done at all, it must be done at once. Fortu-
nately, the enemy in their entrenchments did not withstand our
machine-gun fire and the assault which immediately followed
it ; they were destroyed, and a large number of them were
killed in their flight by falling from the steep cliffs. The booty
included abundant supplies, also clothing and valuable camp
equipment.

The feeling of comradeship which our Askari had for us
Germans, and which was tremendously developed by the
numerous expeditions undertaken together, led on this occasion
to a curious incident. After climbing Kasigao Mountain by
night, among rocks and thorn-bushes, an Askari noticed that
Lieutenant von Ruckteschell was bleeding from a scratch on
his face. He at once took his sock, which he had probably not
changed for six days, and wiped the " Bwana Lieutenant's "
face with it, anticipating the somewhat surprised question with
the remark : ' That is a custom of war ; one only does it to
one's friends."

In order to study the situation on the spot and to push on
the attacks on Kasigao, I had gone by rail to Same, thence by
car to Sonya Mission, and then either by cycle or on foot in the
direction of the mountain to the German border, where a com-
pany was encamped at a water-hole. From there we had fair
communication to Kasigao by heliograph, and we were thus
enabled to make good the success we had gained there. Troops
were at once pushed up, so that until the arrival of the South
Africans the mountain was held by several companies. It was,
indeed, decidedly difficult to keep them supplied ; for although
the German frontier territory west of Kasigao was fertile, it
could not permanently support a force which with carriers
amounted to about one thousand.

I then drove in the car round the South Pare Mountains, on

76

Awaiting the Great Offensive

a road that had been made in time of peace. The construction
of this road had been dropped on account of expense, and for
years the heaps of metal had been lying unused at the roadside.
The culverts — consisting of pipes passing under the road —
were to a great extent in good order. But little work was needed
to make this road suitable for supply by lorry. Supplies were
sent from near Buiko on the Northern Railway by lorry to
Sonya, and thence to Kasigao by carriers. The telephone line
was already under construction as far as the frontier, and was
completed in a few days' time. From then on patrols pushing
out from Kasigao had several encounters with detachments of
the enemy, and did some damage to the Uganda Railway. But
the ruggedness of the country and the dense thorn-bush made
movement so difficult that by the time the South Africans
arrived, we had not derived full benefit from Kasigao as a base
for patrols. However, the continual menace to the railway had,
at any rate, obliged the enemy to take extensive measures for
its protection. Wide clearings had been made along it, of
which the outer edges had been closed by thick zarebas (abattis
of thorns). Every couple of miles there were strong block-
houses, or entrenchments with obstacles, from which the line
\vas constantly patrolled. Mobile supports, of the strength of
a company or more, were held in readiness, so that, whenever
the railway was reported to be in danger, they could at once go
off by special train. In addition, protective detachments were
pushed out in our direction, who tried to cut off our patrols
on their way back on receiving reports from spies or from
observation posts on the high ground. We also identified
English camps on the high ground south-east of Kasigao, as far
as the coast, and also in the settled country along the coast.
They also received attention from our patrols and raiders. Our
constant endeavour was to injure the enemy, to force him to
adopt protective measures, and thus to contain his forces here,
in the district of the Uganda Railway.

While thus establishing points of support for our fighting
patrols from the coast to Mbuyuni (on the Taveta-Voi road),
we worked in the same sense further north. The enemy's camp

77

My Reminiscences of East Africa

at Mzima, on the upper Tsavo River, and its communications,
which followed that river, were frequently the objective of our
expeditions, even of fairly large detachments. On one occasion
Captain Augar, with the I3th Company, was surprised south-
west of Mzima Camp in thick bush by three European com-
panies of the newly-arrived 2nd Rhodesian Regiment. The
enemy attacked from several directions, but being still inex-
perienced in bush fighting, failed to secure concerted action.
So our Askari Company was able first to overthrow one part of
the enemy's forces, and then by quickness and resolution to
defeat the other, which had appeared behind it.

Further north, also, there was some fighting in the bush
which went in our favour ; we worked with whole companies
and inflicted painful losses on the enemy, who was often in
greater force. North of the Engare Len the 3rd Field Company
from Lindi worked with special energy, and sent its fighting
patrols out as far as the Uganda Railway. The mere fact that
we were now able to make raids with forces amounting to a
company and more in the midst of a desert devoid of supplies,
and in many places waterless, shows the enormous progress the
force had made in this type of guerilla warfare. The European
had learned that a great many things that are very desirable
when travelling in the Tropics simply have to be dispensed with
on patrol in war, and that one can at a pinch get on for a time
with only a single carrier-load. The patrols also had to avoid
camping in such a way as to betray themselves, and as far as
possible to carry food ready prepared. But if food had to be
cooked, this was particularly dangerous in the evening or
morning ; the leader had to select a concealed spot, and in-
variably shift his camp after cooking before going to rest.
Complete hygienic protection was incompatible with the con-
ditions of patrol duty. A number of cases of malaria invariably
occurred among the members of a patrol after its return. But
as, in spite of the continual damage done to the enemy, patrol
duty only required comparatively few men, only a part of the
companies had to be kept in the front line. After a few weeks
each company was withdrawn to rest camps in healthy regions,

Awaiting the Great Offensive

European and Askari were able to recover from their tremen-
dous exertions, and their training and discipline could be
restored.

Towards the end of 1915 the shortage of water at Mbuyuni
Camp had become so serious, and supply so difficult, that only
a post was left there, the detachment itself being withdrawn to
the westward to the vicinity of Oldorobo Mountain. Mean-
while, the enemy's camp at Makatan grew steadily larger. A
frequent train service was maintained to it, and one could
clearly see a big clearing being made to the west for the pro-
longation of the railway. Our fighting patrols had, indeed,
many opportunities of inflicting losses on the enemy while at
work, or protecting his working parties, but the line continued
to make progress towards the west.

It was necessary to consider the possibility of the country
through which the Northern Railway passed soon falling
into the hands of the enemy. Steps had, therefore, to be taken
to safeguard the military stores in that district hi time. Where
railways were available this was, of course, not difficult ; but
the further transport by land needed much preparation. The
bulk of our stocks of ammunition, clothing and medical stores
was at New Moshi and Mombo. It was evident that we would
be unable to carry away the factories, or parts of them, by land ;
they must, therefore, be made use of and kept working for as
long as possible where they were. Assuming the enemy would
attack from the north, our evacuation would obviously be towards
the south, and not only the preparations, but the movement
itself, must be started without loss of time — that is, as early as
August, 1915.

The Commandant of the Line, Lieutenant Kroeber, retired,
therefore, in an able manner, collected light-railway material
from the plantations, and built a line from Mombo to Handeni,
at the rate of about two kilometres (one and a quarter miles)
per day. The trucks were also brought from the plantations,
and after mature consideration, man draught was decided on
in preference to locomotives. Thus our stores were moved from
the north by rail, complete, and in time, to Handeni. From there

79

My Reminiscences of East Africa

to Kimamba, on the Central Railway, we principally used
carriers, except for a few wagons. It was, after all, necessary
not to hurry the movement unduly, for, in spite of all the visible
preparations for a hostile attack on the Kilima Njaro country,
I still thought it possible that the main force of the enemy,
or at least a considerable proportion of it, would not operate
there, but in the Bagamoyo-Dar-es-Salaam area.

At the end of 1915 the enemy was pushing his rail-head further
and further westward, and Major Kraut, who was opposing him,
reinforced his position on Oldorobo Mountain with three com-
panies and two light guns. This mountain rises from the flat
thorn desert near the main road, seven and a half miles east of
Taveta, and dominates the country for a great distance all
round. Entrenchments and numerous dummy works had
been made, part being cut out of the rock, and formed an almost
impregnable fort. The disadvantage of the position was the
complete lack of water. A planter who had been called to the
Colours, Lieutenant Matuschka, of the Reserve, was an expert
water finder ; at Taveta he had discovered excellent wells ;
but on Oldorobo no water was found, although at the points he
indicated we dug down more than one hundred feet. Water
had therefore to be taken from Taveta on small donkey-carts
to Oldorobo, where it was collected in barrels. This carriage
of water was an extraordinary strain on our transport. Strangely
enough, it did not occur to the enemy to interfere with it, and
thus render Oldorobo Mountain untenable. Instead of that,
basing himself on his railway, he pushed up to within about
three miles of the mountain, where he established strongly
fortified camps. We had been unable to prevent this, as, owing
to difficulties of water and transport, larger forces could only
move away from Taveta for short periods. The enemy obtained
his water supply by means of a long pipe-line, which came from
the springs in the Bura Mountains. The destruction of the
enemy's reservoir by patrols under Lieutenant von S'Antenecai,
of the Reserve, only caused him temporary inconvenience.

At this time, also, the first hostile aeroplanes appeared, and
bombed our positions on Oldorobo Mountain, and at Taveta

80

Awaiting the Great Offensive

and later even New Moshi. On the 27th January one of
these airmen, while on his way back from Oldorobo, was success-
fully fired on and brought down by our advanced infantry.
The English had told the natives that this aeroplane was a new
" Munga " (God) ; but now that this new Munga had been
brought down and captured by us, it rather increased our
prestige than otherwise.

81

CHAPTER IX

THE SUBSIDIARY THEATRES OF WAR. GUERILLA WARFARE ASHORE
AND AFLOAT UNTIL NEW YEAR, 1916

WHILE employing the bulk of the Protective Force in the
regions on the Northern Railway we could not afford
entirely to denude the remainder of the Colony. In the interior
it was essential to remain undisputed master of the natives,
in order, if necessary, to enforce the growing demands for carriers,
agriculture, supplies, and all manner of work. Accordingly,
the I2th Company remained at Mahenge, and the 2nd at Iringa.
In addition to their other duties both of them acted as large
depots, serving to fill vacancies at the front, and providing
the machinery for raising new units.

The commanders of detachments on the frontiers, who were
far away from Headquarters and beyond the reach of the tele-
graph, rightly endeavoured to anticipate the enemy and to attack
him in his own territory. Owing to the lack of communications
on our side this fighting resolved itself into a series of local
operations, which were quite independent of each other. It was
different with the enemy, who clearly endeavoured to establish
a proper relationship between his main operations and the sub-
sidiary enterprises at other points on the frontier.

In October, 1914, before the fighting at Tanga, Captain Zimmer
reported from Kigoma that there were about 2,000 men on the
Belgian frontier ; and Captain Braunschweig sent word from
Muansa that at Kisumu on Lake Victoria there were also strong
hostile forces, about two companies at Kisii, and more troops
at Karungu. According to independent native reports, Indian
troops landed at Mombasa in October and were then transported
towards Voi. In the Bukoba District English troops crossed the

82

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

Kagera, and the sub-station at Umbulu reported that the
enemy was invading the Ssonyo country. Obviously these move-
ments were preparatory to the operations which were to be co-
ordinated with the great attack on Tanga in November, 1914.

>u«»)4*y«

\^\ Vjil'mo/rck b<j •

KCtu.to>VPV°
i •• •"•
Jtrleho \ ...

. ,3tahoL

™* V »-«fco>(
] Ca-vo CL •• .

The Subsidiary Actions
up to Aug. 1916.

Fig. vi. Subsidiary Actions up to August, 1916.

The means of intercommunication in the Colony were not
sufficiently developed to enable us rapidly to concentrate our
main force, first against one and then against another of these
hostile detachments deploying along the frontier. We had,
therefore, to adhere to the fundamental idea of our plan, of

83 6*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

vigorously attacking the enemy opposed to us in the area of the
Northern Railway and on the Uganda Railway, and of thus in-
directly relieving the other points where operations were in
progress. Of necessity, however, these subsidiary points had
occasionally to be reinforced. Thus, in September, 1914,
Captains Falkenstein and Aumann, with portions of the 2nd
Company, had moved from Iringa and Ubena into the Lan-
genburg District. In March, 1915, the 26th Field Company
was pushed up from Dar-es-Salaam via Tabora to Muansa.
In April, 1915, hostile concentration in the Mara Triangle
(east of Lake Victoria) and at Bismarckburg caused us to
waste much time in moving troops up from Dar-es-Salaam via
Muansa to the Mara Triangle, and via Kigoma to Bismarckburg.
The latter move was particularly delayed on Lake Tanganyika
owing to the slow progress being made on the steamer Gotzen,
which was building at Kigoma.

At first, the enemy's attacks were principally directed against
the coast.

At the commencement of the war our light cruiser Konigsberg
had left the harbour of Dar-es-Salaam and had, on the 29th
September, surprised and destroyed the English cruiser Pegasus
at Zanzibar. Then several large enemy cruisers had arrived
and industriously looked for the Konigsberg. On the igth Octo-
ber, at Lindi, a pinnace steamed up to the steamer Praesident,
of the East African Line, which was concealed in the Lukuledi
river. The local Defence Force raised at Lindi, and the Rein-
forcement Company, were at the moment away under Captain
Augar, to repel a landing expected at Mikindani, so that nothing
could be undertaken against the pinnace.

It was not till the 29th July, 1915, that several whalers went
up the Lukuledi and blew up the Praesident.

After successful cruises in the Indian Ocean the Konigsberg
had concealed herself in the Rufiji river, but her whereabouts
had become known to the enemy. The mouth of the river forms
an intricate delta, the view being obstructed by the dense bush
with which the islands are overgrown. The various river-mouths
were defended by the " Delta " Detachment, under Lieutenant-

84

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

Commander Schoenfeld ; this detachment consisted of Naval
ratings, European reservists, and Askari, and its strength was
about 150 rifles, a few light guns, and a few machine guns. The
enemy made many attempts to enter the river-mouths with
light craft, but was invariably repulsed with severe loss. The
Adjutant, a small steamer which the English had taken as a
good prize, and armed, was recaptured on one occasion, and was
used thenceforward by us as an auxiliary man-of-war on Lake
Tanganyika. Some English aircraft had also come to grief in
the Rufiji delta. A blockship, which the English had sunk
in the most northerly of the river-mouths, did not close the fair-
way. The frequent bombardments by ships' guns, which he had
no means of opposing, Lieut. -Commander Schoenfeld defeated
by the skilful design of his positions, and by shifting them in time.
Early in July, 1915, the English had brought to the Rufiji
two shallow-draught gun-boats, armed with heavy guns. On
the 6th July they made the first attack with four cruisers and
other arjned vessels, and two river gun-boats. The enemy
bombarded the Konigsberg, which was at anchor in the river
with aeroplane observation. The attack was beaten off, but when
it was repeated on the nth July, the Konigsberg suffered severely.
The gun-detachments were put out of action. The severely
wounded captain had the breech-blocks thrown overboard and
the ship blown up. The loss of the Konigsberg, though sad in
itself, had at least this advantage for the campaign on land,
that the whole crew and the valuable stores were now at the dis-
posal of the Protective Force.

Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld, who was in command on
land at the Rufiji delta, at once set himself with great forethought
to raise the parts of the guns that had been thrown overboard.
Under his supervision the ten guns of the Konigsberg were com-
pletely salved and got ready for action again ; five were mounted
at Dar-es-Salaam, two each at Tanga and Kigoma, and one at
Muansa. For their transport he made use of several vehicles
constructed for heavy loads which were found on a neighbouring
plantation. In their concealed positions on land these guns
rendered excellent service, and as far as I know not one of them

85

My Reminiscences of East Africa

was damaged on this service, although they were often bom-
barded by the enemy's vessels.

On the 26th September, by night, the steamer Wami was taken
out of the Rufiji to Dar-es-Salaam.

At the end of August several boats came to Lindi from Mozam-
bique with men belonging to the steamer Ziethen, in order to join
the Force.

On the loth January, 1915, about 300 Indian and black troops
with machine guns landed on the island of Mafia. Our police
detachment, three Europeans, fifteen Askari, and eleven recruits,
opposed them bravely for six hours, but surrendered when their
commander, Lieutenant Schiller of the Reserve, was severely
wounded, who had been maintaining a well-aimed fire on the
enemy from a mango tree. The English held Mafia with a few
hundred men, and also established posts of observation on the
smaller islands in the vicinity.

It was apparently from here that the work of rousing the
natives against us was undertaken. On the night of the 2gth~3oth
July, 1915, we captured a dhow at Kisija carrying propaganda
papers.

The events at Dar-es-Salaam, where, on the 22nd October,
the captain of an English cruiser declined to be bound by any
agreement, have already been discussed.

On the outbreak of hostilities an aeroplane, which had been
sent to Dar-es-Salaam for the Exhibition, was taken into use,
but was destroyed by an accident at Dar-es-Salaam on the I5th
November, when Lieutenant Henneberger lost his life.

At Tanga things had been quiet since the big battle of Novem-
ber, 1914. On the I3th March, 1915, a ship went ashore on a
reef, but got off again on the spring-tide. We at once began salving
200 tons of coal which had been thrown overboard.

Several rows of mines which had been made on the spot, and
could be fired from the shore, proved ineffective, and it was
found later that they had become unserviceable.

On the i5th August, 1915, the Hyacinth and four guard-boats
appeared off Tanga. Our two 2. 4-inch guns were quickly moved
from their rest-camp at Gombezi to Tanga, and with one light

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

gun from Tanga, took an effective part on the igth August, when
the Hyacinth reappeared with two gun-boats and six whalers,
destroyed the steamer Markgraf and bombarded Tanga. One
gun-boat was hit twice, the whalers, of which one steamed away
with a list,* four times.

Bombardments of the coast towns were constantly taking place.
On the 2Oth March a man-of-war bombarded Lindi, when its
demand for the surrender of the troops posted there was refused.
Similarly, the country south of Pangani was bombarded on the
ist April, the island of Kwale on the I2th, and the Rufiji delta
on the night of the 23rd-24th.

For some months past hostile patrols had been visiting the
Ssonyo country, between Kilima Njaro and Lake Victoria, and
the natives seemed inclined to become truculent. As a result
of their treachery, Sergeant-Ma j or Bast, who was sent there
with a patrol, was ambushed on the lyth November, 1914, and
lost his life with five Askari. The District Commissioner of
Arusha, Lieutenant Kaempfe of the Reserve, who had been called
up, undertook a punitive expedition which reduced the Ssonyo
people to submission.

It was not until July, 1915, that any further patrol encounters
took place in this country ; in one of them twenty-two hostile
armed natives were killed. At the end of September and early
October, 1915, Lieutenant Buechsel's mounted patrol spent several
weeks in Ssonyo and in the English territory without meeting
the enemy, as an English post, which had evidently been warned,
had made off.

On Lake Victoria the yth Company at Bukoba and the I4th
Company at Muansa could communicate with each other by wire-
less. The command of the Lake was undisputedly in the hands
of the English, as they had on it at least seven large steamers.
But in spite of this our small steamer Muansa and other smaller
vessels were able to maintain great freedom of movement.
While the Resident at Bukoba, Major von Stuemer, protected
the frontier with his police and with auxiliaries furnished by
friendly sultans, Captain Bock von Wiilfingen had marched with

* Seitenschlag.

My Reminiscences of East Africa

the main body of the 7th Company from Bukoba to Muansa.
From here he marched early in September, 1914, with a detach-
ment composed of parts of the 7th and I4th Companies, Wassa-
kuma recruits, and auxiliaries, along the eastern shore of Lake
Victoria to the north, in the direction of the Uganda Railway.
On the I2th September he drove back a hostile detachment at
Kisii, beyond the border, but on hearing of the approach of other
forces of the enemy he withdrew again to the south. After that
the frontier east of Lake Victoria was only defended by weak
detachments.

Warfare near Lake Victoria was for us very difficult ; there was
always the danger that the enemy might land at Muansa, or some
other place on the south shore, seize Usukuma and threaten
Tabora, the historic capital of the country. If, however, our troops
remained near Muansa, the country round Bukoba, and therefore
also Ruanda, would be in danger. The best results in this area
were to be expected from active operations under a united com-
mand. But the execution of this idea was not quite easy either,
for Major von Stuemer, who was the most obvious officer to be
entrusted with it, was tied by his work as Resident to the Bukoba
District, while that of Muansa was the more important of the two.

At the end of October, 1914, an attempt to take back part of
the troops in boats from Muansa to Bukoba had been frustrated
by the appearance of armed English ships at the former place.
Apparently the enemy had deciphered our wireless messages
and taken steps accordingly. On the 3ist October a force of
570 rifles, 2 guns and 4 machine guns, left Muansa for the relief
of Bukoba on board the steamer Muansa, 2 tugs and 10 dhows,
but was scattered the same morning by hostile steamers which
suddenly appeared ; they were, however, collected again at
Muansa without loss soon afterwards. On the same day the
English tried to land at Kayense, north of Muansa, but were pre-
vented ; a few days later, the English steamer Sybil was found on
shore at Mayita and destroyed.

On the 2oth November, in a twelve-hours' action, Stuemer's
detachment repulsed the English troops who had penetrated
into German territory, north of Bukoba, and defeated them again,

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

on the jth December, at Kifumbiro, after they had crossed the
Kagera river. On the 5th December, the English bombarded
Shirarti from the Lake, without success, and Bukoba on the 6th.

Minor encounters between patrols constantly took place east
and west of Lake Victoria. On the 8th January the enemy
attempted a more ambitious operation ; he bombarded Shirarti
from the Lake with six guns and with machine guns, and landed
two companies of Indians as well as a considerable number
of mounted Europeans. Lieutenant von Haxthausen, who
had only 22 rifles, gave way before this superior force after
fighting 3 1 hours. The enemy's strength was increased during
the next few days to 300 Europeans and 700 Indians. On
the I7th January, von Haxthausen defeated 70 Europeans
and 150 Askari with 2 machine guns on the frontier, and on
the 30th January the enemy left Shirarti and embarked for
Karungu. I believe this withdrawal was a result of the severe
defeat sustained by the enemy at Jassini on the i8th. He
considered it desirable to re-concentrate his forces nearer the
Uganda Railway, where they would be more readily available.

On the west side of the Lake, Captain von Bock surprised a
hostile post of 40 men north of Kifumbiro and drove it off with
a loss of 17 killed.

On the 6th March, 1915, English vessels had attacked the
steamer Muansa in Rugesi Passage. Muansa had sprung a leak
and went ashore close to the land. The enemy attempted to
tow her off, but was prevented by our fire, so that we were able,
the next day, to salve the steamer and get her away to Muansa,
where she was repaired. The difficulty of moving troops by water
between Muansa and Bukoba rendered the continuation of the
single command unworkable ; the officers commanding the two
Districts were therefore placed directly under Headquarters.

The English attempted to land at Mori Bay on the 4th March,
at Ukerewe on the 7th, and at Musoma on the gth ; all these
attempts were defeated by our posts. At the same time, several
patrol encounters occurred near Shirarti, in which the commander,
Lieutenant Recke, was killed, and our patrols were dispersed.
On the Qth March, Lieutenant von Haxthausen, with 100 Euro-

89

My Reminiscences of East Africa

peans and Askari, defeated an enemy many times his superior
at Maika Mountain ; the enemy withdrew after having 17 whites
and a considerable number of Askari killed. On our side, one
European and 10 Askari were killed, 2 Europeans and 25
Askari wounded, while one wounded European was taken
prisoner. Besides the 26th Field Company already mentioned,
Muansa was reinforced by 100 Askari from Bukoba District,
who arrived on the 6th April.

Early in April a few places on the eastern shore were again
bombarded from the Lake ; at the same time some Masai made
an invasion east of the lake, killed a missionary and several
natives, and looted cattle. In the middle of April, Captain
Braunschweig left Muansa with no Europeans, 430 Askari,
2 machine guns, and 2 guns, for the Mara Triangle, and re-
inforced Lieutenant von Haxthausen. Over 500 rifles remained
at Muansa.

On the 4th May, in Mara Bay, an English steamer was hit
three times by a '73 pattern field-gun, which apparently prevented
a landing. On the I2th May 300 men landed at Mayita ; but
they steamed off again on the i8th June, towing the wreck of
the Sybil with them. By the 20th May the enemy, who had 900
men there, had also evacuated the Mara Triangle, and entrenched
himself on several mountains beyond the frontier. Bombard-
ments of the shore took place frequently at that time.

Since early December, 1914, Major von Stuemer had held a
very extended position on the Kagera. Gradually the enemy,
who was estimated at about 300 men, became more active.
He seemed to be collecting material for crossing the Kagera,
and his ships appeared more frequently in Sango Bay.

On the night of the 4th~5th June, on the Shirarti frontier,
Becker's post of 10 men was surrounded by 10 Europeans and 50
Indians of the 98 th Regiment. An armed steamer also took part.
But the enemy was beaten, losing 2 Europeans and 5 Askari
killed.

I may here mention that the enemy's armed scouts used
poisoned arrows on the Shirarti frontier also.

On the 2ist June the English, with a force of 800 Europeans

90

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

400 Askari, 300 Indians, 3 guns and 8 machine guns, and
supported by the fire of the armed steamers, attacked Bukoba.
Our garrison of little more than 200 rifles evacuated the place after
two days of fighting. The enemy plundered it, destroyed the
wireless tower, and left again on the 24th towards Kissumu.
He had suffered severely, admitting 10 Europeans killed and 22
wounded. The Germans had, however, observed that a steamer
had left with about 150 dead and wounded on board. On our
side 2 Europeans, 5 Askari, and 7 auxiliaries had been killed,
4 Europeans and 30 coloured men wounded, and we also lost
the gun.

Of the events of the ensuing period it may be remarked that
Bukoba was bombarded without result on the i8th July. In
Mpororo a great chief went over to the English.

On the I2th September one of the Konigsberg's four-inch guns
arrived at Muansa, where we had in process of time raised five
new companies among the Wassukuma people.

It seemed as though the enemy were rather holding back at
Bukoba, and moving troops from there to Kissenyi. On the
2Qth October the English attacked with some one hundred rifles,
machine guns, a gun, and a trench mortar, but were repulsed,
apparently with heavy casualties. Hostile attacks on the lower
Kagera on the 4th and 5th December were also unsuccessful.
Several detachments of the enemy invaded the Karagwe country.
The command at Bukoba was taken over by Captain Gudovius,
hitherto District Commissioner in Tangarei, who marched off
from Tabora on the 2ist December, and was followed by the
newly-raised yth Reserve Company as a reinforcement for
Bukoba.

In Ruanda the energetic measures adopted by the President,
Captain Wintgens, produced good results. On the 24th Sep-
tember he surprised the island of Ijvi in Lake Kivu, and cap-
tured the Belgian post stationed there, and its steel boat. Another
steel boat had been captured by Lieutenant Wunderlich, of the
Navy, who had moved to Lake Kivu with some men of the
Moewe, where he had requisitioned a motor-boat. On the
4th October, Wintgens, with his Police Askari, some auxiliaries,

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and a few men of the Moewe, drove back several companies
of Belgians north of Kissenyi, inflicting heavy casualties on
them. After some minor engagements, Captain Wintgens then
inflicted a partial defeat on the superior Belgian force of seven-
teen hundred men and six guns, north of Kissenyi, on the 20th
and 3Oth November, and again on the 2nd December, 1914.
Near Lake Tshahafi he drove out an English post. One English-
man and twenty Askari were killed ; we had two Askari killed
and one European severely wounded.

After that, in February, 1915, several minor actions were
fought near Kissenyi and on the frontier. On the 28th May,
Lieutenant Lang, commanding the small garrison of Kissenyi,
beat off the Belgians, who had seven hundred men and two
machine guns. The enemy sustained heavy losses ; we had one
European killed.

In June, 1915, it was said that over two thousand Belgian
Askari, with nine guns, and five hundred English Askari were
concentrated near Lake Kivu, the fact that the Belgian Com-
mander-in-Chief, Tombeur, went to Lake Kivu makes this
information appear probable. On the 2ist June the Belgians
attacked Kissenyi with nine hundred men, two machine guns
and two guns, but were repulsed. On the 5th July they again
attacked the place by night with four hundred men, and suffered
severe losses. On the 3rd August Kissenyi was ineffectively
bombarded by artillery and machine guns. In consequence of
the crushing superiority of the enemy, the 26th Field Company
was transferred from Muansa to Kissenyi.

Immediately after the arrival of this company at Kissenyi,
on the 3ist August, Captain Wintgens defeated the Belgian
outposts, of whom ten Askari were killed. On September 2nd
he took by storm a position held by one hundred and fifty Askari,
with three guns and one machine gun. During the next few
weeks minor actions were fought every day. On the 3rd October
an attack on Kissenyi by two hundred and fifty Askari with a
machine gun was repulsed, and fourteen casualties were observed
among the enemy. After that, possibly in consequence of the
action at Luwungi on the 27th September, considerable forces

92

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

of the enemy were discovered to have marched off for the
south.

On the 22nd October another Belgian detached post of three
hundred Askari, with two guns and two machine guns, was sur-
prised, when the enemy had ten Askari killed. On the 26th
November the Ruanda Detachment, with one platoon of the
7th Company, which had arrived from Bukoba, in all three
hundred and twenty rifles, four machine guns and one 1. 45-inch
gun, drove the enemy, numbering two hundred, out of a fortified
position, when he lost two Europeans and seventy Askari
killed, five Askari prisoners, and many wounded. We had
one European and three Askari killed, four Europeans, five
Askari and one auxiliary wounded. On the 2ist December
the enemy once more attacked Kissenyi with one thousand
Askari, two machine guns and eight guns, including four
modern 2. 75-inch howitzers. He left behind twenty-one dead
Askari, three were captured, wounded, and many wounded
were carried away. Our force of three hundred and fifty rifles,
four machine guns and two guns, had three Askari killed, one
European and one Askari severely wounded.

On the I2th January, 1916, Captain Wintgens surprised a
Belgian column north of Kissenyi, killing eleven Belgian Askari.
On the 27th January Captain Klinghardt, with three companies,
beat off an attack on the Kissenyi position made by two thousand
Belgian Askari with hand grenades and twelve guns, inflicting
severe casualties on them.

In the Russissi country there were also numerous engagements.
Successful minor actions between German patrols and Congo
troops had taken place on the loth and I3th October, 1914, at
Changugu, on the 2ist and 22nd at Chiwitoke, and on the 24th
at Kajagga.

On the I2th January, 1915, Captain Schimmer attacked a
Belgian camp at Luwungi, but the intended surprise was unsuc-
cessful. Captain Zimmer and three Askari were killed and five
wounded.

Then, on the i6th, i7th and 2Oth March small patrol skirmishes

93

My Reminiscences of East Africa

took place, and on the 20th May a Belgian post was surprised.
There was thus incessant fighting, which continued in June and
July. In August the enemy seemed to be increasing his forces
in that region. The command on the Russissi was now taken
over by Captain Schulz ; the forces we had there now consisted
of four field companies, part of the crew of the Moewe, and the
Urundi Detachment, which about equalled one company. There
were also two light guns there. On the 27th September Captain
Schulz attacked Luwungi, when we were able to establish that
the enemy lostjfifty-four Askari killed, and we also counted
seventy-one Askari hit. So the enemy's losses amounted to
about two hundred, as confirmed by native reports received
later. We had four Europeans and twenty Askari killed, nine
Europeans and thirty-four Askari wounded.

Owing to the nature of the country and the relative strengths,
we were unable to achieve a decisive success on the Russissi.
Only the Urundi Detachment and one field company were,
therefore, left there ; two companies left on the i8th and igth
December, 1915, to join Captain Wintgens in Ruanda ; three
others moved to the Central Railway.

On the igth October the enemy met the I4th Reserve Com-
pany, and although outnumbering it by two to one, lost twenty
Askari, while we had three Askari killed and twelve wounded.
Although the Belgian main camp, which reliable natives reported
to contain two thousand Askari, was so near, it was possible
to reduce the troops on the Russissi in favour of other districts,
since on both sides the conditions seemed unfavourable for an
offensive. The Urundi Detachment and the I4th Reserve Com
pany remained on the Russissi under Major von Langenn.

On Lake Tanganyika, at the beginning of the war, Captain
Zimmer had collected about one hundred men of the Moewe,
and in Usambara, about one hundred Askari ; in addition, he
had a few Europeans who were called up in Kigoma, also some
one hundred Askari belonging to the posts in Urundi and from
Ruanda (Wintgens) — all told, about four hundred rifles.

On the 22nd August, 1914, Lieutenant Horn, of the Moewe,

94

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

commanding the small armed steamer Hedwig von Wissmann,
fought a successful action against the Belgian steamer Del-
commune. The captain of the Moewe, Lieutenant-Commander
Zimmer, had gone to Kigoma with his crew, after destroying his
ship, which had been blown up in August, 1914. The steamer
Kingani, which had also been transported to the same place by
rail from Dar-es-Salaam, and several smaller craft on Lake Tan-
ganyika, were then armed and put in commission by Lieutenant-
Commander Zimmer. He also mounted a 3. 5-inch naval gun
on a raft and bombarded a number of Belgian stations on the
shore. He strongly fortified Kigoma itself, and developed it
into a base for naval warfare on Lake Tanganyika.

On the 2Oth November, 1914, the Bismarckburg Detachment
(half company), co-operating with the small armed steamers
Hedwig von Wissmann and Kingani, drove off a Belgian com-
pany in the bay west of Bismarckburg, captured four .43-inch
machine guns and over ninety miles of telegraph wire, which was
used to continue the line Kilossa-Iringa up to New Langenburg, a
work which was, from a military point of view, extremely urgent.

Early in October attempts were made to complete the destruc-
tion of the Belgian steamer Delcommune, which was lying at
Baraka, on the Congo shore, but without success. After bom-
barding her once more on the 23rd October, Captain Zimmer
looked upon her as permanently out of action. On the 27th
February, 1915, the crew of the Hedwig von Wissmann surprised
a Belgian post at Tombwe, and captured its machine gun.
One Belgian officer and ten Askari were killed, one severely
wounded Belgian officer and one Englishman were captured.
We had one Askari killed, one European mortally wounded, one
Askari severely wounded.

In March, 1915, the Belgians made arrests on a large scale in
Ubwari, the inhabitants of which had shown themselves friendly
to ,us, and hanged a number of people.

According to wireless messages which we took in, several
Belgian whale-boats were got ready on Lake Tanganyika during
June, and work was being carried on on a new Belgian steamer,
the Baron Dhanis. On our side the steamer Goetzen was com-

95

My Reminiscences of East Africa

pleted on the gth June, 1915, and taken over by the Force. She
rendered good service in effecting movements of troops on Lake
Tanganyika.

The Police at Bismarckburg, under Lieutenant Haun of the
Reserve, the capable administrator of the Baziots, had joined
the Protective Force. Several skirmishes took place in hostile
territory, and in this district also the enemy was, on the whole,
kept successfully at a distance.

It was not till early in February, 1915, that several hundred
hostile Askari invaded Abercorn, and some of them penetrated
to near Mwasge Mission, but then retired.

Then, in the middle of March, Lieutenant Haun's force was
surprised in camp at Mount Kito.by an Anglo-Belgian detach-
ment. The Commander was severely wounded and taken
prisoner, and several Askari were killed. Lieutenant Aumann,
with a force subsequently formed into a company, was detached
from Captain Falkenstein, and covered the German border
in the neighbourhood of Mbozi, where, in February, 1915,
detachments several hundred strong had frequently invaded
German territory ; at the end of March an unknown number
of Europeans were reported in Karonga, while at Fife and other
places on the frontier there were some eight hundred men. So
the enemy appeared to be preparing to attack. He was patrol-
ling as far as the country near Itaka, and early in April it was
reported that Kituta, at the southern end of Lake Tanganyika,
had been entrenched by the Belgians. Major von Langenn,
who, after recovering from his severe wound — he had lost an eye
—was working on the Russissi river, was entrusted with the
conduct of operations in the well-known Bismarckburg-Langen-
burg country. Besides the 5th Field Company, which he had
formerly commanded, and which was stationed at Ipyana and
in the Mbozi country, he was also given the Bismarckburg Detach-
ment, strength about one company, and three companies which
were brought up from Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma. During
their passage to Bismarckburg on the Lake successful actions
were fought east of that place by our patrols against hostile
raiding parties of fifty to two hundred and fifty men.

96

Native Women.

(Froii a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

[To face p. 96.

Natives bringing food.

(From a drawing by General yon Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

By the yth May, 1915, Major von Langenn had assembled
four companies at Mwasge ; a Belgian detachment stationed
in front of him withdrew. On the 23rd May Lieutenant von
Delschitz's patrol drove off a Belgian company, of which two
Europeans and six Askari were killed. On the 24th orders were
sent to Langenn to move with three companies to New Lan-
genburg to meet the attack which was reported to be impend-
ing in that quarter. General Wahle took over the command in
the Bismarckburg area. The latter arrived at Kigoma on the
6th June, and collected at Bismarckburg the Bismarckburg
Detachment, now re-formed as the 2Qth Field Company, as well
as the 24th Field Company and a half-company of Europeans
brought up from Dar-es-Salaam.

On the 28th June General Wahle attacked Jericho Farm with
two and a half companies, but broke off the engagement on
realizing that this fortified position could not be taken without
artillery. We had three Europeans and four Askari killed, two
Europeans and twenty-two Askari wounded. General Wahle
was reinforced by two companies from Langenburg.

Since the 25th July, 1915, General Wahle was besieging the
enemy, who was strongly entrenched at Jericho, with four
companies and two i873-pattern guns. Relief expeditions from
Abercorn were defeated, but the siege was raised on the 2nd
August, as no effect could be produced with the guns available.
General Wahle returned to Dar-es-Salaam with three companies.
The 29th Company remained at Jericho, the two guns at Kigoma.

Or the i gth June the Goetzen towed oft the steamer Cecil
Rhodes, which was lying beached at Kituta, and sank her.

During September and October there were continual skir-
mishes between patrols on the border near Bismarckburg ;
Belgian reinforcements again invaded the country about Aber-
corn. On the 3rd December it was observed that the defences
of Jericho had been abandoned and dismantled. A new fort,
north-east of Abercorn, was bombarded by Lieutenant Franken
on the 6th December with one hundred rifles and one machine
gun ; the enemy appeared to sustain some casualties.

The English Naval Expedition, the approach of which, by

97 7

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Bukoma and Elizabeth ville, had long been under observation,
had reached the Lukuga Railway on the 22nd October, 1919.
We picked up leaflets which stated that a surprise was being
prepared for the Germans on Lake Tanganyika ; this made me
think that we might now have to deal with specially-built small
craft which might possibly be equipped with torpedoes. We
had, therefore, to meet a very serious menace to our command
of Lake Tanganyika, which might prove decisive to our whole
campaign. The simultaneous transfer of hostile troops towards
Lake Kivu and Abercorn proved that an offensive by land
was to be co-ordinated with the expedition. In order to defeat
the enemy if possible while his concentration was still in pro-
gress, Captain Schulz attacked the Belgians at Luwungi on the
27th September, inflicting heavy loss.

On the night of the 28th October the steamer Kingani surprised
a Belgian working-party, who were constructing a telegraph
line, and captured some stores. In the mouth of the Lukuga
river a railway train was observed on the move. At last, the
Kingani did not return from a reconnaissance to the mouth of
the Lukuga, and, according to a Belgian wireless message of the
3ist December, she had been lost, four Europeans and eight
natives were said to have been killed, the remainder to have been
captured. Evidently, the favourable opportunity for interfer-
ing with the enemy's preparations for gaining command of the
Lake had passed.

Then, on the gth February, 1916, another of our armed
steamers was captured by the enemy.

On Lake Nyassa the German steamer Hermann von Wissmann,
whose captain did not know that war had broken out, was sur-
prised and taken by the English Government steamer Gwendolen
on the I3th August, 1914.

On the gth September, 1914, Captain von Langenn, with his
5th Field Company, which was stationed at Massoko, near
New Langenburg, had attacked the English station of Karongo.
In the action with the English, who were holding a fortified
position, Captain von Langenn himself was severely wounded.
The two company officers were also severely wounded and taken

98

The Subsidiary Theatres of War

prisoners. The German non-commissioned officers and the
Askari fought very gallantly, but were obliged to recognize
that they could do nothing against the enemy's entrenchments,
and, therefore, broke off the hopeless engagement. Over twenty
Askari had been killed, several machine guns and light guns
had been lost. Reinforcements from the 2nd Company at once
arrived from Iringa and Ubena, and several hundred Wahehe
auxiliaries were raised. Gradually it turned out that the enemy
had also suffered severely. He avoided expeditions on a large
scale against the Langenburg District, and so this fertile country,
which was so necessary to us as a source of supply, remained in
our possession for eighteen months.

Later on our company at Langenburg moved its main body
nearer the border to Ipyana Mission. On the 2nd November
an affair of outposts occurred on the Lufira river, and the
steamer Gwendolen on Lake Nyassa was hit several times by
our artillery.

Early in December, 1914, some fighting between patrols took
place north of Karongo, on the Ssongwe river. Lieutenant
Dr. Gothein, of the Medical Corps, who had been returned to us
from captivity by the English in May, 1915, told us that in the
first action at Karongo, on the gih September, 1914, the enemy
had had six Europeans and fifty Askari killed, and seven Euro-
peans and more than fifty Askari severely wounded. The
English spies were very active, especially through the agency of
the " Vali," the native administrative official, on the Ssongwe.

In May, 1915, we were able to effect several successful sur-
prises on the frontier. The rains were late, so that we could
consider the southern part of Langenburg District as safe from
attack until the end of June.

In June, 1915, when Major von Langenn had arrived with his
reinforcements, there were, contrary to our expectations, no
considerable actions. We made use of the time to dismantle
a telegraph line in English territory, and to put it up again in
our own, in the direction of Ubena. In August, the rumours of
an intended attack by the enemy were again falsified. It was
not till the 8th October that considerable hostile forces of Euro-

99 7*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

peans and Askari arrived at Fife. On this border also there
were numerous little skirmishes. Towards the end of the year
the arrival of fresh reinforcements at Ikawa was also established.
In that region, on the 23rd December, 1915, Captain Aumann
repulsed a force of about 60 Europeans with 2 machine guns,
who were attempting a surprise.

On the shores of Lake Nyassa there were only insignificant
encounters.

On the 30th May the English landed 30 Europeans, 200 Askari
2 guns and 2 machine guns at Sphinx Harbour. We had there
13 rifles and one machine gun, who inflicted on them, appar-
ently, over 20 casualties, whereupon, after destroying the wreck
of the Hermann von Wissmann, they retired.

100

PART II

THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK BY SUPERIOR FORCES

(From the arrival of the South African troops to the loss of the

Colony)

CHAPTER I
THE ENEMY'S ATTACK AT OLDOROBO MOUNTAIN

EAST of Oldorobo the enemy now frequently showed con-
siderable bodies of troops, amounting to 1,000 or more
men, who deployed in the direction of the mountain at great
distances, but did not approach it closely. These movements,
therefore, were exercises, by which the young European troops
from South Africa were to be trained to move and fight in the
bush.

Early in February the enemy advanced against Oldorobo from
the east with several regiments. For us it was desirable that he
should take so firm a hold there that he could not get away
again, so that we could defeat him by means of a counter-attack
with Captain Schulz' Detachment, encamped at Taveta. Other
German detachments, of several companies each, were stationed
west of Taveta on the road .to New Moshi, and on that to Kaho,
at New Steglitz Plantation.

On the I2th February again, European troops, estimated at
several regiments, advanced to within 300 yards of Oldorobo.
Headquarters at New Moshi, which was in constant telephonic
communication with Major Kraut, considered that the favour-
able opportunity had now presented itself, and ordered fire to be
opened. The effect of our machine-guns, and our two light guns,
had been reported to be good, when Headquarters left New
Moshi by car for the field of battle. Schulz' Detachment was
ordered to march from Taveta along the rear of Kraut's Detach-
ment, covered from the fire of the enemy's heavy artillery, and
to make a decisive attack on the enemy's right, or northern,
wing. The troops at New Steglitz advanced to Taveta, where
some fantastic reports came in about hostile armoured cars,

103

My Reminiscences of East Africa

which were alleged to be moving through the thorn-bush desert.
The imagination of the natives, to whom these armoured cars
were something altogether new and surprising, had made them
see ghosts. On arriving on Oldorobo, Headquarters was informed
by telephone that the enemy, who had attacked our strongly
entrenched front, had been repulsed with heavy losses, and that
Schulz' Detachment was fully deployed and advancing against
his right flank. The numerous English howitzer shells which
fell in our position on Oldorobo did hardly any damage, although
they were very well placed. In contrast to the great expenditure
of ammunition by the hostile artillery, our light guns had to
restrict themselves to taking advantage of specially favourable
targets, not only because ammunition was scarce, but also because
we had no shrapnel. The enemy retreated through the bush
in disorder. We buried more than 60 Europeans. According
to prisoners' statements and captured papers, three regiments
of the 2nd South African Infantry Brigade had been in action.
According to the documents it appeared that in recruiting the
men the prospect of acquiring farms and plantations had been
used as a bait. The sudden illness of the British General Smith-
Dorrien, who was already on his way out to take over command
in East Africa, may not have been altogether inconvenient to the
English. The transfer of the command to a South African,
General Smuts, re-acted favourably on recruiting in South Africa.
The training of these newly raised formations was slight, and the
conduct of the Europeans, many of whom were very young,
proved that many had never yet taken part in a serious action.
After the action of Oldorobo, however, we observed that the
enemy sought very thoroughly to make good the deficiencies in
his training.

In spite of pursuit by Schulz' Detachment, and repeated fire
opened on collections of hostile troops, the enemy, owing to the
difficult and close nature of the country, made good his escape to
his fortified camps.

It was interesting to find, in several diaries we picked up,
notes to the effect that strict orders had been given to take no
prisoners. As a matter of fact the enemy had taken none,

104 ,

The Enemy *s 'Attack at Oldorobo Mountain

(

Fig. i

Fig. vii. Battle of Yasin (Jassini). Fig. viii. Kilima Njaro and Masai Desert.
Fig. ix. Battle of Reata. Fig. x. Battle of Kahe.

105

My Reminiscences of East Africa

but it seemed advisable nevertheless to address an inquiry to the
British Commander, in order that we might regulate our conduct
towards the English prisoners accordingly. There is no reason
to doubt Brigadier-General Malleson's statement that no such
order was given ; but this case, and several later instances, show
what nonsense is to be found in private diaries. It was quite
wrong on the part of the enemy if he accepted the German
notes which fell into his hands as true, without detailed investi-
gation.

At this time also the hostile troops on Longido Mountain had
been considerably reinforced. This mountain had been evacuated
by the enemy, probably owing to difficulties of supply, but had
latterly been re-occupied. The rock is covered with dense vege-
tation, and our patrols had several times ascended it and examined
the enemy's camps at close quarters. It is at any time difficult
correctly to estimate the strength of troops, but in bush country,
where more than a few men are never to be seen at a time, and
where the view is constantly changing, it is impossible. The
reports of the natives were too inaccurate. On the whole, how-
ever, we could but conclude from the general situation, and from
the increased quantity of supplies which were being brought to
Longido from the north, by ox wagon, without interruption, that
the enemy was being considerably reinforced.

His raids into the Kilima Njaro country had been repulsed with
slaughter. When a squadron of Indian Lancers moved south,
between Kilima Njaro and Meru Mountain, it was at once
vigorously attacked by one of our mounted patrols under Lieu-
tenant Freiherr von Lyncker. Our Askari had come to under-
stand the great value of saddle-horses in our operations, and
charged the enemy, who was mounted, with the cry : " Wahindi,
kameta frasi ! " (" They are Indians, catch the horses ! ")
The Indians were so surprised by the rapidity of our people that
they fled in confusion, leaving some of their horses behind.
Among others the gallant European commander had been left
dead on the field ; he had not been able to prevent his men from
losing their heads.

I should like to remark generally that during this first period

1 06

The Enemy's Attack at Oldorobo Mountain

of the war the conduct of the British regular officers was invariably
chivalrous, and that the respect they paid us was fully recipro-
cated. But our Askari also earned the respect of the enemy by
their bravery in action and their humane conduct. On the loth
March the English Lieutenant Barrett was severely wounded
and fell into our hands ; owing to false accounts he thought his
last moment had come, and was surprised when our Askari,
who had no European with them, tied him up as well as they
could and carried him to a doctor. In his astonishment he
remarked : " Why, your Askari are gentlemen." How greatly
the English soldiers had been misled I learned on the I2th Feb-
ruary from a young South African captured on Oldorobo, who
asked whether he was going to be shot. Of course we laughed at
him. No doubt, in a long war, cases of brutality and in-
humanity do occur. But that happens on both sides, and one
should not generalize from isolated cases, and exploit them for the
purpose of unworthy agitation, as has been done by the English
Press.

107

CHAPTER II

FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE ENEMY AND THE ACTION AT REATA

AT that time we noticed the first parties of hostile spies, and
captured some of them. They were " Shensi " (inno-
cent-looking natives), who, as a proof of having really reached the
objective of their mission, had to bring back certain objects,
such as parts of the permanent way of the Usambara Railway.
The general review of the situation showed that the enemy was
making a detailed reconnaissance of the Usambara Railway
and the approaches to it. A glance at the map shows that a
simultaneous advance by the enemy from Oldorobo and Longido
towards New Moshi was bound to entail the loss of the Kilima
Njaro country, which was of value to us from the point of view of
maintenance. If, however, we wanted to retire before a superior
enemy on our main line of communication, we should be obliged
to move our main forces along the Usambara Railway, thus
making almost an acute angle with the direction of an attack
coming from Oldorobo. The danger of being cut off by the enemy
from this, our principal line of communication, was for us very
great. Should the enemy advance north of Lake Jipe, he would
be cramped by Kilima Njaro and by the steep group of the
North Pare Mountains. It is obvious that in that case his advance
directly on Kahe would be the most inconvenient for us, and if
successful, would cut the Usambara Railway, our line of communi-
cations. But it would be even more serious for us if the enemy
should pass south of Lake Jipe, and press forward by the valley
leading between the North and Middle Pare, to the Northern
Railway, south of Lembeni. Finally, he could reach the rail-
way by way of the valley at Same, between the Middle and South
Pare. In his advance on Lembeni and Same the enemy would be

108

Further Advance of the Enemy

able to make a road suitable for motor traffic with rapidity, and
in places without preparation, across the open plain, and to base
his operations upon it.

The small forces we had in the Kilima Njaro country — about
4,000 rifles — rendered it impossible to divide them in order to
render ourselves secure against all these possibilities. Even
for purely defensive reasons we must keep our forces concentrated
and maintain close touch with the enemy, in order to hold him
fast where we were, and thus keep his movements under observa-
tion. It was from the outset very doubtful whether we could
in succession defeat the two main hostile groups, whose advance
towards the Kilima Njaro country was to be expected from
Longido and Makatau, and which were each considerably stronger
than ourselves. There was no prospect of doing so unless our
troops could be moved with lightning rapidity, first against one
of the enemy's forces and then, just as quickly, against the other.
The necessary preparations were made, and after personal recon-
naissance, a number of cross-country tracks in the nigged forest
country north of the great road which leads from New Moshi
to the west were decided upon. As it happened, no considerable
use was made of these tracks. It would not do to be afraid of
trying anything ninety-nine times, if there was a chance of suc-
ceeding at the hundredth. In following this principle we did not
do badly.

The enemy's activity increased, and he displayed good training
in numerous minor encounters. He had also raised a number of
new Askari formations, largely recruited among the intelligent
tribes of the Wyassa country. Being only sparsely covered with
bush, and therefore very open, the desert country lying to the
north-west of Kilima Njaro did not favour sudden offensive
operations by us ; for this purpose the dense bush district
between Kilima Njaro and Mem Mountain itself, which the
enemy, coming from Longido, would probably have to traverse,
was more promising. Here we concentrated a detachment of
some 1,000 rifles, composed of five selected Askari Companies.
But, owing to the limited range of vision, this detachment did
not succeed in forcing a decisive engagement on any of the

109

My Reminiscences of East Africa

numerous hostile columns which pushed down to the south in
the beginning of March. The enemy, also, had great difficulty in
finding his way ; and we only learned from an Indian despatch-
rider, who brought a report to us instead of to his own people,
that the ist East African Division, under General Stewart, was
in this district. As these encounters took place in the neigh-
bourhood of Gararagua, and south-west of that place, it was too
far away for our reserves at New Steglitz and Himo to inter-
vene. (It is about two marches from Gararagua to New Moshi.)
Before the chance of doing so arrived the enemy also advanced
from the east. The direction taken by the enemy's airmen
showed his evident interest in the country one or two hours north
of Taveta. One was bound to hit on the idea that the enemy
encamped east of Oldorobo did not intend to get his head broken
a second time on that mountain, but meant to work round the
position by the north, and so reach the Lumi River, one hour
north of Taveta. On the 8th March observers on Oldorobo
noticed huge clouds of dust moving from the enemy's camp in
that direction. Numerous motors were also seen. From East
Kitovo, a mountain four miles west of Taveta, Headquarters
also observed these movements. Our fighting patrols, who were
able to fire with effect on the hostile columns, and to take a few
prisoners, established with certainty that the enemy's main force
was approaching at this point, and that General Smuts was
present.

On the afternoon of the 8th March Headquarters observed
strong hostile columns near Lake Dsalla, who advanced from there
in a widely extended line of skirmishers for some distance towards
East Kitovo. On this occasion, and on many others, our want of
artillery obliged us to look on quietly while the enemy executed
unskilful movements at no great distance from our front. But
it was evident that this enveloping movement of the enemy
rendered the Oldorobo position, to which we owed many successful
engagements during the course of the war, untenable. I there-
fore decided to deploy the troops for a fresh stand on the moun-
tains which close the gap between the North Pare Mountains
and Kilima Njaro to the westward of Taveta. Kraut's Detach-
no

Further Advance of the Enemy

ment was ordered by telephone to take up a position on the
Resta-Latema Mountains, on the road leading from Taveta to
New Steglitz. North-west of Latema Mountain, on the road
from Taveta to Himo, Schulz's Detachment- occupied the moun-
tains of North Kitovo, and covered the move of Kraut's Detach-
ment. These movements were executed by night, without being
interfered with by the enemy. On our extreme left wing, on the
south-eastern slopes of Kilima Njaro, Captain Stemmermann's
Company blocked the road leading from Rombo Mission to Himo
and New Moshi. Rombo Mission was occupied by the enemy.
Some of the natives made no attempt to conceal the fact that they
now adhered to the English. This lends colour to the supposi-
tion that English espionage and propaganda among the natives
had for a long time been going on in this district, and that the
light-signals which had often been seen on the eastern slopes of
Kilima Njaro had some connection with it.

The mountain position taken up by us was very favourable
as regards ground, but suffered from the great disadvantage that
our few thousand Askari were far too few really to fill up the
front, which was some 12 miles in extent. Only a few points
in the front line could be occupied ; the bulk of the force was kept
at my disposal at Himo, to be brought into action according to
how the situation might develop. It was a time of great tension.
Before us was the greatly superior enemy ; behind us, advancing
to the south from Londigo, another superior opponent, while
our communications, which also formed our line of retreat, were
threatened by the enemy in the very unpleasant manner already
described. But, in view of the ground, which we knew, and the
apparently not too skilful tactical leading on the part of the
enemy, I did not think it impossible to give at least one of his
detachments a thorough beating. The positions on the line
Reata-North Kitovo were therefore to be prepared for a stubborn
defence. From Tanga, one of the Konigsberg's guns mounted
there was brought up by rail. The reader will rightly ask why
this had not been done long before. But the gun had no wheels,
and fired from a fixed pivot, so that it was very immobile. It is
therefore comprehensible that we delayed bringing it into action

in

My Reminiscences of East Africa

until there could be no doubt as to the precise spot where it would
be wanted.

The situation now developed so rapidly that the gun could not
be used against Taveta. It was therefore mounted near the
railway at Kahe, on the south bank of the Pangani River, from
which position it did excellent service later in the actions at
Kahe.

On the loth March the enemy reconnoitred along our whole
front. Mounted detachments of about 50 men rode up, dis-
mounted, and then advanced in a widely extended line, leading
their horses, until they were fired on. This was their object.
The fire disclosed our positions, although imperfectly. This
method of reconnaissance gave us the opportunity for scoring
local successes, which cost the enemy a certain number of men,
and brought us in some score of horses. From North Kitovo
Mountain we could plainly see how portions of our firing line,
taking advantage of favourable situations, rapidly advanced
and fired upon the enemy's reconnoitring parties from several
directions. To me the force employed by the enemy in these
enterprises appeared too large to be explained by the mere
intention of reconnaisance ; they looked to me more like serious
but somewhat abortive attacks. It was not yet possible to
form a clear idea of the direction from which the enemy's main
attack would come. The tactical difficulties of enveloping
our left (north) wing were far less, but this operation would
prevent him from exerting effective pressure on our communica-
tions. The direction from Taveta through Reata towards
Kahe would be the worst for us, but entailed for the enemy a
difficult frontal attack on the fortified heights of Reata and
Latema, which promised but little success even if made in greatly
superior strength. I, therefore, thought it advisable to move
Captain Koehl with two companies so close up in rear of Major
Kraut's Detachment, which was on the high ground between
Reata and Latema, that we could intervene rapidly without
waiting for orders. For the moment, telephonic communica-
tion with our detachments was secure. But it was to be anti-
cipated that it would become at least very difficult, so soon as

112

Further Advance of the Enemy

any detachment moved away from the existing lines. There
was no material available for rapidly laying a cable that could
follow moving troops. We were also deficient of light wireless
apparatus, by means of which later on the English successfully
controlled the movements of their columns in the bush.

On the nth March another aeroplane appeared over New
Moshi and dropped a few bombs. I was just talking to an old
Boer about the fight on the I2th February, and saying that the
English were incurring a grave responsibility in ruthlessly ex-
posing so many young men, who were quite ignorant of the
Tropics, to the dangers of our climate and of tropical warfare.
Major Kraut reported from Reata that strong hostile forces were
moving up towards his positions from the direction of Taveta.
Soon after, a powerful attack was made by several thousand
men on the three companies holding our position. Our three
light guns could, of course, not engage in a duel with the heavy
artillery, and, as at Oldorobo, had to restrict themselves to
employing their few shells against the denser masses of the enemy
at favourable moments. Knowing the difficulties of the ground,
I thought the attack had little prospect of success, but the two
companies of Captain Koehl held in readiness behind Major
Kraut's Detachment were, nevertheless, sent in to attack. Cap-
tain Koehl, who had originally intended to attack the enemy in
flank, which would have suited the situation and proved de-
cisive, was obliged to recognize that in the unknown and dense
bush this was impossible. The time and place, and, therefore,
the effectiveness of this attack, would have become matters of
pure chance. He, therefore, quite rightly marched up to the
immediate support of Major Kraut. From what I could observe
for myself from North Kitovo, and according to the reports
that came in, it appeared that the enemy wanted to keep us
occupied in front from Reata to Kitovo, while his decisive
movement was being made round our left wing. In the first
instance large bodies of horsemen were moving in that direction
who appeared and disappeared again among the heights and
gullies of the south-east slopes of Kilima Njaro. The nth
Company, under Captain Stemmermann, which was on the

My Reminiscences of East Africa

slopes above these horsemen, prevented them from reaching the
summit. During the course of the afternoon the leading horse-
men had worked their way through the dense banana-plantations
to near Marangu. They appeared to be very exhausted. Some
of them were seen to be eating the unripe bananas.

During the afternoon it became evident that the enemy was
making a strong frontal attack against Kraut's Detachment
on Reata and Latema Mountain. But the telephonic reports
were favourable : the enemy was obviously suffering heavy
casualties ; hundreds of stretchers were being employed in
getting away the wounded. By evening all the enemy's attacks
on our front had been repulsed with heavy losses. In the dark-
ness Captain Koehl's two companies had pursued with energy
and opened machine-gun fire on the enemy when he tried to make
a stand. In the evening I had gone to Himo, and about n p.m.
I was engaged in issuing orders for an attack to be made early
on the I2th on the enemy's horsemen, whose presence had been
established at Marangu. Just then Lieutenant Sternheim,
commanding the guns with Kraut's Detachment, telephoned
that the enemy had attacked once more in the night and had
penetrated into the Reata position in great force. This report
made it appear probable that this strong . hostile force would
now press forward from Reata in the direction of Kahe, and cut
us off from our communications. To accept this risk, and still
carry out the attack on the enemy at Marangu, appeared to be
too dangerous. I therefore ordered the troops at Kitovo and
Himo to fall back during the night to the Reata-Kahe road.
As a covering force Stemmermann's Company was for the time
being to remain at Himo. This march was bound to entail
the unpleasant consequence that, at the very best, all com-
munication between Headquarters and the various units would
cease. Anyone who has experienced these night marches knows
also how easily some parts of the force may become entirely
detached and cannot be reached for ever and a day. Fortunately
I had at least some knowledge of the ground, as we moved across
country to the new road, while we heard continuous heavy
firing going on on Reata and Latema Mountains. A few

114

Further Advance of the Enemy

stragglers who had lost their way in the bush came towards us ;
when we said we were Germans they did not believe us, and
disappeared again. On the new road we found the dressing
station. Here, too, the reports of the numerous wounded were so
contradictory and obscure that one could only gather the im-
pression of very heavy fighting in the bush at close quarters,
but failed to learn anything of its various phases or results. By
and by we got through on the telephone to Major Kraut, who,
with part of his detachment, was on the Kahe-Taveta road, on
the south-west slope of Reata Mountain. On the heights the
fire had gradually died down, and his patrols had found no more
trace of the enemy on Reata Mountain. Early in the morning
of the 1 2th Major Kraut found some of his detachment again
in their old positions on the hills : the enemy had fallen back
to Taveta.

When I arrived at Reata Mountain at six in the morning
the great quantity of booty was being collected. Very great
confusion had occurred in the close-quarter fighting by night.
English dead, who were lying in the bush far in rear of the front
of Kraut's Detachment, proved that certain detachments of the
enemy had got behind our line. Individual snipers, hidden
away among the rocks, maintained a well-aimed fire, and could
not be dislodged. It was, however, clear that the enemy had been
repulsed with heavy casualties. Both our own wounded and
those of the enemy were got away without a hitch, and so were
the prisoners. With the detachments that were moving from
the vicinity of Himo through the dense bush to the Kahe-Reata
road we had no communication, and could expect to have none
for several hours more.

In this situation it was regrettable that I had ordered th«
troops forming our left wing, who had been posted between
Kitovo and Himo, to withdraw to the Kahe-Reata road. After
giving up the high ground held by our left wing the Reata posi-
tion would in time become untenable, the more so as it had no
supply of water, which had to be brought up from a place an
hour's march further back. It was impossible to turn back
the units of the left wing to reoccupy the Himo-Kitovo area

115 8*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

as we were at the moment completely out of touch with them,
and, as has been mentioned, there was no expectation of regaining
it for hours to come. I decided to evacuate the Reata position,
and after the battlefield was cleared I returned with the line
that was nearest to the enemy to the water south-west of Reata
Mountain. In the course of the day the other detachments
reached the Kahe-Reata road at different points further to the
rear and encamped.

Headquarters moved to New Steglitz Plantation. The build-
ings are situated halfway between Kahe and Reata, on a slight
elevation affording a distant view over the forest, which is par-
ticularly dense along the Kahe-Reata road. On the way I met
Captain Schoenfeld, who reported that he had mounted his
4-inch gun out of the Konigsberg near Kahe village on the south
bank of the Pangani. After our withdrawal the enemy occupied
Reata Mountain and for a while fired into the blue with light
guns and rifles.

During the next few days we observed the advance of strong
hostile forces from the direction of Taveta to Himo, and the
pitching of large camps at that place. Against the Little Himo,
a mountain in front of our line which we were not holding, the
enemy developed a powerful attack from the east, across a
perfectly open plain, which, after a long and heavy bombardment
of the empty hill, ended in its capture. Unfortunately, we
were unable to move our troops sufficiently rapidly to come
down upon this attack out of the thick bush. From the Little
Himo the enemy frequently bombarded the Plantation build-
ing of New Steglitz with light artillery. Some weeks before,
after a successful buffalo-hunt, I had enjoyed a hospitable hour
in the few rooms of this building. The native who had guided
us on that occasion had deserted to the English. Now it pro-
vided decidedly cramped accommodation for Headquarters and
the telephone exchange. I myself was lucky enough to find
a fairly comfortable shake-down on the sofa, with the cloth
off the dining-table. Telephone messages and reports came in
day and night without ceasing ; but they did not prevent us from
making the material side of our existence tolerably comfortable.

116

Further Advance of the Enemy

We had a roof over our heads, and the use of a kitchen equipped
in European style, and carried on our combined mess as pre-
viously at New Moshi. The circumstances peculiar to East
Africa make it necessary for the European to maintain a number
of servants which to home ideas seems excessive. Even now,
on active service, nearly everyone had two " Boys " who took
charge of the cooking utensils and provisions we carried with us,
cooked excellently, baked bread, washed, and generally provided
us in the bush with a good proportion of the comforts which
in Europe are only to be found in dwelling houses. Even in the
heart of the bush I restricted these alleviations as little as possible,
out of consideration for the strength, health and spirit of the
Europeans. If, in spite of this, Headquarters often preferred
to occupy buildings, this was done less for the sake of comfort
than in order to facilitate the unavoidable work of writing and
drawing.

While we were at New Steglitz we received the surprising news
that a second store-ship had reached the Colony, with arms,
ammunition — including several thousand rounds for the 4-inch
Konisgberg guns, which were now employed on land — and other
warlike stores. The ship had run into Ssudi Bay, at the extreme
south of our coast, and had immediately begun to discharge
her cargo. In spite of the great distance, and the exclusive
use of carriers, the whole of it was made available for the troops.
This achievement was indeed surprising, in view of the large
number of hostile ships that were blockading and searching our
coast-line, and which were aware of the arrival of the store-
ship. But she probably surprised the English also, for after dis-
charging her cargo, she put to sea again, and disappeared, much
to the astonishment of the enemy. Chaff between the Navy
and the Army is not unknown even in England, and if the latter
is reproached for not having been able to finish us off, the former
may be silenced with the justifiable retort that it should not
have allowed us to obtain such great supplies of arms and ammu-
nition. The bulk of the stores was transported by land to the
Central Railway, and was stored along, or near it, at the disposal
of Headquarters. Owing to our lack of suitable artillery it was

117

My Reminiscences of East Africa

particularly advantageous that we were quickly able to bring
up the four field-howitzers and two mountain guns which had
come in the ship.

The store-ship had also brought out decorations for war ser-
vice : one Iron Cross of the First Class for the Captain of the
Konigsberg, and enough of the Second Class to enable half her
company to have one each. For the Protective Force there were
an Iron Cross of the First Class, and one of the Second Class,
which were for me, and a number of decorations for the Askari.
As regards the Europeans, we only heard in September, 1916,
by wireless that the decorations recommended by Headquarters
had been approved.

CHAPTER III

RETREAT BEFORE OVERWHELMING HOSTILE PRESSURE

IN our rear, Major Fischer, who with five companies had
been employed between Kilima Njaro and Mem, had
evaded the enemy's superior forces by moving on New Moshi,
and had been ordered up to Kahe. Captain Rothert, who had
been acting under his orders with his company and the Arusha
Detachment (strength about one company), had been energetic-
ally pursued by the enemy, and had made his way by Arusha
towards Kondoa-Irangi. We could only expect to get into
touch with him by the wire which had been put up from Dodome,
by Kondoa-Irangi to Umbulu, and that only after a considerable
time. By abandoning New Moshi we, of necessity, left the
road Taveta-New Moshi-Arusha open to the enemy. The latter
was thus also enabled to penetrate into the interior of the
Colony with his troops from Taveta by Arusha and Kondoa-
Irangi, and to act there against our communication at an
extremely dangerous point. From our troops concentrated
in the neighbourhood of Kahe and New Steglitz he had not
much to fear during this operation. Although we had brought
up all our companies from Tanga, leaving there only the troops
absolutely indispensable for security, all we could do with our
four thousand rifles was to let the enemy run up against us on
suitable ground, and, possibly, to take advantage of any mis-
takes he might make by skilful and rapid action ; but the odds
against us being seven to one we could attempt no more. From
an attack on an enemy superior not only in numbers, but also
in equipment, and holding fortified positions into the bargain,
I could not possibly hope for success. I could not, therefore,
accede to the requests of my company commanders that we

119

My Reminiscences of East Africa

should attack, but this expression of a bold soldierly spirit gave
me strength and hope in the serious situation in which we were
placed. Minor enterprises, undertaken against the enemy's
camps by patrols and small detachments, produced no results
of consequence ; but they may have helped to make the enemy's
main force take some notice of us instead of simply marching
on past us. He certainly did push on to the west from Himo,
and heavy clouds of dust were seen moving to New Moshi and
further on to the west. But a large part of the enemy coming
from Himo turned in our direction. For the commander such
situations are extraordinarily trying ; he is not master of the
situation, and must, of necessity, renounce the initiative. Only
the most careful reconnaissance may perhaps reveal some weak-
ness of the opponent, and in order to utilize this weakness and
regain the initiative, not a moment must be lost. Fortunately,
however, the enemy did expose weak points of which we were
able to take at least partial advantage.

Owing to the dense bush and high forest in which our camps
were hidden, aerial reconnaissance can hardly have been any
use to the enemy. The bombs dropped by the enemy caused
only a few casualties at Kahe, and did not interfere with us
in getting away our stores through that place. In order to
draw our fire, the well-known English horsemen appeared once
more north-west of New Steglitz in a widely-extended skirmish-
ing line. In front of them, hidden in the bush, were our com-
panies, ready to take hold immediately larger bodies should
appear. A counter-attack of this description was made late
in the afternoon on the I5th March, and with fair success. In
order to become thoroughly acquainted with the ground,
European patrols were constantly moving about, and I also made
use of every available minute. Through the bush we cut and
marked tracks. By this means we could clearly indicate any
point to which a detachment was required to go.

On the main road leading from Himo to Kahe a strong hostile
force had also appeared and pushed close up to the front of
Stemmermann's Detachment, which occupied a fortified position
on this road at Kahe, facing north. With considerable skill

120

Retreat before overwhelming Hostile Pressure

patrols worked close up to the detachment, and so concealed
the movements of the enemy. When I arrived there in the
afternoon of the 2Oth March, it was not at all clear what was
really going on in front. It was quite possible that the enemy
was merely making a demonstration in order to attack at some
other, more dangerous, spot. Such a manoeuvre would have
been very menacing to us, as the close nature of the bush country
would prevent us from detecting it until very late, probably too
late. I decided t» drive the enemy's screen back on his position
proper. Earlier in the day it had been given out that the
companies were to move off to their former positions at one a.m. ;
the machine guns were left in our entrenchments so as not to
lose them, and as a measure of protection. It was bright moon-
light when the leading company was fired on, apparently by a
hostile outpost, or patrol, which moved off. After that we
encountered several patrols, but then, about three miles north
of our own trenches, we came upon a stronger opponent with
machine guns. The very severe action which now developed
proved that we had come up against the enemy's main position ;
to assault it seemed hopeless. Leaving patrols out, I withdrew
step by step. Our casualties were not inconsiderable, and
unfortunately included three company commanders, who were
difficult to replace ; of the three, Lieutenant von Stosch and
Freiherr Grote died of their wounds a few days later, while
Captain Augar only became fit for duty again after a long time
and when provided with an artificial foot.

Our withdrawal, which the enemy probably took to be in-
voluntary, apparently led him to believe that he would be able
to rout us next day by a vigorous attack. The attacks made
by powerful hostile forces on the front of Stemmermann's
Detachment at Kahe on the 2ist March were unsuccessful ;
the enemy, composed mainly of South African infantry, was
beaten off with heavy loss. Our four-inch Konigsberg gun,
directed from elevated sites affording a good view, fired on the
approaching enemy, apparently with good effect. It may be
assumed that part of their severe casualties, which the English
stated to have amounted on this day to several hundred among

121

My Reminiscences of East Africa

the South African Europeans alone, were caused by this gun.
The enemy realized that he could not advance over the field of
fire extending for five hundred yards in front of our trenches
with any hope of success, and endeavoured to envelop our
right flank. But having previously reconnoitred and deter-
mined tracks, we were also well prepared to execute a counter-
attack, and in the afternoon Schulz's Detachment effectively
struck at the enemy's flank. The last part of Schulz's advance
had, indeed, been very arduous owing to the thick bush. The
Askari could only work through it step by step, when they
suddenly heard the enemy's machine guns at work only a few
paces in front of them.

Unfortunately, however, this counter-attack was not com-
pleted owing to the events which occurred in the meantime on
our left. The activity displayed by patrols during the preceding
days, and the clouds of dust, had shown that strong detachments
of the enemy's horse, coming from near New Moshi and keeping
to westward of the Kahe-New Moshi railway, were trying to
work round our front, which faced north, and of which the left
wing was at Kahe Station. The continuation of this move-
ment would have brought them on to the railway in our rear,
and cut us from our communications while we were engaged
with a superior opponent with our front to the north. I had,
therefore, posted a strong reserve of eight companies in readiness
at Kahe Station. But as I thought it necessary during the
action to remain at Kahe village, near Stemmerm&nn's Detach-
ment, I was unable to exercise rapid and direct control over the
reserves at Kahe. The dense vegetation prevented any distant
observation. The control of the reserve at Kahe had to be left
to the initiative of the commander on the spot and his subor-
dinates. The latter had observed that hostile troops had
advanced through the bush and occupied a hill south-west of
Kahe Railway Station. One company had, on its own initiative,
attacked this force, but the advance had broken down undei
shrapnel fire. Thereupon our four-inch gun opened fire on
these light guns and drove them off.

Late in the afternoon I received an urgent message that

122

Retreat before overwhelming Hostile Pressure

strong forces of the enemy were advancing in our rear towards
the railway at Kissangire, and that the event we feared had
actually occurred. I was, therefore, compelled to issue orders
for an immediate withdrawal towards Kissangire. The enemy
could not yet have reached there in strength, and I hoped to
defeat him there by rapidly throwing all my forces against him.
Thus it happened that Captain Schulz's well-directed counter-
attack could not be carried through, or produce its full effect.
The transfer by night of our force across the Pangani, which
was close behind us, and over which we had previously made
a number of bridges and crossings, was effected smoothly and
without interference. Even on the following day the patrols
we had left behind found its north bank clear of the enemy.
Our good four-inch gun, which we could not take away owing
to its lack of mobility, was blown up. After midnight, that is,
quite early on the 22nd March, I arrived at Kissangire Station,
and discovered to my very great astonishment that all the
reports about strong hostile forces moving on that place were
erroneous, and that our withdrawal had therefore been unneces-
sary. This incident afforded me a remarkably striking proof of
the extraordinary difficulty of observing the movements of troops
in thick bush, and of the great care every commander must
exercise in estimating the value of such reports. But it also
demonstrates how difficult it is for any commander to combine
his own powers of reasoning and his judgment of the situation
with the constantly conflicting reports, both of Askari and
Europeans, in order to base his decision on a foundation that
even approximately resembles the reality. In the African bush
it is particularly important, whenever possible, to supplement
the reports one receives by personal observation.

However, our withdrawal could not now be altered, and the
most important thing was to re-group our forces. In this
operation the decisive factor was water-supply. This, and the
necessity for distribution in depth, caused me to leave only a
detachment of a few companies on the high ground at Kissan-
gire, from where it observed the seven and a half miles of water-
less thorn desert extending to the Pangani. To the east of this

123

My Reminiscences of East Africa

detachment at Kissangire, under Major von Boehmken, was
Otto's detachment, pushed up on to the North Pare Mountains
in order to close the passes leading over them. Major Kraut
took up a position on Ngulu Pass, between the North Pare and
Middle Pare ranges. The main body of the force settled down
in several fortified camps in the fertile Lembeni country.

In spite of the various withdrawals we had recently carried out,
the spirit of the troops was good, and the Askaris were imbued
with a justifiable pride in their achievements against an enemy
so greatly superior. Only a very few individuals deserted, and
they were almost without exception men whose cattle was in
the territory now occupied by the enemy, and who were there-
fore afraid of losing their property.

Almost the entire German civil population had left the Kilima
Njaro country ; most of them had moved to Usambara into the
Wilhelmstal district. The Arusha country had also been
evacuated, and the farmers had moved off by ox-wagon by
Kondoa-Irangi to Dodoma. The numerous Greeks had for the
most part remained on their coffee-plantations on Kilima Njaro,
and the Boers of British nationality had stayed in their cattle
farms, which extended from the north-west slopes of Kilima Njaro
northwards round Meru Mountain and along the western slopes
of the latter to the vicinity of Arusha. At Lembeni the regular
course of existence had not been interrupted ; supply trains
rolled right up to the station ; the companies which were not in
the front line worked diligently at their training, and Head-
quarters continued its work in the railway station buildings of
Lembeni just as it had done previously at Moshi. Airmen
appeared and dropped bombs, just as before.

The country was carefully prepared to meet various possible
battle conditions, passages were cut through the dense rhino-
ceros bush, and a field of fire cleared where necessary. Personal
reconnaissance took up much of my time, and often led me to the
companies encamped in the thick bush and on the dominating
heights. The troops had already developed to a tolerable degree
in adaptability, and in the art of making the material side of
their^existence as comfortable as possible. I remember with

124

Retreat before overwhelming Hostile Pressure

pleasure the occasions when, in a comfortably arranged grass
hut, I was offered a cup of coffee with beautiful rich milk, pre-
pared from the ground-down kernel of a ripe cocoa-nut. The
North Pare Mountains also were frequently the goal of my expedi-
tions. Up there I found a rich and well-watered area of primeval
forest, through which it was hardly possible to penetrate off the
roads. The water-supply of the country proved to be far more
plentiful than the results of former surveys had led us to expect ;
in this respect also it was shown how the necessities of war cause
the resources of a country to be opened up, and utilized to an
extent greatly exceeding previous estimates. The natives of
North Pare are, like those of Kilima Njaro, masters in the art of
irrigating their fields by means of the water coming down from
the mountains.

On the 4th April, one of my reconnaissances took me to Otto's
Detachment on the Pare Mountains. From the north-west
corner one had a clear view of the enemy's camp, lying down
below at Kahe Station. The obvious idea of bombarding it
with one of our long-range guns — in the meantime we had brought
to Lembeni one 4-inch Konigsberg gun on wheels, and one 3.5-inch
gun mounted on a '73 pattern carriage — could unfortunately not
be carried out. With rather too much zeal the troops had
thoroughly destroyed the permanent way of the line between
Lembeni and Kahe. With the means at our disposal it could not
be made sufficiently fit for traffic to enable us to move one of our
guns up and down on it with rapidity. All our observations and
reports agreed that the enemy, who had formerly often sent
patrols and even stronger forces to the south of Jipe Lake, no
longer displayed any interest in that district. He had in any case
moved his principal forces towards Kahe and also beyond New
Moshi westward towards Arusha.

After passing a cold night on the damp height at North Pare
I descended to Lembeni on the 5th April. Here I found a report
that on the previous day Captain Rothert, who was encamped with
the 28th Company beside the Lolkisale, a high mountain in the
Masai desert, two days' march south-west of Arusha, had been
attacked by superior forces. The heliograph communication

125

My Reminiscences of East Africa

with Lolkisale from the south-west had then been interrupted.
It was not till later that the following facts became known.
Several mounted companies of the enemy, coming across the
desert from Arusha, had attacked the 28th Company, who were
in position on the mountain, from several directions. As our
people were in possession of the water they could well sustain the
fight against the enemy, who had none. On the second day of
the action the situation became critical for the enemy, because
of this very absence of water. Unfortunately, however, after
Captain Rothert was severely wounded, this circumstance was
not properly appreciated on our side. The situation was thought
to be so hopeless that the company surrendered with its machine
guns and ammunition. On this occasion also some of the Askari
gave evidence of sound military education by refusing to join
in the surrender. They, together with the wounded, rejoined
our forces near Ufiome, without being interfered with by the
enemy. There they met a new rifle company and the Arusha
Detachment, of which the former had arrived from the Central
Railway, the latter from the direction of Arusha.

The road to Kondoa-Irangi and the interior of the Colony was
now hardly closed to the enemy coming from Arusha. There
were three companies in the neighbourhood of Lake Kivu,
in the north-west corner of the Colony, under Captain Klinghardt,
retired, who had done so well in the actions at Kissenyi ; they
were moved by march route and on Tanganyika steamer to
Kigoma, and from there by rail to Saranda. From there again
they marched up towards Kondoa-Irangi. Captain Klinghardt
was also given command of the troops already north of Kondoa-
Irangi (about two companies) and of another company that came
by rail from Dar-es-Salaam. These movements would take a
long time. Consequently, the good and well-tried I3th Company,
whose peace-station had been Kondoa-Irangi, was at once
brought by rail to near Buiko, whence it marched through the
Masai desert to Kondoa-Irangi. The march through this water-
less and little-known country had to be undertaken before the
completion of the reconnaissances, which were in progress ; and
to do so with what was, according to African ideas, the large

126

Retreat before overwhelming Hostile Pressure

force of one company with carriers, in the dry season, and before
the heavy rains had set in, involved some risk.

But this risk had to be run ; for the force facing us at Kahe,
after its reconnoitring parties had been several times repulsed,
was showing no signs of advancing against us. At the time,
therefore, the enemy was evidently directing his principal effort
towards Kondoa-Irangi. As, for the reasons already set forth,
it appeared unsound for us to attack from Lembeni towards
Kahe, I decided merely to occupy the enemy station in the Kilima
Njaro country, and to direct my main force against the hostile
group which had meanwhile pushed forward to near Kondoa-
Irangi. The execution of this project was not quite easy ; much
time was needed to cover the distance of 125 miles from the
detraining stations on the Northern Railway to the Central Rail-
way on foot, and at any moment a change in the situation might
render it necessary for Headquarters immediately to make fresh
dispositions. All the troops must therefore be kept within reach.
The various detachments could not, as on the march from the
Central to the Northern Railway, be set in motion on different
and widely-separated roads. The march of our fifteen field and
two mounted companies had to be made on one road. The
Force was thus confronted with an entirely novel and difficult
task. There was no time to lose. The detachments of Captain
von Kornatzky, Captain Otto, Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock and
Captain Stemmermann, each of four or three companies, were
moved by rail at intervals of one day, from Lembeni to Mombo
and Korogwe. Thence they marched on to Kimamba (station
west of .Morogoro) to the Central Railway. Manifold difficulties
arose. Hard and fast destinations could not be laid down for the
detachments for each day, more especially because heavy rains
set in which in places so softened the black soil that the troops
could literally hardly get along.

Thus it happened that one detachment made quite short
marches, and the one behind got jammed on top of it. This,
however, was very inconvenient, and interfered both with the
regular service of supply on the line of communication, and with
the transport of the company baggage, in which the relay-carriers

127

My Reminiscences of East Africa

belonging to the line of communication had to be called in to
assist. The companies now began, according to ancient African
custom, to help themselves, seized the line of communication
carriers, regardless of other orders, and simply kept them. As
the whole service on the communications depended upon the
regular working of the relay-carriers, it also became seriously
dislocated.

12*

Masai.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeek's Adjntant.)

[To fare p. 128.

European Dinner-time

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

CHAPTER IV
THE ENEMY'S ADVANCE IN THE AREA OF THE NORTHERN

RAILWAY

AFTER the trains had left Lembeni I handed over the
command of all the troops on the Northern Railway to
Major Kraut. An independent administrative service was
also organized for them. Our railway journey to Korogwe
proved to us once more how closely the German population of
the Northern Territories were knit to the Force, and how they
appreciated its work. At every station the people had assembled,
sometimes from great distances ; every one of them knew that
our departure from the Northern Territories was final, and
that they would fall into the enemy's hands. In spite of this,
their spirit was gallant. A large part of the few remaining
European provisions was brought to us. The widow of the
former Line-Commandant Kroeber, who had recently been
buried at Buiko, insisted on offering us the last bottles of the
stock in her cellar.

Major Kraut and Captain Schoenfeld accompanied me to
Buiko, from where we were able to view several portions of the
ground which I thought might become of importance in our
future operations. These gentlemen remained there in order
to make more detailed personal reconnaissances. From Korogwe
our cars rapidly took us to Handeni, the head of the light rail-
way that had been laid from Mombo. On the way we caught
up our mounted companies, and the exclamation of the Civil
Administrator of Handeni : " Why, that's the notorious poacher
of Booyen," showed me once more that there were among our
mounted troops men accustomed to danger and sport, on whom
I could rely in the troubles that were to come. Handeni was

129 9

My Reminiscences of East Africa

the first collecting station for the stores withdrawn from the
north ; Major von Stuemer, who had left his former post at
Bukoba in order to take charge of this line of communication,
which was for the moment the most important one, complained
not a little of the way in which the troops marching through
had interfered with the further dispatch of the stores. At
Handeni, the seat of the Civil Administration, where the supply
routes from Morogoro, Korogwe and Kondoa-Irangi met at
the railhead of the Mombo-Handeni line, the war had called
into being a European settlement that had almost the appear-
ance of a town. Lieutenant Horn, of the Navy, had built
cottages in the Norwegian style, which were quite charming
to look at, although at the moment the rain was rather against
them. The interiors, consisting for the most part of three
rooms, were comfortably arranged for the accommodation of
Europeans. What was unpleasant was the enormous number
of rats, which often ran about on one when trying to sleep at
night. Captain von Kaltenborn, who had arrived in the second
store-ship which put into Ssudi Bay, reported himself to me
here, and was able to supplement the home news he had already
transmitted in writing by verbal accounts.

Proceeding the next day by car, we caught up a number of our
detachments on the march, and were able to remove at least
some of the various causes of friction between them. Telephonic
communication was rarely possible on account of earths caused
by the heavy rain, and breakages caused by columns of carriers,
wagons and giraffes. It was all the more important for me to
traverse this area of breakdowns, which cut me off from the
troops and prevented my receiving reports as quickly as possible.
But that became increasingly difficult.

The rain came down harder and harder, and the roads became
deeper and deeper. At first there were only a few bad places,
and twenty or more carriers managed to get us through them
by pulling and pushing. The niempara (headmen of carriers)
went ahead, dancing and singing. The whole crowd joined in
with " Amsigo," and " Kabubi, kabubi," and to the rhythm of
these chants the work went on cheerily, and at first easily

130

Enemy's Advance in the Area of Northern Railway

enough. But on passing through Tulieni we found that the
rains had so swollen an otherwise quite shallow river, that during

Invasion of- G.E A. by
Belgian and British
colutrm s, middle of
19/6.

Retreat of the German
Main, force August. 1916

Fig. xii.

Fig. xi. Invasion of German East Africa by Belgian and British columns, middle
of 1916. Fig. xii. Retreat of German Main Force, August, 1916.

the morning its torrential waters had completely carried away
the wagon bridge. We felled one of the big trees on the bank,
but it was not tall enough for its branches to form a firm holdfast

131 9*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

on the far side. It was three feet thick, but was carried away
like a match. The Adjutant, Lieutenant Mueller, tried to swim
across, but was also swept away, and landed again on the near
bank. Now Captain Tafel tried, who had recovered from his
severe wound, and was now in charge of the operations section
at Headquarters. He reached the far side, and a few natives
who were good swimmers also succeeded in doing so. But we
could not manage to get a line across by swimming, and so
there we were, Captain Tafel without any clothes on the far
side, and we on this one. The prospect of having to wait for
the river to fall was not enticing, for I could not afford to waste
one minute in reaching the head of the marching troops. At last,
late in the afternoon, a native said he knew of a ford a little
lower down. Even there it was not altogether a simple matter
to wade across, and took at least three-quarters of an hour ;
we had to follow our guide carefully by a very devious route,
and work cautiously on from one shallow to the next. The
water reached our shoulders, and the current was so strong that
we needed all our strength to avoid falling. At last, in the
dark, and with our clothes thoroughly wet, we reached the far
side, where we were met by three mules and an escort of Askari
sent back by a detachment which we had luckily been able to
reach by telephone.

We continued our journey the whole night through in pouring
rain, and had several times to ride for hours at a time with the
water up to our saddles, or to wade with it up to our necks ;
but at last, still in the night, we reached the great bridge over
the Wami, which had been put up during the war. That, too,
was almost entirely carried away, but part was left, so that we
were able to clamber across and reach the light railway leading
to Kimamba Station. This line, like that from Mombo to
Handeni, had been constructed during the war and was worked
by man-power. In their endeavour to do the job really well,
the good people took several curves rather too fast, and the
trucks, with everything on them — including us — repeatedly
flew off into the ditch alongside, or beyond it. At any rate, we
had had enough and to spare of this journey by water by the

132

Enemy's'Advance in the Area of Northern Railway

time we arrived in the early morning at Kimamba. Vice-
Sergeant-Major* Rehfeld, who was stationed there and had
been called to the Colours, received us most kindly. As there
was a clothing depot at Kimamba, we were, at any rate, able to
obtain Askari clothing to change into. When the remainder
of Headquarters would turn up with our kits it was, of course,
impossible to say.

After discussing the situation with the Governor, who had
come to Kimamba for the purpose, I went next day to Dodoma.
On the Central Railway, quick working under war conditions,
which in the north had become everyone's second nature, had
hardly been heard of. Captain von Kornatzky's detachment,
which had arrived at Dodoma shortly before us, had some diffi-
culty hi obtaining supplies, although Dodoma was on the rail-
way, and could be supplied quickly. I got in touch by telephone
with Captain Klinghardt, who had occupied the heights of
Burungi, one day's march south of Kondoa-Irangi, and on the
next morning, with a few officers of Headquarters, I rode off to
see him. The road lay through uninhabited bush-desert ; it
had been made during the war, its trace was governed by the
need for easy construction, and it touched settlements but
seldom. The Ugogo country is distinguished for its great
wealth of cattle. The inhabitants belong to the nomad tribes,
who copy the customs of the Masai, and are, therefore, often
called Masai-apes. We met many ox-wagons in which German
and Boer farmers, with their families, were driving from the
country around Mem Mountain to Kondoa. It was a scene,
so well known in South-West Africa, of comfortable " trekking,"
in these vehicles so eminently suited to the conditions of the veld.

The supply service of Klinghardt's Detachment was not yet
in working order ; we camped that night in the first of the small
posts on the line of communication. It was evident that the
work of transport and supply would have to be greatly increased
if it was to maintain the large number of troops now being

* We have no corresponding rank. He is a reservist who has served as a
" One-year Volunteer," but has not yet done enough reserve training to
qualify as an Officer in the Reserve.

133

My Reminiscences of East Africa

pushed forward in the direction of Kondoa-Irangi. There was
another difficulty : up to date the various Field Intendants
had not been physically equal to the enormous demands which
the whole field of the work of maintenance made upon the head
of the service. Captain Schmid, of the Landwehr, had very soon
been succeeded by Captain Feilke, of the Landwehr, he again
by Captain Freiherr von Ledebur, of the Reserve, and this
officer by Captain Richter, retired, an elderly gentleman. The
latter, unfortunately, had just now, at the commencement of
an important fresh operation, reached the limit of his strength.
Major Stuemer, retired, who had been working on the line of
communication at Handeni, had been obliged to take over his
duties, but had not yet had time to become thoroughly at home
in them.

By the evening of the following day we had completed our
journey of four marches, and reached Captain Klinghardt at
the Burungi Mountains. The detachments coming from the
country of the Northern Railway were following on behind us,
and some days were bound to elapse before they would all have
arrived ; so we had the opportunity of making extensive recon-
naissances. Here we had the great good fortune to make the
acquaintance of a perfectly new and excellent map. The Dis-
trict Commissioner of Kondoa-Irangi had, when leaving his
district, given it with other things to a yumbe (chief), who lived
on the Burungi Mountains, to take care of. It was in his posses-
sion that we found this valuable property, the secrecy of which
had thus remained intact.

Patrols of mounted English Europeans often came near our
positions, and it was known that stronger mounted forces were
behind them. But where they were was not known. Some
reports stated that they were in Kbndoa-Irangi ; others said
south of that place, and others again placed them on the road
leading from Kondoa-Irangi to Saranda. An important factor
was that there were considerable native plantations at Burungi,
so that supplies were plentiful. It was, therefore, not necessary
to wait until the transport of supplies from Dodoma was in full
swing. The troops were more independent of the line of com-

Enemy's Advance in the Area of Northern Railway

munication than hitherto, and could draw the bulk of then-
subsistence from the country. As soon as the rear detachments
had closed up the advance on Kondoa was started. South of
that place we met only fairly strong mounted protective detach-
ments, who were quickly driven back, and at the beginning of
May, without any serious fighting, we obtained possession of the
great heights which lie four miles in front of Kondoa village.

We had brought with us two naval guns, one 3.5-inch and
one 4-inch, on travelling carriages, and at once got them into
action. From our dominating position they bombarded, appa-
rently with good effect, the enemy's camps south of Kondoa.
The tents were at once struck. We could see the enemy hard
at work entrenching his positions, and his vehicles hurrying
away towards Kondoa. Several patrol encounters went in our
favour, and small hostile posts, that had been left out in various
places, were quickly driven in. From the south — that is, from
behind us — we saw a mounted patrol riding towards our posi-
tions. As our mounted patrols were also out, I thought at
first that they were Germans. But soon the regular carriage of
their carbines in the buckets proved that they were English.
They evidently had no idea of our presence. They were
allowed to approach quite close, and at the short range they lost
about half their number. From what we had hitherto observed,
it seemed probable that the enemy in our front was evacuating
his positions. On the Qth May, 1916, I decided, if this expecta-
tion proved correct, immediately to take possession of the low
hills now held by the enemy. The conditions did not favour
an attack, as our advance was sure to be observed, and a surprise
assault was out of the question. But without surprise the
attempt to capture the occupied position by assault had no
hope of success ; the enemy was sufficiently entrenched on the
small hills, and the latter completely commanded the ground
over which the attack would have to be pushed home, and
which could only be traversed slowly owing to the low thorn-
bush and the numerous rocks.

I was with the companies that were following the advanced
patrols ; the latter reported, shortly before dark, that the hills

135

My Reminiscences of East Africa

were unoccupied. So our companies proceeded, and the com-
manders ordered up the baggage in order to settle down for
the night. I myself went to the Headquarters Camp, which
had remained on the big hills a little further back. I tried to
relieve my great exhaustion with a cup of coffee and a little
rum ; but, knowing that I had no more orders to issue, I soon
fell fast asleep. Next to my sleeping place was the 3.5-inch gun.
Towards eleven p.m. I was awakened by remarks made by
Lieutenant Wunderlich, of the Navy, who was in command of the
gun ; he could not make out the frequent flashes he saw in
the direction of the enemy. Neither, at first, was I quite
certain about them. But soon there could be no doubt that
these flashes, which became more and more frequent, were caused
by rifles and machine guns. When the wind shifted the sound
of the fighting became clearly audible. Contrary to all our
expectations, therefore, a stiff fight was taking place in our front,
but owing to the great distance, and the bushy and rocky country
that would have to be traversed, I did not think I could engage
the reserves I still had in hand with any prospect of success.
It would take hours to obtain even the very roughest idea of
the situation, and the moon would be up for barely an hour
more. For well or ill, therefore, I had to leave the fight in front
to take its course.

Our companies had, indeed, found the high ground, which had
been examined by the patrols, to be clear of the enemy ; but
immediately in rear of it was another rise, and on this was the
enemy, in an entrenched position, which our companies ran up
against. In the close country and the darkness no general survey
of the situation was possible, and ' connection between the
various units was lost. Our Askari established themselves in
front of the enemy, and Captain Lincke, who had assumed
command after Lieutenant-Colonel von Bock had been severely
wounded and Captain von Kornatzky had been killed, came
to the conclusion that, although he could remain where he was,
he would, after daybreak, be obliged to abandon all hope of
being able to move, on account of the dominating fire of the
enemy. As, therefore, no success appeared attainable, he

136

Enemy's Advance in the Area of Northern Railway

cautiously broke off the action while it was still dark, and fell
back on the position he had started from. The enemy, con-
sisting mainly of the nth South African Infantry Regiment,
had fought well, and had repeatedly brought effective machine-
gun fire to bear on our companies. Considering the small
number of rifles that actually took part in the fight — about four
hundred — our casualties, amounting to about fifty killed and
wounded, must be considered heavy.

During the following days we also proceeded to take posses-
sion of the high hills lying further to the eastward, and drove
off the mounted detachments working in the foreground, inflict-
ing quite unpleasant casualties on them. It happened several
times that out of parties of about twenty men, none, or only
a few, got away, and in the foreground also a whole series of
encounters ended in our favour. The heights held by us afforded
an extensive view, and with good glasses we several times observed
columns of hostile troops and wagons approaching Kondoa from
the north, and then turning east and disappearing into the
mountains. Our patrols, whom we sent far away to the enemy's
rear, reported considerable bodies marching from about Arusha
in the direction of Kondoa-Irangi.

The English had at once taken over the civil administration
at Kondoa, and had cleverly ordered the yumbi (chiefs) to come
to that place and given them instiuctions. Among other things,
they imposed on them the duty of reporting the movements of
German troops. It was, therefore, often advantageous for our
patrols to pretend to be English while in enemy country. The
differences in uniform were not great, and the prolonged period
of active service had further diminished them ; uniform coats
were often not worn at all, but only blouse-like shirts, and the
little cloth badges which the English wore on their sun-helmets
Were not conspicuous. The difference in armament had often
disappeared, as some of the Germans carried English rifles.

On the whole, the enemy in Kondoa did not seem to be in
great strength as yet ; but, even if successful, our attack would
have to be made over open ground against defences which with
our few guns we could not sufficiently neutralize. The certainty

My Reminiscences of East Africa

of suffering considerable and irreplaceable losses decided me to
refrain from a general attack, and instead to damage the enemy
by continuing the minor enterprises, which had hitherto proved
so advantageous. Oar artillery — the two mountain guns and
two field howitzers, which had come out in the second store-ship,
had also arrived — fired upon such favourable targets as pre-
sented themselves. The buildings of Kondoa-Irangi, where
General van Deventer had arrived, were also fired at occasion-
ally by our four-inch gun. To the west of our main force, on
the Saranda-Kondoa-Irangi road, our newly-raised 2nd Rifle
Company had had several successful engagements with portions
of the 4th South African Horse, and had gradually forced them
back to the neighbourhood of Kondoa-Irangi.

The enemy now grew continually stronger. Early in June
he also shelled us at long range, about thirteen thousand yards,
with heavy guns of about four-inch and five-inch calibre. His
observation and fire-control were worthy of all respect ; anyhow,
on the I3th June his shell soon fell with great accuracy in our
Headquarters camp. I stopped my work which I had com-
menced under cover of a grass roof, and took cover a little to
one side behind a slab of rock. No sooner had the orderly
officer, Lieutenant Boell, also reached the spot, than a shell
burst close above us, wounded Lieutenant Boell severely in the
thigh, and myself and a few other Europeans slightly. Other-
wise the fire of the enemy's artillery did us hardly any material
damage, but it was a nuisance, all the same, to have his heavy
shell pitching into our camp every now and then.

We dispensed with the heavy work which the provision of
good protection against fire would have entailed, as the whole
strength of our people was required for patrols and outposts,
and for collecting supplies. As far as t^ie eye could reach,
the whole .country was covered by native cultivation. The
principal crop — which formed the main supply of the troops —
was mtema, a kind of millet, which was just ripening. Most
of the natives had run away ; the supplies from Dodoma had
been unable to keep up with us, and so our subsistence depended
almost entirely on the stuff which the foraging-parties of the

138

Enemy's Advance in the Area of Northern Railway

companies were able to bring in. In the hot sun the sheaves
quickly dried on the rocks. All the companies were busy making
flour, either by grinding the threshed grain between stones, or
by stamping it into meal with poles in vessels of hard wood,
called kinos. The Europeans at that time could still get wheat
flour, which came up on the line of communication. The bread
we made before Kondoa out of a mixture of wheat flour and
native flour was of really excellent quality. Besides mtema and
other grains there were also sugar-cane, muhogo (a plant with a
pleasant-tasting, edible root), yams, various kinds of peas, and
other native produce, besides sufficient cattle. In this extremely
rich Kondoa country the troops could obtain a variety of food
in abundance.

The enemy's extension from Kondoa to the east drew our atten-
tion also to this hitherto little-known country. Captain Schulz
was sent there with several companies, and found it to be an
extraordinarily difficult and densely-wooded mountain district,
interspersed with settlements of great fertility. A whole series
of actions, in which one or more of our companies were engaged,
and which resulted in severe loss to the enemy, now took place
in this district. A strong hostile force tried to penetrate between
the companies of Schulz' s Detachment and ourselves, probably
with the intention of cutting off the detachment. But this
attempt failed completely. Our troops pressed forward against
this force from both sides and repulsed it. The old Effendi
(native officer), Yuma Mursal, acted with great skill on this
occasion ; he lay in ambush at a water-place, and fired at the
English, who came there for water, with good effect ; according
to his observation, six of them were killed. During this period
of fighting at Kondoa-Irangi the enemy's battle casualties
gradually mounted up to a considerable figure. If we add to
them his losses by sickness, due to the youth of his white troops,
who were not used to the Tropics, and were extraordinarily
careless about precautions against tropical diseases, the total
losses incurred by him during the Kondoa-Irangi period can
hardly have been less than one thousand Europeans.

139

CHAPTER V

BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL RAILWAYS

I ASK the reader to imagine himself in the position of a Com-
mander, with insufficient means, exposed to attack by
superior numbers, who has continually to ask himself : What
must I do in order to retain freedom of movement and hope ?

At the end of June, 1916, events in the other theatres of war
began to exercise a decisive influence on our operations at Kondoa.
The Belgians pushed in from near Lake Kivu and from Russisi,
the English from the Kagera, west of Lake Victoria, and, since
the middle of July, from Muansa also, and all these forces were
converging on Tabora. Our troops stationed in the north-
west were all combined under the command of General Wahle,
who was at Tabora ; and he gradually drew in his detachments
from the frontiers towards that place.

Owing to the difficulties of communication Headquarters had
but meagre information of these events. Hostile detachments
were also pressing in from the south-west, from the country
between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyassa. Before them, our
company righting in the neighbourhood of Bisrnarckburg fell
back slowly in a north-easterly direction towards Tabora. The
two companies left behind to secure the Langenburg district
gradually retreated on Iringa, followed by General Northey,
whose division was equipped with all the appliances of modern
warfare.

On the Northern Railway, Major Kraut's patrols, who started
out from his fortified position at Lembeni, had occasionally
scored pleasing successes. Several aeroplanes were brought
down, or came to grief, the passengers being captured and the
machines destroyed. When the heavy rains had ceased, the

140

Between the Northern and Central Railways

enemy commenced his advance from Kahe along the Northern
Railway, as well as east of it through the Pare Mountains, and
west of it along the Pangani. Hundreds of automobiles and
large numbers of mounted troops were observed. In order to
avoid the danger of being cut off by the greatly superior enemy,
Major Kraut withdrew his main body by rail to Buiko, leaving
small detachments in contact with the enemy. In this vicinity,
as well as near Mombo, a few actions took place, in some of which
our companies drove through the enemy, who tried to block the
line, and fired on him from the train. Being in superior force,
the enemy was always able, with little trouble, to execute out-
flanking movements with fresh troops, but their effectiveness was
greatly reduced by the difficulty of the country. It seemed,
therefore, as though the enemy frequently departed from this
idea and adopted a sort of tactics of attrition instead. To-day
he would attack with one portion of his force, then let that rest,
and put in another the next day, and a different portion again
on the third. In spite of all his obvious urging, and his favourable
conditions of supply, his advance was fairly slow. Major Kraut's
troops never got into a really difficult situation ; on the con-
trary, they were often able to catch the enemy under fire un-
awares, and to gain partial successes, which occasionally caused
him very considerable losses, such as Captain Freiherr von
Bodecker's rear-guard action near Handeni.

In view of this concentric advance from all directions, the
question arose, what should be done with the main body
of the Protective Force now before Kcindoa? For an attack
the situation was altogether too unfavourable. The problem,
therefore, was, what should be the general direction of our
retreat ? I decided on the Mahenge country. By moving
there we should avoid being surrounded, it was fertile, and
suitable for guerilla warfare. From there also it would be
possible to withdraw further to the south and to continue the
war for a long time to come.

Another important consideration was the safeguarding of
our stores deposited along the Central Railway, particularly
in the vicinity of Morogoro. These were greatly endangered

141

My Reminiscences of East Africa

by the rapid advance of General Smuts, who was opposing Major
Kraut, and had penetrated far to the south beyond Handeni.
Although it was to be assumed that General Smuts would be
delayed by the continually increasing length of his communica-
tions, he seemed to me to be the most dangerous and important
of our opponents. I therefore decided to leave in front of the
Kondoa force only a detachment at Burungi, under Captain
Klinghardt, but to march my main body back to Dodoma, pro-
ceed thence by rail to Morogoro, and move up in support of Major
Kraut. It turned out afterwards that the English were in-
formed of this movement down to the smallest details, and that,
for instance, they knew all about a railway accident that hap-
pened to one company during its progress. When our com-
panies arrived at Morogoro and the Europeans there saw the
splendid bearing of the Askari they lost the last traces of their
depression ; every man and woman had comprehended that
our situation was indeed difficult, but also that there was nothing
for it but to go on fighting, and that our Force was, from its
whole quality and nature, capable of carrying on for a long time
to come.

Early in July I reached Major Kraut, who was holding a forti-
fied position on Kanga Mountain, north-east of Tuliani. I had
expected the Askari to be depressed by their retreat, but found
them in excellent spirits and full of confidence. In front of
their position they had cleared the foreground for 50 to 100
yards and were fully convinced that they could beat off an attack.
I employed the time that elapsed before the arrival of the
other detachments in reconnaissance, and soon formed a mental
picture of the passes which led across the difficult rock and forest
country westward of our line of communication.

Owing to the remarkably dense bush an attempt to send a
strong detachment round the enemy's camp to attack it in
rear was unsuccessful. But the enemy did sustain casualties
through numerous minor enterprises by our patrols, who fired
at his transport columns and the automobiles working behind
his front. In this way also a Staff car was once effectively
fired on. The enemy's patrols were also active and several of

142

Between the Northern and Central Railways

his distant patrols had got behind us. One of them, commanded
by Lieutenant Wienholt, betrayed its presence by surprising
a column of our carriers and burning the loads. Among other
things these contained a quantity of trousers which had come
out in the store-ship and were anxiously expected. Wienholt,
therefore, aroused painful interest on the part of everyone. His
patrol was discovered in camp in the dense bush and surprised.
He himself got away, and trusting to the fact that it is not easy
to find anyone in the African bush, wanted to work his way
alone through our lines and back to the English. Our well-
tried men, zan Rongew, Nieuwenhudgu and Trappel, who had
effected the clever capture of the horses near Longido Mountain,
succeeded in tracking and capturing him. On my return from
a reconnaissance I met Wienholt in our camp at Tuliani enjoying
a cheery meal with his captors. We could none of us help
honestly admiring the excellent work of his patrol, whose route
was accurately marked on the map that was captured in his
possession. Wienholt was then taken to a prisoners' camp in
the interior, from which he escaped some months later while
bathing. In 1917 he did excellent work on patrol round Kilwa
and Livale, and also later on, in 1918, in Portuguese East Africa.
I was greatly interested in his description of an attack by a leopard
which, with great boldness, killed his companion in camp. I
presume he has by now given friends and acquaintances the
benefit of his vivid account, of which he unfortunately lost the
original later on in a patrol encounter.

Weeks now passed, during which the English annoyed us mainly
by bombs from aircraft. They had evidently found out the exact
site of our Headquarter camp at Tuliani. I remember one day
when four aeroplanes, against which we could do nothing, circled
over our camp for hours and dropped bombs. But we had learned
to make ourselves invisible, and only the European employed
in the telephone hut was so badly hurt that he lost his hand.
An adjoining hut full of valuable documents was set alight
by an incendiary bomb.

My cars were then still working, and from Tuliani I was often
able quickly to reach Kraut's Detachment hi front by the good

143

My Reminiscences of East Africa

line-of-communication road. Lieutenant-Commander Schoenfeld
had there made excellent arrangements for directing the fire of
the 4-inch and 3.5-inch naval guns. From his observation posts
on the heights of Kanga Mountain one had a good view of the
English camps. Some weak German detachments had not
followed Major Kraut from Usambara towards Tuliani, but had
escaped along the Usambara Railway towards Tanga. There,
and also near Korogwe, they had minor encounters with the
enemy and gradually fell back towards the south, on the east
side of Kraut's Detachment. They were followed by more
considerable portions of the enemy. Gradually the force at
Tuliani became liable to be circumvented on the east, and to
lose its communication with the Morogoro country, which was
so important for the supply of stores, ammunition and food.
At the same time General van Deventer, whose force had been
augmented to a division, advanced from Kondoa to the south,
and Captain Klinghardt retired before him, first to the south,
and then towards Mpapua.

The closeness and difficulty of the country caused Captain
Klinghardt to still further subdivide his already small force (five
companies) in order to watch and block important passes. The
enemy followed with a large number of automobiles, and occa-
sionally one of them was successfully blown up by mines sunk
in the roads. Owing to the unavoidable dissemination of Captain
Klinghardt 's troops, and the difficulty of maintaining touch
between them, one part often could not know what was hap-
pening to its neighbours. A large German mounted patrol
was attempting to connect up from the east with a detachment
believed to be at Meiameia, on the road from Dodoma to Kondoa-
Irangi. All unconsciously it rode straight into a hostile camp
and was captured almost without exception. The retirement
of our troops from Kondoa, who had not merely to escape, but
also to inflict damage on the enemy, was a very difficult manoeuvre ;
the right moment to fall back, to halt again, to advance for a
sudden counter-stroke, and then break off again quickly, and in
sufficient time, is difficult to gauge. Reliable reports were
lacking. Owing to the scarcity of means of communication

144

Between the Northern and Central Railways

the difficulties attending the retirement of several columns
through unknown country grew infinitely great. The influence
of the commander was often eliminated, and too much had
to be left to chance. On the 3ist July, 1916, the enemy reached
the Central Railway at Dodoma. Captain Klinghardt slipped off
to the east along the railway. In the actions which took place
west of Mpapua several favourable opportunities were not
recognized, and neighbouring detachments, whose assistance
had been relied on, did not arrive in tune. Such things easily
give rise to a feeling of insecurity among the troops and weaken
confidence and enterprise. The difficulties were accentuated
in this case by the fact that Captain Klinghardt was taken ill
with typhoid and became a casualty just at the critical moment.
Captain Otto was sent from Tuliani to replace him, and succeeded
in once more collecting the scattered parties and in establishing
united control.

The 2nd Rifle Company also, which had been obliged to retire
on Saranda by the Kondoa-Saranda road, and with which all
touch had been lost, made a great circuit on the south side of
the railway and rejoined Otto's Detachment. Owing to the
numerical superiority of the enemy, in the actions which now
took place, Otto's Detachment frequently found itself exposed
to an attack on its front while being enveloped on both flanks.
The enemy did not always succeed in timing these movements
correctly. Thus, at Mpapua, the frontal attack got too close to
our line and suffered severely ; and the flank attack, even when
directed on the rear of our positions, produced no decisive effect.
The short range of visibility always enabled us either to avoid
the danger, or, if the opportunity was favourable, to attack the
troops outflanking us in detail. In any event, these outflanking
tactics of the enemy, when followed, as in this case, in extra-
ordinarily thick bush, and among numerous rocks, demanded
great exertions and used up his strength. Every day Captain
Otto fell back only a couple of miles further to the east, and in
these operations the railway enabled him to change the position
of his big gun at will. When Otto's Detachment approached
Kilossa it became necessary to move the main body at Tuliani

145 10

My Reminiscences of East Africa

also. Headquarters and a part of the force moved to Morogoro,
Major Kraut, with several companies and a 4-inch gun, to Kilossa.
At Tuliani Captain Schulz took command.

I now considered that columns pressing on from the north
would soon reach the country west of Bagamoyo, and that at
this place also troops would be landed. In order to reconnoitre
personally, I travelled to Ruwa Station and thence by bicycle
over the sandy, undulating road to Bagamoyo. One day's
march south of Bagamoyo I came on the camp of two Europeans :
it was District Commissioner Michels, who wanted to remove his
threatened District Headquarters from Bagamoyo towards the
interior. The inhabitants were confiding and were living as in
peace. So far the universal war had passed them by without
a trace. As time pressed I had to turn back and Herr Michels'
fast Muscat donkey carried me back to Ruwa in a few hours.
On the next day, from Kidugallo, I reconnoitred the supply
depots established there and further to the north by cycle
and then returned to Morogoro. Other reconnaissances, mostly
also by cycle, took me to the mountains lying to westward in
the direction of Kilossa, and along the roads leading round the
Uluguru Mountains on the west and east. The passes leading
from Morogoro up the northern slopes of the gigantic Uluguru
group, and down again on the south side towards Kissaki, had
to be examined on foot. Owing to the pressure exerted by
General van Deventer on Kilossa, and the danger that Captain
Schulz might also be circumvented at Tuliani, it was imperative
not to miss the right moment for withdrawing Captain Schulz
to Morogoro. But in order to retain the power of delivering
counter-strokes we had to hold on to the Tuliani area as long as
possible.

Captain Stemmermann's Detachment, which had been pushed
out a short day's march due north of Tuliani, was attacked
at Maomondo by a strong force of Europeans and Indians.
The enemy was very skilful. A machine gun of the 6th Company,
placed on a rocky slope, was seized by a few Indians, who had
crept up to it from the front unobserved, and thrown down
the steep slope, so that it could not be found again. The enemy,

146

Between the Northern and Central Railways

who had penetrated our lines, was thrown out again with heavy
loss by a counter-attack by the 2ist Company. At close quarters
the English Major Buller, a son of the well-known General of
the South African War days, put a bullet through the hat of the
Company Commander, Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, but was
then severely wounded by the latter. Major Buller was got
away to the German hospital at Dar-es-Salaam and nursed back
to health by the wife of his opponent, who was working there
as a nurse. During the actions at Maternondo English horse-
men had worked round farther to the west, and suddenly appeared
in one of the mountain passes leading from the west to Tuliani.
In the dense bush the 2nd Mounted Brigade, which had come
from South Africa under General Brits, apparently sustained
heavy casualties.

With the consent of Headquarters, Captain Schulz now with-
drew to Derkawa, which is situated in dense bush on the Wami
river, on the road from Tuliani to Morogoro. Here he occupied
a fortified position on the south bank, where he was attacked
on the I3th August by the enemy pursuing from Tuliani, with a
force of at least one brigade of infantry, and General Brits'
Mounted Brigade, while simultaneously another brigade, which
had marched up the right bank of the Wami, attacked him from
the east. During the action continuous telephonic communi-
cation was maintained with Captain Schulz from Morogoro. The
enemy's losses were estimated at several hundred, and were
afterwards confirmed by the English. The attacks were beaten
off, but in the dense bush it was so difficult to obtain a clear
idea of the situation that it did not seem possible to achieve a
decisive success. Captain Schulz was chary of putting in the one
formed company he had left. I approved his intention of falling
back to Morogoro at the end of the action, as the general situation
made it desirable for me to concentrate my forces. After Major
Kraut's arrival at Kilossa I also brought Captain Otto in to
Morogoro, with part of his companies. Major Kraut had passed
behind Otto's Detachment through Kilossa and after some
engagements at that place, he took up a position immediately
to the south of it, on the road to Mahenge. Even after the

147 10*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

enemy had moved into Kilossa telephonic communication with
Kraut's Detachment had continued to work for a few hours
through the enemy.

From that time on direct communication with Major Kraut
was interrupted. Signalling by helio did not work, and the wires
which led from Kissaki, and later from the Rufiji, to Mahenge,
and thence to Major Kraut, were not yet completed — in some cases
not even begun. With General Wahle at Tabora we had also
had no communication since £ke second half of July, that is,
for over a month. Bagamoyo hao^allen into the enemy's hands ;
and every day we expected to hear\>f the fall of Dar-es-Salaam
and to lose touch with that place.

148

CHAPTER VI

CONTINUOUS FIGHTING NEAR THE RUFIJI

IN order to oppose the troops of General Northey, who were
advancing from the direction of New Langenburg, Captain
Braunschweig had been dispatched from Dodoma at the end of
June. He had taken up reinforcements from Kondoa and
Dar-es-Salaam to the two German Askari companies that had
slipped away from the New Langenburg country, and had con-
centrated his own troops, totalling five companies and one field
howitzer, at Malangali. At that place his force had fought a
brave action with a superior force of the enemy, but had been
obliged to fall back towards Mahenge.

As the converging hostile columns were now approaching
each other in the direction of Morogoro, it became necessary to
consider our future plan of operations. The enemy expected us
to stand and fight a final decisive engagement near Morogoro,
on the northern slopes of the Uluguru Mountains. To me, this
idea was never altogether intelligible. Being so very much the
weaker party, it was surely madness to await at this place the
junction of the hostile columns, of which each one individually
was already superior to us in numbers, and then to fight with
our back to the steep and rocky mountains, of which the passes
were easy to close, and which deprived us of all freedom of move-
ment in our rear. I thought it sounder so to conduct our opera-
tions that we should only have to deal with a part of the enemy.
Knowing that the enemy, and General Brits in particular, had
a liking for wide turning movements, I felt sure that one column
would move off from Dakawa, where large hostile camps had
been identified, or from Kilossa, in order to reach our rear by
working round the west side of the Uluguru Mountains. This

149

My Reminiscences of East Africa

possibility was so obvious that I cycled out every day to the
mountains west of Morogoro, so as to get the reports from the
patrols in good time, and to supplement them by personal
observation of the clouds of smoke and dust. The latter soon
put it beyond doubt that a strong column was moving from
near Dakawa towards the railway between Morogoro and
Kilossa. Patrols identified enemy troops that had crossed the
railway and were marching further south. The observers on
the mountains reported the clouds of dust to be moving towards
Mlali.

As I meant to let this movement run its full course and then
attack the isolated detachment with the whole of my forces, I
waited until I thought it was near Mlali. On the evening of
the 23rd August, Captain Otto, who was encamped at Morogoro,
was ordered to march off for Mlali during the night with three
companies. He arrived there early on the 24th, just as English
horsemen had taken possession of the depot. When I reached
Otto's Detachment the fight was in full swing. The country
was, however, unsuitable for short decisive strokes, owing to
the many steep hills which impeded movement. The other
troops at Morogoro, except Captain Stemmermann's Detach-
ment, were ordered up by telephone. I myself went back again
to Morogoro to talk things over. Stemmermann's Detachment,
to which, on account of the roads, the 4-inch Konigsberg gun
and the howitzer battery were attached, was ordered to fall
back along the eastern slopes of the Uluguru Mountains, and to
delay the enemy there. The passes over the mountains them-
selves were closed by weak patrols. When I arrived once more
at Mlali in the afternoon, the fight was still undecided. At
several points the enemy had been driven back, and several
people thought they had seen him suffer considerably. But by
nightfall we had got so entangled in the mountains, and every
movement had become so difficult and took so much time, that
we halted. We found the night very cold, lying out on the hills
without the carriers' loads. Luckily, however, this fertile
region had so far hardly suffered at all from the war, and a fowl
roasted on a spit soon appeased our hunger.

150

Continuous Fighting near the Rufiji

The next morning numerous explosions in the German depots,
which had been surprised by the enemy, indicated that he had
moved off and had destroyed the 4-inch shells stored there.
We surmised that he was moving south-west, which eventually
turned out to be the case. The enemy was probably making a
turning movement so as to reach Kissaki before us. At the
wealthy Administration Office at that place, 600 tons of food
supplies and the military stores removed from Morogoro had
been collected. Wild rumours exaggerated the actual facts,
and stated that strong forces had already reached the roads
leading to Kissaki before us. Although the wagon road stopped
at Mlali, and the remainder of the route to Kissaki consisted
only of paths broken by many ravines and obstacles, the possi-
bility that the enemy might make a rapid march on Kissaki
had to be taken very seriously, and we had no tune to waste.
In the evening we were most hospitably entertained by the
Father at Mgeta Mission. The buildings are charmingly situated
in the deep ravine of the Mgeta river, which hi this part comes
down very swiftly. The many lights on the slope of the hill
made one think one was approaching some small watering-place
in Germany. A few European women from Morogoro were
also staying there, and bade farewell to the Force for the last
time. With the exception of a few nurses all women had to
stay behind.

The removal of our loads was carried out fairly satisfactorily.
The Force profited by the fact that owing to the insistence of
the energetic Captain Feilke, about a thousand native labourers,
who had until a few days previously been working in the forestry
department at Morogoro, were placed at its disposal. But the
carrier question was beginning to be difficult. The natives
saw that we were evacuating the country ; a number of them,
who had promised to come, stayed away, to the despair of the
sensible Chiefs, who would gladly have helped us. As only
small parties of the enemy appeared in the country round Mgeta,
it began to seem probable that his principal forces were making
a turning movement. Leaving a rear-guard behind, which only
followed us slowly, our main body was, during the ensuing days,

My Reminiscences of East Africa

moved nearer to Kissaki. One night an Askari appeared at
my bedside, bearing himself in a smart military manner : it was
the Effendi Yuma Mursal, of the 4th Field Company, who had
been left behind sick at Morogoro. He reported that a force
of the enemy, as strong as that at Kahe had been, had marched
round the west side of the Uluguru Mountains from Morogoro,
and that a number of German Askari had found the recent
fighting too much for them. They had deserted, and were now
plundering the plantations south-west of Morogoro.

A telephone line was laid from Kissaki to us, by means of

which Captain Tafel kept us continually informed ; up to date

no enemy had been seen at Kissaki. But to the west of us,

patrols reported the enemy to be marching to the south. I

therefore moved to Kissaki, and had to destroy some of our

stores, which were collected in small depots along our route.

Unfortunately, in carrying this out, an efficient Ordnance N.C.O.

was accidentally killed, as had happened before on a similar

occasion at Morogoro. At Kissaki, several days passed before

we came seriously into collision with the enemy. It was not

advisable to occupy the Boma Fort itself ; it consisted of a

group of buildings surrounded by a massive high wall, and was

situated in the middle of a completely cleared bit of country.

The enemy could, therefore, only capture it by a costly attack ;

but he had no need to assault it at all ; by means of artillery

and bombs from aircraft, he could have made it intolerable for

us to remain in the cramped Boma, and we ourselves should

then have been forced to make a sortie over the open and to

endure the fire which the enemy would have been able to pour

into us in perfect security. Our defences were, therefore,

placed a long way outside the Boma, covered from the view of

aircraft, and so arranged that they could be occupied and

evacuated unobserved.

It was not until I arrived at Kissaki myself that I obtained
a proper idea of the abundance of stores and supplies available
there. I learned that, contrary to my belief, practically nothing
was stored further south at Behobeho or at Kungulio, on the
Rufiji. At Kissaki there were large stocks, but notwithstanding

152

Continuous Fighting near the Rufiji

the dense native population, it was impossible to get them away.
The numerous inhabitants, to whom the war and the many
Askari were something quite new, lost their heads and ran
away into the bush. The Civil Administration, which enjoyed
the complete confidence of the people, proved powerless against
the overwhelming influences now bursting in upon them. Even
presents of clothing, which were ordinarily so highly valued,
failed to hold them. It seemed as if all the evil spirits had
conspired together to deprive us of transport. Our column
of several hundred pack-donkeys had been driven over the moun-
tains from Morogoro. It arrived at Kissaki late and completely
exhausted. Our ox-wagons, which had to go round the east
side of the Uluguru Mountains on account of the state of the
roads, seemed to be never going to arrive. The head of the
Communications Service could not find any other means of
carrying away the stocks which were essential to us for con-
tinuing the war. And yet it was obvious that we must continue
to fall back further south, towards the Rufiji, before the superior
numbers of the enemy.

One circumstance that brightened the gloom was that our
great herds of cattle, which had been grazing east of Mpapua,
had been brought away hi good time. Several thousand head,
mostly beautiful cattle, arrived at Kissaki, and would have
formed a most welcome mobile reserve of supplies. But, unfor-
tunately, our pleasure at this was diminished by the frequent
occurrence of the tse-tse fly at some places ; if the animals
got stung by them they lost condition badly, and mostly died
after a few weeks. The bulk of the cattle was, therefore, driven
on into the healthy districts on the Rufiji. As for the rest, we
simply worked with energy at getting away the stores to Beho-
beho and on to Kungulio, using the carriers belonging to the
troops, all the people we could raise in the district, and our few
wagons. In order to effect this, we had to gain time, and
Captain Stemmermann, who was marching round the Uluguru
Mountains by the eastern road, could only be allowed to fall
back quite slowly before the hostile division which was pushing
after him with all its might.

153

My Reminiscences of East Africa

I waited at Kissaki with the main body, in order to be able
quickly to recognize and make use of any favourable oppor-
tunity. As was to be expected, the enemy had, owing to our
withdrawal to Kissaki, abandoned his concentration on Moro-
goro ; he had sent a few detachments direct over the Uluguru
Mountains, but his other columns had separated and followed
us, extending far to the east and west. The hope of being able
to defeat one or more of these columns separately was fulfilled
beyond expectation. West of the Uluguru Mountains General
Brits had divided his division into brigade columns (two mounted
and one infantry), which had difficulty in keeping touch. Soon
large hostile camps were discovered a day's march west of
Kissaki, and on the 7th September, 1916, Captain Otto's Detach-
ment, which was encamped at a plantation near Kissaki, was
attacked by a large force of European horse, and by native
and white infantry. It turned out later that this force con-
sisted of General Enslin's Mounted Brigade, and of portions
of the infantry brigade of General Brits's Division. The turning
movement which the enemy was making round the left wing of
Otto's Detachment was allowed to continue until the out-
flanking detachment had got right round in rear of Captain
Otto, near the Boma of Kissaki. Evidently the enemy did not
expect German reserves to be posted under cover still further
back. These reserves were now loosed upon him. The gallant
nth Field Company, under Lieutenant Volkwein of the Reserve,
worked through the dense bush close up to the outflanking
enemy, and immediately attacked with the bayonet, cheering.
With that the enemy's beautiful plans completely collapsed ;
our further advance simply rolled him up, and he was com-
pletely defeated. The almost impenetrable bush made it im-
possible vigorously to push the enemy, or to undertake a pursuit
on a large scale ; but the bulk of his troops was broken up, and
the small fragments were scattered in the bush in hopeless con-
fusion. The led-horses and horse-holders were captured, and
about fifteen Europeans taken prisoner. Even the next day
an English soldier arrived from quite another direction ; he had
lost himself with his led-horses in the dense bush and had no

154

Continuous Fighting near the Rufiji

idea where to go. The man had plenty of humour ; he threw
his rifle and ammunition across a small stream and said : " It's
just luck ; I might have taken the right road or the wrong one.
I had the bad luck to take the wrong one. That's my fault."

Tafel's Detachment, which was encamped north of Kissaki,
on the road we had come by, had only partially joined in the
fight on the evening of the 7th. I had kept it back, as I thought
that, simultaneously with the attack on the yth from the west,
another one would be made from the north along the road.
And General Brits undoubtedly did hold this perfectly sound
intention ; but the execution failed. General Nussy's Mounted
Brigade, without having any idea of the action of the yth,
marched along towards Tafel's Detachment from the north on
the 8th. It was just as thoroughly beaten as its friends had
been the day before. In the dense bush it was, on the 8th, even
more difficult to survey the fighting, and a considerable number
of prisoners taken by the ist Company managed to escape.

In the two days we took some thirty European prisoners, and
some of them were sent back to the enemy, on taking an oath
not to fight again in this war against the Germans or their
allies. The humanity of this step, which was, under tropical
conditions, in the best interest of the prisoners themselves, was
not recognized by the English. They suspected spying, seized
the German envoy who brought back the prisoners, sent him
far into the bush with his eyes bound, and then let him go
where good luck might take him. It was a wonder that the
man, who was exhausted by prolonged wandering about, found
his way back. This shows how difficult the English made it
for us to avoid unnecessary severity towards the enemy. At
the same time, the English private soldiers had faith in the
treatment we meted out to our prisoners. While the battle-
field was being cleared, in which both English and German
medical officers took part, wounded Englishmen begged to be
treated by the German doctor. And later on, also, wounded
men remarked that they would hardly have been cured if they
had been treated by English medical personnel.

It was my opinion that these satisfactory successes at Kissaki

155

My Reminiscences of East Africa

had not brought us a final decision against the troops of General
Brits, and I still believe that in the dense bush and the rugged
country an energetic pursuit, which alone would have secured
the desired result, was impossible of execution. My attention
was all the more drawn towards the force pursuing Stemmer-
mann's Detachment, as it had already come within two days'
march north-east of Kissaki. During the last few days the
situation there had not been favourable ; the broken ground
had in several instances caused our already weak forces to be
disseminated. Some portions had been ambushed, the troops
were very fatigued, and several people were suffering badly
from nerves. On the gth September Stemmermann's Detach-
ment approached the village of Dutumi, which was known to
me from previous reconnaissance. I thought the enemy would
press on on the following day, and considered the opportunity
favourable for achieving a success at Dutumi by rapidly moving
my main body there from Kissaki. In the evening we marched
away from Kissaki by the fine broad road, and reached Dutumi
that night. Captain Otto remained at Kissaki with five com-
panies. On arrival I decided to make use of the factor of sur-
prise, and to make an enveloping attack in the early morning
on the enemy's left wing, which was identified close in front of
Stemmermann's Detachment. I knew that this wing was in
the plain, while, looking from our side, the enemy's centre and
right stretched away to the left up the foot-hills of the Uluguru
Mountains. It was because of these foot-hills that the chances
of attack were less favourable on our left.

Early on the gth September, Schulz's Detachment attacked
from our right. Rifle and machine-gun fire soon started, and
the enemy's light artillery also opened fire ; but the thick high
elephant grass, with which the plain was covered, made it
impossible to form a clear idea of things. I thought the attack
was going well, and proceeded to the left in order to get a view
of the situation. The heights there were also densely over-
grown. It was very fatiguing to get along and difficult to find
anybody. I was clambering about, fairly exhausted in the heat
of a tropical noon, when I luckily heard the sound of tin pots,

156

Continuous Fighting near the Rufiji

and found I was right in concluding that some European was
just having lunch. It was Captain Goering, who had taken
up his post in the bush on a height which afforded a good view.
Here, towards three p.m., I received the unwelcome news that
the attack by Schulz's Detachment on our right had not attained
its object. It had been simply impossible to get at the enemy
through the dense elephant grass. If, therefore, any decisive
action was to be taken on that day at all, it could only be done
on our left. Even here, owing to the difficult country, success
was not very probable. The advancing companies got into a
very intersected mountain tract, in which they shot at the
enemy, and were shot at by him without any result, and at dusk
returned to their original positions.

During the following days the enemy directed his attacks
mainly against our left, and was frequently driven back by
counter-strokes. But, on the whole, it was evident that success
was only possible if the enemy proved very unskilful. On the
other hand, our communications, which from now on no longer
ran to Kissaki, but towards Behobeho in the south-east, were
in a great degree threatened by the enemy. I therefore aban-
doned Dutumi, and withdrew the main body an hour's march
to the south, across the Mgeta river, where the Force occupied
an extensive fortified camp, which it continued to hold for
months. By this move the rich fields of Dutumi were unfortu-
nately given up. In the poor country of Kiderengwa we had
to depend mainly on supplies from the rear, which were sent up
from the Rufiji. Unfortunately the fatigues of this transport
work, combined with sickness caused by tse-tse, very soon led
to the almost complete loss of our pack-donkeys. From Kider-
engwa our fighting patrols attacked the enemy's communica-
tions, which ran to the north-east from Dutumi, as well as the
Dutumi-Kissaki road, which soon became alive with enemy
detachments and transport.

Various observations now concurred in disclosing remarkable
movements on the part of the enemy. Both east and west of
the Uluguru Mountains movements of troops in such strength
were seen to be taking place towards Morogoro, that the natives

157

My Reminiscences of East Africa

said : " Wana hama " (" They axe moving elsewhere "). A large
number of the South African Europeans, of whom, by the way,
many had come to the end of their strength, were sent home.
Other observations disclosed a movement of troops towards
the east. Generally speaking, a period of rest ensued, which was
only interrupted by minor expeditions of patrols and occasional
artillery bombardments.

General Smuts realized that his blow had failed. He sent me
a letter calling upon me to surrender, by which he showed
that, as far as force was concerned, he had reached the end of
his resources.

158

CHAPTER VII

HOSTILE ATTACKS IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE COLONY

MEANWHILE, the situation at Kilwa began to demand
increased attention. We had there only weak detach-
ments for protecting the coast, which consisted mainly of young,
newly-enlisted Askari, and had been organized as a company.
This company was not sufficient, and there was a danger that
the enemy might march from Kilwa to the Rufiji, or to Livale,
and get in our rear. No doubt the enemy had some such inten-
tion, and something had to be done to prevent it. Major von
Boemken, with three companies, had already marched off from
the battlefield of Dutumi for Kunguliu on the Rufiji, proceeding
thence to Utete by route march and on the stern-wheeler
Tomondo. The Tomondo was the only shallow-draught steamer
on the Rufiji, and carried most of the supplies, which came from
the lower Rufiji to Kunguliu, whence they were carried to the
troops at Kiderengwa by donkeys and carriers. It now required
a certain amount of discussion before the civil authorities would
place the Tomondo at my disposal for carrying the necessary
troops. At Kilwa the situation did not develop altogether satis-
factorily. It is true that a few minor engagements were more
or less in our favour, but, as so often happened during the war,
we did not manage to secure united control of our forces.
Among other things, the enemy succeeded in destroying a
supply depot west of Kilwa, which was too near the coast. The
enemy cleverly incited the natives to rebellion, and they rendered
him valuable service as spies. Several German reconnoitring
detachments were ambushed and suffered severely. The Dis-
trict Commissioner of Kilwa was taken prisoner. The awkward-
ness of the already difficult situation at Kilwa was increased by

My Reminiscences of East Africa

the fact that the District Commissioner's Askari were not
placed under the orders of the military commander.

At the same time, the pressure of hostile forces was felt from
the direction of Dar-es-Salaam, in the north, towards the lower
Rufiji. Our weak detachments, which had fallen back from
Dar-es-Salaam in a southerly direction towards the Rufiji, and
consisted principally of a young company of Askari and part
of the ship's company of the Konigsberg, were not enough to
protect the rich sources of subsistence in the lower Rufiji country.
But at the time this country was what the Force depended on,
for the middle Rufiji country was but sparsely settled, and could
not maintain both troops and carriers for any length of time.
In view of this necessitous situation, we had at once started to
grow maize in the fertile lowlands of Logeloge and Mpanganya,
but the harvest could not be expected before March, 1917.
We were, therefore, threatened by a great danger when several
companies of Indians attacked our advanced officers' post in
the Boma of Kissengire. The enemy, who assaulted the steep
walls without sufficient preparatory fire, was driven off with
considerable loss. Unfortunately, the German commander,
Lieutenant Baldamus, of the Reserve, who exposed himself too
freely to the enemy projectiles, was killed. But his resolute and
gallant defence secured us in the possession of the seat of adminis-
tration at Kissengire until the arrival of adequate reinforce-
ments ; it is, therefore, due to this officer that we retained
control of the rich supply area of the lower Rufiji for months to
come.

It has already been mentioned that a pause in the operations
had occurred at Kiderengwa ; an attack on the enemy, who was
entrenched in a strong position, promised no success. Head-
quarters accordingly left only eight companies, under Captain
Tafel, in the Kissaki-Kiderengwa area (and this force was
reduced later), moving with the bulk of the troops to the lower
Rufiji. The road to Kunguliu led past large lakes, which, like
the Rufiji, were full of hippopotami. Owing to the general
demand for fat, hippopotamus shooting became a question of
existence. One has to watch until the animal's head is clearly

160

Askari. A halt.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

\To face p. 160.

The Banyan Tree.

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

visible, so as to hit in a spot that will cause instantaneous death.
The animal then sinks, and comes up again after a little time

Fig. xiii.

Fig. xiv.

AJorcK of Go-man. Main force
-September' 1 6 to June' 17

Fig. xiii. Battles of Kissaki and Dutumi. Fig. xiv. March of German Main
Force, September, 1916, to June, 1917.

when it can be drawn to the bank by means of a rope, quickly
made of bark. There it is cut up, and the expert knows exactly

161 ii

My Reminiscences of East Africa

where to find the white, appetizing fat. The quantity varies :
a well-fed beast provides over two bucketfuls. But one has to
learn, not only how to prepare the fat, but also how to kill imme-
diately with the first shot. Some foolish people had been reck-
less, and in many places the dead bodies of wounded animals
were to be seen, which quickly decompose and become unfit for
food. The elephant also was now regarded in a new light ;
ordinarily the elephant hunter gauges the length and weight
of the tusk before firing ; now the pressing question was : how
much fat will the beast supply ? For elephant fat is very good,
and possibly tastes even better than that of the hippo.

At Kunguliu the herds of cattle we had brought along were
driven into the river, and swam across. Up till then the troops
had crossed by ferry, on which Herr Kiihlwein, the former
traffic manager of our lost Northern Railway, now contented
himself with the more modest post of " Traffic Manager, Kun-
guliu Ferry." When we arrived, a bridge, three hundred and
thirty yards long, had been completed, which was also capable
of taking vehicles. On the south bank we went into camp near
Niakisiku Plantation, belonging to Lieutenant Bleeck, of the
Reserve, who had been called up. The Europeans' houses had
been fitted up as hospitals, and were fully occupied. At Loge-
loge we found the Headquarters of the Line of Communication,
where a large number of roomy grass huts had been put up for
the troops. The plantation itself, belonging to a company,
comprised extensive sisal fields. Food also was cultivated in
plenty. The country being free of tse-tse, supported a large
amount of cattle, and the survivors of our pack-donkeys had been
brought there from the tse-tse country north of the Rufiji.
Here the families of the Europeans still lived in their solidly-
built houses, and were thankful that the course of the operations
had enabled them to continue their home and business life
undisturbed for more than two years.

At Logeloge, and at the agricultural experimental establish-
ment of Mpanganya, which we reached next day, other Europeans
of the neighbourhood had also collected, and, where the existing
buildings failed to accommodate them, had built themselves

162

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

houses with poles and cane, or grass. Here an unpleasant
symptom also made its appearance. While the troops at the
front were animated by the best spirit and great enterprise,
things behind the front were not always the same. The people
who understood least of the business always knew everything
better, and fostered a certain amount of discontent. That
kind of thing is catching, and in the long run undermines right
feeling. Fortunately, however, many of the troops behind the
front had enough soldierly pride to shut up the grousers pretty
bluntly on occasion. In one of the hospitals there someone was
becoming rather too free with his destructive criticism, and a
wounded man answered : "I tell you what, the Commandant
is the brain of the Force, but you're its backside ! " This
unvarnished epithet was so apt, that it at once turned the laugh
on the side of the speaker, and polished away the spot of tarnish
that threatened to spread.

The question now was, whether we should first turn to the
north against the force at Kissengire, or against the one at
Kilwa. The latter had not, as Major von Boemken had feared,
moved on towards Li vale, but, possibly influenced by the move-
ments of our troops, had turned towards the north. It thus
worked into the Kibata country, which, though rich, was very
mountainous, and difficult for manoeuvre, and as long as it
remained there I did not think it would be very dangerous. I
considered it sufficient merely to prevent it from pushing further
towards the Rufiji, for which a weak force of five companies,
under Major Schulz, was enough. Major von Boemken, who was
anxious about Livale, had, with two companies and a 4-inch
gun, made his way into the neighbourhood of Mpotora, a chance
circumstance, from which, as will be seen, we later reaped great
benefit. I had, therefore, a free hand to move on towards Kissen-
gire. That was important, and enabled us to secure the rich
supply country north of the lower Rufiji, and to get away the
valuable stocks from thence to the middle Rufiji. Whether there
would be an opportunity of obtaining a success in the field it
was not possible to tell ; but I thought that the enemy, since he
had pushed troops from the Uluguru Mountains in an easterly

163 n*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

direction to the neighbourhood of Kissengire, would exert some
pressure from the north. So it was quite possible that we might
find a favourable opportunity for a fight. We crossed the
Rufiji at Utete in boats, and in a few days reached Makima,
one day's march south of Kissengire. By that time a suffi-
cient garrison of two companies had been assembled at Kissen-
gire, where it was actively employed in strengthening the posi-
tion. A little to the north, at Maneromango, was a strong force
of the enemy, and a European patrol, which had started out
from Kiderengwa, reported that hostile troops had been moved
from the west towards the Maneromango-Kissengire area.

A few days after leaving Kiderengwa this patrol had got into
a waterless country in terrible heat, and the various members
had lost each other in the dense bush. They made their presence
known by firing, and had no choice but to surrender to the
English. Only the determined patrol-leader had managed to
escape to a native village, where the inhabitants greeted him
with apparent friendliness and brought him eggs. As he bent
down to take them, they fell upon him, and handed him over
to a patrol of English Askari concealed close by. An Askari with
a mule, who behaved rather arrogantly, was to escort the German
back. On the way the German, during conversation, drew his
attention to faults in his bridle, and succeeded in seizing the mule
and riding off on it with all speed. In the struggle which took
place, he had seized the Askari's rifle and shot him with it.

To the east of Kissengire our patrols also pushed on to the
north, and quite a number of minor engagements took place in
the bush, in which the enemy at times suffered very severely.
Further to the east, on the coast near Kissiju, other hostile
detachments were also roaming about, and a small English man-
of-war was there too. One morning Captain von Lieberman,
with the nth Company, surprised this opponent, and our Askari
went for him with a will, cheering. The man-of-war was also
fired upon with the field gun, and apparently several hits were
obtained. After driving the enemy out of Kissiju, Captain von
Lieberman returned. We also operated against the enemy's
communications, and small fights occurred almost daily.

164

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

The closely-settled country is of simply fabulous fertility.
Besides abundant flour, both Europeans and Askari had mangos,
paw paws, mustapheles, cocoa-nuts, and other tropical fruits^
We were surprised to see the large rice-fields, which were here
close to the south side of Dar-es-Salaam, seeing that in peace-
time most of the rice had come from India. Of cattle there was
but little, but the companies began to send out shooting parties
into the prairie, which was full of game, and extended especially
on the western side of our positions. That there must be game
in the vicinity was proved by the presence of numerous lions.
Frequently a family of five lions wandered through our camp at
night, and occasionally killed animals in it.

While Headquarters was at Makima in October, a report came
in which caused me to suppose that the landing of strong enemy
forces at Kilwa, and the appearance of hostile detachments
which, coming from the west towards Livale, had arrived on the
Mbaranganda river, formed part of a big converging movement
by the enemy against Livale. Strong forces of Portuguese had
crossed the Rovuma, invaded the highlands of Makonde, and
established themselves in the district of Nevala. The captain
of the Konigsberg, Captain Looff, had, after the evacuation of
Dar-es-Salaam, proceeded by land, first to the Konigsberg1 's old
area on the Rufiji, and then to Lindi. He had now taken over
command in the south. With the three newly-raised companies
of Askari, the only troops available there at the moment, he
had entrenched himself in front of the strong positions of the
enemy who had landed at Lindi, covered the removal of the cargo
of the store-ship from Ssudi to the north, and inflicted damage
on the Portuguese, who had shown themselves on the lower
Rovuma, by means of minor expeditions. His force was, how-
ever, rather too weak to enable him to turn against the Portu-
guese, who were advancing in his rear about Nevala, with any
prospect of a rapid and decisive success.

It was, therefore, very convenient that, as already men-
tioned, two companies and the 4-inch Konigsberg gun of von
Boemken's Detachment happened to be at Mpotora. To com-
mand this detachment, Captain Rothe, of the Reserve, was sent

165

My Reminiscences of East Africa

from the Rufiji, as he could in the circumstances be spared from
his duties as Principal Postmaster (Oberpostdirektor) , and had, at
his urgent request, been placed at the unrestricted disposal of the
Protective Force. In a few days he arrived from Niakisiku by
cycle, took over his detachment, and led it towards Nevala.
Captain Looff took command of the whole force, the Portuguese
were thoroughly well hammered by the Konigsberg gun, and their
positions were captured by assault. We took a really very con-
siderable amount of booty, including four mountain guns, a
number of machine guns, several hundred rifles, much ammuni-
tion, several automobiles, supplies, and all kinds of equipment.
During the following weeks we continually found quantities of
buried stores and ammunition. The very secret places were
particularly well stocked. The Portuguese were driven com-
pletely out of German territory, and pursued for some distance
into their own country. But consideration of the general
situation prevented me from carrying on the pursuit to the
uttermost. Rothe's Detachment was brought back to Mpotora,
in order to keep an eye on the enemy at Kilwa, who grew con-
tinually stronger. Even before this movement was executed,
I considered it necessary to transfer strong forces from the
neighbourhood of Kissengire towards Kibata. No opportunity
had presented itself of fighting a decisive successful battle north
of the lower Rufiji ; as I had expected, I was obliged to proceed
to a prolonged operation in the mountains of Kibata, which
offered but little prospect of leading to a decision.

The transfer of the troops towards Kibata took place at the
end of November, 1916. On the way we encamped at Utete,
where roomy hospitals had been established in the building of
the Civil Government, and where an officers' mess had been
established on a baraza (an airy veranda). The place was
situated on dominating heights, and had been strongly fortified
with trenches and abatis, and commanded the lower-lying and
very extensive native town. Almost all night one heard the
deep grunting of the hippo, and one impudent lion, having failed
in his attack on a native, tried to kill another man in our camp.
Fortunately his quarry was taken from him at the last moment

166

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

by a European, who hurried to the spot, and several natives.
Continuing, we reached the Moboro-Kibata road. Captain
Schulz, who had with his detachment occupied a strong position
two hours north of Kibata, was drawing his supplies from the
country round Moboro. Several depots on this road were filled
from the fertile country immediately surrounding them. In
addition, Captain Schulz sent out parties to buy supplies in the
districts near his camp, in which the whole wealth of the country
is revealed.

From a mountain near Mbindia, the camp of Schulz's Detach-
ment, one could see a broad forest track passing over the
heights. This was the road for a 4-inch Konigsberg gun, which
was being brought up to its position before Kibata by Lieut. -
Commander Apel. Chanting in rhythm, hundreds of natives
dragged the heavy load up and down the steep slopes, over which
a suitable track had been surveyed and cut through the thick
bush. Shortly after its arrival at Mbindia, the gun had been
placed in position on a mountain saddle from which, later on,
the bombardment was successfully carried out. One of the 4-inch
howitzers was also got into position further forward in a valley,
so as to fire over the high ground hi front and reach the enemy's
camps. Detailed reconnaissances had disclosed the possibility
of moving our infantry, concealed by the dense bush, into some
high ground which commanded the country north of Kibata.
The weak hostile force holding this high ground was surprised
by an attack from the rear and quickly driven off. Then another
height was attacked, situated at a water-hole immediately to the
north of the solid European buildings. We could soon see our
Askari climbing up it, and establishing themselves on it about
eighty yards in front of a hostile position.

By this time the deployment of our artillery was completed ;
besides the 4-inch Konigsberg gun and the field-howitzer the two
mountain guns had been brought into action, in line with our
infantry. We had delayed opening fire on the buildings, where
we saw numbers of men and animals walking about on the bare
hill-top, until everything was ready. One company which had
got round the enemy's rear, and established itself on his main

167

My Reminiscences of East Africa

line of communication, running from Kibata to Kilwa, observed
that the heavy shells falling near the Boma (Fort) caused a
frightful panic. Heaps of the enemy's Askari ran away as fast
as they could, across the front of the company which was lying
in concealment. But unfortunately the company allowed itself
to be deterred from taking advantage of this favourable oppor-
tunity. It hoped that the scattered parties of Askari would
soon be followed by larger bodies, and did not want to give away
the chance of a surprise prematurely. But the expected large
bodies did not come, and thus, as unfortunately happened often,
a good opportunity was lost through waiting for a better. The
infantry attack on the above-mentioned heights immediately
north of Kibata had involved the loss of several very efficient
Europeans. Sergeant-Major Mirow was killed, Vice-Sergeant-
Major Jitzmann was shot in the leg and sustained a severe and
very painful injury to the nerve of his leg. He had previously
often distinguished himself by his untiring and successful raids
on the Uganda Railway. Through prolonged detention in hospital
he was now lost to the Service, and fell into the enemy's hands
before he was recovered.

It was very difficult to find one's way in the extraordinarily
rugged mountains of Kibata. A number of reconnoitring expe-
ditions were sent out and after a few days we felt more or less at
home. It was possible to obtain a good view of Kibata and of
the enemy's communications, and we ascertained that he was re-
inforcing his troops more and more. As a matter of fact he
employed at Kibata the main body of the division landed at
Kilwa. Our observations and the peculiarities of the ground
led us to expect that the enemy intended to work from Kibeta
round our right, or western, flank, and thus force us to evacuate
the heights commanding Kibata and its water-supply from the
north. A direct attack by the i2Oth Baluchis had been defeated
with great loss to the enemy. During the opening days of
December we observed at first weak, and then stronger detach-
ments, which pushed forward from hill to hill towards our right
flank, and whose advanced parties soon reached a commanding
mountain, known to the English as Gold Coast Hill. Our

168

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

counter-stroke against this force was at first favoured by ravines
and forests, and our Askari surprised even us when they became
visible close in front of the enemy's positions. Our guns were
ready to fire, but unluckily the first shell pitched among our own
men, and the infantry attack, which could only succeed by
rapidity and surprise, failed. However, the fire of our two
mountain guns at under 1,800 yards, and of our howitzers,
which were further back, caused quite considerable casualties
among the Gold Coast Regiment. The enemy was on a narrow
hog's-back, the steep slopes of which were for the most part
bare. He could, therefore, hardly withdraw, and in the hard
ground entrenching took a long time. We then surrounded the
hill with infantry, and poured a converging fire on the good
targets presented to us. It became impossible for the enemy
to hold this highly important position any longer. After it was
evacuated we found a large number of graves, each for many
bodies, and at this point the enemy must have lost not less
than 150 killed.

The advance of the Gold Coast Regiment had nevertheless
been of advantage to the enemy. My force being so weak —
we had, all told, about nine companies — I had withdrawn one of
the two companies stationed in the immediate vicinity of Kibata
in order to employ it against Gold Coast Hill. After I had
returned to camp that night I heard the sound of a number of
small detonations emanating from the one company left alone
to face the enemy. It was only after some time that we recog-
nized this as a grenade attack, a manoeuvre then unknown to us.
Several companies of the enemy attacked with such rapidity
and skill, that they penetrated the trenches of our weak com-
pany by surprise and drove it out. The loss of this position de-
prived us of the possibility of firing at close range from that very
suitable height at hostile troops moving about, or proceeding to
their water-supply. Until then I had done so with success,
and had even occasionally sent up a light gun to the place,
withdrawing it again after it had ceased fire.

But the loss of this high ground and the casualties sustained
in it faded into insignificance beside the success achieved on

169

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Gold Coast Hill. In spite of our inferiority in numbers, we com-
pletely dominated the situation. Our patrols and stronger
raiding parties worked right round the enemy's rear and pushed
on to his communications. Minor enterprises on his part pro-
duced no results. On the whole, the enemy suffered very con-
siderable casualties at Kibata, and I think they should be esti-
mated at not less than four hundred men. The operations
intended by him were also completely wrecked. There can be
no doubt that he waited to advance from Kilwa on Livale.
Our vigorous action at Kibata forced him to move from Kilwa
against us, and to leave the rest of the country and the whole
of our supply and transport apparatus in peace. Towards
the end of December hostile planes appeared, cruising about
over our positions and dropping bombs. Although they now
used far more powerful bombs than formerly, they hardly in-
flicted any casualties. On Christmas Day we saw a larger mass
than usual falling on the Boma of Kibata. We were dis-
appointed in our hope that the enemy was bombing his own
camp ; it was only a large quantity of cigarettes as a Christmas
present for the troops.

One day, during that period, I received a personal letter from
the British Commander-in-Chief, General Smuts, in which he
informed me that I had been awarded the Order Pour le Merite,
and expressed the hope that his cordial congratulations would
not be unacceptable to me. I thanked him equally politely,
although I at first believed that he was confusing it with the
Second Class of the Order of the Crown with Swords, which I
had received a short time before. I mention this letter from
General Smuts as a proof of the mutual personal esteem and
chivalry which existed throughout in spite of the exhausting
warfare carried on by both sides. On many other occasions also
the enemy intimated his great appreciation of the achievements of
the German forces.

At the end of 1916 I regarded the military situation in the
Colony as remarkably favourable, for I knew that the South
African troops were for the most part worn out with battle-
casualties and sickness, while a large proportion of the remainder

170

Hostile Attacks in the South -East of the Colony

were returning to South Africa at the end of their engagements.
Prisoners had repeatedly assured us that they had had enough
of the " picnic " in East Africa. The Indian troops also, who had
been in the field in East Africa for some length of time, were
reduced in numbers, while the late arrivals — we identified
Indian Pathan Regiments at Kibata — consisted largely of young
soldiers. Other regiments, like the I2gth Baluchis, who had
fought in Flanders, were no doubt very good, but they might not
be expected to stand the fatigues of African warfare for a very
prolonged period. The enemy's Askari were, generally speaking,
new troops, and only a small proportion of them had at that
time been in the field. So we could continue calmly to contem-
plate the continuation of the war for a considerable time. I
still believe that we would have succeeded not only in holding
our own, but even hi beating the enemy, if he had not enjoyed
the power of continually filling up his reduced units and of
bringing up fresh ones. At the end of 1916 I did not know that
this had already been effected on an extensive scale. Among
other reinforcements a strong brigade of black troops had been
brought from Nigeria to Dar-es-Salaam, whence it had been
moved on without delay to Dutumi and Kissaki.

In the early days of January, 1917, the five companies encamped
there under Captain Otto were attacked by General Smuts
with at least two brigades. In planning his attack the enemy had
provided for simultaneous wide turning movements, which, with
his greatly superior numbers, enabled him to bar the retreat of
our troops towards Kungulio. More than once our Askari
had to clear their way with the bayonet, and in the close country
some of our companies got into very awkward situations. In
withdrawing to Behobeho our field howitzer, having only a weak
escort, was ambushed by a hostile force of several companies,
and was lost, after the whole detachment had been killed. But
in the end all portions of the detachment successfully avoided
being surrounded, and in assembling at Behobeho. At this
place very heavy fighting immediately took place, in which the
enemy also fought with great bravery. It was in this action that
the old hunter Selous was killed, who was well known even

171

My Reminiscences of East Africa

among Germans, on account of his charming manner and his
exciting stories. He had joined as a subaltern. With a superior
enemy before him and on both flanks, and behind him the
mighty Rufiji, crossed only by the one frail bridge, Captain Otto
yet succeeded in reaching the south bank of the river, with all
his troops, and in destroying the bridge, in accordance with his
instructions.

We had also observed a wide turning movement which the
enemy was making from Kissaki further west towards Mkalinzo
on the Rufiji, which now became ineffective. The hostile
brigade undertaking it did not reach the south bank of the Rufiji
in time to oppose Captain Otto's passage, and thus render his
situation desperate ; on the contrary, we gained partial successes
which were quite considerable. The enemy following us from
Behobeho came on very vigorously and passed a large part of his
force over the Rufiji at Kungulio in boats. Captain Otto held
his detachment in readiness a little to the south of the river, and
now attacked the enemy, of whom part only had crossed over, and
completely defeated him with heavy loss. This partial success
was favoured by the inaction of the hostile column, which, as
already mentioned, was making the turning movement by
Mkalinzo. It consisted principally of whites, and a part of the
black Nigerian troops. Neither of them were equal to the long
march involved, and had therefore reached the Rufiji exhausted
and unfit for further operations. They remained out of action
for quite a long time, and the unity of General Smuts' otherwise
quite well-planned operation was wrecked.

In consequence of the enemy's advance in force at Kungulio,
the danger arose that he might gain possession of the middle
Rufiji, and of the country to the south of it. He might then
easily seize the bulk of our stores, and our whole system of
communications, which for the most part ran from the middle
Rufiji towards Livale. It was therefore necessary for me to
meet his movements with our main body, which was before
Kibeta, and so I marched off with the greater part of it to Lake
Utungi, where I would be in a position to help Captain Otto, or
to seize any favourable opportunity that might offer.

172

CHAPTER VIII

ANXIETIES AND HARDSHIPS DURING OUR STAY IN THE RUFIJI

COUNTRY

OUR march from Kibata was on the first day carried out
according to plan. On the following day I rode ahead
with a few companions, in the expectation that the troops who
had several native guides with them would not fail to find the
way. In the Kissi mountains we came upon large numbers
of natives who, however, were very timid and often deserted
their flourishing rice plantations on our approach. Later in
the day I regretted that I did not appropriate some of this
abundant produce for our own use. During the midday heat we
rested at Pori. Some of my companions who knew the country
called my attention to the acid Mbinji fruit, which we found very
refreshing. Unfortunately we did not know at that time that
the stone of this fruit, when roasted, makes an excellent dish,
tasting like our hazel-nut. The heat was overpowering, but as
we were in the neighbourhood of the enemy patrols we had to
keep a sharp look-out. The springs and water-courses were
now dried up ; after a long search we at last found a small pool
of dirty water, which, however, we were told was not injurious
to health. Towards evening we reached the great deserted
settlement. Here \ve were fortunate enough to find a negro in
the employ of the German Government, who informed us that
we were at Ungwara, our destination for that day. After we
had walked through the place, the man showed us a pool near
which we pitched our camp. My old black cook, the bearded
Baba, well known to many East Africans, had very nearly kept
up with our horses, and, following our trail, soon arrived. He
had soon prepared his uzeli (boiled rice), and was sitting con-

173

My Reminiscences of East Africa

tentedly by the fire. We watched him enviously, for we had
nothing, and were waiting for our baggage and the troops. But
no one came and we lay down, hungry, to sleep. The friend
in need, however, was approaching in the shape of a splendid
sable-antelope, which in the brilliant moonlight was coming down
to drink. Almost simultaneously the rifles of two of my com-
panions, van Booyen and Nieuwenhuizen, experienced Boer
hunters, who had become Germans, rang out. We sprang from
our blankets as though we had received an electric shock, and
within a short time the first pieces of delicate flesh were roasting
on the spit.

On the following day we reached Lake Utungi, where Captain
Feilke was awaiting us, and we refreshed ourselves with bread,
coffee and sausage made from antelope flesh. There was still
no trace of the troops. They had lost us in Pori, and almost
all completely lost their bearings. One detachment did not get
into touch with us until several days later, when they came upon
our telephone line in the neighbourhood of Utete. In view
of the difficulty of communication, it had hitherto been impos-
sible to get an accurate estimate of the state of our supplies.
I had expected to find well-filled depots at Mpanganya on Lake
Utungi and in the neighbourhood of Madaba. This was why
I had pressed on out of the fertile country north of the lower
Rufiji through Mpanganya to the line-of -communication area.
The question of supplies had developed quite differently from
my expectations.

In the line-of-communication area, in addition to the large
numbers of bearers necessary for the transport of war material
to the south, a numerous personnel was maintained, who were
employed on road-making, building grass huts and for other
purposes. Even in the small depots there were always a number
of men who, whenever possible, did nothing but fetch supplies,
which they ate themselves. Often the supplies were even
fetched by others who, in their turn, had to be fed. In many
places it was almost the case that a load of supplies collected
and forwarded by the fighting troops in the north finally landed
in a small depot, and were devoured by these people who had

174

Hardships during our stay in the Rufiji Country

nothing else to do. In view of the difficulties of transport, and
the great distances, even the energy and thoroughness of Captain
Stemmermann, who had taken charge of the depots, did not
succeed in detecting and putting a stop to these abuses. Further,
there were too many people in Africa whose propensity for
diverting valuable energy to non-essentials to the prejudice of
the really important things that it would take a very strong
broom to sweep them away. The general result of all these
obstacles was that thousands and thousands of useless mouths
were devouring the supplies which had been collected with
great effort in the region occupied by the fighting forces. The
depot did nothing for the supplies, but, on the other hand, lived
on them, and the most serious point was that the moment was
at hand when the areas from which the supplies were drawn
would have to be evacuated by the fighting forces. It was a
difficult situation. It was necessary to lose no time in putting
under cultivation the territory we were then occupying — that
is to say, the country round Madaba and Livale, and in the
southern parts of the Protectorate, which were likely to be the
scene of the subsequent operations. But months must elapse
before any results could be obtained from these measures.
During these months we should have to remain on the Rufigi
and live there. Here, it is true, some hundreds of acres of maize
were standing, but even these would require months to ripen.
Until this time came the force could not move south ; it would
have to remain in the unproductive area which it was then
occupying.

The accomplishment of this task was difficult. The order had
at once to be given for the removal of every man who was not
absolutely indispensable for carrying on the war during the
next few months. This meant that thousands of bearers and
workmen in the line-of -communication area were sent home.
The most serious drawback to this step had to be reckoned with ;
we were sending over to the enemy thousands of men from
whom he was bound to gain detailed information as to our
strength, the condition of our supplies and our internal organiza-
tion. Nor was it enough to cut down the personnel of our

175

My Reminiscences of East Africa

lines of communication. The non-combatant personnel of the
companies was also reduced. Among other things, it was
laid down that henceforward no European should have more
than five native attendants. That sounds a generous allow-
ance to European ears, but under African conditions native
attendance is really indispensable to the European. He requires
at least one man or boy to cook for him and attend to his personal
needs, and, in addition, it must be remembered that all baggage,
kit, rations, blankets and tent-material, has to be carried when-
ever he moves. When one considers that in peace-time a
travelling official on a long safari (journey) took with him from
eleven to thirteen bearers, in addition to two or three personal
servants, it will be understood how drastic this new order was
and what a storm of indignation it aroused. Fortunately I was
in a position, when appealed to on grounds of health and
decency, to point to the fact that I myself had for months
managed with three, or at a pinch two, loads — that is, four
negroes — and had kept in good health. I am still particularly
grateful to those regimental officers who, as on so many other
occasions, saw the necessity of this vexatious regulation and set
the example. They upheld the tradition of our officer-corps
by not claiming any special comforts for themselves, and were
the first to submit to the unavoidable discomfort. I believe
that among all the soldiers and non-combatants up to the highest
civilian official, there is not one who still condemns this order,
at first so strongly opposed.

But reduction of the number of food-consumers alone was not
sufficient to solve the problem of existence ; the supplies would
not go round. It was already obvious that the supplies from
the area of the fighting force, which were, of course, being
worked at high pressure, would not suffice to feed us until the
new harvest at the end of March. After close and mature con-
sideration, we found it impossible to avoid the necessity of
cutting down the rations, a measure which went very much
against the grain, as even the native, if he is to be relied on,
must be well fed. This gave rise to a fresh and much stronger
outburst of indignation. From all sides came telegrams and

176

Hardships during our stay in the Rufiji Country

messages to say that it was impossible to get the calories of
nourishment necessary for a fighting man from the daily cereal
ration, fixed at six hundred grammes of meal. But the hard fact
had to be faced that only a certain quantity was available, and
we must make the best of it. The reduction of the cereal ration
could not be avoided. For the rest, each man and each company
would have to try to make good the shortage by hunting, which
in this region, where game abounded, could be managed with
the exercise of a little agility. But logic is apt to go to pieces
with many people when it comes to a question of daily food,
and many did not scruple to lay the whole blame for the at times
barely sufficient ration at the door of the wicked commander-
in-chief, and even to do all they could to have the daily ration
increased to its former amount. This I had to bear calmly,
and I made my own observations as to who were the men to
make the best of an unavoidable necessity and who were not.

In carrying out these drastic measures new difficulties were
encountered. A crowd of Askari women had followed the
force, and had attached themselves to various camps on the
Rufiji, where they were very comfortable. I was most anxious
to send them south, where the question of supplies was less
difficult. The necessary transport was arranged for, and the
women were given rations for the march. After one short day's
march, however, the women simply lay down, and declared
that they could go no further. Their rations, which were
intended to last a considerable time, were all eaten by the third
day, and they were crying out for more. Some even went so
far as to attack and beat the European who was hi charge of
the transport. Even under a dark skin the gentler sex did
not always scruple to make full use of their prerogatives, which
are usually justified.

Finally we got over this difficulty, and a tolerable solution
was found to the ration problem. The Askari, to whom the
position was explained, saw the difficulty and were very reason-
able. Skilled hunters were sent to the different hunting-grounds,
and the empty stomachs from time to time more generously
filled. I remember that with us on Lake Utungi our two

177 12

My Reminiscences of East Africa

hundred blacks in one day completely devoured a big buffalo and
an elephant. It was often found possible to give a piece of
antelope to the passing caravans of bearers.

In the course of February the stores in our supply dumps,
of which I took stock every day, ran out. I began to fear
that for reasons of supply we would not be able to wait for the
ripening of the corn on the Rufiji. In that case, not only
would the harvest be lost, but the crops growing further south
could not be used to the best advantage. There we should have
to use the grain that was actually ripe and pass on, leaving the
unripe portion standing. A lucky chance came to my aid in this
dilemma. I went one day from Lake Utungi to Mpanganya to
see Captain Tafel, who was handling the tactical and commis-
sariat problems there with admirable efficiency. I spent the
night in his camp, and he set before me an excellent dish of
young maize prepared like asparagus. This led us to speak of
the maize fields of Mpanganya and the neighbourhood. These
were full of women and other natives who had swarmed over
them like a flock of birds, and were living on the young, unripe
corn. This was as bad economy as well could be, but it gave
me the idea that in case of need the maize crops could be largely
used before they were ripe. This need very soon occurred, and
an experiment with the ears which had ripened most showed that
these could be artificially dried and a very good meal made from
them. After this, the ripest ears were gathered daily, and as
the whole crop ripened the food situation improved from day to
day. By ist March it was found possible to increase the ration
to seven hundred grammes, or nearly the normal allowance.

The increasing severity of the whole campaign called for a
more intensive and energetic exploitation of our food resources ;
the slow, deliberate supply methods of the civil authciities, which
had sufficed for the first phase of the campaign, were no longer
adequate. Twice, at Kissaki and on the Rufiji I had been put
in a most difficult position with regard to supplies, which had
almost made it impossible to carry on the operations. A more
efficient supply service which would know the military needs,
look ahead and work more quickly and energetically was a

178

Hardships during our stay in the Rufiji Country

vital necessity for the further carrying on of the campaign.
Fortunately I was able to convince the Governor on this point,
and, as a result, a new supply detachment was raised from the
force, and sent ahead to Massassi, via Livale. They established
several subsidiary detachments, which were attached to the
administrative stations in the Lindi area, and in this way worked
side by side with the civil authorities in organizing, and, later,
in carrying out, the cultivation and storing of food. In this
way the desired impregnation of the supplies and transport
service with the necessary military spirit was completely
attained.

At this time there was no appreciable shortage of kit, and
there was also an adequate supply of arms and ammunition.

With a view to the envelopment of the enemy at Mkalinzo,
where he was reported to be in strong force, Captain Otto had
marched his detachment south from Kungulio. North of Mawa
he covered the fertile area of Madaba, and the line of transport
and telephone communication running from Lake Utungi, via
Mawa to Madaba. On 24th January, 1917, Captain Otto was
attacked north of Mawa by several battalions of the Nigerian
brigade. The enemy was beaten off with heavy losses and
pursued several miles through the bush to an entrenched posi-
tion, where he took refuge. The troops under Captain Schulz, who
had been left behind after our departure from Kibeta, were gradu-
ally withdrawn to Ungwara. They had been reinforced and
relieved from time to time after the fighting in the region of the
Kibeta-Utete-Kissi mountains. Strong enemy forces — iden-
tified as an infantry brigade — had followed them. In spite of
his numerical superiority, the single engagements were very
costly, and for the most part unfavourable for the enemy.
Captains von Lieberman, Goering and Koehl, and numerous
patrol leaders on many occasions completely routed more than
twice their number of Indian or negro troops, and captured
rifles, machine guns and ammunition. The long war had pro-
duced a large number of capable leaders, and their example,
as in the case of Lieutenant Kroeger, who was afterwards killed,
roused unbounded enterprise and daring. Over and over again,

179 12*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and without stopping to ask the strength of the opposing force,
this officer, followed by a handful of men with fixed bayonets
and cheering loudly, had charged the enemy in the thick of the
bush. He had even trained the Askari. Several of these dis-
tinguished themselves as patrol leaders, and when later the brave
Effendi, of the 4th Field Company, with his patrol, routed an
entire Indian company, we owed the success to this training
at Ungwara.

Our line of communication to the south, passing through
Madeba and Livale, was in danger from a strong enemy force
west of Kibata, and it was necessary that we should afford it
adequate protection. This meant a gradual move south of our
forces from the Rufiji, especially as our supplies on this part of
the river were coming to an end and the rainy season was at
hand.

It was particularly important that we should not evacuate
this part of the Rufiji until the rains had set in. This would
mean a considerable gain in time for us, as, during the actual
rainy season and immediately after, the operations would, of
necessity, come to a standstill, and the corn, particularly the
mtema (millet), would have time to ripen.

When the migrations of the ants warned us that the rains
were at hand, orders were given, as a precautionary measure,
that the women, children and non-combatants should as far as
possible be transferred to the north bank of the Rufiji, and
thence transported to Dar-es-Salaam. This step, which the
approaching rains and the state of the supplies made necessary,
aroused much discontent, which I was obliged to treat with the
same indifference as the previous outbursts of indignation. I
am, however, still of the opinion that the timely removal of these
people was much better for them than spending part of the
rainy season on the drenched ground or in flooded dwellings
with insufficient food.

The rains, which set in at the end of March, were particularly
heavy in 1917. The site of our camp, which was slightly elevated,
became an island, from which access to the outer world was only
possible by boat through the Rufiji wood. A number of people

180

Hardships during our stay in the Rufiji Country

\vere drowned in the wood during the rains ; others had to take
refuge for days in the trees. The water rose so high that in
Mpanganya it reached the high-lying dwellings of the Europeans,
and invaded the hospitals and disturbed every kind of filth. It
was impossible for women and children, sick and wounded to
remain, and after the withdrawal of the troops they had to give
themselves up to £he English, who took pity on their need,
and provided them with food and transport.

The majority of the troops marched south out of the flooded
districts on the Rufiji and Lake Utungi in good time, after using
up the available crops almost to the last grain. The evacuation
was carried out gradually and in echelon ; the greater part of the
troops were assembled in Mpotora, which was occupied by
Captain Rothe, in a fortified camp, with his two companies which
had defeated the Portuguese at Nevala. Only a few small
detachments were left on the Rufiji, and these were gradually
reduced to the strength of patrols. Four days' march east of
Madaba the detachments of Koehl and Goering had the oppor-
tunity of some successful skirmishes against enemy detach-
ments on the western edge of the Matumbi Mountains. Gradu-
ally, however, all these detachments were brought to Mpotora,
and only Captain Otto remained in the higher regions of Madaba.

181

CHAPTER IX

THE END OF THE FRONTIER DEFENCE IN THE SUBSIDIARY

THEATRES

IN August, 1916, Major Kraut had gradually retired from
Kilossa on Mahenge, leaving only Schoenf eld's division at
Kidodi, on the Ruaha. Captain Braunschweig's force was
embodied in Major Kraut's command. Of these Captain Falken-
stein, with the 5th Field Company, had retired, at the end of
May, 1916, from Ipyana, and Captain Aumann, with his company,
from the Mbozi region in the direction of Lupembe and Maubire.
During the retirement there was continual skirmishing. Our
weak divisions had to make a stand against the pursuing enemy,
at least a brigade strong.

At the end of June, 1916, Captain Braunschweig, who was
then at Dodoma, was sent through Iringa, and his force was
strengthened to five companies by the addition of the Kondoa
troops and others brought from Dar-es-Salaam, including the
two companies from Langenburg. One hundred of the crew of
the Konigsberg from Dar-es-Salaam and a field howitzer were
added to this force. At Malangali he accepted battle with the
enemy, and apparently inflicted heavy losses. Then, however,
he evacuated the position, and abandoned the howitzer, which
was difficult to move, first making it useless. The difficulties
of Braunschweig's position were increased by the action of an
important Wahehe chief in his rear, who rebelled and went over
to the enemy with all his people and cattle. Captain Braun-
schweig then retired on Mahenge, fighting a succession of minor
rearguard skirmishes, and put himself under the orders of Major
Kraut.

• After numerous minor engagements Major Kraut's retiring

182

End of Frontier Defence in Subsidiary Theatres

March of the force
under Ihe Commander
ut the West cm

Tabora 1916.
The further march, oru
,j M ahe nge and the march
op Captairt Wiutgetts ana
Major Kraut From, tke
district

Fig. xv. March of Major-General Wahle in the West

183

My Reminiscences of East Africa

divisions established themselves on the line of the Ruhudje
and Ruaha rivers. In the fertile region round Mahenge the
supplies were excellent, even after the evacuation of a large
part of the rice-field west of the Ruhudje. On this river the
enemy had established a strongly fortified camp at Mkapira.
With our insufficient resources it was impossible to take this
position by force, but there was a chance that by cutting the
enemy's line of communication with Lupembe, we might force
him to evacuate the camp owing to shortage of food.

Major Kraut crossed the river with five companies and a
light field gun, and occupied a position in a semi-circle of hills
in the enemy's rear and right across his line of communication.
In the enemy's front weak forces covered the river bank on the
Mahenge side. Unfortunately the fortified positions of our
companies were so extended that, owing to the difficulties of
the country, there was no guarantee that support could be brought

up in time. On the , before daybreak, the loth Company

on the right wing was surprised by a heavy enemy attack. The
enemy also cleverly took the company's position in the rear
and, after inflicting heavy losses, put the machine guns out of
action. On the left wing Lieutenant von Schroetter's company
was also attacked from all sides, and had to cut its way out with
the bayonet, losing the light field gun and a machine gun. In
view of the heavy casualties of the enemy, Major Kraut would
have been able to remain on the west bank of the Ruhudje, in
spite of this partial disaster, but fighting could be heard from
the direction of Lupembe, where the 25th Field Company was
covering his rear. Major Kraut thought, wrongly, that there,
too, a sharp attack had been made, and, therefore, retired again
to the east bank of the Ruhudje. To his astonishment the
enemy's strong entrenchments at Mkapira were found to be
evacuated a few days later, the enemy having withdrawn in
the night. Closer inspection showed that he had suffered
heavy losses in the recent fighting. This, however, was not
enough to explain his withdrawal ; this riddle was not solved
until later, on the appearance of General Wahle, with whom
no communication had been established.

184

End of Frontier Defence in Subsidiary Theatres

In expectation of the opening of the big operations of 1916
the reinforcements that had been provisionally sent to Victoria
Nyanza, Ruanda, the Russissi and the Tanganyika area were
brought back and embodied into our main forces along the North
railway. A single command for these minor theatres of war was
required, and with this object a " western command " was estab-
lished under Major-General Wahle, who for the most part
co-ordinated and directed these operations from Tabora. In
April and May, 1916, when the British main forces in the Kilima
Njaro area had completed their march, and, after the rainy
season, were beginning a fresh advance to the south, English
and Belgians from Muansa, Lake Kiwu, the Russissi and Bis-
marckburg began to advance concentrically on Tabora through
these minor theatres of war. Our weak divisions retired on
this place.

Major von Langenn retired at once f rom Tschangugu to Issawi,
followed by Captain Wintgens from Kissenji. Heavy casualties
were inflicted on the pursuing Belgian brigades in successful
rearguard actions. The German detachment later continued its
retirement on Mariahilf. The danger to our district from the
strong Belgian forces on our heels had been correctly estimated
by Captain Gudovius. When in June, 1916, strong English
forces advanced across the Kagera, he retired south from Bukoba
with his division. Owing to the difficulties of communication
and getting information, a part of his force unfortunately ran
upon strong Belgian forces hi Ussuwi district. Captain Gudovius
himself was wounded hi the abdomen and fell into the enemy's
hands. The engagement went badly for us and cost us heavy
losses. Individual bodies of the detachment, however, managed
to fight their way through to Muansa and Uschirombo.

In the middle of July, 1916, the English succeeded in effecting
a surprise landing with about a brigade in the neighbourhood of
Muansa. There, too, there was some skirmishing, favourable
to us, and there the Commanding Officer, Captain von Chappuis,
retired in the direction of Tabora. The troops from Muansa
and those under Major von Langenn and Captain Wintgens
established a new front, approximately on the line Schinjanga-

My Reminiscences of East Africa

St. Michael, and repulsed several Belgian attacks. Captain
Zimmer had sunk the steamer Goetzen at Kigoma and blown up
the Wami. He then retired slowly along the railway to Tabora.
Captain Hering von Usumbura followed suit. The fact that
the operations were nearing Tabora gave General Wahle the
opportunity to bring up quickly part of the troops from the
north of Tabora, to make a dash west by rail and retire again
at once. In this raid the 8th Field Company completely routed
a Belgian battalion west of Tabora, and Wintgens' detachment
brought off a successful surprise attack west and north of Tabora.
These minor victories were^ often considerable, and on several
different days of skirmishing the enemy losses amounted to
hundreds ; several light howitzers were also captured in these
raids.

On 2nd June, 1916, the 2Qth Field Company was surrounded
in its fortified position in the Namema mountains. In fighting
his way through, the brave company commander, Lieutenant
Franken, was severely wounded and taken prisoner. Lieutenant
Hasslacher retired step by step on Tabora. In an affair of
patrols south of this place he met with a hero's death.

In this way the troops of the western command were actually
assembled at Tabora, and the moment had come for a systematic
retirement to the south-east. These last operations and the
capture of Tabora were not known at Headquarters until long
afterwards. There was no means of communication with the
western command. Major-General Wahle was aware that
this retirement of our main forces was of first importance for the
Mahenge area. Accordingly he gave orders for the march. At
first the railway could be used for supplies and transport.
The eastern column, under Major von Langenn, marched on
Iringa, the centre column, under Captain Wintgens, on Madi-
bira, and the western column, under Lieutenant Huebener, on
Ilembule. Major Wahle accompanied the centre column. In
this way they came upon the line of communication between
Neu-Langenburg and Iringa, and the enemy's dumps along
this line. Huebener's detachment lost touch, and surrendered,
being enveloped by a superior force of the enemy at Ilembule.

186

End of Frontier Defence in Subsidiary Theatres

Langenn's detachment was most unfortunately surprised by; a
burst of fire while crossing a ford near Iringa and lost heavily.
The subsequent attack on Iringa was also costly and without
success.

Wintgens' detachment surprised enemy dumps and columns
near Madibira, and also captured a gun and some wireless
apparatus. In spite of several days of stubborn fighting, they
were unable to take Lupembe and the surrounding farms. The
influence of Wahle's advance immediately made itself felt
hi the Mahenge district. The apparently strong enemy troops,
who from their fortified positions at Mkapira had carried out
the successful raid against Major Kraut, now felt themselves
seriously threatened in their rear. They evacuated their strong
positions and retired on Lupembe. General Wahle took over
the command of all the forces at Mahenge.

At the end of 1916 the troops of General Wahle's western com-
mand were grouped round Mahenge. From here he directed
the operations extending approximately to the line Ssongea-
Lupembe-Iringa-Kidodi.

It has been said that all touch with General Wahle had been
lost since July, 1916, until in October, 1916, his patrols joined
up with those of Major Kraut south of Iringa.

It was not, therefore, until after the fighting at Mkapira
that Major Kraut, and through him Headquarters, learned of
General Wahle's advance ; the development of the situation
made a very different impression on the enemy. He must have
regarded the advance of General Wahle's columns against the
English line of communication from Iringa to Langenburg,
and Major Kraut's accidentally simultaneous threat to Mkapira,
as a widely-planned joint operation, which was seriously endan-
gering his troops at Mkapira, even after Major Kraut had with-
drawn to the east bank of the Ruhudje. He avoided this danger
by a hasty retirement from Mkapira in a westerly direction.

General Wahle's columns at once concentrated in the Lupembe-
Mkapira area. No news was received of Huebener's western
column. Its capitulation was not known until much later.

Welcome though this reinforcement of the forces in the west

187

My Reminiscences of East Africa

was, there were difficulties of supplies, and it became necessary
to put under cultivation a considerable area, stretching almost to
Ssongea. Major Grawert's detachment advanced to Likuju
on the Ssongea-Liwale road, that of Major Kraut to the Mpepo
region and Captain Wintgens' surrounded an enemy detach-
ment in a fortified camp at Kitenda. The enemy quickly
marched to the relief of this force, but the relieving troops
were driven off with heavy losses. At the same time the position
of Grawert's detachment took a very unfavourable turn. The
enemy had succeeded in driving off this force's live-stock.
As other supplies in the district were scanty, Major von Grawert,
exaggerating the difficulties of supply, thought his position hope-
less and surrendered in January, 1917. A transportable 8.8
air naval gun which had been brought to Lihuju with great
difficulty fell into the enemy's hands, as well as a number of good
machine guns. In reality the position of Grawert's force does
not appear to have been so desperate as he supposed ; at any rate,
a strong patrol under Sergeant-Major Winzer, who refused to
surrender, made its way south without being molested by the
enemy, and, a few days later, found abundant supplies at small
cost in the districts west of Tunduru. The conduct of this patrol
gave further proof that there is almost always a way out, even of
an apparently hopeless position, if the leader makes up his mind
to face the risks.

Meanwhile General Wahle's supply difficulties were increasing.
Whether they could have been modified by ruthlessly reducing
the number of non-combatants, as had been done on the Rufiji,
or whether the material welfare of the western command could
have been substantially improved by greater care in procuring
and rationing the available resources, could not be decided from
my position on Lake Utungi. The temporary telegraph to
Mahenge was very inefficient and often interrupted, and it took
several days to get a despatch through from General Wahle in
Mahenge to the troops. This made it difficult for me to get a
view of the situation from the incomplete information at hand.
Suffice it to say that the difficulties of supply in Mahenge were
regarded as so acute that it was not considered possible to keep

188

End of Frontier Defence in Subsidiary Theatres

such strong forces concentrated there, and part of them would
have to be withdrawn.

Kraut's and Wintgens' forces were marched west to Gum-
biro, whence they were to press on across the Ssongea-Wiedhafen
road. It was thought that they would find adequate supplies
in the mountains south of Ssongea. The report of this move
reached me too late for me to interfere. From Gumbiro Captain
Wintgens turned north and, near Lake Rukwa, successfully en-
gaged an enemy column which had been following him ; on
nearing Tabora he got typhus and was taken prisoner. Captain
Naumann led the force on until finally he surrendered to the
pursuing enemy column near Kilima-Njaro towards the end of
1917. It is to be regretted that this operation, carried out with
so much initiative and determination, became separated so far
from the main theatre of war as to be of little use.

Major Kraut had separated from Captain Wintgens in Gumbiro,
and, carrying out General Wahle's orders, had marched south.
There was no difficulty about crossing the line of communication
Ssongea-Wiedhafen, but as the enemy had strongly entrenched
and secured his supply dumps, no booty was captured. In the
open little was to be found in March, 1917, the poorest season of
the year, a few months before the new harvest. After some
rearguard actions against English troops a success was scored in
a surprise attack on the small Portuguese camp at Mitomoul,
on the Rovuma. Major Kraut then followed the river down-
stream to Tunduru and himself came to Headquarters to report.
Two of his companies remained at Tunduru to guard the fertile
district. The other three marched further east and were tem-
porarily taken over by Captain Loof at Lindi.

189

CHAPTER X

LINDI AND KILWA

THE operations of the last few months had narrowed the
area from which supplies for the troops could be obtained.
The productive areas of Lupembe, Iringa, Kissaki and the lower
Rufiji had been lost, and the newly-occupied districts included
wide stretches of barren land. The productivity of the more
fertile areas was for the most part unknown ; for instance, it
was not known until during the subsequent operations what
yield could be expected south-west of Kilwa and south-west of
Livale, for example. At that time I only had a general idea
that the eastern part of the Lindi area was very fertile and known
as the granary of the colony. But this fertile region, owing to
its nearness to the coast, was in a very precarious position, and
it was already necessary to consider what should be done if it
were lost.

Our eyes naturally turned to the Portuguese territory across
the Rovuma, but we had even less information about this than
about parts of the German colony. Fortunately, however, a
number of Portuguese chiefs had immigrated into German
territory out of hatred for their oppressors, and, apart from this,
we Germans enjoyed a very good reputation among the intelli-
gent natives of Portuguese East Africa, many of whom worked
on German plantations. Thus we were able to get at least an
approximate picture of the district east of Lake Nyc.ssa, and to
take it as probable that south of the steppe-like zone of the
Rovuma, in the neighbourhood of Mwembe, several days' march,
broad and thinly populated, lay a fertile region. An expedi-
tionary force of a few hundred rifles under Major von Stuemer,
crossed the Rovuma south of Tundura, and quickly took pos-

190

Lindi 'and Kilwa

session of Mwembe from where our patrols explored the banks of
Lake Nyassa as far as the neighbourhood of Fort Jackson, and
east half-way to Port Amelia.

Anarch of the M*m force,
>

during tlie op«r*kios.s
on. inferior lines west of

Fig. xvii.

_

Fig. xvi. March of Main Force during operations on interior lines west of Lindi,
June to November, 1917. Fig. xvii. Battle of Mahiwa.

In view of the difficulty of communication— messengers from
the telegraph station at Livale took about three days to get to
Tunduru and five from there to Mwembe— it was difficult to get

191

My Reminiscences of East Africa

a clear idea of the situation at Mwembe. We had no definite
news until Lieutenant Brucher personally reported at Head-
quarters in January, 1917. The European potatoes he brought
with him gave us good hopes that supplies could be expected
there. He reported that the country was fertile, as was also the
region round Tunduru, where the war had so far hardly been felt.
There were still large numbers of eggs and fowls in the richly culti-
vated district. When Brucher slept on the ground in Tunduru,
this was regarded as a piece of bravado by the inhabitants, so
little did they know about war. In view of the difficulties of
transport and the constant movement of the troops, it became
increasingly necessary to make the force less and less dependent
on their inadequate line of communication. With this object
the forces of Captains Goering and von Lieberman were also
moved to the region south of Kilwa, where, according to the
stories of some Europeans in the Kiturika mountains, there was
plenty of food. In order to relieve the transport of supplies
from the rear the troops were marched off to Kilwa without
waiting for further investigation, and it was fortunate that the
reports as to the fertility of this district were realized. In order
to take the enemy, who had already moved some small forces
half-way to Livale, as far as possible from south of his point of
debarkation, and at the same time to secure the fertile districts
south of Kilwa to Mbemkuru, Goering's and von Lieberman's
divisions made a detour from Mpotora southwards and pressed
forward, Goering's force following the coast straight to Kilwa,
and von Lieberman keeping further west and making for the
Kilwa-Livale road. A weaker force followed this road to Kilwa
and served as a reserve for the patrols, which several times
surprised the enemy in his camps and threw him back. Our
patrols were soon swarming in the neighbourhood of Kilwa.
Several enemy dumps were surprised and part of the garrisons
killed. On one of these occasions brave Sergeant-Major Struwe,
who was afterwards killed, skilfully forced his way, with a large
part of the 3rd Field Company, inside a dump, and, taking
cover behind the sacks of flour, inflicted heavy losses on the
enemy, who appeared from outside in great force. It was

192

Native Types (1).
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

\Tofactp. 192.

Native Types (2).

(From a 'drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

Lindi and Kilwa

difficult to get much away from the dump, so the patrol had
to content itself with destroying the greater part of the stores.
One patrol took a field gun with it — a strange weapon for a
patrol. After careful reconnaissance this reached the coast
at Kilwa-Kissiwami, and bombarded some of the transports
lying there.

In May, 1917, Captain von Lieberman, who, with the nth and
xyth Companies, was occupying an entrenched position at
Ngaula, a day's march south of Kilwa on the Kilwa-Livale
road, was attacked by eight companies with two guns. Lieu-
tenant Buechsel, with his I7th Company, made such a heavy
flank attack that he completely routed, one after the other,
several of the enemy's Askari companies, who took to their
heels, followed by the 4oth Indian Pathan Regiment. The enemy
left about seventy dead on the field, and, as the English related
afterwards, it was only by chance that we did not find his guns,
which had stuck fast in a river.

On the whole it seemed to us that the enemy's forces were
once more getting exhausted. Unless he brought over very con-
siderable reinforcements it was obvious that the forces available
would before long be worn out and his operations end in failure.
It was already apparent that they were involving a great strain.
It had been ascertained that a battery from the Indian interior
had been brought to Kilwa and that a large number of new
Askari companies were being raised.

More dangerous than the enemy seemed to me the material
position of our men. The cargo of wheat from the relief ship
was coming to an end, and I thought it questionable whether
bread could be baked from Mtama flour alone, without the addi-
tion of wheat flour. At that time I still regarded bread as an
indispensable necessity for the nourishment of Europeans, and
therefore I made experiments personally in baking bread without
wheat flour. Unfortunately the results were unsatisfactory.
Afterwards, under the stress of necessity, we all produced excel-
lent bread without wheat. The methods differed widely. Later
we made bread not only with mtama, but also with muhogo,
sweet potatoes, maize, in short, with nearly every kind of meal,

193 13

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and with mixtures of all sorts of combinations, and later still
improved the quality by the addition of boiled rice.

The necessary kit also required attention. A shortage of boots
was in sight. My experiments showed me that a European can
go barefoot where there are tolerable paths, but never through the
bush. Sandals, which anyone can make, given an odd bit of
leather, proved helpful, but did not take the place of boots. To
be ready for any emergency, I had some lessons in boot-making,
and succeeded, with supervision, in producing an object that
at a push could be taken for a left boot, though it was intended to
be a right. It is very convenient for a European who knows the
simplest rudiments of this craft to be able to kill an antelope and
make a boot, or at any rate repair one, from his skin a few days
later, without the help of any of the tools of civilization. A
nail must serve as an awl, a tent-pole as a last, and the thread he
can cut from the tough leather of a small antelope. As a matter of
fact, however, we were never driven to these extremities, as we
were always able to obtain the necessary kit and equipment
from captured stores, and many captured saddles were cut up to
make soles and heels for boots.

Every European was becoming more and more like a South-
African " Trekker " and was his own workman. Naturally,
not always in person, but within the small independent household,
consisting of his black cook and his black servant, which followed
him about. Many had even provided themselves with a few hens
which they took about with them, and the noise of these betrayed
the position of German camps even as far as the native settle-
ments. An order issued in one force that the crowing of
cocks before 9 a.m. was forbidden brought no relief.

The important question of salt was very simply solved by the
troops at Kilwa, by the evaporation of sea-water. In order
to secure the supply, which was beginning to run short, against
the loss of the coast, salt-yielding plants were collected and the
salt obtained from their ashes by lixiviation. We got this idea
from the natives of the district, who supplied themselves with salt
in this way. The salt thus obtained was not bad, but was never
required to any extent, as we were always able to meet our re-

194

Lindi and Kilwa

quirements from the captured stores. The large numbers of
elephants in this district furnished us with fat ; sugar was re-
placed by the excellent wild honey which was found in large
quantities. The troops had made an important step forward
as regards supplies of grain. They found out how to ripen it
artificially, and in this way provided against want.

It should be noted here particularly that the Medical Corps,
in spite of the difficult and constantly changing circumstances of
life in the field, had succeeded in satisfactorily solving the impor-
tant questions of quinine and material for bandages. It has
already been mentioned that in the north quinine tablets of better
quality than the English had been added to the stock of Peruvian
bark. After the evacuation of the northern area a large consign-
ment of Peruvian bark had been sent to Kilossa. Through the
efforts of the Deputy Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon Teute,
a part of this was transported further south. It was of course
impossible without the necessary apparatus to manufacture
tablets, but liquid quinine was produced by boiling Peruvian
bark. This had an infernal taste and was drunk unwillingly
but with beneficial results by the patients, among whom it was
known as " Lettow-Schnaps."

The other difficulty was the supply of bandages. To supple-
ment the stock of linen, which was beginning to give out, not
only was clothing of all kinds disinfected and used for this pur-
pose, and then after being boiled used again, but quite a good
bandage-material was made from bark. This idea, too, we got
from the methods of the natives, who for a long time had made
clothing and sacks from Myombo bark. The medical service had
done everything humanly possible to keep the troops alive and
well. The great resource of this service and the necessary hus-
banding of the primitive material available deserve special
recognition, as this service had always been accustomed under the
special conditions of a tropical climate, and rightly so, to be very
free with their stocks. The Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon
Stolowsky, and later his successor, Staff-Surgeon Teute, showed
exemplary devotion, energy and foresight.

The surgery was on an equally high level. The hospitals

195 13*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

which, during the early part of the campaign, had been accommo-
dated for the most part in solid buildings, and had worked the
whole year round without moving their quarters, had now to
turn themselves into movable columns, which might at any
moment be called upon to pack up, with patients and baggage,
and keep up with the march in various directions of the troops.
All not absolutely indispensable material had to be eliminated,
so that the preparations for a surgical operation had always to be
more or less improvised. The operating-theatre was as a rule a
newly-erected grass hut. In spite of all this, Staff-Surgeon
Miiller, Dr. Thierfelder, of the Imperial Medical Service, and others
successfully performed even serious operations, including several
for appendicitis.

As has already been mentioned, the confidence even of the
enemy in the German medical service was fully justified. The
successful and devoted activity of these men went far to strengthen
the mutual confidence between white and black. In such ways
as this the strong bond was formed which united the different
elements of our force.

At Lindi the enemy had strengthened himself more and more,
and it was reported that detachments were being transported by
sea to Lindi, which hitherto had been posted west of Kilwa.
General O'Grady, who had commanded a brigade at Kibata,
also appeared at Lindi. The obvious idea that the enemy would
advance from Lindi against our weak forces and our main supply
area, as had been his intention earlier at Kilwa, appeared to be
materializing. Several attacks had been beaten off by Captain
Looff's force west of Lindi. At the request of the Governor three
of the companies which had arrived under Major Kraut were not,
as had been the original intention, used to subjugate quickly and
thoroughly the rebellious inhabitants of Makonde,in the south-
east corner of our Protectorate, but were put under the command
of Captain Looff. Two of them took part in an attack on Sudi,
south of Lindi, where the enemy was strongly entrenched. The
attack on the fortified position was bravely launched, but suffered
heavy losses, and could not be brought to a successful con-
clusion.

196

Lindi and Kilwa

Later, Captain Rothe was ordered to Lindi with reinforcements
consisting of three companies from Mpotora. But the rains
spoiled our plans. The crossing of the Matendu had already
become difficult. All the ram that had fallen in Donde district
collected ultimately in the valley of the Matendu, which in the
dry season is simply a series of pools. It had become a strong,
rushing torrent, like the Fulda in spate at Cassel. and tore up
great trees in its course. By making use of some islands, tree-
trunks were got into position under the direction of skilled
engineers and a bridge to take transport was built ; but a sudden
rise in the stream repeatedly swept it away, several men being
drowned. A footbridge further down-stream met with the same
fate ; a narrow suspension-bridge of ropes made from twisted
bark was only of slight service and was somewhat uncertain
as, in view of the alternation of strong sunlight and wet, there
was always a danger of the ropes rotting and giving way.

At Nahungu, on the Mbemkuru, similar conditions hindered
Captain Rothe's march. The stream was so strong that the
first attempt to cross by the few ferry-boats available failed.
Driven out of Nahungu by scarcity of supplies, Captain Rothe
marched into the fertile region to the north-east, in this way
seriously compromising the plans of Headquarters. It was
necessary that this fertile country north-east of Nahungu should
be spared to serve as a reserve for the forces south of Kilwa and
to provide for a strong reinforcement of these troops should
tactical reasons make this necessary. The time that was lost
before a message could be got through to Captain Rothe was
very vexatious, but finally his division was diverted towards
Lindi again in time to take part in some of the fighting.

In view of the need for reinforcement of our troops at Lindi
owing to increased tension of the military situation and the pro-
jected transference of fresh troops to that area, General Wahle
had been withdrawn from Mahenge and had taken over the
command of the Lindi front ; Captain Tafel succeeded him at
Mahenge. In the middle of June, 1917, General Wahle had, after
several engagements which had brought to light a considerable
increase in the enemy's strength, retired so far up the Lukuledi

197

My Reminiscences of East Africa

river that the enemy seemed to be incautiously exposing his
north flank.

I decided to make use of this advantage without, indeed,
knowing exactly how it was to be done. So much was clear :
that only a surprise attack promised success. I therefore
advanced, with four companies and the mountain-battery con-
sisting of two guns, through Nahungu, along the main road
leading via Lutende to Lindi. At Lutende were encamped
Captain von Chappuis' company and Lieutenant Wunder's com-
pany, and the rest were further back. I went on ahead to
reconnoitre, with my able companion Nieuwenhuizen, who had
played the chief part in the horse-drive on Erok mountain. From
the height on which Chappuis' company lay, there was an exten-
sive view : one could see the different farmhouses round Lindi
and the Lukuledi river with the steamer President, which had
taken refuge there and been rendered useless. It was, perhaps,
fortunate that no wild pigs or bush deer had come within range
of our guns in this otherwise gameless district, for not far from
Chappuis' camp we crossed the trail of a strong enemy patrol
which must only just have passed. The talk of the natives, too,
led us to suppose that they had recently seen something interesting.
When we questioned them they would tell us nothing. Making
a wide detour,' we arrived in the evening, after dark, at the camp
of Wunder's company. We reported our observations to the
company commander and the capable guide Inkermann, who died
a hero's death a few days later, warning them to keep a sharp
look-out. Orders were also given that this camp, situated as
it was in an open plain and exposed to fire from the surrounding
bush, should be moved. After a cup of tea we returned to our
main force about a quarter of an hour's march to the rear.

On the morning of 3oth June we heard increasing rifle-fire from
the direction of Wunder's company. Assuming that the enemy
had taken advantage of the lie of the ground and was firing on
the camp from the surrounding bush, I immediately advanced
with the three companies to the right through the bush, so as
to strike the road further south and so take the enemy in the
rear. Soon, however, we met some Askari, who told us that a

198

Lindi and Kilwa

strong force of the enemy had forced its way into the camp,
taking the company by surprise and driving it out. A young
Askari complained to an old " Betschausch " (sergeant) of the
third company that the enemy had taken everything from
them. " Niemaza we, tutawafukuza " (shut your mouth, we'll
soon have 'em out), was the defiant answer which at once shamed
the excited youth into silence. The sergeant's answer indeed
hit off the position. The enemy, consisting of the 5th Indian
Regiment and a few natives, had thought to find only a weak
German outpost. He had rashly penetrated into our badly-
placed entrenchments and was now in his turn exposed on all
sides to a concentrated fire from the bush.

The position was so clear that it called for the quickest possible
independent action by the subordinate leaders, and Captain
von Chappuis also attacked at once. Staff- Surgeon Mohn
(afterwards killed), who had remained in Wunder's camp and had
temporarily fallen into the enemy's hands, described the very
harassing effect of our concentrated fire at short range and the
panic it caused among the enemy. Nevertheless, the cover
afforded by a few ravines and the undergrowth enabled some of
the enemy to get away. These fled wildly. A number so en-
tirely lost themselves that they were picked up in the bush days
afterwards by our patrols in a half-starved condition. We
inflicted about 120 casualties. In addition to recovering our own
ammunition, which had fallen temporarily into the enemy's
hands, we captured the enemy's ammunition which he had just
brought into the camp, about a hundred rifles and some machine
guns. Among the severely wounded whom we took to the
English camp at Naitiwi, and there handed over, was the com-
manding officer of the English regiment. He afterwards died
of his wound.

We stayed a few weeks longer in the fertile district of Lutende
and tried with our patrols to inflict losses on the enemy, whose
fortified camps at, and south of, Naitiwi offered no prospect
of successful attack. Far to the south we often heard the ex-
plosion of air-bombs and of the heavy guns which were bombarding
Wahle's division. Von Chappuis' company was marched to

199

My Reminiscences of East Africa

reinforce Wahle's force. Apart from some skirmishing our
success at Lindi was followed by a lull in the operations.

That this was only the prelude to new efforts on the enemy's
part was borne out not only by the reports of the transport of
strong forces to Kilwa, and also by the fact that at the end of
May General Hoskins, who had taken over command from
General Smuts, had been relieved by General van Deventer.
Once more a Boer was in command, and the rumours that fresh
European troops were being brought from South Africa seemed
to be confirmed. South of Kilwa the enemy attacked our nine
companies with three brigades, but Captain von Lieberman,
who had taken over from Captain Goering, the latter being
seriously ill, succeeded with extraordinary skill in beating off the
superior forces of the enemy. On July 6th, at least a brigade
made a frontal attack on Captain Lieberman at Unindi and
was repulsed with heavy losses. The bold charge of our com-
panies cost us heavily too ; among the casualties was Lieutenant
Bleeck, who received a mortal wound in the stomach while leading
his company. This brave and upright personality had done
excellent service both as a fearless patrol-leader and on the
Headquarters Staff, and I knew him intimately. Von Lieberman' s
right flank was covered against another enemy brigade by Captain
Spangenberg with two of the nine companies. He carried out
his task and attacked the enemy brigade so energetically with
his two companies that, as we heard later, the English reports
spoke of an attack by very strong enemy forces.

In spite of this success at Unindi, the great superiority of the
enemy and the danger from enveloping movements to our sup-
plies in the rear, induced Captain von Lieberman to withdraw
gradually south, fighting all the time. I thought the moment
had come to make a rapid counter-march with the available
companies at Lutende, and the mountain-battery come un-
expectedly to the aid of Captain von Lieberman and perhaps
seize a favourable opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat upon
the enemy. We moved due north from Lutende by forced marches
and crossed the Mbemkuru, now once more an insignificant stream,
without difficulty, two days' march below Nahungu. The only

200

Lindi and Kilwa

opposition we encountered was from swarms of wild bees which
forced us to make a slight detour. North of Mbemkuru we con-
tinued our march north into the Ruawa hills.

I made use of the two days required to muster the force again
to reconnoitre thoroughly the surrounding country, and on
the 28th July, to my astonishment, I learned accidentally from
some natives that a road through the mountains led almost in
a straight line from our camp to Captain Lieberman's camp at
the Narungomba water-hole, about six hours' march. A patrol
of Europeans was sent at once to reconnoitre this road. In
the morning of the 2Qth July I heard from my camp at Ruawa
some explosions from the direction of Lieberman's force.
I did not think this could denote serious fighting, as the sounds
ceased and, further, the patrol which I had sent to Lieberman's
force, and which had returned that morning, reported that
everything was quiet there. I had, however, to change my
mind when at noon van Rooyen, who was very reliable, returned
from a hunting expedition and reported that he had certainly
heard continuous machine-gun fire. The reader will, perhaps,
wonder that I had not already begun the march to Lieber-
man's camp, but it must be remembered that there was no
water on the way, and my men were very exhausted, while some
had only just reached Ruawa. By nightfall I was just three
hours' march nearer the scene of action, but it was not until the
night was well advanced that my companies had all come up.
A continuance of the march through the bush in pitch darkness
was hopeless ; it was bound to lead to a good deal of misunder-
standing and would have meant a useless waste of the men's
strength, which had already been severely tried.

At 3 a.m. the march was continued and soon after a
report came from the advance officer patrol that Captain von
Lieberman had certainly defeated the enemy, but, owing to
shortage of ammunition, had marched to Mihambia during
the night. The rear-guard had evacuated the springs and at
the time of the report was following the rest. My order to hold
the springs at all costs until my arrival at 6 a.m. to join in the
battle had, therefore, been disregarded owing to pressure of

201

My Reminiscences of East Africa

circumstances. I now thought that the enemy, who was stronger
than we, would have strongly entrenched the springs position,
as was his habit, and that I should have to carry out any attack
with thirsty troops. That seemed to offer little prospect of
success. Later, when I learned the enemy's real position, I
inclined to the opposite view. In spite of his superiority the
enemy had suffered a severe defeat. His 7th South African and
8th European regiments were almost broken up. Again and
again his infantry had hurled themselves in deep waves against
the front of our Askari regiments, and each time they had been
driven back by counter-attacks. A forest fire had broken out
and spread among his ranks. Finally the main body of his
troops had broken away and fled in wild disorder through the
bush. Machine guns, masses of rifles and hundreds of cases of
ammunition had been left on the field. In this condition, my
attack, even after the withdrawal of Lieberman's force, would
perhaps have sealed the doom of the enemy's main body. It is
much to be regretted that at that time large numbers of the
troops did not show sufficient initiative to make good the shortage
of German ammunition during the battle itself, by using the
enemy rifles and cartridges which were lying about in quantities.
We had been within reach of a most important success which
was snatched from our grasp by accident. We must, however,
be grateful for the feat of arms which the yth Askari Company
performed under the doubtless brilliant leadership of Captain
von Lieberman, against overwhelming odds.

I did not get a clear report of this action, however, until later.
For the moment I thought it right to march to Mihambia in order,
by joining with Lieberman's detachment, to secure unity of
command, to supply it with sufficient ammunition to carry on
and, if necessary, to raise its moral after the severe battle by a
visible reinforcement. This last turned out to be unnecessary ;
when I arrived I found Lieberman's detachment in excellent
spirits, all the companies being proud to have dealt such a heavy
blow to the superior enemy. For me the operation at Narun-
gombe was a further proof how difficult it is in the unknown
African bush and in face of the uncertainty of communication,

202

Lindi and Kilwa

even if other circumstances are favourable, to carry through an
operation in which several columns are taking part, so as to
secure the necessary unity of action on the battlefield. At
Narungombe, where all the conditions were as favourable as could
have been hoped, the decision was finally thwarted by slight
mischances, and my belief was strengthened that if I wanted
to use different bodies of troops hi one operation it was necessary
to secure the closest connection first.

The engagement at Narungombe brought the enemy at Kilwa
to a standstill for a considerable tune, and the fighting was con-
fined to patrols, who inflicted losses on the enemy's lines of com-
munication, firing out of the bush on his detachments and
motor transport and attacked at close quarters when a favourable
opportunity offered. In order, for one thing, to put this patrol
work on a broader basis, but also to counter the moving of enemy
troops westward, and finally for reasons of supply, I deployed
the force laterally on the line Mihambia-Xdessa. A large number
of aircraft appeared over the fertile Ndessa district against
whose bombs we were defenceless, and some severe wounds
resulted ; from this air-reconnaissance we could infer the enemy's
keen interest in the district and soon it was reported that he was
moving still further west. Our patrols did such good work that
from time to time whole companies of the enemy were put to
flight with heavy losses. But the enemy continued his efforts
to obtain information. He hardly took the trouble to hide his
intention when sending flags of truce. I remember one occasion
when the party bearing the white flag arrived at our camp out
of the bush ; they had, therefore, not only avoided the roads
leading to it but had deliberately crossed them. The closer
proximity of the enemy made it more difficult for us to get up
our supplies, which were gradually running out. It was unavoid-
able that the position of our requisitioning and hunting-parties
should become known to the enemy and that they should be
surprised. The influence of the enemy on the natives was shown
by the fact that south of Mihambia several villages had been
suddenly deserted. I had long regarded this phenomenon
as a sign of the enemy's intention to advance in that direction.

203

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The state of our supplies made it impossible for us to maintain
so strong a force in the Mihambia-Ndessa area. As in any case
the evacuation of this area could not long be delayed, and as the
enemy west of Lindi was at the same time developing increased
activity in strong force on General Wahle's front, I decided to
join General Wahle with some of the companies from Ndessa
and perhaps bring off the operation that had failed at Narun-
gombe ; a decisive success by an unexpected reinforcement.
On the 3rd August General O'Grady's forces had certainly suffered
a serious defeat. An Indian regiment, which had advanced
through the gap between two strongly fortified German outposts,
was attacked by our reserves, held ready for such a contingency,
and almost annihilated. In the pursuit much valuable material
fell into our hands. The enemy, however, had renewed the
attack a few days later, and in face of the enveloping movement
of his strong detachments, General Wahle had fallen back on
Narunyu and a mountain of equal height south of the Lukuledi
river.

Captain Koehl, with six companies and a battery, remained
behind at Ndessa ; I crossed the river Mbemkuru below Nahungu
with four companies and two mountain-guns, and then marched
diagonally across the Muera plateau to the mission-station at
Namupa. The prefect in charge entertained us, among other
things, with muhogo (a species of corn with edible roots), pre-
pared like fried potatoes, and supplemented the scanty pro-
visions of our Europeans with bananas and other fruit out of his
extensive gardens.

In the camp at Njangao the receipt of part of a German wireless
message directed to me, expressing his Majesty's acknowledg-
ments on the occasion of the third anniversary of the outbreak
of war, delighted us all.

We pitched our camp with the first company at Njengedi,
on the main road between Njangao and Lindi, in the rear of
Wahle's division, in unpleasant, rainy weather. I immediately set
out for Narunyu to inform General Wahle of our arrival. Here, in
an almost impenetrable country broken by numerous ravines,
at the bottom of which lay deep swamps, friend and foe faced

204

Lindi and Kilwa

one another in close proximity. Our men were working at
dug-outs covered by branches cut from the trees. Only five
of General Wahle's seven companies were at Narunyu, the two
others being on Ruho Mountain on the south bank of the Luku-
ledi river. In view of the danger of a surprise attack on our
weak forces at Narunyu I ordered them to be reinforced by the
companies on Ruho Mountain and marched two of those that
had come with me to take their place. The enemy attack on
Narunyu occurred the following day. Captain Lieberman's
Company from Ruho Mountain and the two companies I had
brought with me all took part in the engagement. The third
company had literally started their forced march to Karungu
immediately after their arrival at Njengedi. I can still see the
Askari coming up just before dawn and hear their shouts
of delight at the thought of once more routing the enemy.

Our attempt to envelop the enemy's right wing, however,
only served to press it back ; the bush was too thick for an
offensive movement which had to be developed at short range
under a continuous machine-gun and rifle fire. The darkness
made it still more difficult to direct the operations, and there
is no doubt that in the confusion of the two fronts in this broken
country our detachments often fired on one another : it was
almost impossible to recognize friend or foe. For instance,
hearing loud sounds of shouting in front of me, in the complete
darkness of the bush, I thought this came from our enveloping
attack driving back the enemy. It was not discovered till some
time afterwards that this was the enemy and soon we heard him
working at his trenches. The exact location of his trenches gave
us the advantage of being able to get the range for the 10.5 cm.
gun of the Konigsberg, which was with Wahle's force. This
was done with good results ; at any rate the enemy evacuated
his trenches on the following day and retired.

The complete victory desired had not been attained and, in
view of the difficulties of the ground, could not be expected, as
we had discovered our strength to the enemy hi the fighting of
the i8th, and lost the advantage of a surprise. Once more I
had to content myself with delay. In this fertile country there

205

My Reminiscences of East Africa

was no difficulty about holding our ground from the point of
view of supplies. The force has rarely been so well fed as in the
Lindi area. Great fields of sweet-potatoes and muhogo stretched
as far as the eye could see, and there was an abundant supply
of sugar-cane. The numerous Arab plantations indicated the
fertility and the ancient civilization of the country. We made
ourselves at home, and though rifle bullets often whistled through
our camp and aircraft dropped bombs on us, not much harm was
done. On one occasion the dentist, who had set up his surgery
in a European house and was giving us the attention we had
long needed, was attending to a patient when a bomb fell into
the room. It was discovered later, when the place was examined,
that the planter kept his store of dynamite in this very room.
Fortunately the bomb did not touch this or both patients and
dentist would have been permanently freed from toothache.

It was no easy matter to decide what to do with the German
women and children, some of whom had fled from Lindi and
did not know what to do. A number of them had taken refuge
in the planters' houses, which were within range of the enemy's
guns. In view of the restriction of supplies and the difficulties
of transport and accommodation, it was desirable that these
women and children should be sent back to Lindi. Some were
intelligent enough to see this. By means of a parley their trans-
ference behind the British lines was duly arranged, and they were
able to leave for Lindi. For reasons unknown to me the English
then refused to keep to the arrangement, and the women and
children, as well as male non-combatants, gradually collected in
the Catholic mission at Ndanda. A military convalescent home
had been quartered there for some time and had developed into
an important hospital. All the people who were brought here
found good food and accommodation in the spacious buildings
of the mission with its extensive gardens.

206

CHAPTER XI

IN THE SOUTH-EAST CORNER OF THE COLONY

WHILE at Narunyu there was a lull in the fighting for
several weeks, the enemy had shown considerable
activity in the section of Portuguese territory occupied by
Stuemer's force. Several English columns from the south-
west and south had concentrated on Mwembe, and Major von
Stuemer, not thinking himself strong enough to resist, had
evacuated Mwembe. The different companies had then gradu-
ally retired on the Rovuma. North of this river Lieutenant-
Commander Jantzen, who had been sent from Headquarters to
Tunduru, and under whom the various companies of Stuemer's
force had re-formed, had taken over the command. Enemy
forces were also advancing on Tunduru from Ssongea.

It was difficult to obtain detailed information about the enemy.
My impression was that he wanted to bring our main force to
a halt, invade our supply-area hi the Tunduru-Massassi-Ruponda
district with strong forces, and cany off our supplies. I did
not then think it out of the question that we might score a
success, and I, therefore, marched on the loth September, 1917,
with five companies, from our camps at Narunyu towards Massassi.
From there Captain Goering immediately marched with three
companies towards Tunduru ; Jantzen's division stood north-
east of this place. I reconnoitred the road to Tunduru on a
bicycle and feared that the difficulties of supply would be very
serious. These fears were unfortunately realized. Supplies
from the land could not be brought up and there was no time
for a prolonged operation that would allow of additional supplies
being obtained from Massassi.

The small English and Portuguese patrols which attacked

207

My Reminiscences of East Africa

our supplies and transport from across the Rovuma to the
south did not cause us to hurry our movements. But the enemy
from Kilwa, whom Captain Koehl's heavy attack from Mbeo-
Chini and a number of lesser encounters had not been able to
stop, reached the neighbourhood of Nahungu. His flying
columns, for the most part mounted, outflanked Koehl's force,
and pressed forward up the Mbemkuru river to Nangano. Com-
munication with Captain Koehl by means of the telephone-line
from Nahungu to Nangano was first interrupted for a few days,
and then broken off completely. The supply dumps fell into the
enemy's hands and were destroyed. To provide against the
interruption of the exposed telephone-line a new line had been
laid from Ruponda, running north-east, but connection by
messenger between this line and Koehl's division took several
days.

In view of the slow means of communication with Koehl's
detachment, it was not possible to get an accurate view of the
situation in time, and as. the intended success at Tunduru could
not in any case be attained, I marched the five companies from
Massassi to Ruponda at the beginning of October, and then
further north-east, joining forces with Koehl's force at Likan-
gara. On receiving the report that enemy detachments were
approaching Ruponda, I ordered the removal of the sick and the
stores from Ruponda to Lukuledi and Mnacho. On gth October,
1917, an enemy patrol was beaten off with some losses at Ruponda.
On loth October a considerable force of the enemy — the 25th
Indian Cavalry Regiment was identified — assaulted Ruponda
from several sides. The withdrawal of our companies had,
therefore, unfortunately been rather premature ; otherwise the
enemy might have encountered some of our passing companies
at Ruponda and perhaps suffered a serious defeat. As it was,
there were no troops in Ruponda except a few of our patrols ;
most of the sick fell into the enemy's hands, and also some 90,000
kg. of supplies. At Likangara there was no fighting worthy of
notice. Some enemy patrols and weak detachments did appear,
but our fighting-force, which was attacking the enemy's main
line of communication along the Mbemkuru river, firing on and

208

In the South -East Corner of the Colony

destroying motor-transport, and capturing mails and supplies,
led me to suppose that the strongest part of the Kilwa force
was recuperating further west in the direction of Ruponda.

The increased enemy activity a few days' march east of
Likangara, where he established requisitioning stations, as well
as the stories of the natives, made it seem probable that con-
siderable enemy forces were marching from Nahungu towards
the south, and therefore against General Wahle. Captured
mails revealed the fact that in spite of his extensive intelligence
and spy systems the enemy was groping in the dark. He did
not know, for instance, where I was, although he seemed to place
the greatest importance upon knowing. The knowledge of
my Headquarters would tell him the probable position of our
main force. While one letter thought that I was in the neigh-
bourhood of Lukuledi, another professed to know that I was at
Tunduru, and according to a third I was at Mahenge. The
talkativeness of these Europeans, who, in spite of all warnings,
cannot refrain from communicating to one another in their
private letters their knowledge and their conjectures about the
war situation, had in this case done good : there was so much
gossip, the rumours were so contradictory, and even the most
improbable things were so indiscriminately believed, that any-
thing at all could be read into the German correspondence. In
spite of this unintentional misleading of the enemy, it is difficult
to understand how intelligent people can entrust to the post
important matters, the knowledge of which must be kept from
the enemy, knowing how unreliable the post is, and that the
letters often fall into the enemy's hands.

It was clear to me that the enemy's obvious uncertainty about
the situation would give me a great opportunity if it could be
used quickly and decisively. I ventured to hope that the
intended decisive blow might now be struck for which I had
tried twice near Lindi and once at Tunduru, and the success of
which at Narungombe had hung on a hair. The development
of the situation on Wahle's front seemed favourable for this
attempt. His forces had gradually withdrawn from the Mtua
district to Mahiwa. Vhe enemy's whole handling of the

209 14

My Reminiscences of East Africa

campaign suggested that his various columns would press forward
with all their weight and try to crush us by a concentration
from all sides. The enemy's Lindi Division was advancing
energetically with the rest. General Wahle's nine companies,
fighting stubbornly, had retired before them to Mahiwa. I
had a fair personal knowledge of the country at Mahiwa. It
was very probable that my march in that direction would not
be observed by the enemy in time.

On the loth October, 1917, trusting in the fortune of war, I
crossed the Linkangara mountains to Mnacho with five com-
panies and two mountain guns. I arrived there at dark and
left again at daybreak on the I5th. On the narrow mountain
paths the force got very scattered. The guns were left far behind,
and the pack-animals gave trouble. Askari and bearers came
to the rescue, and again and again Sergeant-Major Sabath rose
superior to the difficulties and brought his guns forward. It
surprised me that we were unable to get any information from
Mahiwa, but the rifle and machine-gun fire indicated that fighting
was in progress. Before dark I reached Lieutenant Methner's
company, which was in reserve behind Wahle's left wing. The
enemy seemed to be attacking this company with a view to
enveloping it. His fire had the unfortunate effect of causing
the disappearance of my bearer, with my dispatch-box, containing
most important dispatches and maps : he did not return for
two days. The first two companies to come up were immediately
thrown against the enemy's enveloping movement, and the
enemy was thrown back. The companies then dug themselves
in. On the morning of the i6th I went to reconnoitre, and
found that the enemy had also entrenched himself immediately
in front, at a distance of sixty to a hundred metres. When
Lieutenant von Ruckteschell offered me a cup of coffee, care had
to be taken, as the enemy was keeping a fairly sharp look-out,
and shot with tolerable accuracy. I thought the opportunity
favourable for a determined surprise attack. It was decided to
launch the attack at noon, on the left (north) wing, and try to
turn the enemy's flank. Goering's detachment was to lead the

attack.

210

In the South -East Corner of the Colony

After we had eaten our midday meal undisturbed, I went at
once to the left wing, where Captain Goering had just begun his
advance with his two companies. When he had crossed a wide
depression in the ground, to my surprise he changed direction
still further to the left. The companies were soon in action.
Only gradually I realized the significance of this surprising move.
Captain Goering had come unexpectedly upon a new enemy
who had come from Nahungu and was now attacking from the
north. The force consisted of several battalions and two guns
of the Nigerian Brigade who knew nothing of our arrival at
Mahiwa and were expecting to smash General Wahle's force by
an attack on his left flank and rear, while his front, facing east,
was vigorously attacked by a division. The Nigerian Brigade
was as much taken by surprise as Captain Goering and was not
so quick to adapt itself to the new situation. Captain Goering,
closely supported by the reserves, threw himself so vigorously
against the enemy in the bush that he ran through some of
his detachments, threw them into confusion, and finally put them
to flight. An enemy officer in command of an ammunition
column took our men for his own, with the result that we captured
about 150,000 rounds of ammunition. A gun with ammunition
was taken by assault, and the killed did not consist wholly of
Nigerian Askari. On Captain Goering's right, where two com-
panies under Lieutenant von Ruckteschell and Lieutenant
Brucker, wounded in this action, were fighting, the enemy was
also thrown back some way into the bush.

While this fighting was going on on the flank, and on the
following day also, the enemy attacked Wahle's force with all
his strength. Here the enemy was hi great superiority ; wave
after wave of fresh troops were thrown against our front. There
was a danger that General Wahle's front would give way, and the
fighting was very severe. There was also serious danger that our
enveloping movement, hi the very difficult swampy ground of
the bush, would be held up so long by weak enemy forces that a
defeat would be inflicted upon our front before it could make itself
felt. In that case the battle was lost. I thought it expedient
to increase the disadvantages that the enemy was bringing upon

211 14*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

himself by his costly frontal attack and used all my available
strength in such a way that the enemy by the increasing fierceness
of his frontal attack was bleeding himself to death.

The original intention of enveloping the enemy's left wing
was not developed further on the following days, but, on the con-
trary, every available company was withdrawn from the left
wing to stiffen General Wahle's front. In this way we not only
succeeded in holding our ground, but, by immediately taking
advantage of the enemy's moments of weakness to make heavy
counter-attacks with our reserves, we were able to inflict a real
defeat. My, perhaps surprising, tactics were prompted by the
personality of the enemy commander. I had learned in the
engagement at Reata (nth March, 1916) that General Beves
threw his men into action regardless of loss of life and did not
hesitate to try for a success, not by skilful handling and small
losses, but rather by repeated frontal attacks which, if the defence
held its ground and had anything like adequate forces, led to
severe losses for the attack. I guessed that here at Mahiwa
he was carrying out the same tactics. I think it was by taking
advantage of the enemy leader's mistaken tactics in this way
that we were able to win this splendid victory. Until the i8th
October, for four days therefore, wave after wave of the attack
broke on our front, but my own observation told me that the
weight of the attack here on the right wing was diminishing and
that the enemy's defeat was absolute.

On the evening of the i8th October we had, with some 1,500
men, completely defeated a whole enemy detachment at least
4,000, and probably not less than 6,000, strong. With the
exception of Tanga, it was the most serious defeat he had
suffered.

According to a high English officer the enemy lost 1,500
men ; but I have reason to believe that this estimate is much
too low. Our casualties were : 14 Europeans and 81 Askari
killed, 55 Europeans and 367 Askari wounded, I European
and i Askari missing. Considering the smallness of our forces
these losses were for us very considerable, and were felt all
the more seriously because they could not be replaced. We

212

In the South -East Corner of the Colony

captured a gun, six heavy and three light machine guns, and
200,000 rounds of ammunition.

The situation, unfortunately, did not allow us to take full
advantage of our victory ; in our rear was the enemy who had
occupied Ruponda on the loth October, advanced in strong
force further south and on i8th October attacked Major Kraut
at Lukuledi. It must be remarked in passing that our troops
which had fought under Lieutenant-Commander Jantzen near
Tunduru had gradually retired north-east to the upper Mbenkuru
and had reached Headquarters above Ruponda before the occu-
pation of that place by the enemy on the loth October. Two
of these companies had reinforced the company which was
guarding our supplies near Lukuledi, and it was these three com-
panies, under the command of Major Kraut, which were attacked
by a superior enemy from the north on the i8th October.

The enemy, believed to be six companies of the Gold Coast
Regiment, was driven off, but in order to protect our supplies and
material lying at Chigugu and Chiwata, Major Kraut retired to
the first of these places. As well as Chigugu and Chiwata,
Ndanda, where we had large stores of war material, was also
threatened by the enemy, who had doubtless, in my opinion,
been reinforced at Lukuledi. The enemy from Lukuledi might
at any moment attack our lines of communication, capture our
stores and supplies, and so put us out of action. We had no
means of protecting our lines of communication locally, for the
few thousand men we had were required for fighting. As, how-
ever, the force had to be kept alive, the danger had to be over-
come in some other way.

There was only one way : to beat the enemy decisively at
Lukuledi. It was necessary therefore to lose no time at Mahiwa,
and, hard though it was, I had to abandon the idea of an anni-
hilating pursuit. When, early on the igih October, a few scat-
tered detachments of the enemy were seen and fired on, I had
already begun my march with six companies and two guns. On
the next day at two o'clock we entered Lukuledi from the east,
and on 2ist of October at dawn we attacked the enemy, who
was apparently taken completely by surprise. North of Lukuledi,

213

My Reminiscences of East Africa

on the Ruponda road, Major Kraut's column surprised the camp
of the 25th Indian Cavalry Regiment, which, with transport
harnessed, stood ready for the march on Massassi ; the camp
was taken by storm and the regiment lost almost the whole of
its transport horses, altogether 350. Whilst I was engaged
with the detachments of Koehl and Ruckteschell in a fairly serious
action against the enemy entrenched at Lukuledi, I waited in
vain for the intervention of Kraut's force. An attack on the
camp without the advantage of surprise had little hope of success.
When the force began to come under the fire of the enemy's
mine-throwers on the flank, I withdrew the greater part from the
zone of the effective cross-fire, after beating off a strong enemy
attack, in order to avoid unnecessary losses. A fresh enemy,
in the shape of a company of King's African Rifles (English East
African Askari), who appeared unexpectedly from the bush, was
quickly driven off. In this engagement Lieutenant Kroeger fell
at the head of his company. The action was then broken off.
No news came of Major Kraut until night ; thinking he could
no longer attack successfully at Lukuledi, and hearing no sounds
of fighting, he had made a detour and then approached Lukuledi
from the south.

Owing to unfavourable circumstances we had not succeeded
in inflicting a decisive defeat on the enemy at Lukuledi, and the
operation had only in part gained its objective, but the enemy's
losses must be regarded as serious. The impression made on
him was even greater than I had supposed. At any rate, it was
reported that he had evacuated Lukuledi and withdrawn to the
north. Among our casualties were three company-commanders
killed. I can still see Lieutenant Volkwein, severely wounded in
the leg, limping through the bush at the head of his company.
I had also spoken with Lieutenant Batzner and Lieutenant
Kroeger shortly before they fell. Sergeant-Major Klein also fell,
who had so often led his patrol on the Uganda railway. He was
a capable machine gun leader. But our losses were not in vain.
Our patrols pursued the enemy and fired on his camp near
Ruponda and also his lines of communication. The impossi-
bility of maintaining large bodies of troops in the neighbourhood

214

In the South -East Corner of the Colony

of Ruponda — our supplies collected there had fallen into the
enemy's hands — forced me to give up all idea of pursuing the
enemy.

At that time I thought it possible that the enemy's withdrawal
from Lukuledi might have been due to the movements of Captain
Tafel's force, which was marching from Mahenge to join us. We
had lost touch with him since the beginning of October. He had
received orders to retire gradually before the strong enemy
columns which were advancing on Mahenge from the north
(Ifakara), west and south-west (Likuju, Mponda), and to try to
get into touch with the main force under my command. I
thought it quite possible that he had already arrived in the
district of Xangano, or west of that place, and that the enemy
had turned about again out of anxiety for his lines of communi-
cation.

CHAPTER XII -^

THE LAST WEEKS IN GERMAN TERRITORY

ON 24th October, the Governor of Chiwata, which had be-
come the centre of the Administration, arrived at my camp
east of Lukuledi for a conference. I firmly stated my opinion
that, in spite of all difficulties of supply which must shortly
arise in German East Africa, the war could and must be carried
on. One possibility that offered was to base the operations on
Portuguese territory. This could only be done by evacuating
German East Africa and invading Portuguese East Africa.

The question of supplies was becoming very serious ; we had
in our stores only about 500,000 kg. of supplies. That would
last us about six weeks. But it had been found that these
figures were deceptive. The piled-up sacks had to a great extent
lost weight and the grain had been eaten by insects. The new
harvest could not be expected until March at the earliest. If
the operations were to be continued it was necessary from this
point of view alone to move south. I was still reckoning with
the possibility that Captain Tafel's force might arrive in the
neighbourhood of Massassi and Chiwata, in which case I should
hand over to him the supplies at Chiwata, while I crossed the
Makonda hills in the direction of Lindi with part of the Chiwata
force and attacked the enemy's main line of communication on
the Lukuledi river. In whichever way the situation might
develop, the Chiwata district was, on account of its fertility, of the
greatest importance to us. Chiwata was, however, not protected
and was further threatened by the fact that enemy operations
were taking place in the north against Mnacho, and enemy
mounted forces had been seen on the Lukuledi-Lindi road in the

216

The Last Weeks in German Territory

neighbourhood of Ndanda. Also enemy aircraft were paying
our camp at Chiwata increasing attention.

These were my reasons for withdrawing from Lukuledi at the
end of October with the main part of my forces. It could not
be foreseen whether another opportunity would offer of making
another attack from Chiwata on one of the enemy columns that
would be passing before long. For the next few weeks the
enemy's pressure was again directed against Wahle. Quite
fresh troops were appearing there, among them the Cape Corps
of South African half-castes. This corps had been stationed
along the Central railway and had been brought up to reinforce
General Beves' troops, apparently via Dar-es-Salaam and Lindi.
Fortunately General Beves had not waited for this reinforcement
before his defeat at Mahiwa.

General Wahle was retiring step by step up the Lukuledi
river. I was, unfortunately, not able to send him any support,
but even had to draw on his forces to have troops in hand ready
for a favourable opportunity for an attack and to protect the
supplies. In the almost daily bush-fighting of General Wahle's
force heavy losses were apparently inflicted on the enemy, and
he was held severely in check. There was, however, no defeat
and no considerable capture of booty, and meanwhile our supplies
were getting lower and lower. On 6th November, I rode from
Chiwata to Nangoo, near Ndanda, where, close behind Wahle's
force, I found a suitable point of attack for the Chiwata troops.
On 7th November I rode back from Nangoo to Chiwata, making
a detour south across the Makonde hills. On the same day
enemy troops were again reported at Lukuledi, and on gih Novem-
ber an affair of patrols took place at Chigugu, just west of Chiwata.

At this critical time, when the heads of the enemy columns
were nearing Chiwata, it was urgently necessary for us to throw
all our strength against one of these columns as soon as possible
before the others could intervene. The first essential to make this
blow effective was to bring the whole strength of our all too weak
forces to bear simultaneously. This depended chiefly on the
supply of ammunition. Our whole supply had dwindled to about
400,000 rounds, a very scanty allowance for our 25,000 rifles and

217

My Reminiscences of East Africa

50 machine guns in a serious engagement, after which it would
only be possible to continue the struggle if ammunition were
captured. For this the nature of the ground was unfavourable.
In the thick bush there was a tendency for each individual to fire
many rounds and make few hits, so that the supply of cartridges
was quickly used up without producing the decisive results we
needed. What made a satisfactory solution of the ammunition
question still more impossible was that the cartridges were for
the most part the smoky '71 type, whereas only about one-third
of the troops were armed with '71 rifles ; the other two-thirds
had modern German, English or Portuguese rifles, and for these
the supply of cartridges was very small. What there were were
required for our most important weapon, the machine gun. It was
a difficult position. There was nothing else for it but to make the
attack with only those troops who were armed with the '71 rifle
and to hold in reserve the rest, who had only twenty rounds of
ammunition suitable for their modern rifles, the rest being the
smoky '71 type. The two forces would then be interchanged
so that the first, armed with the '71 rifles, could hand them over
to the relieving force, taking the modern weapons in exchange.
This meant that at the best only one-third of the available
strength could be in action at the same time and even then would
have to be very sparing with their ammunition.

Our artillery ammunition had already been exhausted with
the exception of a few rounds for the two mountain guns and some
Portuguese ammunition. Our last field-howitzer, as well as the
English gun captured at Mahiwa, had burst. The last two 10.5
cm. guns from the Konigsberg had been destroyed a few days
before. On the day after a German mountain gun had been de-
stroyed and sunk at Kitangari. We were thus left with one Ger-
man and one Portuguese mountain gun. During the last few
months the lack of artillery ammunition had been so serious
that we had rarely more than three hundred rounds all told.
That was about the allowance per engagement for one of the
numerous English guns.

Under such circumstances an attack could only promise success
if the situation was exceptionally favourable. This was never

218

The Last Weeks in German Territory

the case. The patrols were kept active, and the enemy harassed
as much as possible, but otherwise there was nothing left but for
General Wahle's force and the nth Field Company, which had
been left at Mnacho to bring away the supplies, gradually to
give way before the pressure of the enemy and retire to Chiwata.
On loth November the Ndanda mission, immediately hi the rear
of General Wahle, who was at Nangoo, was surprised by a strong
enemy force and captured. The field-hospital quartered there,
and part of our stores, fell into the enemy's hands. Lieberman's
force, south of Ndanda, ensured the retreat of General Wahle's
force, which ascended to the Makonda plateau, by the road
south-east of Nangoo, the road I had reconnoitred on 7th
November, and, by crossing the plateau diagonally to Chiwata,
escaped from the enemy's trap. The nth Company also found
its way to Chiwata from Mnacho, so that, with the exception of
Captain Tafel's Detachment and some small bodies of troops
further south, the whole force was concentrated at Chiwata.
The gradual transport of our supplies from Chiwata east to Nam-
bindinga had begun, and with that our march to Kitangari.
Meanwhile I kept an anxious look-out for a vulnerable point
in one of the enemy columns. On the I4th November I thought I
had discovered one.

A strong enemy column, to which belonged the loth South
African Mounted Infantry, had passed close to our position
while marching from Lukuledi via Massassi, and had attacked
Mwiti, two hours' march south of Chiwata. In this place, which
until then had been only weakly held, Lieberman's force (three
companies) had arrived the day before. In spite of the shortage
of ammunition there was, I thought, a chance that by unexpect-
edly throwing into the fight Koehl's force from Chiwata, this
enemy might be defeated separately. I was, however, very
busy with the preparations for the withdrawal to Nambindinga
and unfortunately let the opportunity at Mwiti pass without
taking advantage of it.

There was nothing for it, then, but to retire gradually to Nam-
bindinga.

Through the evacuation of Chiwata the European prisoners,

219

My Reminiscences of East Africa

as well as the Indians, who had been carried to the hospital,
and the hospital itself, full for the most part of seriously wounded,
fell into the enemy's hands. The march to Nambindinga was
carried out under continuous fighting between the I5th and iyth
November. I wanted to make the enemy complete the concentric
march of his columns, advancing north-west and south, so as to
effect a junction ; then, when the enemy's masses were help-
lessly crowded on a narrow area, I could inarch where I liked. On
November iyth I had to take a fateful decision at Nambindinga.
The continual bush-fighting was threatening to consume all our
ammunition. It would have been madness to go on with this
fighting, which could not bring about a favourable decision. We
had therefore to withdraw.

The supply question pointed the same way. Only by a
drastic reduction of strength could we carry on with the stores in
hand. Our supply area had been narrowed, fresh requisitioning had
been interfered with by the enemy, and the produce of the land
exhausted. The supply of quinine would last the Europeans a
month longer. After the consumption of this the Europeans
would certainly fall victims to malaria and its attendant evils ;
they would no longer be able to contend with the rigours of a
tropical campaign. Only by reducing the number of Europeans
to a minimum could enough quinine be ensured for each man to
enable us to carry on the operations for months.

At the same time we had to reduce our total strength. Our
large force with little ammunition was of less value in the field
than a smaller number of picked men with plenty of ammunition.
It amounted to the reduction of our strength to about 2,000
rifles, including not more than 2,000 Europeans. All above this
number had to be left behind. It could not be helped that among
the several hundred Europeans and 600 Askari that we were
compelled to leave behind in the hospital at Nambindinga, there
were men who would have^liked to go on fighting and were
physically fit to do so. Unfortunately, it must be admitted
that among those who were left behind at Nambindinga, even
among the Europeans, there were many who were not unwilling
to lay down their arms. It is, however, worthy of mention

220

The Last Weeks in German Territory

that not only the majority of the Europeans, but also many
Askari, were bitterly disappointed at having to remain. We
had repeatedly to refuse the request of a brave Askari that he
might come and fight for us. But when, two days later, Lieu-
tenant Grundmann, though severely wounded and scarcely able
to walk, reported himself, saying that he could not, in spite
of orders, bring himself to surrender, I have seldom been so
pleased as at this breach of discipline. It may be mentioned
here that in general the enemy, as far as I am in a position to
judge, treated our prisoners with humanity, but it seems to me
that he was anxious to convict us of cruelty to English prisoners,
perhaps in order to justify reprisals, perhaps for other reasons.
Lieutenant Cutsch had been left sick hi Nandanda, and fell
into the enemy's hands. On the totally unfounded and unproved
evidence of a negro that Lieutenant Cutsch had on one occasion,
when commanding a patrol, burned to death a wounded English-
man, he was put in irons and sent by sea to Dar-es-Salaam, being
imprisoned during the voyage just outside the ship's round-
house. At Dar-es-Salaam he was locked up for several weeks in
the prison without a trial. When at last he was tried, it came
out that the charge of senseless cruelty rested purely on the lying
evidence of the negro. Again, General Deventer informed me
that Captain Naumann, who had surrendered near Kilima
Njaro, had been tried for murder. He, too, as I heard later, was
kept imprisoned for a long time without a hearing, until his inno-
cence was finally established. I find it all the more difficult to
understand this mockery of justice, as the English prisoners were
always humanely treated by us, and were often better cared for
materially than our own people.*

These decisions placed the conduct of the war on an entirely
different basis. Hitherto we had stored the supplies in dumps
and for the most part had been able to satisfy our demands from
these ; the ammunition also had been maintained from stores.
This system had laid us more open to attack and offered the enemy
points of attack which we could not protect. But by the methods

* The English Government issued to us articles of food for the English
prisoners which we could not get for ourselves.

221

My Reminiscences of East Africa

adopted hitherto it had been possible to keep the troops in the
field at great strength, considering our position, and to employ
a great part of them on a small area for a considerable period.
It had further been possible to give a permanent character, at
any rate to some of our hospitals, where sick and wounded
could recuperate in peace, and in this way we could fill the gaps
in our front with refreshed and experienced men. This system
had made our operations dependent to a great extent on the
situation of the supplies and reinforcements, and had hindered
freedom of movement. The advantage, however, in our position
of being able to employ strong troops and with them successfully
to engage, and often defeat decisively, superior enemy forces was so
great that I held to this system as long as it was at all possible.

It was now no longer possible, and the advantages I have
mentioned had to be sacrificed under the pressure of necessity.
It was certainly questionable whether the reduced force could
be maintained without supply dumps, and without reinforcements
the prospect of remaining, after twelve days in the plains, with
five thousand hungry negroes and without supplies was not
attractive. Should we succeed in satisfying those requirements
of the force which could not be obtained on the spot, especially
ammunition and arms, by means of capture from the enemy —
for the only possibility of renewing our supplies lay in capturing
the enemy's — in sufficient quantities to make the continuation
of the war possible ? That was the all-important question. If
we succeeded, however, hi maintaining the force on the new
territory the increased independence and mobility, used with
determination against the less mobile enemy, would give us a
local superiority hi spite of the great numerical superiority of the
enemy. In the unlimited territory at our disposal it would be
possible to withdraw from unfavourable positions. The enemy
would be compelled to keep an enormous amount of men and
material continually on the move, and to exhaust his strength
to a greater extent proportionately than ourselves. There was
also the prospect of tying down strong enemy forces and pro-
tracting the operations indefinitely if — my forecast proved correct.
This was at that time doubtful, but the risk had to be taken.

222

The Last Weeks in German Territory

We did not stay long at Nambindinga ; this place situated on
the plateau had no water and the springs in the valley were within
range of the enemy's guns and machine guns. Under the pro-
tection of patrols, which held back the enemy at Nambindinga,
Headquarters and the main part of the forces arrived at Kitangari
on i8th November. The enemy did not follow, probably he
could not. As had been foreseen, he had strained every nerve
to strike the so long hoped-for knockout blow at Chiwata and
had to re-form before undertaking further operations. At Kitan-
gari the old experience was repeated of finding that the supplies
stored there had been estimated much too highly. The supplies
at all serviceable would, all told, only feed the force for about ten
days ; we could reckon on no appreciable addition to these stores
from the region south of Kitangari. The question in which
direction the march should be continued focussed itself in the
maui on the prospect of again finding the means of adequately
feeding the force. There was no tune to be lost.

I knew that in the area along the Rovuma the English and
Portuguese had systematically destroyed our supplies. Our
small dumps, requisitioning stations and supply columns had
been attacked and the supplies destroyed. The natives had been
influenced against us. The north and south banks of the middle
Rovuma were only thinly populated ; at Tunduru, further up the
Rovuma, strong forces of both sides had been engaged and the
supplies there were probably exhausted. I could get no reliable
information about the Mafia plateau south of the lower Rovuma.
Even if, as many reported, this had been a richly-cultivated
district before the war it was very doubtful whether now, after
strong Portuguese forces had been billeted there for years, there
would be any food left. The most probable place for finding
supplies seemed to me at that time to be the district where Major
Stuemer's operations had taken place : the corner between the
Rovuma and the Ludjenda rivers and further south in the region
of Nangware and Mwembe. Even this was doubtful, for here, too,
war had interfered with the agriculture of the natives. Meanwhile,
of the various improbabilities this last seemed to me the least
improbable, and I decided to march at once up the Rovuma.

223

My Reminiscences of East Africa

A determining factor in the choice of this direction was my wish
to equip my force for a prolonged period of action by a large cap-
ture of ammunition and other war material. Previous observa-
tion and the reports of the natives led me to believe that some-
where near the Rovuma the enemy still possessed large stores.
On 2Oth November we reached Nevale, where we were joined by
the patrols which had secured our southern flank, and the reorgani-
zation of the force was finally carried through. At Nevale the
last men unfit for marching were left behind, and on 2ist
November we marched south to the Rovuma with 300 Europeans,
1,700 Askari, and 3,000 bearers and other natives. Every man
was loaded to his full capacity. In general, as the supplies were
consumed, the bearers no longer required were left behind, so
as to keep the number of consumers as low as possible. In many
cases we had to refuse the urgent requests of our good old bearers
to remain with us, a large number offering to carry on without
pay, some even without either pay or rations ; these were ready
to provide their own rations from what we threw away and Pori
fruit. The quartermaster at that time, Naval Lieutenant
Besch, reorganized the supplies and transport service very
efficiently. He deserves the chief credit for the force's ability to
carry on.

As was to be expected, only small detachments of the enemy
were reported in the neighbourhood of the Rovuma. On 2ist
November we arrived at Mpili, on the bank of the river, and were
about to pitch our camp when several shots passed close to a
hunting party. On reconnoitring we found in front of us a large
pond, on the opposite side of which horses were being watered.
Behind rose a rocky mountain. Soon afterwards a native,
apparently a spy, appeared, bringing a written message : " We
are English cavalry, and we want to get into touch with Portu-
guese infantry regiments." Whether this was a ruse could not
be ascertained. It was clear that for the moment we had only
to do with a small squadron of cavalry. By a sharp attack the
enemy was soon routed and in the pursuit sustained several
casualties : five European prisoners belonging to the loth South
African Mounted Infantry were, for reasons of supply, sent back

224

Native Types (3).
(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Yorbeck's Adjutant.)

[To fact p. 224.

Native Types (4).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

The Last Weeks in German Territory

to the enemy. The captured horses were welcome as chargers
and as a possible addition to our rations.

The rest of the march up the Rovuma progressed very slowly.
A great part of the force were unaccustomed to long route-
marches. The columns straggled endlessly. The Askari women
followed singly, several hundred yards apart. It was some time
before they learned to keep to a regular marching order. In-
cidentally it became obvious that in some companies the Askari
who had come with us had not been selected from the most suit-
able point of view. In the reorganization of the companies
which had had to be carried out during the fighting, many good
and reliable men had been left behind, and replaced by others,
stronger perhaps, but less reliable. Many went into battle with
their children on their shoulders ; it would have been better to
choose an equally reliable man who was not burdened by having
to drag about a wife and family.

But it was too late now to alter anything.

Apparently we had quite got outside the enemy's range of
observation. The aircraft which usually followed our marches
were absent and no bombs fell on our camps. Once an enemy
supply column crossed the Rovuma right into our camp. It
was a welcome capture. Of grain we found practically none
in this district, but on the other hand, we shot plenty of game.
Several buffaloes and quite a number of antelopes, particularly
Wasserbok, fell to our guns. But we dared not delay ; our
shrinking supplies urged us continually forward. Fortunately
I had with me a few Europeans who knew the country, and
who, shortly before, had been working near the confluence of
the Ludjenda and the Rovuma. In peace time a Portuguese
station had been situated there, and even in war a more or less
strong garrison had been reported there. It might be assumed
that even now we should find some traces of the enemy. The
few natives we came across even spoke of a stronger garrison,
amounting to two thousand English or Portuguese. The natives'
figures could not, of course, be relied on, but they strengthened
my belief that in the neighbourhood of Ngomano something
might be done.

225 15

PART III

FIGHTING ON FOREIGN SOIL
(From the Crossing into Portuguese East Africa to the Armistice)

15*

CHAPTER I

ACROSS THE ROVUMA

ARLY in the morning of November 25th, 1917, our advance
guard waded across the Rovuma, a little above the
Ludjenda confluence ; the main force of nine companies followed
in the course of the forenoon, the rearguard about two days'
march in the rear. Captain Goering with three companies had
crossed much further downstream to surprise a Portuguese
camp reported there. We had no news of Captain Tafel, and
I thought it probable that he would strike the Rovuma much
further west.

The feeling that we were cut off from all support, as well as
the absolute uncertainty as to the fate before us, had produced
what is popularly known as " allgemeine Wurcktigkeit "
(absolute callousness). Undisturbed by the tactical situation,
our hunting parties went on with their work, and their shots
were, as afterwards transpired, distinctly heard by the enemy.

While crossing the river, many took a careful bath in full view
of the enemy ; in many cases it required some effort to make
clear the requirements of the state of war.

On the south bank we soon came under fire. The company
acting as advance guard came upon enemy scouts, several of
whom were killed. I employed the next few hours, while the
troops gradually came up and covered the crossing of the rest,
to reconnoitre. Not far from our front, on the far bank of the
Ludjenda river, signals could be heard and men could be seen.
We came close to the enemy camp and saw men in white suits
moving about, a few hundred yards away. Others were build-
ing earthworks and a transport column was also observed.
The troops were certainly in great force.

229

My Reminiscences of East Africa

While I was still considering whether, and in what way, a
prospect of attack offered, a column of Askari in khaki advanced
from the camp towards our troops. About a company of the
enemy left the camp. Guessing that the enemy was wisely about
to attack our troops with all his force while they were still
occupied in crossing the river, I ran back quickly and ordered
those of our companies who had crossed first to put themselves
in a defensive position. The favourable opportunity I had
hoped for did not, however, materialize : the enemy did not
come. Thus I was again faced with the question what to do.
I was doubtful whether, in view of our large numbers of bearers,
it would not be more expedient to march past the enemy stationed
here at Ngomano and advance further up the Ludjenda river.
Either the enemy would not hinder us, or, if he did, he would
have to emerge from his entrenched positions and make up his
mind for a difficult attack.

On the other hand, it was not unlikely that an attack by us
on the enemy camp would be successful, for its defences were
not yet especially strong. Reconnaissance had established
that on the far bank of the Ludjenda river a belt of thick wood
led right up to the camp and offered the opportunity of sur-
prising the enemy here in strength, and bringing off a decisive
attack. I had not yet fully made up my mind when Captain
Miiller decided me to take that one of the two decisions which,
though very risky, offered a prospect of the long awaited decisive
success and the capture of ammunition and war material which
had become an urgent necessity. No time was to be lost.

The attack was, therefore, made while part of the force was still
crossing the river. While our light mountain-gun fired on the
enemy's entrenchments from the west, and while at the same
time several companies engaged the enemy on this side as
also from the north, Captain Koehl's detachment crossed the
Ludjenda half a mile above Ngomano, marched through the high
wood on that bank and made a determined attack on the enemy's
camp from the south. I took up my position on a little hill
west of the camp, near our guns. Immediately behind me the
last company of General Wahle's force to cross the river was

230

Across the Rovuma

advancing along a valley. In front I had a fairly good view
of the enemy's entrenched positions. The enemy's machine guns
were not shooting badly, and their fire was at times directed upon
our little sand hill, from which I had to send into cover a number
of Europeans and Askari, who had collected there immediately
and were visible to the enemy. The clear ring of the enemy
rifles, which we had heard before, and the absence of trench-
mortars, made it probable that the enemy were Portuguese.
We had already learned to distinguish clearly between the dull,
full detonation of our '71, the sharp crack of our S-rifle, the double
report of the English rifle and the clear ring of the Portuguese
rifle of a little over 6 mm. calibre. Even our Askari had noticed
at once that in short skirmishes the speed with which the enemy
trench-mortars always got the range of our positions had been
very harassing.

Our '71 rifles threw up so much smoke that it was impossible
to guard against this. To-day, however, there were no mine-
throwers, and the treacherous smoke of our good old rifles was
not so bad. On the other hand, when they did hit their target
they made a very considerable hole. Our Askari soon realized
that to-day they were able to bring their soldierly superiority
to bear without being handicapped by inferior weapons. " To-
day is the day of the old rifles ! " they shouted to the German
leaders, and from my hill I soon saw the firing line of Koehl's
detachment storm the enemy's entrenchments at the double
and capture them.

This was the signal for attack on the other fronts also. From
all sides they charged the enemy, who was badly shaken by the
concentrated fire. Scarcely more than 200 of the enemy force,
about 1,000 strong, can have survived. Again and again our
Askari troops, in search of booty, threw themselves ruthlessly
upon the enemy, who was still firing ; in addition, a crowd of
bearers and boys, grasping the situation, had quickly run up
and were taking their choice of the pots of lard and other supplies,
opening cases of jam and throwing them away again when they
thought they had found something more attractive in other
cases. It was a fearful melee. Even the Portuguese Askari

231

My Reminiscences of East Africa

already taken prisoner, joined in the plunder of their own stores.
There was no alternative but to intervene vigorously. I became
very eloquent, and, to make an example, dashed at least seven
times at one bearer I knew, but each time he got away and
immediately joined in the looting somewhere else. At last I
succeeded in restoring discipline.

We buried about 200 enemy dead, and about 150 European
prisoners were released after taking an oath not to fight again
during this war against Germany or her Allies ; several hundred
Askari were taken prisoner. Valuable medical stores, so
necessary to us, and, as a result of the Portuguese experience of
centuries of colonial campaigning, of excellent quality, were
captured, as well as several thousand kilos of European supplies,
large numbers of rifles, six machine-guns and about thirty horses.
Unfortunately we captured no native supplies. Almost half of
our force was re-armed this time with Portuguese rifles ; and
a plentiful supply of ammunition was served out. A quarter
of a million rounds of ammunition were captured, and this number
was increased in the course of December to nearly a million.
From captured dispatches we learned that the Portuguese-
European companies had only reached Ngomano a few days
before, in order to carry out the impossible English order to
prevent a German crossing of the Rovuma. It was really a
perfect miracle that these troops should have arrived so oppor-
tunely as to make the capture of the place so profitable to us.
With one blow we had freed ourselves of a great part of our
difficulties.

But yet another serious difficulty arose, which drove us
remorselessly on. This was the necessity of procuring food for
our large numbers of natives. Accordingly we advanced up the
Ludjenda river. Day after day our patrols searched for native
guides and supplies. During the next few days, however, they
had little success. The natives, never numerous in this district,
had fled before the advance of the Portuguese, fearing their
ruthlessness and cruelty, and had hidden what stores they pos-
sessed. One after another, mules and horses found their way
into our stew-pots. Fortunately this district is very rich in

232

Across the Rovuma

game, and the hunter can always shoot one of the numerous
antelopes or guinea-fowl.

Though at first our marching columns were too long and
straggling, here again practice made perfect. Bearers, boys,
women and children, soon learned to keep pace and distance
as exactly as the Askari. Regularly and in good order, the
expedition wound along the narrow native paths, and even
through the thick bush, into the unknown land. Half an hour's
halt was called after every two hours' march ; the rule was six
hours' march a day, i.e., about fifteen to twenty miles, and this
was often exceeded. The force was for the most part divided
into detachments of three companies, each with one supply
train and one field hospital. The advance detachment was a
day's march ahead of the main body, the last a day's march
behind. At the head of each detachment marched the fighting
companies with their machine guns ; they had with them only
the necessary ammunition and medical stores, and each European
was allowed one load of necessities. The Askari marched gaily
forward, straight as lances, and with their guns reversed over
their shoulders, as has always been the custom in the rifle regi-
ments. Lively conversation was kept up, and after the plunder-
ing of an enemy camp, which often yielded rich booty, cigarette
smoke rose on all sides. The little signal recruits strode bravely
forward, half-grown youths in Askari uniform for the most
part, carrying all their worldly goods in a bundle on their heads.
The Askari would call out their friendly, " Jambo Bwana Obao,"
or " Jambo Bwana Generals " (" Good-day, Colonel "), or a little
signalman would express his hope of coming some day to Uleia
(Europe) and Berlin. " Then the Kaiser will say to me, ' Good-
day, my son,' and I shall give him an exhibition of signalling.
Then he will give me roast meat and present me to the Empress.
The Empress will say, ' Good-day, my child,' and will give me
cakes and show me the shop- windows." During all their talk
the Askari kept a sharp look-out, and no movement in the thick
bush escaped their lynx eyes.

The head of the column investigated every trail, and from it
gave the number and the distance of the enemy. Equally

233

My Reminiscences of East Africa

soldierly were the machine-gun bearers, mostly strapping
Waniamwezi and Wazukuma. The companies and detachments
were followed by bearers with the loads of supplies, baggage,
camp-kit and stretcher cases. The loads, about 25 kg., were
carried alternately on the head and shoulders. The endurance
of these men is enormous. They became more and more attached
to the troops. If ever the supplies were short and the hunting
parties unsuccessful, they would say, " Haiswu'b (it doesn't
matter), we wait, get some another time." Many marched
barefoot and often got thorns in their feet. Often one would
promptly take his knife and calmly cut out a piece of flesh from
the wounded foot. Then he would start off again. The bearers
were followed by the women and the Bibi. Many Askari had
their wives and children with them in the field, and many children
were born during the march. Each woman carried her own
Mali (property), as well as that of her lord, on her head. Often
they carried on their backs a small child, his woolly head peeping
out of the cloth in which he was wound. The women were kept
in order and protected by a European or a trustworthy old non-
commissioned officer, assisted by a few Askari. They all liked
gay colours, and after an important capture, the whole convoy
stretching several miles would look like a carnival procession.

Even during the march the obtaining of supplies had to be
attended to. Hunting patrols marched ahead of the column or
on the flanks in the bush. Often they would remain behind near
the old camping sites, where game or traces of game had been
observed. Other patrols followed human tracks leading to
settlements to requisition supplies. On arriving at the camping-
ground, four Askari and my boy Serubiti would cut down
branches and erect a frame for the tent sections or for a grass-
hut. Sometimes a raised bivouac of branches was arranged
and covered with grass. Soon afterwards the bearded Baba,
my cook, would arrive and give careful directions for the
arrangement of the kitchen. The bearers would come and
fetch water, cut grass and firewood with their bush knives.
The hunting patrols brought in what they had shot, and soon
the smell of cooking rose from the camp-fires on all sides. Mean-

234

Across the^Rovuma

while, parties of bearers had been threshing in the villages, and
brought back corn. In the Kinos (thick wooden vessels) the
corn was crushed by beating it with thick clubs, the dull thuds
sounding far into the bush. Messages, reconnaissance reports,
and captured dispatches were brought in ; a box hi a shady spot
served as a desk. During the longer halts a table was built of
branches. The evening meal was eaten in company with friends
round the camp fire, the boys bringing cases to sit on. The more
lordly had deck-chairs. Then to bed under the mosquito-nets,
and in the early morning once more into the unknown. Should
we find supplies, and could we make what we had last out
until we did ? These uncertainties cropped up every day afresh,
and haunted us week after week and month after month. The
eternal marching was, as will be understood, no mere pleasure.

At I heard some remarks about myself, such as : " Still

further ? The fellow must come from a family of country
postmen ! "

When we reached the confluence of the Chiulezi, difficulties of
supplies had become so serious, and the district hitherto regarded
as fertile had so greatly altered, that I dropped my original
intention of keeping the force together. For the moment it
seemed impossible, from the tactical point of view also. From
the English, who were probably following us, we need not expect
any strong pressure, owing to the daily lengthening of their
line of communication and the consequent difficulty of bringing
up supplies.

A written message from the British Commander-in-Chief,
General van Deventer, in which he summoned me to surrender,
was brought under protection of the white flag, and strengthened
me in my belief that our escape had taken him by surprise, and
that our invasion of Portuguese territory had put him at a loss.
Neither he nor General Smuts had ever thought of sending a
summons to surrender when the situation was favourable to
the English. Why should they do so in a situation like the
present, or that of September, 1916, at Kissaki, which was
undoubtedly favourable to us ? Only because they were at
their wits' end. That was indeed not difficult to see through.

235

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The time before the setting in of the rainy season, at the end
of December, was too short to prepare for a fresh operation,
and after the rains had begun the enemy transport of supplies,
which depended largely on motors, would be faced with new
difficulties.

We had, therefore, plenty of time, and could divide ourselves
into several columns without hesitation. We had nothing to
fear from temporary loss of touch one with the other. Accord-
ingly General Wahle's detachment was separated from the rest,
and marched through the Mkula mountains, while I marched
further up the Ludjenda.

The surrender of Captain Tafel, which I learned from General
van Deventer's message, came as a severe and unexpected blow.

Captain Tafel had taken over the command at Mahenge from
General Wahle, when the latter left to take over the forces on
the Lindi front. He secured the fertile region of Mahenge
to the north, with Commander Schoenfeldt's detachment of a
few companies. The latter succeeded in holding his ground
with his weak force by skilful use of his 10.5 gun from the
Konigsberg, and put his force in a very favourable position
materially by the cultivation of gardens and, fields.

On the middle Ruhudje was a weak detachment under Captain
Aumann, and north-east of Ssongea Captain Lincke's detachment
near Likuju. The latter engaged the enemy repeatedly, and in
the barren district suffered from lack of supplies. They therefore
gradually retired north to Mponda. There they were reinforced
by two companies and one gun from the main force. Captain
Otto took over the command. In August, 1917, strong English
and Belgian forces converged on Mahenge ; Captain Tafel had
foreseen this, and withdrawn his supplies out of the Mahenge
district to Mgangira. On September nth, Mahenge was evacu-
ated. Even though the individual engagements were often
successful, the superiority of the enemy made itself seriously
felt, and the shortage of ammunition handicapped more and
more the Askari companies, mostly armed with the smoky
'71 rifle.

I learned later through Captain Otto, who had fought his way

236

Across the Rovuma

through to me with one of Captain Tafel's patrols and joined me

at , that Captain Tafel, from west of Livale, had marched

south in three columns, and on the upper Mbemkuru had fought
several partially successful actions, capturing large quantities
of ammunition. He had then marched further south to the
Bangala river, and turned east when he thought he was near
Massassi. South of this place he heard from the natives that
the Germans had not been fighting north of Rovuma for several
days. Captain Tafel turned towards the Rovuma and crossed
near the Nangala confluence, hoping to find supplies on the
south bank. His own were literally exhausted. He found
nothing and had no idea that about a day's march from him
Goering's detachment of my force had captured the Portuguese
camp and found enough food on the prosperous farms to enable
them to live well for fourteen days. Captain Tafel therefore
returned to the north bank of the Rovuma and surrendered to
the enemy.

The news of Captain Tafel's surrender strengthened my
reluctance to detach another part of my force, though, in view
of my proximity, the junction at which we were both aiming
had as nearly as possible been effected. I was straightway put
upon the rack by the cessation of news from Goering's detach-
ment with which, while it was at Ngomano, we had kept touch
by means of patrols. During the march up the Ludjenda,
when we had to keep the different detachments and companies
further apart, in order to facilitate the search for food, it was
necessary to impress upon subordinate leaders the importance
of keeping the whole force in touch. It was, however, not to
be expected that these officers, who later performed such excellent
work as leaders of detachments, and worked so successfully in
co-operation with the rest, should possess the necessary training
from the beginning. The Governor had remained with the
force even after leaving the Protectorate, hi accordance with the
regulation (certainly not intended to provide for war with a
European power) that he was the military head of the Pro-
tectorate. He had interpreted this authority in such a way as
to interfere most seriously with that of the Commander-in-Chief,

237

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and had often encroached upon my sphere of activity. I had
been powerless to prevent this, and now that we were outside
the Protectorate I attached the greatest importance to the fact
that now, at any rate, I had a free hand. Even if I did not
yield to the Governor's claims, it must be understood that in the
unprecedented military situation there were enough differences
of opinion to overburden the Commander-in-Chief, who, what-
ever happens, is held actually, if not morally, responsible.

It was perhaps natural that at this time I was not always
very gentle and considerate to those around me. So it happened
that those very officers of my Staff who were working with the
greatest devotion to the cause and deserved the most recog-
nition, were the objects of much unjustified reproach. For not
taking offence or allowing this to prejudice the cheerful con-
tinuation of their work, they deserve particular gratitude. It is
largely to the work of these officers, often carried out under
adverse circumstances, that are due the successes which the
public is so generously inclined to place wholly to my credit.
For me, who have always delighted in the good comradeship
characteristic of our officer corps, this general atmosphere of
snarling and fault-finding was naturally not ideal. Fortunately,
however, it was only a passing phase.

Our position was now such that hi case of an encounter with
the enemy we could not investigate his strength. We had no
time for prolonged reconnaissance. Perhaps this conviction,
together with the determination with which we attacked the
Portuguese forces whenever we met them, accounts for the
fact that, during December, three more Portuguese fortified
positions were taken in quick succession. Of decisive impor-
tance in these enterprises was the personality of the officer
in command who first engaged the enemy. He must lose no
time, and so could not wait for orders. On the 2nd November,
Lieutenant Kempner, commanding the nth Company, which
was acting as advance-guard in the march up the Ludjenda,
came upon a fortified Portuguese camp at Nangwale. Like
most Portuguese camps, it lay on a bare hill, with a wide range
of fire. The brave nth Company at once deployed along the

238

Across the Rovuma

edge of the bush, and advanced to the attack across three hundred
metres of open ground exposed to the enemy's fire. The
Askari, who were carrying full marching kit, could not keep
up with the company commander and his Effendi (black officer).
Lieutenant Kempner and the Effendi leapt upon the enemy's
breastwork, and from there into the enemy's entrenchments,
and so for a time found themselves alone among the enemy
garrison, consisting of a platoon. The latter were so dumb-
founded that, hearing the cheers of the oncoming Askari, they
at once obeyed the order to lay down their arms. In addition,
a considerable ammunition dump fell into our hands, as well as
enough rations to feed our whole force for several days. When
the Portuguese officer invited Lieutenant Kempner to a glass of
special brandy and found the bottle empty, its owner had further
reason for being taken aback, but with the difference this time
that his enemy was taken aback equally. An Ombascha (black
lance-corporal) had the best of the joke.

I was filled with grave anxiety about the fate of Captain
Goering, of whom I had received no news. From General
Wahle's force, which had marched up the Chiulezi river, we
heard subsequently that they had attacked and annihilated a
force of several Portuguese companies in a strongly entrenched
position in the Mkula mountains. The repeated attempts to
establish communication with Wahle's force by means of the
heliograph did not succeed, although the Portuguese hi the
Mkula mountains had clearly observed our signals from Nang-
wale. The Portuguese Europeans captured by our detachment
had refused to give their word not to fight against us again in
this war. They had been sent north to the Rovuma by General
Wahle owing to the difficulty of feeding them.

Captain Stemmermann succeeded, after several days' siege, in
capturing another very strongly held and vigorously defended
fortified position. As the storming of this offered no prospects
of success, the enemy's water supply was cut off, which made
his position in the trenches untenable, and forced him to sur-
render. Among our casualties, unfortunately, were a number
of very good native non-commissioned officers. I was not

239

My Reminiscences of East Africa

present at the fighting at Nangwale, as I was occupied in dealing
with delays in the rear companies and arranging that the march
should be kept up to the intended standard. By a doub.le day's
march I easily made up for the delay this had caused me, and
arrived in Nangwale in time to superintend the division of the
captured stores. In the most favourable circumstances we
were only living from hand to mouth. At Nangwale, where six
months before our troops had found such a rich neighbourhood,
the position was now quite different. Apart from the captured
stores there was absolutely nothing ; even the game in a con-
siderable area round Nangwale had been shot or frightened
away. This was a disappointment, for I had hoped at this
place to be freed from the more ordinary difficulties of supplies.
The force had, therefore, to be split up. From the information
of the prisoners and captured documents it appeared that the
garrison in Nangwale had been fed by columns of bearers from
the distant neighbourhood of Mwalis. There must, then, be
something to be found there.

On 5th December Captain Koehl, with five companies, a gun
and an ammunition column, left Nangwale to march to the
Mwalia-Medo district. I myself continued the march up the
Ludjenda. Fortunately the assurance of Lieutenant von
Scherbening and other Europeans, who had already patrolled
this district, that we should soon come into a region rich in
supplies was confirmed. These supplies, however, were not
excessive, and we were very glad that they could be largely
supplemented by hunting. The enormous numbers of hippo-
potami which lived in the river above Nangwale, often in large
herds of from fifteen to twenty, had become quite a staple dish.
I myself could not resist having a shot at a huge bull ; the animal
sank at once, the water above it swirling as over a sinking ship.
After a time it came to the surface again, feet uppermost, and
made little further movement. The animal was then drawn to
the bank with a rope. The numerous crocodiles made us cautious,
and many a good prize had to be left from fear of these. The
flesh of the hippopotamus tastes like coarse beef; the tongue,
however, is particularly delicate. The most valuable product,

240

Across the Rovuma

however, is the excellent lard which the men had very quickly
learnt to prepare. Its snow-white, appetizing appearance now
was quite different from the dirty yellow of the first attempts
on the Rufiji. On my many reconnoitring and hunting expedi-
tions into the bush the Askari, who came with me and the bearers
to carry the spoils of the chase, gradually revealed some of the
secrets of the bush. We had long ago learned to make excellent
spinach from different foliage plants (called Mlenda) ; now
they showed me many different kinds of excellent wild fruit.
We also learnt that the kernel of the Mbinji-fruit, the pulp of
which I already knew contains prussic acid, is quite free from
acid, and when roasted makes an exceptionally delicate dish,
tasting like our hazel-nut.

On the iyth December, 1917, Headquarters arrived at Chir-
umba (Mtarika). Lieutenant von Ruckteschell, with his com-
pany, had gone on ahead and had soon driven off the weak Portu-
guese outposts. This was a station of the Portuguese Nyassa
company ; this merchant company also administered the northern
part of the colony. Further south, too, the administration is
in the hands of other private companies. The Portuguese
official in Chirumba, called Fernandez, seems to have been very
capable. The massive buildings of his station, situated at the
top of a bare eminence, were spotlessly clean. A trench ensured
it against surprise. Beautiful gardens with fruit and vegetables
stretched along the bank of the adjacent Ludjenda river. Avenues
of mulberry and mango trees fringed the carefully laid-out roads.
Many species of this mango fruit, known to the natives as Emben,
were to be found in the station and the neighbouring native
villages. It was already beginning to ripen and was so plentiful
that it was found worth while to have the fruit systematically
gathered. The waste to which the natives are generally prone
was prevented as far as possible. The beautiful, sweet fruit
was enjoyed by all the Europeans and a great part of the natives,
and, hi view of the shortage of sugar, for weeks provided a really
valuable addition to the supplies. When, on my arrival at
Chirumba, I stepped on to the veranda of the European house,
Lieutenant Ruckteschell set before me some hog's lard, which

241 1 6

My Reminiscences of East Africa

I had not seen for a long time. Here, as at many other Portu-
guese stations, there had been European pigs.

We remained here for several weeks. One detachment moved
further upstream and took possession of the small station of
Luambala. At the same time General Wahle marched to the
prosperous station of Mwemba, already known to us. The
richly-cultivated triangle Chirumba-Luambala-Mwemba and
beyond the frontier was patrolled by our requisitioning and
reconnaissance patrols. The natives of this district showed
themselves for the most part intelligent and friendly ; they
already knew that they had nothing to fear from the German
troops. In spite of that they had hidden their stores of food
in the bush and would let us have little or nothing. Our men
had, however, long since learned to examine closely, for example,
a suspicious-looking tree stump, and often found that it had been
put together by hand and was the hiding place for stocks of
food. Others would drive their sticks into the hollow ground
of a freshly laid-out garden and found stores of grain buried there.
In short, many such hiding-places were found, and when, at
Christmas, we sat down to dinner in a large grass-hut, we were
relieved of the most pressing shortage of food. According to
the descriptions of our men the Ludjenda river was, during several
months of the year, so full of fish that they could be pulled out
in basketfuls. Oddly enough, on this occasion only very few
were caught. Most of them were sheat-fish, about eighteen
inches long, and smaller fish which were best fried crisp. These,
too, contributed their modest share towards the improvement
of the rations.

Touch was kept with Koehl's detachment in the neighbour-
hood of Medo by means of a system of relays. I thought it
probable that the enemy, following his usual tactics, was pre-
paring a great concentric movement against us which would not
be ready for at least a month. We could thus rely on there
being no considerable enemy activity until after the rains, which
would end at the end of February. About this time I intended
to concentrate my forces in the neighbourhood of Nanungu.
Until then we must husband our supplies in this area and live

242

Across the Rovuma

as far as possible on what could be obtained in the outer fringe
of our present locality. At first there was not much game
shot at Chirumba, but the bag increased when we found con-
siderable herds of antelopes on the east bank of the Ludjenda,
and particularly further upstream. During the remainder of
the dry season, while the river was low, caravans of bearers were
continually crossing the river by several fords, carrying their
loads to the dumps on the east bank. As well as the fords,
canoes made from hollowed tree-trunks were used for crossing.
Patrols were sent out for weeks at a time to collect supplies
and reconnoitre. Lieutenant von Scherbening, with his patrol,
made an expedition lasting months, marching from Chirumba
via Mtenda, Mahua and finally south, via the Lurio river, then
up the Malema, where they surprised the Portuguese Boma
Malema. An Italian, who had been hunting elephants on the
Ludjenda and had joined us in a ragged, starving condition,
accompanied Lieutenant von Scherbening's patrol. The man's
health was, however, so undermined by lingering malaria and his
spleen so terribly swollen that he had to be carried from Mahua
to a plantation near Malacotera.

At the beginning of January, 1918, the English began to move.
From the south-east corner of Lake Nyassa two battalions —
the ist and 2nd King's African Rifles — began to advance towards
Captain Goering's detachment, which had joined up with us
and occupied the acute angle between the Luhambala and
Ludjenda rivers. He was covering the supply stores further up
the Ludjenda. On gth January, in the forenoon, a detachment of
the enemy, attacking unsupported, was defeated. When, in
the afternoon, the enemy returned to the attack after the arrival
of his reinforcements, and at the same time an enemy force pressed
forward in a northerly direction toward the supply dumps on
the east bank, Captain Goering crossed to the east bank with
the main part of his force. Only a strong patrol was left in the
old camp on the west bank, and they held the enemy in check.
At the same time an enemy force — the 2nd Cape Corps of South
African half-breeds was identified — was advancing on Mwembe.

Then began innumerable small skirmishes and patrol actions,

243 i 6*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

which often put us in an awkward position, owing to our inability
to protect the bearers bringing up supplies. The English cleverly
took advantage of these difficulties to try to undermine the
loyalty of our Askari. Many were very war-weary. Added
to this, "there was in many cases the feeling of uncertainty as to
where the campaign was going to lead them. The great majority
of black men cling to their homes and their relations. They
said to themselves : " If we go further we shall come into country
we don't know. We can find our way back from where we are
now, but soon we shan't be able to." The English propaganda,
by word of mouth and pamphlets, fell in many cases on fruitful
ground, and, as a result, a number of good Askari and even older
non-commissioned officers deserted. Small annoyances, such
as are bound to arise — the persuasion of the women and so on-
all contributed to their decision to desert. One old sol (native
sergeant-major) suddenly disappeared, who had led a brilliant in-
dependent patrol and had brought a strong detachment of bearers
with their loads right through the enemy lines, and for his good
service had been promoted to " Effendi." He, too, had deserted.
The impulsiveness of the black makes him very sensitive to
insinuation. But even if the English Colonel can boast of having
lowered the moral of certain elements, this was only a passing
phase. The old lust of battle and the old loyalty returned,
even among those who had begun to hang their heads. The
example of the faithful Askari, who simply laughed at the moun-
tains of gold the English promised them if they would desert,
won the day. In so long and trying a campaign the moral
was bound to be low from time to time. It was no use to be
astonished and discouraged, the important thing was to fight
against it firmly, and for this the loyal elements, of which there
were many, both among Europeans, Askari and bearers, had
firmly made up their minds.

244

CHAPTER II

EAST OF THE LUDJENDA

THE patrol of Captain Otto, who had been sent from Captain
Tafel to me after the latter's surrender, and gave me
details about the events leading up to it, had arrived at Chirumba.
Captain Otto, with two additional companies, now marched to
Luambala and took over the command also of Goering's detach-
ment (three companies). As was expected, the main pressure
of the enemy was felt at Luambala, as also on the east bank of
the Ludjenda. It was clear that if the enemy advanced down-
stream my position at Chirumba on the west bank of the river,
in a district where the supplies were being gradually exhausted,
and with the river swollen by the rains in my rear, was extremely
unfavourable.

It was necessary to evacuate this position and to move my
force, while there was tune, to the east bank of the Ludjenda.
Unfortunately the fords were impassable, owing to the height of
the river, so that the whole crossing had to be effected by means
of the three canoes available.

Gradually, and without interference, the companies were
transferred to the east bank. The supply question was beginning
to become very serious. Fortunately Captain Koehl, who, in
the neighbourhood of Medo and Xamunu, had kept the very
intelligent natives to the cultivation of the quickly ripening
grain, reported that a good harvest could be relied on as early
as the middle of February. But that was not for another month,
so we should have to try by every possible means to hold out a
bit longer at Chirumba. Welcome as the manna to the children
of Israel, the fungi which shoot up at this season helped to keep
us from starvation. I had already in Germany interested

245

My Reminiscences of East Africa

myself in mycology, and soon found fungi closely related to our
German species of mushrooms and yellow boleta and others, in
the African bush. I had often gathered basketfuls in a very
short time, and even though an excessive diet of mushrooms is
indigestible and not very sustaining, they were a considerable
help.

In torrential rain we marched east. The usually dry ravines
had become raging torrents. Trees, felled hi such a way as to
fall over the stream, formed bridges, a hand-rail being improvised
from poles or bark lashed together. The mule I was riding on
account of fever — I am apparently very sensitive to malaria,
from which I suffered a great deal — as well as the few other
riding animals that had not found their way into the cooking-
pot swam across. When we arrived at the camping ground my
men soon built me, on account of the damp, a raised shelter
of branches over which both my tent-cloths were laid as a roof.
Veterinary Surgeon Huber, who was responsible for the material
welfare of the staff, and under him our capable black cook, old
bearded Baba, at once got to work and, no matter how wet
the wood, we were always able in a short time to sit down to our
meal beside the camp-fire. Dr. Huber often managed even to
have a grass roof erected for our protection.

On sunny days tobacco was eagerly dried and cut. The
efficient Quartermaster-Lieutenant Besch, who was full of resource
where the comfort of the men was concerned, had thought of this
and had collected very good tobacco from the natives. But
in spite of everything the deprivations were very great and the
insidious whisperings of the enemy, that every native who deserted
should be free to go home and there live in comfort on his own
land, did not always fall on deaf ears. Even the faithful boy
of one of our officers, whom he had served for years, had one
morning disappeared ; probably his Bibi (wife) had had
enough of campaigning.

Captain Otto's detachment marched from Uambala due east
to Mahua, and there, on the Lurio river, found a district rich
in supplies. Goering's detachment, marching from Luambala
across country to Mtende, found considerable supplies on the

246

East of the Ludjenda

way. In this district the harvest was very much earlier than in
German East Africa ; the maize was beginning to ripen and could
to a large extent already be eaten. Headquarters next moved
from Chirumba to Mtende and, some days later, on to Nanungu.
Wahle's detachment, which had followed us from Chirumba
to Mtende, was here cut off by several enemy companies which
appeared unexpectedly on a height on their rear and interrupted
the messenger service and the transport. General Wahle ex-
tricated himself by a detour from this uncomfortable position
and advanced nearer to Headquarters at Nanungu.

At Nanungu we found abundant supplies and we thought it
expedient, as before, to establish requisitioning stations and supply
dumps in the district between Nanungu and Namunu and further
south. There was good shooting, and the natives readily brought
garden produce and honey to exchange for meat or, preferably,
clothing. Very welcome was a delicate sweet, cherry-like Pori
fruit, which ripened in millions in the neighbourhood of Nanungu.
I preferred to have it made into jam. We also occasionally
obtained other dainties, particularly pig-nuts, and the crowing
of cocks proclaimed far and wide that there were fowls and eggs
in the camps and among the natives.

The setting in of the rainy season did not quite coincide with
the forecasts of the natives. There were some sharp downpours,
but in the undulating country the water quickly ran off and
collected in the main artery of that region, the Msalu river, which
was soon swollen so as to form a strong obstacle. Over the
Msalu river the post-service official, Hartmann, who had joined
the force as a Sergeant-Major, had built a pontoon bridge which
connected us with General Wahle's force, which was still on the
west bank. The floating supports of the bridge were boats
made from bark. The necessity in this well-watered country
of being able to cross the swollen rivers without difficulty had
drawn my attention to this question. Hitherto our sole pro-
vision for such contingencies consisted of a few hollowed canoes.
Their continued transport, however, was too difficult and their
capacity too limited. A planter named Gerth, who had joined
us as a volunteer, interested himself particularly in this matter

24?

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and had himself instructed by the natives of the district in the
building of boats from bark. The ensuing experiments soon
produced good results, after which the building of these boats,
which took barely two hours to put together, for crossing rivers
was enthusiastically taken up by every company. Most of these
boats were not used, but they gave us a feeling of security that,
if necessary, even a full stream would not be impassable for our
unwieldy caravans and baggage.

When we became better acquainted with the neighbourhood,
we found fords over the Msalu which could be used even when the
river was in flood. Our patrols, in charge of Sergeant Valett
and others, left our fortified camp at Nanungu, crossed the river
which formed the boundary of our camp on the west, and went
to look for the enemy in his camps at Mtenda. One of these
patrols, which was particularly strong and armed with two
machine guns, succeeded in surprising an enemy column west of
Mtenda. Our men, however, did not get away quickly enough
to escape the enemy's covering force and, attacked from all
sides, found themselves in a difficult position. Both machine
guns were lost and the Europeans working them fell. Gradually
the Askari all returned to Nanungu, but the patrol leader, Ser-
geant-Major Musslin, who had got away from the rest during the
march, had fallen into the enemy's hands. Another patrol, with
which Captain Miiller crossed the Msalu to the north, quickly
drove off an English outpost at Lusinje. In the neighbourhood
of Lusinje, also the camp of the English, Lieutenant Wienholt,
who, as has already been mentioned, escaped from arrest and
became one of the best English patrol leaders, was captured.
The natives were thoroughly exploited by the English patrols
and acted as spies for the enemy in return for articles of clothing.
The volunteer, Gerth, who has been mentioned in connection with
boat-building, was attacked and killed by an English patrol
while in the house of a native chief.

In the second half of March, 1918, our spirits were greatly
raised by the news, received by our wireless, of the powerful
German March offensive on the Western front. I laid a wager
with the Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon Taute, that Amiens

248

East of the Ludjenda

would soon fall. I used the period of rest that now set in
for several weeks during the lull in our operations to have my
foot attended to. It had been bitten by a sand-fly, and for the
last six months had caused me inconvenience. These sand-flies,
which infested many of the camps, bore their way into the flesh,
round the edge of the toe-nails, causing painful inflammation. If
care is not taken they attack the flesh round them and, according
to medical opinion, the maiming of the feet frequent among
the natives is very often to be traced to the sand-fly. I, too, was
suffering from this inconvenience, and on the march the inflam-
mation constantly recurred. Fortunately Staff-Surgeon Taute,
using a local anaesthetic, was able to extract the nail.

I was also inconvenienced in another way. On a reconnoitring
expedition a blade of the tall grass, which grows above a man's
height, had pierced my right eye. During the subsequent
treatment it was feared that the use of the lens might be affected
by atropia ; the result was that I could not see properly with
my right eye and was unable to read hand-writing or sketch-maps.
This was very awkward, as my left eye had been so seriously in-
jured by a shot wound received during the Hottentot rebellion
in South-West Africa, that I could only see through it with the
help of spectacles. Suitable spectacles could not, however, be
obtained, and so I was compelled to carry out various enterprises
without being able to see properly.

The patrols of Koehl's detachment in the Medo-Nanungu dis-
trict had meanwhile reached the coast, after taking Portuguese
fortresses on, and far south of, the lower Lurio river, and carrying
off a few guns and, what was more important, rules, ammunition
and considerable supplies. The natives showed themselves very
friendly towards our men, whom they regarded as their deliverers
from Portuguese oppression. Patrols from Otto's detachment
from Mahua had also reconnoitred as far as the region south of
the Lurio. Lieutenant Methner, so experienced in the ways of
the natives, and first refer ant of our government, praised the capa-
city and cleverness of the Portuguese natives and the intelligence
and far-sightedness of their local chiefs.

Lieutenant von Scherbening, who with his patrol had taken

249

My Reminiscences of East Africa

the Boma Malema, reported that this neighbourhood was very
productive. As a specimen he sent us a captured pig to Nanungu.
As it refused to walk it was carried the 500 km. Unfortunately
it turned out eventually not to be a European pig at all, but
a Pori pig, like those we frequently shot in the bush.

Once more a time had come when it was difficult to obtain
news of the enemy, but a good deal could be conjectured from
the incomplete maps at our disposal. I could have no doubt
that the imminent enemy operations would be launched from
the neighbourhood of Port Amelia with their main force from the
coast. The appearance of strong enemy forces at Mtende, as
well as the report, unconfirmed it is true, that troops were on the
march from the south-west towards Mahua, showed me that other
troops from the west were going to co-operate with the approach-
ing attack of the enemy main force. A situation seemed to be
developing in which I could make use of my inner line to attack
one part of the enemy singly. The enemy's position with regard
to reserves and supplies made it obvious that the columns
marching from the west could not be over strong. This seemed
to be the chance I had so long been awaiting. I, therefore,
remained with my main force at Nanungu and also recalled
Captain Otto's detachment from Lurio. With these forces I
intended to assume the offensive in a westerly direction. Captain
Koehl, whose detachment was assembled at Medo, was charged
with the duty of holding up the enemy's main force advancing
from Port Amelia and retiring gradually on my force.

Captain Miiller, who, after years of work at Headquarters, had
taken over an independent detachment of two companies, was
sent on from the neighbourhood of Nanungu to Mahua to harass
the enemy as far as possible. He passed round Mahua and
surprised, south-west of this place, the fortified supply depot of
Kanene. The defending English European troops saw that all
the stores were lost. To prevent this, at least to some extent, they
fell upon the stores of liquor in the camp and were captured in a
thoroughly intoxicated condition.

For myself, I, likewise, advanced in the middle of April in the
direction of Mahua, and during the march could hear from afar

250

East of the Ludjenda

heavy sounds of firing. At Koriwa, north-east of Mahua, Captain
Miiller had attacked an enemy battalion under Colonel Barton,
which had been making a reconnoitring expedition and was at
once attacked by our troops on the march. In spite of the fact
that on our side scarcely 70 rifles took part in the action, our
troops succeeded in enveloping the enemy's right wing, and
from a large ant-hill poured upon him such a vigorous and effec-
tive machine-gun fire that he fled wildly. He lost over 40 men
in this action. Lieutenant-Commander Wunderlich, who had
received a severe wound through the abdomen, had to be taken
to the hospital at Nanungu, two days' march distant, and died
shortly afterwards.

The blow which I had intended to strike with the main force
had already been successfully carried through by Miiller's weak
detachment. I, therefore, turned with my main force to the
district west of Nanungu. A large force of the enemy had
arrived meanwhile on the Msalu river and had crossed it with
several patrols. My calculation that I should be able to surprise
a strong body of the enemy immediately after crossing the river
was not fulfilled : the reports received had been incorrect. How-
ever, in a whole series of minor engagements on the Msalu river
and further west our fighting patrols inflicted, gradually, severe
losses on the enemy and his patrols soon evacuated the east bank
of the Msalu. On 3rd May our supply patrols, whose duty it
was to obtain further supplies from the direction of Mahua, sur-
prised, in the neighbourhood of Saidi, strong enemy detachments
which were seriously threatening our field hospital and supply
depots at Makoti.

Part of our stores had been brought to Makoti in readiness for
the operations planned to be carried out further west. Our
fighting patrols, which were sent out immediately, had several
encounters with the enemy near the Kireka mountain at Makoti.
I thought at first that these were only enemy patrols, so sent
Captain Schulz there with a strong patrol as a reinforcement,
and myself marched on the 4th of May, with the main body, to
the Nanungu-Mahua road. From here I expected to be able
to carry out a swift attack on the enemy forces, which were trying

251

My Reminiscences of East Africa

to surprise us somewhere in this neighbourhood. The general
situation was made clear when it was known that patrols had,
in the course of the day, encountered a new enemy near the
Kireka mountain. An enemy detachment had been thrown
back and it was probable that strong forces were in entrenched
positions in the rear. In the morning of the 5th May I marched
from my camp to Makoti. During the march I hoped sincerely
that the enemy would spare us the necessity of making the attack
on his fortified positions and that, as in view of the general situa-
tion was not improbable, he would emerge from his entrench-
ments and offer battle in the open. If this happened, and we
succeeded in attacking with our main force before the
enemy was aware of our arrival, a considerable success was
probable.

At eleven o'clock in the forenoon I arrived at the Kireka
mountain and went on ahead to see Captain Schulz who, with
his patrol, had occupied some rocky grottos in the copse. As
soon as I had arrived a sol (native Sergeant-Major), who had just
returned from a patrol expedition, reported that the enemy was
advancing in great force and must soon appear at close quarters.
I passed on this report to Lieutenant Boell, who had just brought
up his company in the rear of Schulz's detachment, and instructed
him to go up at once in case of an enemy attack. I then went
back and ordered the advance of our companies which were
gradually arriving. Meanwhile the fighting in front began.
The enemy, advancing in close order, had quickly thrown back
our patrols out of the grottos, but had then been completely
taken by surprise by the effective machine-gun fire of Boell's
company and partially driven back. Goering's detachment,
coming up at that moment, began an enveloping movement
on the right, completely surprising the enemy, who was rapidly
driven back with very heavy losses.

After several miles of hot pursuit we reached the enemy's
entrenchments. On our left wing, where two more companies
had been sent into action, the fight wavered, and it was difficult
for me in the thick bush to distinguish friend and foe. It was,
therefore, some time before I could get a clear idea of the situa-

252

East of the Ludjenda

tion on the left wing, and it was not until I received a report
from Major Kraut, whom I had sent to investigate, that I realized
that, in advancing, our left wing had come under a withering
enemy fire in a clearing which had brought it to a standstill.
A counter-attack by the enemy, which had brought him very near
to the position of our Headquarters, looked very dangerous.
Fortunately for us, however, just at this moment Lieutenant
Buechsel, whose company had been detached from the main
force and so arrived late, came upon the scene of action and was
able to avert the danger.

Meanwhile, on the right wing, Captain Goering had realized
that a frontal attack on the enemy entrenchment offered no
prospect of success. He had, therefore, sent Lieutenant Meier
with a strong patrol round the enemy's position to fire on the
enemy mine-thrower from the rear and if possible to capture it.
This capture was not brought off, for the enemy had at his dis-
posal unexpected reserves which were able to keep Meier's patrol
at a distance.

The action thus came to a standstill. When it had grown
quite dark we were close in front of the enemy. Shots were
still being exchanged from both sides, but only occasionally.
The clerical work — even in Africa there was writing to be done,
though not as much as is usually the case — was postponed
during the fighting. A number of charges and other tiresome
details had to be written up. I was aole from time to time to
talk personally with the company leaders, and called them
together for this purpose. I changed my own position as little
as possible to avoid difficulties and annoying delays in the dis-
patch and receipt of messages. A meal was cooked further in
the rear, where the dressing station had also been established.
We at Headquarters had our meal prepared as usual by our black
servants, who brought it up to the firing-line.

In order to get the force in hand ready for further action,
some parts of it were withdrawn from the front line and mustered.
I came to the conclusion that it would be expedient to remain
where we were for the night, to be in readiness to renew the
action on the following day, and especially to cut the enemy off

253

My Reminiscences of East Africa

from his water-supply, which must be somewhere outside the
camp.

About midnight it was reported that one of our patrols had
encountered a strong enemy force on the Nanungu-Mahua road.
I was afraid that this force, which I took to be strong in view of
its independent movement, would advance further on Nanungu
and capture our company's stores (ammunition, medical stores,
supplies, etc.), which were on this road as well as the depot
at Nanungu. I therefore withdrew during the night with the
greater part of my force, via Makoti, to the Nanungu-Mahua
road. Only strong patrols remained in front of the enemy,
but these did not notice that the enemy, too, evacuated his
position during the night and withdrew towards Mahua. On
6th May it became apparent that the report of strong enemy
forces on the Nanungu-Mahua road, which had caused my
retirement, was incorrect. There was no enemy there. Captain
Miiller, hearing the firing of the English trench-mortars, had,
with admirable initiative, immediately begun a forced march
from his camp north-east of Mahua, towards the sound and
had apparently been taken for the enemy.

When he arrived on the battlefield he found that the enemy
had retired. The enemy, consisting of four companies and a
machine-gun company, and to judge from his fortifications a
thousand strong, had been completely defeated by our force
of little more than 200 rifles — we were 62 Europeans and 342
Askari. He had lost 14 Europeans and 91 Askari killed,
3 Europeans and 3 Askari taken prisoner. In addition, his
hospital with about 100 wounded had fallen into our hands,
and according to the natives he had taken other wounded with
him. Our casualties were : 6 Europeans, 24 Askari, 5 other
natives killed ; 10 Europeans, 67 Askari and 28 other natives
wounded.

While this gratifying success against the enemy's western
columns was being attained, Koehl's detachment had been
engaged in continuous fighting, often on a considerable scale,
against the enemy divisions which were advancing on Nanungu
from Port Amelia. At Medo the enemy, according to his own

254

East of the Ludjenda

statement, suffered heavy losses in one engagement west of
Medo. Captain Spangenberg, with his two companies, had
succeeded in getting round the enemy, falling on and capturing
from the rear his light field howitzer battery. Nearly all the
men and horses of this battery were killed. Unfortunately it
was not possible to remove the guns and ammunition. They
were rendered useless. But in spite of this individual success,
Koehl's detachment had to retire. The moment was approach-
ing when the timely intervention of my main force with Koehl's
detachment might bring about a decisive success against General
Edwards. Once more, however, the question of supplies dragged
our movements. The crops of the district had all been con-
sumed, except the Mtama, which ripens much earlier in this
country than in German East Africa. But it was not yet ripe.
In order to avoid having to withdraw simply for reasons of
supply, we ripened the Mtama artificially by drying it. This
made the grain quite edible, and as there was plenty of it in the
district everyone got as much as he wanted, and there was no
want.

The condition of the crops prompted me to march with the
main body of the force further south-west, in the direction of
Mahua, and pitch my camp beside the Koroma mountain, not
far from the Timbani mountain. I intended, if necessary, to
march further south, to avail myself of the abundant crops in
the fertile districts near the confluence of the Malma and Lurio
rivers. West of the Timbani mountain the country was favour-
able for a decisive action against General Edwards, who was
following Captain Koehl's detachment south-west from Nanungu.
The extraordinarily rocky and broken country near the moun-
tain, and four miles north-east of it, as far as the place to which
Koehl's detachment had retired, was not favourable for the
decisive attack I had in view. On 2ist May smoke indicated
fresh enemy camps west of the positions of Koehl's detachment.
I guessed that this new enemy would march on 22nd May to
take Koehl's detachment in the rear from the west. Un-
fortunately I omitted to give Koehl's detachment definite
orders to withdraw their main force immediately from the

255

My Reminiscences of East Africa

unfavourable country to the south-west of the Timbani moun-
tain. Instead of a positive order I gave him instructions which
left him too much freedom of action.

Thus it came about that Koehl's detachment did not get
their bearers with the ammunition and baggage on the march
until the forenoon of the 22nd of May. Even then all would
have been well if the Governor, who had attached himself to
Koehl's division, had not marched at their head. Not under-
standing the seriousness of the situation, he made a considerable
halt in the middle of this unfavourable country, where he was
exposed to a surprise attack from the enemy at any moment,
without being able to put up an effective defence. The bearers
of Koehl's detachment, in spite of Captain Koehl's orders, allowed
themselves to halt likewise. During the morning of this day,
I once more personally reconnoitred the very favourable country
south-west of the Timbani mountain, and met, among others,
Lieutenant Kempner, who had been wounded the day before
with Koehl's detachment and carried to the rear. From Koehl's
detachment itself, where, since the morning, several enemy
attacks had been beaten off, sounds of distant fighting were to
be heard. There was telephonic communication with Captain
Koehl, and I returned about n a.m. to the Koroma camp without
having any idea of the situation of his transport. At noon I
had just entered the camp when suddenly there was a loud sound
of firing, from a very short distance, of trench-mortars, beyond
doubt between us and Koehl's detachment. Immediately
afterwards telephonic communication in that direction was
broken off. There was no alternative but to march my whole
force immediately from the Koroma camp against this new
enemy. I secretly hoped that, in spite of the unfavourable
country, we might perhaps succeed in taking him by surprise,
and in inflicting a decisive defeat. Barely an hour later we
reached the Timbani mountain and quickly threw back the
advanced detachment of the enemy. A few scattered men
reported that the Governor and Captain Koehl's transport had
been surprised by the enemy and all the baggage lost. The
Governor himself had only just managed to get away ; others

256

Native Types (5).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

[To fate p. 256.

Native Types (6).

(From a drawing by General von Lettow-Vorbeck's Adjutant.)

East of the Ludjenda

said he had been taken prisoner. The enemy had opened a
fairly lively fire with several mine-throwers, and was attacked by
our companies from several sides. He had, however, taken up
a good position, in which he entrenched himself and had hidden
part of the captured baggage. Unfortunately we only recaptured
a small quantity. But the enemy position was surrounded
and subjected to a concentrated and gruelling fire. According
to a dispatch captured later, the ist King's African Rifles alone
lost about two hundred men.

Fig. xviii. The Action at the Kireka Mts.

Several companies and patrols of Captain Koehl's detachment
took part in this envelopment of the enemy. Captain Koehl
himself had turned his main force against the new enemy, attack-
ing his rear, and hoped to be able to defeat him while a strong
patrol facing north-east held his former enemy in check. This
patrol, however, was much too weak. It was pressed back, and
had again to be reinforced with troops from Captain Koehl's
detachment. Even though the enemy had without doubt
suffered on the whole considerable losses, a decisive success
was unattainable. The fighting was broken off at dark, and we

257 *7

My Reminiscences of East Africa

withdrew to the favourable country I had reconnoitred between
the Timbani and Koroma mountains.

Meanwhile the Governor had found his way to the camp by
the Koroma mountain. He had lost all his belongings in the
adventure, and was looked after by Heder, a non-commissioned
officer, and the trustworthy and cautious leader of the supply
column. I, too, came up to help the Governor in his adversity,
and honoured him with a pair of blue socks, which his wife
had made me at the beginning of the war, but which unfortunately
had faded.

Apart from the serious loss of about 70,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion, we had also lost a considerable amount of notes — I believe
it was 30,000 rupees. My desire to give requisition notes in pre-
ference to bank notes, and so save a lot of transport of securities
and avoid unnecessary losses, had not been acceded. Millions
of rupee notes had been printed, the dragging about of which,
in the present war situation, was particularly burdensome.
In order, at least, to avoid similar losses in the future, the
Quartermaster, on my instructions, destroyed a great part of
the notes which had been obtained with so much trouble.

258

CHAPTER III

IN THE REGION OF THE LURIO AND LIKUNGO RIVERS

ON May 23rd the rest of our transport and the main body of
the troops were started off from Coroma camp on a track
right through the bush to Koriwa. The bulk of our carrier
columns and the sick had gone on ahead. The rearguard under
Captain Otto remained a few days longer on the Koroma Moun-
tain and there successfully repulsed several hostile attacks.
It looked as if our enemy had once again collected the bulk of
his troops at Timbani, after the conclusion of a concentric opera-
tion, and needed some time to reorganize his supply before
resuming his march. Returning patrols reported heavy motor
traffic on the Nanungu-Timbani Mountain road. Other patrols
informed us that hostile forces from the east were approaching
the northern bank of the Lurio river.

Unmolested by the enemy, I now made for the fertile district
of Kwiri, south of Mahua, and from thence on to the Lurio. It
turned out, however, that some of our seriously wounded and sick
would not be able to endure several days of such marches in their
" Maschille " (litters). Nor was it easy to ensure medical atten-
tion. We had too few attendants to be able to leave the sick
behind individually. So there was nothing for it but to collect
our invalids from time to time, turn them into a complete Field
Hospital, under a single medical officer, and take our leave of
them finally. Even the senior medical officer of the Protective
Force, Dr. Meixner, was left behind at Kwiri with one such
hospital. On that occasion I said farewell to Lieutenant Schaefer
who had rendered us such exemplary service in the preparations
for the action at Jassini, and was now stricken with black-water

259 17*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

fever. This experienced " African " was fully aware of his situa-
tion, but was as cheerful as ever and faced his inevitable end,
which was approaching fast, with composure.

I did not wish to linger long north of the Lurio, for I thought
that this river, which had been very high only a short time before,
would be a serious obstacle. For that reason I proposed to
cross it with our large quantity of transport quickly and with-
out let or hindrance. When we actually reached the Lurio it
appeared that at this time of the year there were plenty of fords
which offered a comfortable crossing. We left some of our troops
on the northern bank without anxiety as to the drawbacks in-
volved, and established a camp for the main body on the southern
bank. The country was very fertile and the inhabitants trusted
in us ; good relations had been established by the earlier visits
of the patrols and raiding parties. One of my orderlies had a
hearty reception from some old acquaintances.

I was pretty sure that the English would attack us here and
be compelled to bring up ever more troops. If I only withdrew
slowly enough, the strong enemy forces would, I believed, pro-
bably follow, but in view of their immense supply difficulties,
it would be in vain. In this way I might achieve my main pur-
pose of gaining enough time to raid the weaker hostile camps
and posts further south. Captain Miiller's detachment, which
had been sent south, discovered one such camp at Malema, the
same place where our troops had won heartening successes
before.

After fighting for several days Captain Miiller captured the
Boma Malema. It had been occupied by an English half-batta-
lion which retired south at night. Simultaneously a Portuguese
patrol had gone north from the Boma Malema and returned.
Captain Miiller took the latter for the retreating English, attacked
them on the march and was very astonished to find that the
killed were Portuguese.

After the action Captain Miiller shifted his camp. In the move,
Lieutenant von Schroetter, who was ill with malaria, was left
behind for a short time and taken prisoner by an English patrc.
which suddenly appeared upon the scene. When this patro

260

Region of the Lurio and Likungo Rivers

marched off to the Boma Inagu he managed to escape, and re-
joined us at length, quite exhausted. But he lost all his belong-
ings, and had nothing on his head— a very serious matter under a
tropical sun.

From the reports of the natives and our own patrols there was
no longer room for doubt that strong enemy forces, which had
disembarked at Mozambique, were marching west on the Boma
Malema, and were already only a few days' march from that
place. Simultaneous reports were received that troops were also
marching towards the Boma Malema from the west, the direction
of Malacotera. A few days later the enemy following us from
the north reached the Lurio, so we evacuated its northern bank.
From captured documents and the fighting that took place on
the northern bank, we judged that this hostile force was stronger
than I had suspected. Thanks to its light motor transport
columns it had been able to follow us up quickly with all its supply
as well as a body which I estimated at about three or four batta-
lions with auxiliary arms.

The country along the river Malema in which we had our
camp was quite extraordinarily fertile. The mtama was per-
fectly ripe, and there was an abundance of tomatoes, bananas,
sweet potatoes (batatas) and other fruits. The food was also
very varied. Game and fish were plentiful. The natives knew
the German troops from previous acquaintance, and were very
friendly. When I rode from one detachment to another the
women came running out of their houses to see the " Njama "
(animal, game, flesh), a creature quite unknown to them. I
was riding a horse, of course ! The fertile country was so
extensive that we could not even approximately exploit or protect
it. We could not prevent it supplying the necessities of life to
the large number of Askari and non-combatants with our enemies,
as well as ourselves. We could not deprive the enemy of the
possibility of also making this prolific region in a large measure
into a new base and shortening his line of supply. From our
point of view the country was, if anything, too fertile and we were
not in a position, as on earlier occasions, to exploit it to such an
extent before we left that it was insufficient to support the enemy

261

My Reminiscences of East Africa

masses. But at any rate it had the result that for the moment
we were very mobile as, thanks to our sojourn of several
weeks, our wounded and sick were so far recovered that all,
even the inmates of the field hospitals, were quite fit for
marching.

This advantage would have been lost once more by any con-
siderable actions. I decided gradually to evacuate the region,
in spite of its extraordinary fertility, and slip through the ring
in which the enemy columns were enclosing me in the fertile district
of the Malema river. My idea was that a small part of my troops
should hold off these enemy columns and keep them so busy
that they would think they were involved in a serious affair,
and attack my rearguard properly. In coming to this decision,
good service was done me by the orders of the English commander
which had fallen into our hands. He had no intention of being
" foxed " by us a second time, as he had been at Koriwa, and had
therefore arranged that whenever contact was established with
us at any point, several detachments should immediately execute
a flank march round us at a distance of five or six English miles.
I told General Edwards about this later on, and he was extra-
ordinarily amused that this had given me an intimation of his
intentions, and enabled me to take my counter-measures against
them. It was obvious that if I only echeloned my troops deeply
enough the enemy's enveloping detachments would be placed in
the greatest peril. They would find themselves sandwiched
between my detachments and in this way could be taken by
surprise in the flank or rear by my troops echeloned further
back. Unfortunately the execution of this plan was only
imperfect. In the very thick bush, however carefully one
watched camp fires and the dust, there were too few indications
to follow a column properly and it was very difficult for a column
to keep its direction. In addition there were a number of factors
that threw out one's calculations, factors such as dense bush,
marshes and watercourses. In spite of all these obstacles, we
succeeded every now and then in taking one of the hostile envelop-
ing columns by surprise and bringing it under fire. The in-
evitable difficulties 'of moving separate columns in the thick bush

262

Region of the Lurio and Likungo Rivers

were even greater on the English side than on the German.
When a collision occurred there was often a complete mix-up in
which neither friend nor foe knew whom he had before him.
On one occasion Lieutenant von RuckteschelTs detachment,
which had been nearest to the enemy, fell back on some of our
trpops which had been echeloned further back. In so doing
it came across a reconnoitring party in the bush, at a distance
of about thirty paces. This patrol was recognized as an
enemy. The machine guns were brought into position
under the nose of the enemy and without any interference on
his part, and the patrol, which had taken our men for English,
was fired on lustily at point-blank range and put to flight in
a second.

In the same way our own patrols continually found themselves
in the middle of enemy troops. On one such occasion Vizefeld-
webel Schaffrath made his patrol lie down in the high grass and
then opened an effective fire on the head of approaching enemy
columns. Then he took cover again. In this way he succeeded
in the course of a few hours in inflicting sensible losses on the
enemy several times and capturing some material.

I wanted to gain time by these holding actions, so that I could
get my main body into the country further south, which was
supposed to be fertile, according to report, and fall upon and drive
away the smallish hostile garrisons we expected to find there.
The first objective of this nature was the Portuguese Boma
Alto-Moloque. A captured map showed that this had been the
seat of a higher administrative authority in peace time and the
military station of a force exceeding a company. Both natives
and food must certainly be there. Between us and Alto-Moloque
lay the high range of Inagu. An English battalion in its en-
trenched camp at Inagu barred the road which led from the
Boma Malema round the west side of the Inagu Mountains to Alto-
Moloque. It was therefore probable that our advance by that
road would be contested, and that would have been unpleasant
in view of the length of our carrier columns. In any case we
should have been delayed and our intended surprise attack on
Alto-Moloque would have been spoilt. But surprise I regarded

263

My Reminiscences of East Africa

as absolutely essential, as we suspected the presence of ammuni-
tion and arms at Alto-Moloque.

Accordingly we left the enemy in peace in his entrenchments
at Inagu and marched round the east side of the Inagu Mountains
on Alto-Moloque. The strategic situation was somewhat re-
markable, and well described in the words of an old Boer, words
that were not quite pure High German : "Is das eine Komische
Orlog ; ons lopt achter de Portugies an, und de Englanders lopt
achter ons an " (This is a funny war. We chase the Portuguese,
and the English chase us) .

We marched by native tracks or straight through the bush.
Several considerable streams had to be negotiated on the way.
This district, too, was fertile, and we soon came across unmis-
takable human tracks leading towards Alto-Moloque, not to men-
tion kraals, the first I had ever seen. They were grass huts,
very thick and carefully built. Ashes were smouldering in places
and the heads of hens which were lying about were still fresh.
We exchanged shots with some Portuguese patrols and a few
rifles with ammunition were captured.

No time must be lost, so Miiller's detachment, made specially
mobile by being relieved of all its transport, went on ahead and
found in Alto-Moloque only a few Portuguese officers and non-
commissioned officers who were just drinking coffee on the
verandah of the very fine European house. These were taken
prisoner.

I now followed slowly with the main body. Our rearguard,
under Captain Koehl, had quite a series of little collisions, which
in bulk caused the enemy not inconsiderable losses. One of our
Askari patrols had been surprised and captured by a stronger
enemy patrol when engaged in foraging for food. These Askari
subsequently looked on while this English patrol fought quite a
bloody action with another English detachment in the thick
bush and the occurrence gave them their opportunity of escaping.
The lack of caution which many of our Europeans continually
showed, in spite of all warnings, caused us many unnecessary
losses. There was one Askari, a particularly reliable and in-
telligent man, whose father, the old Effendi Plantan, had already

264

Region of the Lurio and Likungo Rivers

been with Von Wissmann's Zulu Askari, whom I had been only
too glad to take with me on patrol. He never came back from
some quite unnecessary mission on which he was sent, and was
probably taken prisoner. It was a phenomenon common to both
sides that a large part of the losses in the war in East Africa were
unnecessary and due solely to thoughtlessness.

Koehl's detachment gradually came up with the main body,
which had reached the Alto-Moloque-Inagu road at a European
plantation which was well stocked with provisions. From this
place it had rung up Alto-Moloque on the enemy's telephone and
received a reply, first from a Portuguese, then from Captain
Miiller. Miiller reported that only a small amount of ammuni-
tion had been captured, and that the bulk must have been got
away to the south-east just in tune by several carrier parties.
Strong patrols were immediately sent out after them.

When the main body entered Alto-Moloque on June i6th we
found some very fine and massive European houses. They were
charmingly situated on a little hill, and had a view for miles
over the neighbouring forests to the mighty rugged mountains
in the distance. There were thousands of orange trees in full
bloom and our coloured men immediately christened it the
" Boma ja machungwa " (Orange boma).

The numerous maps and documents of all kinds which were
found at the station gave us a tolerably clear idea of the country
towards Quelimane. We could see that there was a telegraph
wire from Alto-Moloque to Quelimane via Hi. A large com-
pany, the Lugella Company, had its headquarters at the con-
fluence of the Lugella with the Likungo. There were great
plantations and factories and large supplies of food. Above
all, it looked as if preparations were in progress to make this
station a main supply depot for food and ammunition for consider-
able bodies of troops.

If we wished to exploit the opportunity that this situation
presented, our subordinate commanders would have to act very
promptly and must not be hampered by too rigid instructions.
The impression that I formed in my mind rested in many respects
on unproved assumptions. Our pursuing patrols must be able

265

My Reminiscences of East Africa

to act according to circumstances independently and rapidly if
that original impression was not confirmed subsequently. Time
must not be lost, or the enemy would be able to get his supplies
away in time. He would have the advantage of a railway which
began not far south of the Lugella Company's station and led
south to the river Namacurra, as well as the steamer which plied
on that stream.

As so often happens, our pursuing patrols and companies
were occasionally found wanting in some respects. Yet it must
not be forgotten that besides many other qualities a very mature
tactical judgment is required to give an independent decision on
the question when the very exhausting pursuit of a fleeing foe is
to be continued at top pressure or should be broken off. To
exploit the promising situation to the greatest possible extent,
on the very day of my arrival at Alto-Moloque I had sent in
pursuit the whole of Miiller's detachment, which I had hitherto
kept by me. In the course of various patrols and raids in the
neighbourhood we caught individual Portuguese Askari who
in many cases had set up off their own bats as little tyrants in the
villages of the district. The natives reported their presence to us.

The region of Alto-Moloque turned out to be very fertile, as
we anticipated. We were therefore in a position to give Miiller's
detachment a greater start in following up the enemy. One of
the patrols of this detachment had captured a hostile supply
depot near Hi. An enemy carrier column, turned off by an Anglo-
Portuguese detachment which was now several days' march east
of Alto-Moloque, and trying to pass through Alto-Moloque
in ignorance of our presence, was a welcome acquisition to our
Intendant, who needed it to carry the supplies captured at Hi.
Unfortunately this intended removal succeeded only partially,
for a fresh English detachment appeared at Hi, apparently from
the direction of Inagu, and drove off our patrols.

The advance of our main body on Hi was contested by con-
siderable hostile patrols which were approaching the Alto-Moloque-
Ili road from the north. One of these patrols was immediately
pursued energetically and attacked in its camp, but I gained the
impression that larger enemy forces were advancing on us from

266

Region of the Lurio and Likungo Rivers

the north of Hi and Alto-Moloque. I had no intention of delay-
ing, but wished rather to join up as soon as possible with Miiller's
detachment, which was on its way to Lugella. Accordingly I
marched south, skirting Hi and occupied the Portuguese post of
Nampepo. In this district, at about a day's march from each
other, the Portuguese companies had established a number of
clean, well-arranged stations around which lay the fields, which
they cultivated. A whole series of these posts and their field-
depots fell into our hands during the march. Nampepo was one
of them, only larger than usual, and the centre of 'an extraordi-
narily fertile district. A special feature of the Nampepo camp
was our chase after domestic pigs. Large numbers of these were
running loose in the bush, so that we had excellent sausages to
eat, as well as roast pork and brawn. A German planter named
Hauter, from the district of Morogoro, who had delivered large
supplies of sausages to Morogoro during the war, had acquired
expert skill in preparing them, and this now came in very useful.
He now had the insides of pigs to practise on instead of the insides
of cows, and our enjoyment of this unwonted luxury was so great
that we did not allow ourselves to be disturbed even by the shots
that fell into our camp.

For as a matter of fact a considerable enemy column from the
north was approaching the station of Nampepo, which was held
by Captain Spangenberg with our outposts. From the com-
manding ground the approach of a large enemy column could be
noted quite easily. As a particularly favourable opportunity
for attacking it presented itself we did not disturb the enemy in
his approach. However, contrary to expectation, he did not
attack us. Pillars of smoke arising from the bush about 1,500
yards away showed us that he had encamped there. Our patrols
which went round the enemy crawled up to his camp at night
and fired into it. Koehl's detachment had come up meanwhile
and I marched off with the main body to follow Miiller's detach-
ment in the direction of Lugella. Captain Spangenberg remained
with our rearguard in touch with the enemy, and then followed
us at a distance of a day's march.

Meanwhile Captain Miiller's detachment had succeeded in

267

My Reminiscences of East Africa

crossing the Likungo river, near the confluence of the Lugella,
at a ford. It had been able to give an apparently severe drub-
bing to a Portuguese battalion which had rushed up from the
south to protect it. Several machine guns were captured. The
great depot of the Lugella Company fell into our hands. It was
possible to distribute a large amount of 'food and clothing. The
buildings themselves, which had been adapted for defence, and
about 300,000 kilograms of food were burnt.

As no other remunerative objective presented itself Captain
Miiller considered he had fulfilled his mission for the time being,
retired to the southern bank of the Likungo and there awaited
my arrival.

I was afraid that our wonderful captures of the last few weeks
would tempt some of our Europeans to help themselves to things
improperly, and I took advantage of the occasion to point out
the evils of such behaviour. It must not be forgotten that
war booty belongs to the State, and that the individual soldier
has to notify to his superiors if he happens to want any parti-
cular object he has captured. An estimate is then made of the
value of the object and he has to pay the amount. It was
important for me to maintain the moral of our troops
unconditionally if I was to be able to appeal to their sense of
honour and make calls on their endurance.

A certain amount of ammunition was captured here and there,
and, further, a small Portuguese gun had fallen into our hands,
but the great haul of cartridges for which we had hoped and
striven had not materialized. I thought it extremely doubtful
whether there ever had been such large stocks at Alto-Moloque
and Hi, and suspected that the whole thing was a case of ex-
aggeration of the approved native type. That did not imply
evil intentions on the part of those concerned. On the contrary,
the natives were well-disposed towards us. For example, they
brought back of their own accord one of our captured Portu-
guese officers who had escaped. They also brought us some
German black boys who had been enjoying themselves looting,
and had been caught and well beaten by the natives, excusing

hemselves on the ground that they had taken them for Portuguese i

268

Region of the Lurio and Likungo Rivers

It is an extremely difficult matter even for a European to
estimate, for example, the numerical strength of a detachment
on the march. The native finds it much more difficult, especially
when it comes to larger numbers. The words he so frequently
uses, mingi (much) or kama majani (as thick as grass) can mean
50 just as well as 5,000.

269

CHAPTER IV

ON TO THE SOUTH

HOWEVER, wherever these large ammunition depots
might be, they had certainly not fallen into our hands.
We had to start out on the search again. The whole strategic
situation, as well as the documents we captured, showed that
they must be somewhere in this region. There was a high degree
of probability that the more considerable stocks, whose existence
we suspected, were further south, either because they had been
there from the start or because they had been moved there as
a result of our approach. It seemed likely that before long
they would be transported to the coast and transferred to ships,
in case of emergency.

During our march considerable patrols had reconnoitred the
region within a radius of a day's march, and captured a few
small enemy food depots, but no arms or ammunition. Miiller's
detachment, with which we had joined up at Mujeba on June
27th, marched further south again the same day. The natives
told us of a large boma at Origa, which was said to be somewhere
further south, near the coast, and to have Ikrge ammunition
supplies. Miiller's party was to find this boma. Our directions
were thoroughly inaccurate, as usual. I was quite certain that
on the march other and conflicting reports would infallibly
arrive. Unfortunately we had not a long time in which to
test the intelligence that came in. All we could do was to trust
that it contained at least an element of truth.

As the situation demanded, Captain Miiller was given the
greatest freedom of action. If any promising objective pre-
sented itself during his march, he was to decide without hesi-
tation what his best course was. I would bring up our main

270

On to the South

body and intervene unconditionally in his support, and, in any
case, I would accept the situation he had created. The main
thing was that he should not wait for special orders and instruc-
tions. I realized that in acting thus I was in a large measure
placing the conduct of our operations in the hands of a sub-
ordinate commander. It was only possible because that
subordinate commander possessed a very sound, tactical judg-
ment and great initiative.

Our leading troops, with their three weak companies, had to
perform the double function of cavalry sent out far and wide
to reconnoitre, and that of an advance guard led with the
greatest energy. In any other circumstances I should have been
with the advance guard myself, in view of its important task,
so that I could have a surer hold on the course of operations.
Experience had taught me, however, that in view of the distance
between our columns, my presence with the main body was
indispensable, both to overcome obstacles quickly and to be
able to act in face of some unforeseen change in the situation.
It must not be forgotten that our whole advance was based on
combination, and that, as actually happened often enough, the
unsuspected appearance of hostile detachments from some
other direction transformed the situation at a blow and made
fresh dispositions necessary.

Accordingly we marched by small native tracks or right
through the bush in single file. Owing to the great length of
our columns, on a day's march of nineteen miles or so the head
had to start off in the dark — about 5 a.m. — if the tail was to
reach the camp appointed the same day, that is, late in the
evening and just before darkness fell. It was inevitable, because
camping material had to be procured, wood to be chopped, grass
to be cut and shelters to be built, in case of need, for the sick.
For that reason our whole force could not march concentrated.
It was much too extended. Miiller's detachment, forming the
advance guard, marched one or two days' march ahead. The
rearguard, Spangenberg's detachment, followed the main body
at a distance of about a day's march. Communication was
maintained by means of runners.

271

My Reminiscences of East Africa

In the reports which reached us by the runners of Miiller's
detachment, the name " Kokosani " was now perpetually
recurring. Considerable enemy depots, strongly protected by
hostile troops, were to be found there, so it was said. But
where was this Kokosani ? The word could not be found on
our maps. It gradually came to light that Kokosani was the
same place that figured on Portuguese maps as Namacurra.
In any case, all our previous intelligence, as well as a glance at
the situation on the map, showed that Kokosani must be our
most promising objective. We had no means of knowing whether
it would be possible to capture this place, probably very strongly
fortified, with our relatively limited resources. Only the attempt
itself could enlighten us on that point. Captain Miiller had
turned west towards the place independently. On the way it
became clear that, as the natives had told us, there actually
was a ford over the river Likungo.

I now marched on quickly with our main body, in order to
join up, and gave orders to the same effect to our rearguard
under Captain Spangenberg. In the afternoon of July ist, the
main force reached the Likungo and immediately crossed it.
The water of this great river, more than four hundred yards
wide, came up to our necks at the deepest parts of the ford.
It took each man about an hour to cross. When the troops had
successfully reached the western bank, we bivouacked, and next
morning continued our march in the tracks of Miiller's detach-
ment ahead.

On the way some thirty natives met us. They had worked
in Kokosani, and told us that a large number of Portuguese and
Askari were encamped there, and that a number of chests had
arrived. We had to employ interpreters in our talk with these
men, as they did not know Kisuaheli. Several of our Askari
were masters of the local tongue or related dialects.

Before long we received an important report from the advance
guard. On the previous day Captain Miiller had completely
surprised the enemy at Kokosani by an encircling move. March-
ing on the factory buildings from the north in broad daylight,
through a field of knee-high agaves and without any cover, he

272

On to the South

had succeeded in getting into the Portuguese entrenchments
and, in several hours of very severe hand-to-hand fighting,
defeating the three Portuguese companies holding them, with
very heavy losses to the enemy. In the course of the action
a number of rules, as well as two field guns with their ammuni-
tion, were captured.

I myself went on a little ahead of our main body, and in the
morning came across several extensive and well-arranged plan-
tations. Next I followed the track of a field railway, which
ran along the main road right through the fields, and after a
short time joined up with a standard-gauge line. As was to
appear later, the latter led from the river Namacurra northwards
to the neighbourhood of Lugella. When Captain Miiller struck
this standard-gauge line the day before, he held up a train which
had just come from Lugella. It is easy to realize the mutual
amazement when there descended from the train several Portu-
guese non-commissioned officers whom Miiller had captured at
Lugella and released again.

When I reached the factory buildings, Captain Miiller came
limping up to me, pretty lame. He expressed his astonishment
that I had brought my detachment direct to Kokosani by the
main road and without opposition, for he thought that there
must be quite two English companies somewhere in the neigh-
bourhood. He had not yet been able to ascertain their where-
abouts, but documents which Captain Miiller had captured
pointed conclusively to their presence in the district. Miiller
also told me that he had not yet found the considerable quantity
of infantry cartridges. All his people were still busy trying
to find them and anything similar.

When I considered the matter more closely, it seemed to me
more probable that the ammunition stores we were hunting
for would not be near the factory, but must be somewhere
directly on the railway, and, indeed, at its southern terminus.
That was the place for a large ammunition depot, for it must
be the unloading point where the stuff was transferred to rail
from ships on the Namacurra. Wre had to find out whether
these deductions were sound. I went back immediately and

273 18

My Reminiscences of East Africa

met the leading files of our main body among the plantations.
The leading companies were anything but pleased to have to
retrace their steps in order to follow the standard-gauge rail-
way southwards. After the long, tiring march a few compli-
mentary remarks about my arrangements were comprehensible
enough. Fortunately for me, I did not hear them.

It was in a rather bad humour that the men at the head of
the column arrived in the neighbourhood of the railway-station.
They did not seriously believe in the possibility of a fight. It
was upon them suddenly, however, and several Askari were
struck by hostile bullets at quite short range and fell. The
rest of our main force, which was near at hand and ready for
action, was brought up. When I arrived, the situation was not
at all clear ; the enemy was obviously entrenched and closer
reconnaissance was in progress. An indecisive exchange of
shots now developed. It began to rain and was unpleasantly
cold, so that everyone felt thoroughly uncomfortable. I myself
went to Lieutenant von Ruckteschell's company, which was
lying opposite to and about ninety yards from the corrugated-
iron buildings of the station and directing a well-aimed rifle
and machine-gun fire from some high ant-hills every time any-
thing showed.

I considered that the situation at the moment was unfavour-
able to storming the station. We would have been compelled
to rush at the enemy's position through the thick bush, which
was commanded by a most effective hostile fire. That offered
but little prospect of success. A number of our men would
probably not have joined in the rush at all, and those who did
and got close to the enemy's fortress would probably have
been held up and found themselves unable to get on. We
should, therefore, achieve nothing.

On the other hand, my reconnaissance had brought the idea
to my mind that on targets, some of which were very visible,
artillery fire would be effective, especially from two sides. It
would frighten the enemy's Askari and make them run away.
That would be a favourable moment for good machine-gun
fire. But the day was already too far advanced, and our gun

274

On to the South

was smashed, so that nothing definite could be ventured on for
that day. The larger portion of the troops retired to our camp,
and only three companies of Captain Poppe's detachment
remained in close contact with the enemy.

The next day, July 3rd, we got our gun into working order
again, after strenuous efforts. As luck would have it, it was
of the same model as the guns Captain Miiller had captured,
and so, by interchanging the individual serviceable parts of these
three guns, we produced a field-piece fit for use. There was
thus a prospect of putting to good use the two hundred rounds we
had captured two days before. In the afternoon the gun was to
be brought up to within a few hundred yards of the station, and
open fire upon it. Another smaller, 4-cm., gun was ready in the
foremost infantry line — and therefore about a hundred and twenty-
five yards off — to start a cross fire. All our machine guns were
held ready. In the morning I had been to the factory buildings
again for a conference, and had told the civilian personnel there
they need not get frightened if they heard the sound of firing
in the afternoon. The white women and children had been
very frightened by the fighting, and some of them had fled into
the bush.

I had gone back to our camp, extremely tired, when the sound
of fighting at the station suddenly made itself heard. We
received a telephone report that loud yells and cries of " hurrah "
could be heard coming from the station. By degrees the
following facts were established : the enemy was apparently
tired of the well-aimed, concentric fire which had been directed
at them since the afternoon. They were now being subjected
to artillery fire from two sides at once, and the moment there
was the slightest movement machine guns opened on them.
Their young troops could not stand it, and were very restless.
Our companies recognized that this was their weak moment
and used it immediately, showing splendid initiative. They
leaped up with loud hurrahs, and the next minute were in the
enemy's position. The enemy began to run away. The English
maintained that they had been infected by the example of the
Portuguese. However that may be, they ran away and our

275 18*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

companies immediately went after them as hard as they could.
Our flying foes reached the river Namacurra, which ran imme-
diately behind their position, quickly pulled off their boots
and dashed into the water. Here most of the hostile troops were
drowned, including their commander, Major Gore-Brown.

Between July ist and 3rd the enemy had 5 Europeans and
100 Askari killed, 4 Europeans and about 100 Askari drowned,
while 421 Askari were taken prisoner. Of the Europeans (5
English and 117 Portuguese) who also fell into our hands, 55
Portuguese escaped and 46 sick and wounded Portuguese were
left behind in the hospital at Kokosani. We had 8 Askari and

1 machine-gun carrier killed, 3 Europeans, n Askari and 2
machine-gun carriers wounded. At first it was quite impossible
to estimate, even approximately, what amount of ammunition
and food we had captured at the station. Seven heavy, 3 light
machine guns and 2 guns had fallen into our hands, but these

2 guns had been rendered useless.

More and more cases of captured ammunition were brought
into our camp. The Intendant, Lieutenant Besch (retired naval
officer), was in despair because he did not know where he was
going to get enough carriers to remove such vast stores. They
included more than 300,000 kilograms of food and the stocks
from the Kokosani sugar factory. The amount of booty enabled
all our coloured men to receive as much clothing material as
they wanted, and my boy, Serubili, said to me : " This is a very
different matter to Tanga ; we're all getting as much sugar as
we want now."

It is a fact that the whole camp was littered with sugar.
Each of the blacks was so well-off for food and clothing of all
kinds that they stopped stealing, as if by word of command.
Everyone knows what that means where blacks are concerned.

The booty included large quantities of European food and
preserves. Every European found himself well provided for
for months ahead. Unfortunately it was not possible for us
to get away the whole stock of excellent wine we had captured.
After a sufficient quantity had been set aside as a restorative
for the sick, the rest had mainly to be drunk on the spot. The

276

On to the South

risk of a wholesale " jollification " that involved was gladly
taken, and everyone was allowed to let himself go for once, after
his long abstinence.

In addition there was some fine schnapps in a large number
of casks in the Kokosani factory. These were being stored
ready for the English troops. With the best will in the world
it was impossible to drink it all, so we had to empty a large
number of the casks into the Namacurra.

Column after column of carriers arrived in the camp with
booty, and the Intendant became more and more desperate.
Affairs reached a climax when a telephone message came from
the station that a river-steamer had arrived. An English
medical officer, all unsuspecting of what had happened at
Xamacurra, disembarked from it and closer examination of the
boat revealed the presence of a considerable consignment of
cartridges, exceeding three hundred cases.

In all we had captured about three hundred and fifty modern
English and Portuguese rifles, a welcome addition to our resources,
which brought our armament once more up to requirements.
We were able to discard our '71 pattern rifle almost entirely.

277

CHAPTER V

BACK NORTH TO THE NAMACURRA RIVER

IN face of the enemy's orders we had captured I had to
anticipate that within a short time comparatively strong
hostile forces would be coming from Quelimane to attack us.
The country between the Namacurra and the Zambesi, however,
offered a large number of river barriers, so that a march to the
Zambesi would be full of difficulties for us and hinder our freedom
of movement to an extraordinary degree. Equally unfavourable
for campaigning, from our point of view, was the country south
and south-west of our present halting-place. In the last resort
we should find ourselves cooped up on the Zambesi without being
in a position to effect a crossing of that mighty river which was
commanded by the enemy's gunboats.

I thought it better to abandon our previous march direction.
Yet in view of the total absence of news it was very difficult
to say where I ought to make for. Only one thing appeared
to be clear — that the enemy was not directly on our heels.
At any rate our rearguard and the patrols they had sent out
behind them were not being pressed at all by the enemy. It
seemed probable that if hostile bodies were following us at all
they were engaged in trying to overhaul us on some route parallel
to that we had taken. If I were right in that view — and it
seemed to be confirmed by such reports as the natives brought
in — we could assume that the enemy was insufficiently informed
of our presence at Namacurra and further that the Portuguese
soldiers among our prisoners whom we had turned off could
give him no clear or trustworthy information.

We had, therefore, to devote all our efforts to making those

278

Back North to the Namacurra River

fellows believe we intended to fortify and put up a stiff defence
of Namacurra and, further, that we had our eye on Quelimane.

The unexpected disaster at Namacurra was bound to speed
the steps of the pursuing enemy. It was probable that his columns,
advancing on a parallel line to us, would overshoot the mark,
especially as they must be anxious about the important port
of Quelimane. I therefore decided to wait at Namacurra until
the pursuing enemy columns had actually shot ahead of me
and then turn about to the north-east. What chiefly influenced
me in this decision was that a march in this direction, leading
towards Mozambique, on the main line of communication, would
cause the enemy anxiety, and as soon as he became aware of
it he would at once turn about to protect the neighbourhood
of Mozambique with its wealth of stores. If he did not do so
we should have a free hand at Mozambique. As the position
would then develop the enemy would be forced to undertake
marches that would exhaust his troops, while we gained time to
recuperate our strength and allow our sick and wounded to
recover.

It was difficult to decide on the most favourable moment for
our change of direction north-east ; we should have to rely
to some extent on the fortune of war. Even if I made the
movement too soon and encountered one of the enemy columns
there was always a chance of defeating it when cut off from the
rest. The first thing, however, was to get safely across the
Likungo river again. The available information as to the
fords was very unreliable. In order not to use the same fords
as before I marched with my main body on the evening of 4th
July to a crossing further to the south. Lieutenant Ott, however,
ascertained by personal reconnaissance that no ford existed
at the place of which we had been informed. On the other hand,
it was apparent from native information as well as from tracks
discovered that on the same day an English patrol had halted
in this neighbourhood. The position might become awkward.
In order to lose no time in investigation I marched along the
west bank of the Likungo to our previous ford. Unfortunately
I had withdrawn the covering force that had hitherto been left

279

My Reminiscences of East Africa

there and I did not know whether it was free. I was therefore
very relieved when on 5th July the crossing was effected with-
out further interference. Koehl's detachment was still at Nama-
curra and followed as rearguard.

When we were again marching as a single column through
the bush, the great length of the column was unwieldy and,
in the event of an encounter with the enemy, would be a source
of danger. We therefore tried to shorten the column and to
march in two, and later in several parallel columns through the
bush. The disadvantage of this arrangement was that instead
of one head of a column having to cut a way through the bush
this had now to be done by several. But the advantages of
the shorter length outweighed this disadvantage.

Information from our patrols and from the natives indicated
that the march of the enemy columns to the south-west had not
been pressed so far as I had anticipated. Enemy troops were
reported both between the Moniga and the lower Likungo and
also at Mujebain ; in some cases they were ascertained to be
marching south-west. This brought about the extraordinary
situation that the enemy troops were marching in several columns
south-west while we were passing between these columns in the
contrary direction, north-east. This fact could not long remain
hidden from the enemy, especially as the patrols soon began
to come in contact, and the enemy troops, marching along the
line of telephone communication from Mulevalla to Murubella,
crossed our track. We continued our march to Oriva, threw
back a weak Portuguese detachment west of this place, and
occupied Oriva itself on I4th July. Unfortunately the abundant
stores of supplies and ammunition that we had expected to
find at this station were not forthcoming ; apparently either
the numerous enemy troops had drawn heavily on the resources
of the neighbourhood or the stores that had been originally
left here had already been removed. A small patrol, sent
out to Muatama under Sergeant-Major Hiittich, succeeded in
surprising a small mixed detachment of English and Portuguese ;
as it was unfortunately impossible to get away the supplies
found in this station the stores had to be burned.

280

Back North to the Namacurra River

Meanwhile our attempts to get information from the natives
as to the whereabouts of supplies met with no success ; it was
impossible to wait for the reports of other patrols dispatched
to Murua in search of supplies. Various patrol actions showed
us that the enemy had meanwhile become aware of the change
in the situation and had accordingly turned his columns about.
Want of supplies forced us to continue our march, and the attack
of a mixed Portuguese-English column on our rearguard under
Captain Koehl could not be developed into a complete success
as our main force was already on the march. We halted for
a few days in the tolerably fertile territory between Oriva and
Murua. Captured papers showed us that an English patrol had
closely observed our movements.

It was interesting to notice that the English prisoners whom
we took with us, for the most part, accepted as a matter of course
the hardships of the long marches, the constant crossing of
rivers and the countless difficulties connected with supplies
and transport ; they realized that we Germans had exactly
the same hardships to endure as themselves and were in addition
burdened with a number of further duties such as patrol expedi-
tions, fighting, carrying of supplies and watch-keeping. They
bore everything with a certain humour and it was obviousty
interesting to them to see the war from the German point of
view. It was quite otherwise with the Portuguese officers. It
is true they were in an unenviable position : for the most part
they were infected with syphilis and were carefully avoided
by the English prisoners. In addition they were not real
campaigners. They had received a generous share of the booty
captured at Namacurra, but had not learned how to make the
best of it. They had at once consumed the precious oil with
rice and it was too much to expect that the Germans should
now share with them their own meagre ration. Marching was
a burden to them, their boots were torn to pieces — in short,
their spokesman, the general staff officer captured at Namacurra,
was continually complaining to me of the inconveniences which
with the best will in the world I could not help. He was con-
tinually asking to be released. I should have been only too

281

My Reminiscences of East Africa

glad to consent if he would have given his parole not to fight
against us, but this he would not do. I could not be expected
to release people without any obligation and so put them in
a position to attack us again immediately.

Considerations of supply drove us on. After the failure of the
Oriva neighbourhood to come up to our expectations in this
respect, I planned to reach the territory east of the Ligonja, which
was marked on the map as thickly populated and well cultivated.
On the way the advance guard, under Captain Miiller, quickly
took Boma Tipa, where several days' supplies, particularly
pig-nuts, fell into our hands. The weak Portuguese garrison
offered only slight resistance and then fled at once ; the leader,
a Portuguese sergeant, was the only prisoner captured.

We had reached a high degree of efficiency in the rapid and
systematic distribution of booty ; the main force hardly lost
a day's march and I can still see the approving smile of one of the
English prisoners who seemed to have entirely forgotten that
the Portuguese were his allies. Apparently it amused them
to see with what little ceremony we took from them their depots
one after the other, together with their supplies. The captured
enemy papers repeatedly gave us valuable information. Two
days' march from Tipa lay another boma called Namirrue, where
the Portuguese garrison had been strengthened by an English
company. Apparently considerable stores lay here. At any
rate, according to information, supply columns had been sent
to replenish at Namirrue. The English troops there probably
belonged to an enemy force newly appeared from the direction of
Mozambique. It was impossible for the enemy force to which
we had hitherto been opposed, and which had taken part in the
general march south-west north-east, to have established such
a lead on us. Accordingly the advance guard with our gun
at once marched on Namirrue (the smaller gun had been put out
of action at Namacurra and left behind after firing its few cart-
ridges). Captain Miiller was instructed to reconnoitre the posi-
tion at Namirrue and act independently as might be required.
For the time being the main force remained at Tipa, on the east
bank of the Moloque. It was to obtain supplies and hold up the

282

Back North to the Namacurra River

enemy advancing from the south-west long enough to allow
Captain Miiller the necessary time at Namirrue. It was not long
before small enemy reconnoitring forces appeared at Tipa, OP
the west bank of the Ligonja, which at this point offers no obstacle
worth mentioning. There was a series of unimportant patrol
engagements on the east bank also. The rearguard, under
Captain Koehl, carried out a number of delaying actions at places
along the Tipa-Namirrue road which for the most part have
already been mentioned. As I was not clear whether the main
force would find the best opportunity to attack in Koehl's posi-
tion or at Namirrue I began by following cautiously with him
Miiller's detachment. The report then came in from Captain
Miiller that an enemy force of some two companies was en-
trenched on the heights at Namirrue and that he could not get
at them even with his gun. On the other hand, he reported that
in all probability English troops would come to the support of
the enemy from the north or north-west. There was a favourable
opportunity for us to defeat these troops in the open. I there-
fore marched the main force to Namimie and on the 22nd July
crossed the Namirrue river, about three miles above the
rocky hill occupied by the enemy. Camp was pitched on the
east bank and immediately there were patrol engagements.
I myself, with Lieutenant Besch, made a detour of the hill to join
Captain Miiller, who was encamped immediately south-east of it.
The enemy position had been encircled with patrols and machine
guns. On the heights above several horses could be seen and,
here and there, men too. Wherever a target offered the enemy
was fired on to prevent him from sending down men to fetch water.
It appeared, however, that the enemy must have been able to
keep himself supplied with water from a source unknown to us.

After drinking a cup of coffee with Captain Miiller we went
further round the hill and came upon Lieutenant Kempner and
other patrols, keenly engaged on reconnoitring work. In order
to keep under cover we had to work our way partly through the
thick bush and came on large quantities of cow-itch : contact
with this plant produces an intolerable irritation of the skin.
We were just in the middle of a thicket of this plant when we

283

My Reminiscences of East Africa

heard lively firing from the camp of our main force. At the
same time the enemy in the hill fired several salvoes, apparently
as a signal to their friends. I was immediately convinced that
a not very strong enemy detachment was approaching which was
unaware of the arrival of our main force. I was seized with
the desire to use this rare opportunity at once with my full
strength. I tried with all haste to get to the main force, but the
cow-itch hampered my progress and the irritation was madden-
ing. Eventually we reached the camp before dark. My second
in command, Major Kraut, had begun the attack with small
forces. In the bright moonlight I could still hope to use the
approaching night for a successful battle. All available forces,
with the exception of a company left to protect the camp, were
at once prepared for action. On the left wing, Captain Goering,
who was to undertake an enveloping movement, took his force
round to a position in the rear of the enemy. There he heard the
barking of a dog, ran forward at once and found the English
commanding officer, Colonel Dickinson, with his adjutant and a
medical officer, telephoning in a ravine and took them prisoner.
Captain Goering at once attacked and the detachments of
Captains Spangenberg and Poppe, in front and on the left wing,
did the same. In a very short time the enemy, consisting of one
battalion, was completely overwhelmed and routed. All the
detachments engaged in a hot pursuit, but in the darkness and
the thick bush touch was lost with the enemy.

It turned out later that the enemy's troops marching parallel
with us had crossed the Namirrue at the same time a little further
upstream. In view of the constantly changing situation, due to
the continuous movement of the forces and the impenetrable
screen of the bush which made it impossible to see far in any direc-
tion, and also owing to the large number of his marching columns,
it was quite impossible for the enemy, in spite of the unremitting
labours of his wireless service, to obtain a clear picture iof the
situation as a whole and to keep his subordinate leaders informed
in time of all the changes of the situation. In this case a column
had become detached and had run upon us with only a part of
its strength : only one battalion had crossed the river. In an

284

Back North to the Namacurra River

exposed and very dangerous position this battalion had been
badly handled by our main force.

A company detailed for the further pursuit of the retreating
enemy returned the following day without having achieved any-
thing more ; here, again, after such a favourable action the sub-
ordinate leaders and the troops themselves could only with
difficulty be persuaded to throw themselves in to thejast ounce
to wring every possible advantage from their success. Lieutenant
Schroetter, who then for several days carried on the pursuit

Fig. xix. The Action at Namirrue, July 23, 1918.

in a manner in keeping with the situation, was unable to effect
more than a few patrol skirmishes. The enemy had, in the
meantime, gained too great a start. No information was
obtained except as to the very hurried flight of the enemy.

I, with the main part of my forces, stood my ground. The
full exploitation of the success lay less in the pursuit of the
beaten enemy than in the chances offered by the situation of the
enemy we were surrounding on the hill, now that the help intended
was for the moment unavailable.

285

My Reminiscences of East Africa

For the first time in this campaign we had captured a trench-
mortar with ammunition. The various parts were collected on
the field of action and the seventeen rounds of ammunition made
ready for firing. Experiments made with practice ammunition
gave satisfactory results, and we were able to arrange for the
bombardment of the enemy among the rocks at four o'clock in
the afternoon. The command of this attack was entrusted to
Captain Miiller, whose detachment had not taken part in the
fighting on the previous day and had known nothing about it.
To this detachment was added Lieutenant von Ruckteschell's,
which had remained in the camp. The trench-mortar was placed
in position on one side of the hill, the gun on the other ; our
machine-guns were disposed round the hill in readiness for the
attack. At 3.45 Lieutenant von Ruckteschell took leave of the
English Colonel Dickinson, who had been placed in his charge,
saying that he expected to be back in an hour. At 4 o'clock
the first round from our trench-mortar burst in the centre of the
enemy's position. The enemy commander was just considering
whether he should make a sortie during the night. In a moment
the hill burst into life : everywhere men could be seen running
up and down the rocks. They were brought under the fire of
our gun and machine guns. Very soon the enemy showed the
white flag, but continued to fire.

Lieutenant von Ruckteschell returned to his guest as he had
promised, an hour later, but unfortunately with a shattered leg.
His orderly who, when he was wounded, had tried to carry him
out of the fight, was shot down under him. Meanwhile Captain
Miiller had climbed the hill from the other side and stormed
the camp. It was occupied by a squadron of mounted infantry
of the Gold Coast Regiment of whom hardly one came out alive.
Even the horses were killed almost without exception. On our
side brave Lieutenant Selke was killed by an enemy bullet shortly
before the storming of the camp. He was buried on the battle-
field. The materiel captured was small, but the two days of
fighting had cost the enemy heavy losses in men. His detach-
ments, which were numerically hardly less strong than our
own, were literally annihilated. Here, as at Namacurra, it turned

286

Back North to the Namacurra River

out that the English had conscripted black troops from German
East Africa into their fighting force, including a considerable
number of old German Askari.

Our thorough work at Namirrue had been made possible by
Koehl's detachment, consisting only of three companies, which
had kept us free from interference. This detachment had
fallen back gradually from Tipa on Namirrue, daily fighting rear-
guard actions with the enemy who was pressing on with all
his strength. They were now within half a day's march of
Namirrue and I ordered them across to the east bank of the
Namirrue river. Patrols sent out to reconnoitre had meanwhile
learned from the natives that there was an enemy depot with
a garrison at Pekera. This seemed to me very probable, as Pekera
lies in the thickly populated area east of the Ligonja river,
said to be a fertile district. Our expectations were realized
when after two days' march we arrived at Pekera. The mounted
squadron of the Gold Coast Regiment stationed there was at
once destroyed and several motors were captured. In the
same way we quickly took possession of the Boma of Chalau and
a number of other stations where the Portuguese had stored
large quantities of supplies, particularly pig-nuts. Our patrols
advanced as far as Angoche and in a very short time we were
masters of the wide and exceptionally fertile district. One night
some of the Portuguese officer prisoners escaped and succeeded
in joining the enemy troops at Angoche. Apparently there were
among these gentlemen some who knew the country well by
reason of their occupations in peace.

The period of rest during our stay in the Chalau district made
it possible for our sick and wounded, who had been brought
with us on the long marches, to recover; the fit, too, benefited
by the respite. All had suffered more or less from the uninter-
rupted marching and exertions they had just gone through. It
was noteworthy how the recent successes brought out the war-
like spirit of the bearers, who were for the most part a very sound
and reliable lot of men. A large number offered their services
as Askari. Even my old cook was not disinclined to take up
arms.

287

My Reminiscences of East Africa

On 5th of August supplies began to run short and there re-
mained as our chief article of diet only the still bitter muhogo.
Several enemy patrols approaching us from the north-east showed
me that the enemy columns following us from the south-west
had actually overtaken us during our halt and were concentrating
or an attack at Wamaka, north-east of our camp.

288

CHAPTER VI

BACK TO THE LURIO RIVER

IN order to confirm the enemy in his mistake as to our ob-
jective I marched on yth August along the road to Wamaka
and pitched my camp three hours' march north-east of Chalau,
in a good supply area. Several enemy patrols were driven off.
From Wamaka an enemy officer appeared with a flag of truce to
announce that the English Commander-in-Chief would like
to arrange for an exchange of medical prisoners. He was also
instructed to inform me as to when and where equipment for the
English prisoners could be handed over to us. These very
transparent proposals showed me that the enemy had something
serious in hand from the north and was trying to make his task
easier by enticing me into a trap. Various enemy spies were
captured and confirmed my belief. Their report that the enemy
intended to attack in three columns was hi accordance with the
usual plan of such undertakings.

When several patrol and outpost actions on loth and nth
August indicated that a strong enemy column was advancing
along the Wamaka-Chalau road, I assumed that at least one
other column would be marching parallel with this further
south ; their objective was obviously Chalau. I decided to
engage this southern enemy column by itself. The prospect
of the success of my plan was certainly not great, as the enemy
was marching for the most part through the bush, avoiding the
paths. To meet such a development of the situation I had had a
path reconnoitred and marked. In spite of this our march,
begun in the evening of nth August, lasted through the whole
night. Not until daybreak did we arrive east of Chalau at the

289 19

My Reminiscences of East Africa

place I had selected. Strong patrols, among them a whole
company under Captain Koehl, were still on the march.

My general idea was a march west to enable me to turn either
to the Blantyre district or east of Lake Nyassa. Without any
hindrance from the enemy we crossed the Ligonja at Metil and
the Tipa-Namirrue road. There the grave of an officer of the
ist battalion 2nd King's African Rifles proved that the enemy
column, which had first followed us from Tipa to Namirrue,
had gone round us to the north to Wamaka : for this ist battalion
2nd King's African Rifles belonged to the force which was now
approaching from Wamaka. On the further march to Hi we
passed through the camps of the enemy forces which had come
from the south-west and had continued their march in the
direction of Alto-Moloque. They too had made a wide detour
and had accomplished correspondingly long marches. It was
strange that all these enemy columns should suddenly display
such a high degree of mobility ; they had changed their supply
system and, partially at any rate, left their lines of communi-
cation. According to the reports of prisoners they sent
requisitioning parties on ahead to commandeer supplies from
the natives, which were then distributed among the troops.
This requisitioning of supplies seems to have been carried out
with great ruthlessness. The confidence which the natives had
shown during our recent stay in the Hi district had vanished.
They now saw an enemy in every Askari and individual men
who were left behind were on several occasions attacked by the
natives.

When we came to Hi, the English telegraphic station situated
there was quickly captured. The papers found there gave
useful information as to the movements of the enemy troops.
According to this there were considerable stores at Numarroe
and Regone ; strong forces were to try to overtake us from
Alto-Moloque and Mukubi, while one column followed im-
mediately on our track. The enemy, who up to a short time
back had been groping in the dark, had apparently received, a
few days before, reliable information as to our movements.
It was very difficult to find the road to Regone, as no guides could

290

Back to the Lurio River

be raised. From Hi, however, a newly erected telephone line
of copper wire led to Numarroe. If we followed this line we were
sure to come upon something useful. As a matter of fact parts
of the enemy columns were near us when we left Hi. The patrols
we had left behind even met some Askari whom they took to
be friends : they exchanged cigarettes and lights with these and
did not realize until afterwards that they were enemies.

During these days I was much occupied with a domestic
question. The supply of bread for the European prisoners be-
came difficult in view of the prolonged marches. The men were
unskilled and not in a position to help themselves. At last I
succeeded in getting over the difficulty, and had considerable
quantities of flour prepared by other methods. Captain Kriiger,
who had charge of the prisoners of war and died soon after-
wards, was already very ill and exhausted by hardships ; with
the best intentions he had not always managed to find the ways and
means of meeting the wishes of the prisoners, which were often
very exacting.

In the morning of 24th August we crossed the Likungo river,
and continued our march towards Numairoe. We could already
see, several miles in breadth, the hill and the buildings of Boma
Numarroe. During a halt we lunched in the congenial company
of Lieutenant Ott, Sergeant-Major Nordenholz and the other
officers of the advance guard. We had long grown accustomed
during the halts to bring out, without ceremony, a piece of bread
and a box of lard or hippopotamus fat. Naval Lieutenant
Freund even still possessed some butter from Namacurra.
Even the Askari and bearers, who formerly used to wait for their
meal until camp was pitched, adopted more and more the " des-
turi " (manners, customs) of the Europeans. As soon as a halt
was called every black would bring out his lunch. It was very
jolly when the whole force bivouacked in this way in the forest,
in the best of spirits, and refreshed themselves for fresh exertions,
fresh marches and fresh fighting.

We were still two hours east of Numarroe when the advance
guard was fired on. An enemy company had camped on our
line of march and was slowly and cleverly retreating before us

291 19*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

from kopje to kopje in the direction of Numarroe. Lieutenant
Ott, who was shot through the chest, was in a very serious
condition. With the main body led by Goering's detachment, I
made a detour, and, passing the enemy to the south, made straight
for the Boma of Numarroe. Before dark our gun was brought
into position and fire opened on the Boma and its "entrenchments.
Goering's detachment, without loss of time, made a still wider
detour to the south in order, by using a ravine, to come close
up to the Boma in the rear. The advance guard (Miiller's
detachment), which was out of sound of the fighting, was
also quickly brought up. The enemy shooting was not bad,
and in spite of the distance the rifle bullets of the infantry came
very close whenever one of us exposed himself.

It soon grew dark ; the firing increased and died down again,
until suddenly heavy firing was heard from the direction of
Goering's detachment. Then there was silence. Goering's
detachment had surprised the enemy in the rear and stormed
some stubbornly defended trenches. The retreating enemy was,
however, not recognized as the enemy by another German
detachment and got away. The night was unpleasantly cold ;
it was pouring with rain and our baggage had not yet come up.
On the following day 3 enemy Europeans and 41 Askari
were buried by us ; i European and 6 Askari wounded, i
European, 7 Askari and 28 other blacks unwounded were
taken prisoner. Among the prisoners was the enemy Com-
mander, Major Garrod, who commanded the half of the 2nd
battalion 4th King's African Rifles here. On our side, Sergeant-
Major Nordenholz was shot through the head ; 6 Askari and
i machine-gun bearer were killed ; 3 Europeans, 18 Askari
and 4 machine-gun bearers were wounded ; 40,000 rounds
of ammunition and two light machine guns, in addition to
hand-grenades, medical stores and large quantities of supplies,
were captured. Among our wounded left behind in the clean,
massively built houses was Lieutenant Ott, cheerful as ever.
Fortunately, his wound was not so serious as was feared at first,
but it was not possible to take him with us.

On August 25th I wanted at all costs to reach the camp of

292

Back to the Lurio River

Regone. From captured papers I knew that valuable stores
had been taken to Regone to be safe from us, including trench-
mortar ammunition. Regone was probably, for the moment,
still weakly garrisoned. In view of the proximity of the enemy
columns it might, however, be assumed that August 26th would
already be too late for a coup de main. The path led through
a pass in the steep rocky hills. During the march our advance
guard soon came upon the enemy and engaged him, while I,
with the main force, passed round this enemy and marched
direct on Regone. During the climb over the hilly country,
where it was only possible to see a short distance ahead, two
German detachments, mistaking each other for the enemy,
nearly became engaged. The machine guns were already in
position when the mistake was fortunately discovered.

We then advanced further over the hills, while below us,
already considerably in the rear, could be heard the machine-
gun fire of our advance guard. The march was so difficult, and
as we could only cross the hills in single file, our column was so
long that Regone, my objective for that day, was not nearly
reached. As a matter of fact we had no exact idea where Regone
was. Only the fact that we could see hi the distance the con-
verging of several paths led us to conclude that Regone must
lie there. Half way to Regone we saw a large encampment of
tents which I took to be the other half of the battalion which
had marched from Regone to the support of Numarroe.

In pouring rain we had to pitch our camp in the bush. On the
next day the camp we had observed had been struck. The
Boma of Regone was held in considerable strength. An attack
on this place over the bare hills offered no prospect of success,
and we confined ourselves to skirmishes with patrols and single
detachments. As I had seen from his papers, the enemy had
given orders that we should be allowed to strike at Regone un-
hindered and then attacked in the flank or rear by the strong
reserves which lay outside. It was therefore necessary to
exercise particular caution, and the impetuosity with which
Lieutenant BoelTs company, in spite of all these considerations,
advanced on the Boma might have had serious consequences.

393

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Several enemy camps and columns outside the entrenchments were
surprised by our fire and some supplies captured. The captured
papers informed us of the approach of strong enemy columns
from the south and south-east towards Regone. But there were
also troops to the north ; whether these were in the neighbour-
hood of Lioma-Malacotera or at Malema could not be ascertained.
It was, however, certain that they were at hand and it was
probable that they were approaching Regone, and that from
the north.

As a coup de main against Regone offered no prospect of
success, and a prolonged enterprise, in view of the intervention
to be expected from outside, could not be relied on, I determined
to resume the march. On account of the obstacles formed by
the rivers and swamps south of Lake Nyassa, the line of march
I had formerly decided on to the west appeared ill-advised,
especially as the enemy could, with the help of steamers and
railways, easily concentrate and maintain a force there. A
further march north seemed to me more practicable, passing the
lake on the east ; it seemed probable that our return to German
East Africa would be a complete surprise to the enemy, who
would take our objective to be the natural capital of this district,
Tabora. Under this impression he might be expected, in order
to save his main force the difficult overland march to Tabora, to
withdraw to the Portuguese coast, take ship from there to Dar-es-
Salaam, and proceed by rail to Tabora. These calculations were
to a large extent realized. It was natural that, having reached
the north end of Lake Nyassa, I should continue my march,
not to Tabora but in another direction, probably west. In any
case, the first thing was to reach the north end of the lake. This
could not be done in less than a month and meanwhile the
situation might alter considerably.

At Regone we observed the concentration of strong enemy
forces, who examined our camps immediately after our departure
but followed us only slowly. The country, with its numerous
ravines and water-courses, was particularly favourable to us.
On the way to Lioma a considerable enemy supply dump was
captured, including a large quantity of tobacco. Miiller's

294

Back to the Lurio River

detachment, which had gone on ahead to Lioma, soon reported
the enemy occupation of this place, but could not obtain any
exact information as to his strength. I reached this advance
detachment on 30th August with the main force. The position
of the enemy entrenchments in the thick bush had not yet been
located with any exactness. Apparently he had only just
arrived and had not yet completed his works. I therefore
attacked immediately. The detachments of Miiller and Goering
marched round the enemy to take him from the north. Mean-
while the main force gradually closed in along several ravines
in the forest.

In view of the lack of information I could get no clear picture
of the situation. Suddenly lively firing was heard from the rear,
where our carrier columns were still on the march. A strong
enemy patrol had unexpectedly opened fire on our bearers. A
great part of our baggage was lost. Captain Poppe, who with
two companies was standing by in case I required him, was sent
to attack. He could no longer find the patrol, but followed
their line of retreat and came upon an entrenched camp which
he immediately stormed. Sergeant-Major Schaffrath was severely
wounded. These events were personally reported to me by
Captain Poppe, who was brought back severely wounded in the
chest. He reported that the enemy had been completely
defeated, and that large captures of arms and ammunition had
been made. The companies of Poppe's detachment had pursued
the fleeing enemy and come upon a fresh and larger camp.
This same camp was also attacked from the north by Goering's
detachment, so that the enemy was taken under an effective
cross fire. Meanwhile, a new enemy, advancing from the north-
east, was held up by Miiller's detachment.

I did not get anything like a clear view of these different events
until I personally reconnoitred the position long after dark.
On one of these reconnaissances an enemy rifle-bullet, of which
many were being fired, passed through the trousers of one of
my companions (Hauter, of the Landsturm), struck my other
companion, Lieutenant Besch, in the thigh and severed the
artery. Fortunately we were near the dressing station. I was

295

My Reminiscences of East Africa

thus able to take leave of this officer, who had hitherto acted as
Quartermaster and at the same time had undertaken the duties
of orderly officer, with the knowledge that he would recover.
His few possessions he gave to his companions together with his
wishes for good luck for the future. I, too, was honoured with
a handful of cigarettes. It was my habit to smoke continuously
during serious fighting.

In the middle of the bush I met Lieutenant Von Ruckteschell
with some bearers, on his stretcher which he was forced to use
temporarily because of his wounded leg, which had not yet
healed ; he had kept the column together as far as possible
during the long march and now, rifle in hand, was beaming with
joy at the possibility of taking part in the engagement with the
enemy patrol which appeared on the flank and in our rear.
Part of our columns had lost their way in the thick bush and only
found us some hours later. After nightfall the dressing station
in a ravine had been filled with wounded. It was reported that
Lieutenant Schroetter and Naval Lieutenant Freund had fallen.
In a further patrol-attack, Sergeant-Majors Bolles and Hiittig
accidentally came close to the enemy positions and were fired on
suddenly ; Bolles fell, Hiittig was captured, severely wounded.
Sergeant-Major Thurmann had come within five yarcjs of the
enemy trenches, and being an excellent shot he repeatedly
picked off from an ant-hill any of the enemy inside the camp
who exposed himself, until he, too, received a mortal wound.

Captain Goering, regarding it as hopeless to storm the camp,
did not attempt this and, after dark, withdrew the force, leaving
only patrols in front of the enemy. The main force was thus
collected in several groups north of the enemy camp, and I decided
to evacuate the scene of action on the following day and march
on.

By force of necessity we had to leave behind part of our sick
and wounded, as well as the sick prisoners, in charge of an English
medical officer, and at nine o'clock in the morning we began
our march north in several columns. We had no guides ; the
country was quite unknown to us and I could only give the
Commander of the advance guard general instructions that I

296

Back to the Lurio River

intended to pass round one of the hills that lay before us to
the north. Soon firing could he heard from the advance guard.

Fig. xx. Through Portuguese East Africa.

It gradually became clear in the bush that our advance guard
had turned against an enemy who had attacked in the rear

297

My Reminiscences of East Africa

from the left. The shooting was at close range, and from Head-
quarters, which was with the main body, seemed to come from
a considerable force.

I sent back an Askari to lead the head of the main force to
the place where I was. The position certainly invited us to
catch the enemy between our advance guard and our main
force, and overwhelm him. I waited, but our main force did
not arrive. At last I ran back and saw from the tracks that
the main force had been wrongly guided and had marched
past us a long way to the side. On the other hand, I saw
the head of Stemmermann's detachment, to which the greater
part of our columns and our sick belonged, in the very act of
marching unwittingly straight into the enemy. There was just
time to head off this detachment. I myself now joined the
advance detachments of Miiller and Goering, who had mean-
while continued their march further north. They were following
a road which led up the hill and was then completely lost. I
paid no further attention to the firing which I heard from time
to time further to the rear. In the late afternoon I was astonished
to notice that the rest of the troops had not followed the detach-
ments of Miiller and Goering, but were marching along the valley
to our right. I had no idea that our column had meanwhile
been fired on again by a new enemy from the east and that a great
part of a field hospital had fallen into the enemy's hands.

In order to bring the force together, I tried to descend from
my hill. The descent, however, proved impossible ; the rocks
were steep, almost perpendicular. We continued along a native
path, and evening was falling when Captain Miiller reported
that this path, too, ended abruptly in a precipice. Fortunately
there was another small bypath. This we followed and succeeded
in climbing down. Even here it was very steep in places, but
the bare feet of the carriers gave them a good foothold and I,
too, after taking off my boots, managed the descent. It was
pitch dark and we had no water. At last, however, we found
some, and a load fell from my heart when we came upon the rest
of the force which, under General Wahle, had, on their side, been
rying to join us. On the 3Oth and 3ist of August, we had lost

298

Back to the Lurio River

6 Europeans, 23 Askari killed ; n Europeans, 16 Askari
wounded ; 5 Europeans, 29 Askari missing ; 5 Askari taken
prisoner ; 48,000 rounds of ammunition, important medical
and surgical stores, a considerable number of rifle parts and
the whole transport of Miiller's detachment had been lost. The
enemy losses were also severe, as appeared from a casualty list
of the ist battalion ist King's African Rifles which was captured
later. In addition to this battalion part of the 3rd battalion
of this regiment and the 2nd King's African Rifles had taken
part in the fighting against us.

Our men fought brilliantly ; some of the carriers, it is true,
had been somewhat unnerved by the unexpected fire and more
than 200 were missing. There was no news of Koehl's detach-
ment, but our leaders had become so experienced and skilled in
bush warfare that there was no need for me to be anxious. On
the next day, on arrival at our camp, we surprised an English
supply column.

We then crossed the Cutea-Malema road on which enemy
troops also appeared, and then crossed the Lurio river at Mtetere.
An English requisitioning force fled and some supplies were
captured. Here Koehl's detachment rejoined the main force.
They had followed the enemy who was following us and had
ascertained that he was several battalions strong. We then
marched down the Lurio to the fertile district of Mpuera. Here
Sol (Sergeant -Major) Salim, who, during an earlier patrol ex-
pedition, had married a wife who had followed him faithfully,
left her behind with her father, the local Jumbo, in view of her
approaching confinement.

As there was plenty of food in this district, I gave our troops,
who had been very exhausted by recent events, a day's rest.
It was necessary, anyhow, in the interests of our numerous invalids.
Captain Koehl had been left behind with his company without
transport so that he could do the enemy as much damage as
possible. He reported that strong bodies of enemy troops had
arrived in the neighbourhood and east of Mtetere. It was clear
that for the time being the enemy was devoting his whole
energies to pursuing us, and for that purpose had concentrated

299

My Reminiscences of East Africa

all his forces. On that account I did not think the moment
favourable for some partial success, because it could not be
exploited, and an action would have cost us wounded whom we
could not take away with us. As my idea was to forage the
district north of Luambala for food, I was unwilling to postpone
the march thither any longer.

The day of rest, September 5th, was employed in completing
our food supplies from the fertile region of Mpuera, and early
on the 6th we continued our march in a northerly direction.
It was to be assumed that the enemy would march downstream,
and therefore in a north-easterly direction, in several columns.
Our troops advanced in order of echelon through the bush, and
I expected any moment to come across the most northerly of
the enemy columns, but we crossed its probable course without
discovering its tracks. About midday we were approaching our
objective, a water-hole on Mount Hulua. Here our advance
guard was shot at and before long a lively action was in progress.
Captain Miiller, in command of the advance guard, had stumbled
on the rear of a hostile column which was marching north-east
on a course making an acute angle with ours. He had im-
mediately attacked the 2nd battalion 2nd King's African Rifles,
which was at the end of the column, and put it to flight, capturing
the enemy's field-hospital and his mule train.

I deployed Goering's detachment on the right of Miiller's
detachment, and it quickly threw back part of the opposing
forces, but did not press on as the enemy deployed larger bodies —
the ist battalion of the 2nd King's African Rifles and apparently
parts of the 3rd battalion as well.

Our left wing, which had arrived in rolling, open country in
its advance, and also collided with fresh hostile troops, had
retired a few hundred yards and occupied a slight eminence,
giving a field of fire of several hundred yards. I was not able
to get a clear picture of the situation until I went from the right
wing, where I had joined Goering's detachment, back to the left.

The action was pretty violent and at length came to a stand-
still. We now heard the sound of trench-mortar fire coming
from the rearguard, under Captain Spangenberg, whose arrival

300

Back to the Lurio River

I was awaiting. The rearguard had beaten off the attack of
another enemy column at Mpuera and driven part of it away in
disorderly flight. In accordance with its instructions it had
followed the main body at seven o'clock in the morning. It arrived
on the battlefield about five in the afternoon, and I considered
whether I ought not to throw in all my reserves to inflict a decisive
defeat on the 2nd King's African Rifles there and then on Mount
Hulua. I gave up the idea, however. Time was very short,
for there was only an hour to darkness, and I felt perfectly
certain that very early next morning fresh hostile forces would
appear on the scene. If we were to achieve a decisive victory
it would certainly cost us appreciable losses, and I was anxious
to avoid such losses in view of the small numbers — 176 Europeans
and 1,487 Askari — which our strength return of September i,
1918, revealed. Lieutenant Wenig (Navy), who had been em-
ployed with his gun in Goering's detachment, told me that he
had taken over the command of that detachment, because all
the other officers were incapacitated. Before long, Captain
Goering, with a severe wound in the breast, and Lieutenant
Boell, with one in the head, were brought to the dressing station.
Accordingly I would not commit our reserves to the confusion
and uncertainty of a night battle in the bush, and determined
to slip away from the battlefield in a north-westerly direction.
It wras soon quite dark and our progress was very slow in the
thick, high grass. After going three miles we bivouacked. Our
losses in the action of September 6th had been 5 Askari, 4
machine-gunners killed ; 13 Europeans, 49 Askari, and 15
other natives wounded ; 3 Europeans, 13 Askari, and 12 carriers
missing ; 3 Askari and 3 bearers captured. The enemy were
seen to have some 10 Europeans and 30 Askari hit, while 8
Europeans and 45 Askari were captured ; those of the prisoners
who were sick or wounded, and our own more severely wounded,
were left on the battlefield under the charge of English R.A.M.C.
Documents captured later on at Mwembe showed that " Kar-
turol " (abbreviation for " Column of the 2nd King's African
Rifles ") had heavy losses on the 6th September and was put
out of action for a time.

301

My Reminiscences of East Africa

The enemy did not molest our further progress. Captain
Koehl had remained behind with his company to the west of
Mpuera, in order to operate from the rear against the enemy
and his communications. He followed our trail, having
slight encounters at Milweberg with the ist battalion of
the 4th King's African Rifles, which arrived at that point
from the south on the 8th September. We moved in several
columns right through the bush, a region rich in game. We
even killed several buffaloes on the march. At Kanene we
crossed the road that ran from Lake Amaramba to Mahua.
The enemy had burnt down the store at Kanene, but we found
ample supplies in the country itself, and the material condition
of the troops would have been good, if only the influenza epidemic
had not made such strides. About half had bronchial catarrh,
and from three to six men in each company had inflammation
of the lungs ; as it was only possible for some eighty sick to be
carried in the whole force, about twenty men suffering with
slight inflammation of the lungs had to march at times. No
satisfactory solution of the problem of transport of sick was
to be found, short of abandoning the campaign ; we could not
simply leave the sick to die in the bush. This difficult position
inevitably placed the greatest possible strain on the nerves of
Surgeon-Major Taute, our splendid senior medical officer. It
was the greatest good fortune that this officer, singularly gifted
both in medicine and in organization, proved equal to his grave
responsibility. We owe it to the measures adopted by him,
as well as to the change of district and climate forced upon us
by circumstances, that the epidemic soon abated. A number
of Askari and other natives not in a fit state for heavy work
followed the force slowly ; many of them lost courage when they
continually found our camping-places empty. A large number,
however, caught up with us, especially when the force did one
of its short marches, or was able (a rare occurrence enough)
to take a day's rest.

302

CHAPTER VII

ON GERMAN SOIL ONCE MORE

BUT we could not afford many halts. The military position
imperatively demanded that we should pass quickly
through the districts to the east of the centre of Lake Nyassa,
which were not fertile and had been largely stripped in the
latest period of the war. Rapidity was all the more essential
as it was possible for the enemy to move troops by sea to the
north end of the lake and thus anticipate us by strongly occupying
the district there. As we approached the river Lujenda, the
ground became more mountainous and was scored with many
water-courses and ravines. We could not simply march by
the compass, but had to have regard to the watershed and keep
along the mountain ridge. Fortunately, the leader of the advance
guard, Captain Spangenberg, found some natives who acted as
pathfinders and made it much easier to discover a good route.
But a certain amount of doubling was unavoidable, and that
retarded our progress, while the enemy were in a position to
move troops and supplies swiftly from Malacotera along a good
road to Luambala.

I was somewhat anxious to know whether the water of the
river Ludjenda would have fallen sufficiently to enable us to use
the fords. It would no doubt have been easy to construct
bark boats, but the transport of the whole force could hardly
have gone smoothly forward, having regard to the violence of
the current. In any case, I thought it most important that there
should be no enemy opposition, and that again made haste
essential. Fortunately patrols which we sent ahead found a
ford below Luambala, where the wading of the river presented
no difficulty. Several slaughtered hippopotami enabled us to

303

My Reminiscences of East Africa

prepare some fat again, and in the neighbourhood of Mwembe,
which we reached on the iyth September, we were able to replen-
ish our supplies once more. At this point we took our first
day's rest for a long time. It was here at Mwembe that the
lung epidemic reached its crisis. Since the middle of August,
7 Europeans and about 200 natives had been attacked, of whom
2 Europeans and 17 natives had died. The stores at Mwembe
had been destroyed by the weak enemy posts, but there were still
ample supplies to be had in the district. The question of carriers
began to cause anxieties. The men had been severely tested
by the continual marching, by the epidemic, and by the carriage
of the sick ; and we were approaching their home districts.
It was probable that the Wangoni carriers would desert the
moment they reached their home, which lay to the north of the
Rovuma. In the district of Mwembe and the well-cultivated
valleys of the river Luscheringo, several patrols of the enemy
" Intelligence Department " were encountered ; true, they were
easily driven off, but their presence showed that the enemy was
in the main aware of our movements.

We sent long-distance patrols towards Mitomoni and Makalogi.
To the south of the Rovuma, after leaving the Luscheringo
valley, the steppe through which our march led us was amazingly
rich in game, as was the Rovuma itself, which we reached on
the 28th September. But the big game had its drawbacks, for
once again a sentry was killed by lions. We came on to German
soil again, and stayed two days at Nagwamira ; we surprised
several enemy depots and columns, which had had no news of our
appearance. The country was amazingly fertile, and the troops
were able to get thoroughly fit again. Our patrols sent out
towards Mitomoni reported a camp somewhat strongly held
and the arrival of reinforcements coming from the west. Sson-
gea, too, was occupied by the enemy, but in what strength could
not be ascertained. Various reports, as well as the geographical
position, made it likely that reinforcements were also on their
way to Ssongea from Lake Nyassa.

We continued our march, moving in the direction of Ssongea,
and southwards of this place came into thickly settled country,

304

On German Soil once more

The enemy wireless disclosed that enemy troops were present
in Ssongea, and that another column had arrived in the neigh-
bourhood, in all probability from Mitomoni. On the 4th October
I passed Ssongea on the west and continued to the north. When
the advance guard under Captain Spangenberg reached the
high road from Ssongea to Wiedhafen, it was attacked with
trench-mortars by three enemy companies, which had come
from the west. The enemy was forced back a little. On account
of the hilly and ravine-scored nature of the ground and the
advanced hour, it was improbable that we could achieve a really
effective success on this day. By the morrow, however, there
would be further enemy troops on the spot. I accordingly carried
the attack no further, and marched by to the west of the enemy
into a camp at the Peramiho mission station.

As we passed through the Wangoni territory, a large number
of our carriers deserted, as we had feared would happen. It
would after all have been asking too much of human nature,
to expect that these men, who had not seen their people for years,
should now march straight through their native district. The
nigger's love of home is too strong. Even Samarunga, one of
my own carriers and a very devoted and trustworthy fellow, asked
for leave to visit his village, which lay near by. He came back
faithfully enough and brought his brother with him. The two
then marched on with us, and Samarunga stayed on even when
his brother left. To revive his depression, I gave him some of
my meat ration, but on the next morning he proved to have dis-
appeared after all, having first put all my things in order.

To the north of Ssongea a few enemy reconnoitring patrols were
again met with. Day after day we moved through territory
formerly fertile and well settled. Thousands of farmers could
settle there in a healthy and beautiful climate. On the I4th
October, we reached Pangire (Jacobi), a pleasantly situated
mission station, in which, before the war, the missionary Groschel
had entertained me on my last tour. The missionary's family
had been removed, but the natives, who were of the Wabena
tribe, had remained, and received us as in peace time, in a most
friendly manner. Several old Askari, also, who had left the

305 20

My Reminiscences of East Africa

force for one reason or another, now reported again. Here,
too, some patrols were met with and driven off. In the Wabena
country, which is well stocked with cattle, our very scanty stocks
were replenished, and a mobile food-reserve thus constituted,
which helped greatly to lighten our transport. After we had
quitted Pangire, a patrol that we had left there was fired on by
an enemy detachment. Near Ubena our rearguard, under
Captain Miiller, was attacked by several enemy companies
arriving from the south. A fairly strong enemy column was
thus following our track. The free open steppes of Ubena were
not favourable ground for us to fight on, as they were commanded
from long range by rifle and gun fire. Several reports were also
received of the advance on Ubena of strong enemy forces from
Mwakete ; these reports proved to be in part incorrect, and led
to a short fight between two German patrols.

It was highly probable, and later it proved to be the case,
that enemy troops would be moved by water to the northern
end of Lake Nyassa and march from there on Ubena or
further to the north. If I desired to give up the march towards
Tabora, and to move instead between Lakes Nyassa and Rukwa,
and later between Lakes Nyassa and Tanganyika, to Rhodesia,
the time for the change of direction was now approaching and
there was not a day to lose ; this was all the more so as our
freedom of movement was severely restricted by the steep slopes
of Mount Livingstone and the hills round Mbeja. In settling
our line of march we had to bear in mind that our stocks of pro-
visions had dwindled considerably and required replenishing.
Native information pointed to this being possible in the region
of Kidugala and Sombowano, while famine was said to be raging
in Ussangu, and especially round New Utengule.

On the I7th October, I quitted Ubena with the main body,
leaving behind there, sick or wounded, General Wahle, two
other Europeans, and some Askari. I reached Kidugala on this
day. Koehl's detachment followed on the i8th October. On
the same day, the Boma Ubena was occupied by some 100 enemy
Askari, while 200 to 300 advanced northwards to the Iringa
road. We learnt from captured newspapers that Cambrai had

306

On German Soil once more

fallen on the 2gth September and that the Belgians had advanced
3 kilometres west of Roubaix. We read, too, of the cessation of
hostilities in Bulgaria, of the retirement of Count Hertling, and
of the capture of St. Quentin and Armentieres. But positions
could be given up for so many different reasons that I did not
attribute any decisive importance to this news.

Our further march past Ngombowano and Brandt led us
through a district well stocked with cattle. Missions and schools
had been deserted, but we were very glad to find garden fruits,
especially mulberries and peaches. In the bush we also found
great quantities of wild figs and other sweet and tasty fruits.
Small patrol encounters indicated that enemy troops were moving
direct from Lake Nyassa northwards into the Brandt district.
In Ruiwa we found large English depots, and we had to destroy
a whole warehouse full of leather. We went on to the mission
of Old Utengule, also well known to me from peace time, and
now lying deserted. We then reached Mbozi mission, where
the English had assembled the men from the district, examined
them, and sent them to New Langenburg, probably in order to
turn them into Askari there. At Mbozi there was a large English
depot, containing, among other things, 75 loads of salt and 47
loads of coffee.

It was difficult to feel our way through the district. In the
main it was but little known to us, and for years the enemy had
been altering it by building storehouses and transport roads.
To have reconnoitred in advance would have made too great a
demand on our time and strength, besides depriving us of the
advantage of surprise. The inhabitants were very hostile to
the English and rendered us valuable service, but their informa-
tion was too often very vague. While we rested a day in Mbozi
and replenished our stores, our patrols were far afield, one to-
wards Galula (St. Moritz' mission), another towards Itaka, one
in the direction of New Langenburg, and one in that of Fife.
Some of them would be away for weeks, and we could not wait
for their reports.

This much, however, became clear, that a main communica-
tion road of the enemy ran past Mbozi from Fife via Rwiba

307 20*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

to New Langenburg. On this road we captured a lot of stores
and several supply columns on the march. The existence of this
road showed that a large English depot must lie in the neigh-
bourhood of Fife. It would probably be possible to capture this
by swift action, before stronger enemy forces arrived there. On
the morning of 3ist October a fighting patrol was dispatched
against Fife. On the evening of the same day natives and
patrols reported the advance of strong enemy forces on the New
Langenburg- Rwiba road. In the early morning of the ist
November I moved off with the whole force, advancing in the
first instance towards Mount Rwiba. There the track showed
that a strong enemy column had passed the Rwiba hill shortly
before us, in the direction of Fife. This enemy force had not
been observed by a German fighting patrol that had been sent
out to Mount Rwiba.

308

CHAPTER VIII

THE ADVANCE INTO BRITISH RHODESIA

second patrol dispatched by us on the 3ist October
towards Fife had halted at Mount Rwiba. I had now
to advance with the whole force towards Fife, hi order to
reach it before the enemy, or to attack if our first patrol
should prove to be engaged there. The ten-hour march (actual
marching time) from Mbozi to Fife was a tremendous strain
on the force, but the reports of our patrols, the track of the
enemy, and his notes found on the trees, proved beyond a doubt
that the enemy was doing everything possible to reach Fife on
the same day, the ist November. The great distance 'which
they, too, had to march justified us in assuming that our patrol,
which I expected would reach Fife on the 3ist October, or at the
latest on the ist November, would be equal to preventing the
enemy occupying the depot at Fife on the ist. In the course
of the afternoon we fired on several patrols, without halting
in our advance. Late in the afternoon weak enemy detachments
in the hills near Fife were quickly thrown back. I m3rself,
with Spangenberg's detachment, which had moved off the road
to the right, advanced along a mountain ridge on to a point
where we judged that Fife would lie.

The ground was becoming more open, being mainly covered
with knee-high bush and grass, when a few hundred yards
before us we observed men moving about and tents pitched
close together. The men were moving about in such uncon-
cerned fashion that I almost took them for our own patrol, but
at 200 yards we were received with violent and at first very
well directed rifle and machine-gun fire. It was fortunate that
our men did not answer it, for I had happened to get in advance

309

My Reminiscences of East Africa

and was between the two parties. After a time the enemy,
who had apparently become very excited, began to fire high.
It started to grow darker, so that my patrol was able to get back
to our line. We had, at any rate, reached certainty. We knew
that the enemy with a strength of several companies was lying
before us in an entrenched position with a good field of fire.
His advanced detachments had been thrown back. His depots lay
in part outside the trenches, and later fell into our hands. I did
not want to undertake the storming of the position, which would
have been costly, but the opportunity seemed favourable to
bombard the enemy, massed as he was in the position, with our
trench-mortar, and also from a height with our gun, as well as
with rifle and machine-gun fire if he should show himself. Our
machine guns were accordingly moved forward in the night
close to his position and entrenched. Reconnaissance for a
good gun position was postponed to the next day.

It was probable that the opening of our trench-mortar and
gun-fire would lead the enemy advancing from New Langenburg
to attack us. Such an attack against our heights would have
been very difficult. But in spite of the bombardment on the
2nd November, which was observed to cause some losses, no new
enemy appeared. The definite success for which we hoped against
the camp was not achieved, since our trench-mortar was de-
stroyed at one of the first shots by a prematurely bursting shell.
Flat trajectory fire alone could do nothing against the well-
protected enemy. In the afternoon, therefore, our main body,
with its herds of cattle more than 400 strong, marched off, be-
tween Fife and the Mwenzo mission towards Rhodesia. When
we had reached camp, we saw heavy columns of smoke rising
from the depots at Fife, to which Miiller's detachment had set
fire after our departure. From the direction of the Mwenzo
mission we heard short bursts of fire on several occasions.

Reports came in gradually from that direction. In addition
to our fighting patrols dispatched from Mbozi, other patrols
of ours had arrived, and had fought with English patrols, and
also with each other. One report stated that one enemy patrol
had been observed with quite dark uniforms, hitherto unknown,

310

The Advance into British Rhodesia

and that it must be some recently arrived body. After many
inquiries I finally ascertained that one of our own patrols, whose
equipment was certainly no longer quite in accord with regula-
tions, had been continually mistaken for the enemy. In the
Mwenzo mission itself there was a stationary enemy hospital,
from which we were able to replenish our medical stores. Our
quinine stocks were brought up to over fourteen kilos., supplies
thus being insured until June, 1919.

Fig. TXI. The March into Rhodesia.

Various reports and statements of prisoners showed that enemy
transport was moving from the Broken Hill district to Kasama,
and from there onwards to Fife, with motor-cars and ox-wagons.
Kasama itself seemed to be a large place and an important road
centre. In any case, we could expect enemy depots on the way
from Fife to Kasama, and Kasama itself would be a valuable ob-
jective. So far as one could tell from the map, the position also
seemed to be such that we should be able there to decide to go
further southwards round Lake Bangweolo and reach the Zam

3"

My Reminiscences of East Africa

besi-Congo watershed, or to march further westwards between
Lakes Bangweolo and Moero. The information was certainly
very uncertain, resting almost exclusively on several Askari,
who as children had been employed in trade caravans in the
neighbourhood of Lake Moero.

The important question of the nature of the rivers, and in
particular of the Luapala, which flowed from Lake Bangweolo
into Lake Moero, was for the time quite unsolved. We did not
clear up these points until we captured some maps and notes.
About this time, according to these, the Luapala was a mighty
barrier ; deep and in many places very broad ; it is enclosed by
extended marshes. In the rainy season that was just approach-
ing, any attempt to cross the river in canoes would meet with
difficulties, since on our approach the canoes would certainly be
removed to the opposite bank or concealed. I devoted every
minute to the study of maps and travel-descriptions, burying
myself in them at every halt in the march. There was great
danger that in ignorance of our position we might run into an
impasse in this region of great rivers and lakes.

The first thing was to sweep rapidly along the communication
road Fife-Kajambi mission-Kasama. Mobile detachments were
sent on by forced marches, capturing several small depots,
taking their guards prisoner, and also securing a few ox-wagon
teams. Captain Spangenberg followed immediately with three
companies, and then the main body, at a distance of about one
day's march.

The heavy marches and the deviation to the south-west,
into quite new and unknown territory, was too much for a number
of carriers. On one single day there deserted from the staff
20 Wafiri, who had their homes in the region of Bismarckburg,
and 13 carriers from other districts.

The main body arrived at Kajambi on the 6th November.
The Catholic mission station there consists of wonderful, spacious
and massive buildings. The missionaries had fled, quite un-
necessarily. In the nuns' house there was a letter for me from
a Catholic nun. She was a native of Westphalia, and as a fellow-
countrywoman appealed to my humanity. She would certainly

312

The Advance into British Rhodesia

have spared herself many discomforts if both she herself and the
other people attached to the mission had remained quietly at
their posts. We should have done as little to them as we had
done earlier to the old English missionary at Peramiho, near
Ssongea. The soil was extraordinarily fertile ; in the mission
garden magnificent strawberries were growing. At midday
we heard rifle fire from the rearguard, which was encamped
two hours' march north-east of Kajambi ; Captain Koehl had
remained there to gather supplies, and his Europeans and Askari
had largely been distributed into separate supply patrols. In
this situation he was attacked by an enemy patrol. Captain
Koehl extricated himself from this unpleasant position and on
the next day established his front by Kajambi mission, and we
had the opportunity, which we used with great success, to take
the enemy under our fire by surprise. On the 7th November
our main body resumed its march on Kasama. The enemy
were not observed to be following up. If, however, they were
to press on behind us, it was to be assumed that questions of
supply would prevent their doing so in really great strength.
We had the prospect of swiftly seizing Kasama, and then of
making this place our base and giving battle under favourable
conditions.

But these were hopes of the future ; the first thing was to
take Kasama itself quickly ; according to our information it
was not strongly held, but was well fortified. Captain Spangen-
berg with the advance guard kept increasing his distance from
the main body by longer and longer marches. I followed with
the main body ; ample supplies were found, and we also met
with confirmation of the descriptions given in various books
to the effect that the forest is well stocked with tasty bush fruits.

On the 8th November Spangenberg's detachment had several
patrol fights to the north of Kasama, and on the gth it took
Kasama, whose garrison, hi the strength of half a company,
retired to the southward. Only a little ammunition was cap-
tured and there was little else of value in the armoury. There
was a large repair shop for motor and other vehicles, and
more than a score of Boer wagons were taken. There was con-

313

My Reminiscences of East Africa

siderable booty in food supplies for Europeans. It was note-
worthy that an English company in Kasama — I think it was
the African Lakes Corporation — had given written instructions
for the destruction of its depots by the natives. These came
in large numbers to loot, and Spangenberg's detachment
found buildings and their contents largely destroyed by looting
natives. It is due to his action that among other things the
house of the British Commissioner, which was built and furnished
with great taste, was preserved.

During our advance from Fife it had appeared that the further
we went the fuller were the enemy depots. We gained the im-
pression that we were working up a line of communications
which started around Broken Hill or somewhat to the north
of it, and was only just being established. We had grounds
for hoping that if we moved rapidly forward, we should find
depots even more plentifully stocked ; and the documents taken,
besides information from natives, seemed to confirm this. Three
days' march further along the telephone line, large stores were
said to be lying at the Chambezi ferry, which had in part been
brought thither by boat. I myself on the nth November
cycled to Kasama and met Captain Spangenberg there, and
he immediately resumed his march, with two companies, south-
wards, in the direction of the Chambezi ferry.

On the i2th November the main body reached Kasama. To-
wards evening rifle and machine-gun fire was heard from the
direction of our march. Our rearguard had been attacked
in its camp, two hours to the north of Kasama. The enemy
'who had fought at Kajambi had not followed us directly, but
had taken a parallel course. In the evening Koehl's detachment
arrived in Kasama. I had now formed the opinion that the
attempt on the Chambezi depot was the more promising and im-
portant undertaking, especially as the whole position made it
probable that the pursuing enemy would continue to follow and
thus again afford us an opportunity to give battle.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARMISTICE AND OUR RETURN HOME

A CCORDINGLY only Koehl's detachment remained at Ka-
-i\. sama, with instructions to follow us a day's march behind.
Early on November I3th I followed Spangenberg's detachment
with our main body. I had gone on ahead on a bicycle, selected
the site for our camp and was waiting for the troops to come
up when Captain Miiller appeared before me, also on his bicycle,
and reported that an armistice had been concluded. An English
motor-cyclist who was to have brought the news to the British
troops had apparently passed through Kasama and been cap-
tured there by Koehl's detachment. Thanks to the English
telephone line, along which we were marching, we were soon able
to understand each other, and thus did we get the news of the
armistice.
The telegram of the motor-cyclist ran as follows :

" 12. n. 18. To be fwded. via M.B. cable and despatch rider.

" Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white
flag. The Prime Minister of England has announced that an
armistice was signed at 5 hours on Nov. nth, and that hostilities
on all fronts cease at n hours on Nov. nth. I am ordering
my troops to cease hostilities forthwith unless attacked, and of
course I conclude that you will do the same. Conditions of
armistice will be forwarded you immediately I receive them.
Meanwhile I suggest that you should remain in your present
vicinity in order to facilitate communication. — General van
Deventer. As message is also being sent to Livingstone, it is
important Karwunfor receives this same time as enemy ; every
effort must be made to get message to him to-day."

Our feelings were very mixed. Personally, as I had no know-

315

My Reminiscences of East Africa

ledge of the real state of affairs in Germany, I felt convinced tha
the conclusion of hostilities must have been favourable, or at
least not unfavourable to Germany.

Spangenberg's detachment, which was on ahead, had to be told
as soon as possible, and I immediately set out on my bicycle after
it, taking with me Haouter, a Landsturm soldier, as my sole
companion. About half-way, Reissmann's cyclist patrol of
Spangenberg's detachment met me and reported that Captain
Spangenberg had arrived at the Chambezi. Although I had no
doubts about the correctness of the English news, our position
was very uncomfortable. We were in a district where there was
little food, and were therefore compelled to move on from place
to place. This circumstance had already compelled us to recon-
noitre and secure for ourselves the crossings of the Chambezi.
If hostilities were resumed we must be certain of a safe crossing.
This was a burning question, as the rainy season, meaning a great
rise of this river, was near at hand. We had already encountered
heavy storms. I had, therefore, much to discuss with Captain
Spangenberg and the English officer who would presumably be
on the far bank of the river. In any case we must continue to
devote our energies to buying or getting food. Full of that
idea, I sent my companion back and cycled myself with Reiss-
mann's patrol to Spangenberg's detachment.

We arrived about eight o'clock, when it was quite dark. Cap-
tain Spangenberg was away on a reconnaissance, but Assistant-
Paymaster Dohmen and other Europeans looked after me well
as soon as they learnt of my arrival. I was able to convince my-
self that the supply depot of Kasama really existed. I tasted jam
and other good things which had been unknown to me hitherto.

When Captain Spangenberg came back he told me that he had
already heard of the armistice through the English. After I
had gone to bed in his tent, he brought me about midnight a
telegram from General Deventer which had been brought in by
the English. It had come from Salisbury. It stated that Ger-
many had accepted the unconditional handing-over of all troops
operating in East Africa. Deventer added that he demanded
the immediate surrender of all our English prisoners of war, and

316

The Armistice and our Return Home

that we should march to Abercorn. All our arms and ammuni-
tion were to be given up at Abercorn, but our Europeans were to
be allowed to keep their weapons.

The full text of the telegram ran as follows :

" 13. ii. 18. To Norforce. Karwunfor via Fife.

" Send following to Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck under white
flag : War Office London telegraphs that clause seventeen of the
armistice signed by the German Govt. provides for unconditional
surrender of all German forces operating in East Africa within
one month from Nov. nth.

" My conditions are. First : hand over all allied prisoners
in your hands, Europeans and natives to the nearest body of
British troops forthwith. Second : that you bring your forces
to Abercorn without delay, as Abercorn is the nearest place at
which I can supply you with food. Third : that you hand over
all arms and ammunition to my representative at Abercorn. I
will, however, allow you and your officers and European ranks
to retain their personal weapons for the present in consideration
of the gallant fight you have made, provided that you bring
your force to Abercorn without delay. Arrangements will be
made at Abercorn to send all Germans to Morogoro and to re-
patriate German Askari. Kindly send an early answer, giving
probable date of arrival at Abercorn and numbers of German
officers and men, Askari and followers."

This was news enough if it were confirmed, and showed the
desperate situation of the Fatherland. Nothing else could account
for the surrender of a force still maintaining itself proudly and
victoriously in the field.

Without being in a position to examine the ground in detail,
I had to tell myself that the conditions imposed upon us were
inevitable, and must be loyally carried out. I met the British
Commissioner, who had come from Kasama to the Chambezi
rubber factory, at the river at eight o'clock on the morning of the
I4th. There I handed to him a telegram to His Majesty, in which
I reported what had happened and added that I would act accord-
Si?

My Reminiscences of East Africa

ingly. The Commissioner told me that the German fleet had
revolted, and that a revolution had also broken out in Germany ;
further, if he was to accept a report which was official but had
not yet been confirmed, the Kaiser had abdicated on November
loth. All this news seemed to me very improbable, and I did not
believe it until it was confirmed on my way home months later.

All our troops, native as well as Europeans, had always held
the conviction that Germany could not be beaten in this war,
and were resolved to fight on to the last. Of course it was doubt-
ful whether our resources would last out if the war lasted several
years more, but we faced all possibilities tranquilly for at least
another year. The men were well armed, equipped and fed, and
the strategic situation at the moment was more favourable than
it had been for a long time. The Askari, it is true, saw that our
numbers were dwindling — we were still 155 Europeans., compris-
ing 30 officers, medical officers and higher officials, 1,168 Askari,
and about 3,000 other natives — but whenever I discussed this
topic with one of my orderlies he always assured me : "I will
always stick by you and fight on till I fall." Many others spoke
to the same effect, and I am convinced that it was not merely a
case of empty words.

In the afternoon of the I4th November, I cycled back to our
main body and told the Europeans what I had learned at the
Chambezi, and that it was my intention to carry out the conditions
which had been officially communicated to me, conditions the
accuracy of which I did not doubt.

Before the prisoners were released Colonel Dickinson, the most
senior of them, came to look for me to say good-bye. He said
that his period of captivity (it had been more than three months)
had given him an interesting insight into our camp life, our march-
ing methods, and the way in which we conducted our actions.
He was full of praise for the simplicity of our arrangements and
the absence of friction which distinguished our operations. There
is no doubt he had been using his eyes.

Our Askari were now informed of the turn of affairs. It was to
be anticipated that there would be difficulties when it came to
settling up with them for their pay, which was years overdue, and

The Armistice and our Return Home

the same applied to the carriers. Yet it was a matter of honour
for us to see that these people, who had fought and worked for us
with such devotion, should receive their rights. The sum in-
volved— about one and a half million rupees — was relatively
small, and so Lieutenant Kempner was sent out on a bicycle to
get this sum from the English, or induce them to procure it as
quickly as possible. Our repeated efforts were without result.
We were told at different times and places that the matter was
" under consideration " by the War Office, and there it remained-
I never even received a reply to my telegram to the German
Government in Berlin. There was nothing for it but to draw up
lists of all the back pay that was due, and give the individual
carriers and Askari certificates against it.

We then marched by short stages through Kasama to Aber-
corn. The British gave us further details about the armistice
conditions. It appeared that not " unconditional surrender "
(as General van De venter had said originally) but " unconditional
evacuation " was what was required. I made several protests
against the interpretation of the British War Office, which made
the word " evacuation " include surrender and disarming, but I
received no answer either from the Governments of the allied
countries and the United States, or from the German Govern-
ment. In view of the doubtful interpretation of the word
" evacuation," I considered whether I should not cut short nego-
tiations and march to join the Belgians or somewhere else. But
in comparison to the whole series of peace conditions which
affected the Protective Force, this seemed a small point, and in
the end I decided to go to Dar-es-Salaam, as General van De venter
required, though certainly in the expectation that in accordance
with the terms the English would immediately send us back from
there to Germany. As will appear later that expectation was not
fulfilled.

Not far north of Kasama we came up with the enemy with
whom we had fought our last engagement. They were the ist
battalion of the 4th King's African Rifles. I had to refuse the
invitation of Colonel Hawkins (their estimable commander, who
was barely thirty years old), communicated to me on the march

319

My Reminiscences of East Africa

by Colonel Dickinson, to bring all the German officers to lunch,
much though I appreciated such an expression of chivalry. Yet
Colonel Dickinson did not neglect to pay me his promised visit
on one of the following days, and we had a very pleasant hour
over a cup of coffee. I must record that the officers of this batta-
lion, even in the somewhat difficult circumstances in which they
were placed, behaved with great tact and with that regard which
is due to an honourable foe. Hawkins told me that for reasons
of supply he would not have been able to follow us any further,
and in fact we had to help him out with cattle, of which we had
an ample stock.

Lieutenant Kempner had gone on to Abercorn on his bicycle.
When he came back I went there myself in a car which General
Edwards had sent for me. My reception by General Edwards,
as well as his Staff, was very kind. I put forward my point of
view to General Edwards that I did not recognize any duty to
surrender of our arms, but was ready to do so if I was thereby
conferring some advantage, not on ourselves individually, but on
the German Government. I was then informed that the arms
we surrendered would form part of the quantity which Germany
had to hand over to the Allied Governments in accordance with
the terms of the armistice. Further, the surrender of our arms
should not have the character of a laying-down of arms.

As regards the Askari and carriers, I was informed that the
English would take them to an internment camp at Tabora, until
the question of their pay had been settled and their repatriation
arranged. The Europeans were to be interned at Dar-es-Salaam
until their ship left, presumably, therefore, for a few days. Not
only the Askari but the Europeans at Dar-es-Salaam were kept
behind barbed wire for a month and a half and more.

The troops arrived at Abercorn on the 25th November. The
English flag was waving on the parade-ground where the handing-
over of arms took place, and this shows that the character of a
surrender of our arms was not altogether avoided. What we
handed over was as follows :

i Portuguese gun, 37 machine guns (7 German, 16 heavy and
14 light English), 1,071 English and Portuguese rifles, 208,000

320

The Armistice and our Return Home

rounds, 40 rounds of artillery ammunition. The English were
mighty quick at getting away the surrendered material. There
was not a single modern German rifle among it ! The strength
of our troops was : the Governor, 20 officers, 5 medical officers,
a doctor of the Voluntary Medical Detachment, a senior veterinary
officer, a senior chemist, a field-telegraph officer, 125 European
other ranks, 1,156 Askari and 1,598 carriers. The arrival of
individual detachments was delayed for hours by heavy rain.

The camp for the Askari was surrounded by a thick thorn
hedge, and was much too small. This led to a good deal of bad
feeling among our Askari, which vented itself in frequent demon-
strations against the English Askari. But at length our people
resigned themselves to the uncomfortable conditions, and even
General Edwards realized that the treatment provided an oppor-
tunity for unnecessary friction. We were not ordinary prisoners
of war, whose escape he had to fear, but had given ourselves into
his hands voluntarily in the performance of an unpleasant duty.
He took precautions against similar occurrences during our march
to Bismarckburg, and we went there with Hawkins' battalion
nd \vithout the slightest friction. On November 28th we
bivouacked by the mighty waterfall of the river Kalambo, three
hours' march from Bismarckburg. Here we remained several
days, as the departure of the steamer from that place was being
continually delayed. Many of my officers continually badgered
me to know whether we could not fight on. These suggestions
were far from comfortable, as I had already quite enough to do to
consider how we should get out of so unpleasant a situation. But
putting aside the difficulties involved, I could only feel glad and
proud of such a revelation of true soldierly spirit, a spirit which
did not shrink, even after we had handed over all our arms,
from storming an enemy camp and once more procuring for our-
selves the means to continue the war.

On December 3rd I received a telegram, dated the 2nd Decem
ber, from General van Deventer. It ran as follows :

" I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram setting
forth your formal protest against your troops being treated as

321 21

My Reminiscences of East Africa

prisoners of war. This will duly be forwarded to the War Office.
Meanwhile I am sure you will recognise that pending the receipt
through the War Office of a communication on the subject of
the German Govt. I have had no choice but to act in accordance
with the orders of the War Office, and treat your force as prisoners
of war."

The same day the first lot of troops for transport went on board
four ships. One of them, the St. George, had, in addition to its
crew of English bluejackets and an escort officer, only the
Governor and the officers of our force with their black servants.
For food the English gave us corned beef, dates and biscuits,
and Dr. Huber, the veterinary officer, looked after our bodily
welfare here on board as carefully as he had done for so many
years in the bush. The British commander, the escort officer
and the whole crew were extraordinarily kind. After a short
stop on the evening of the 3rd, at the Belgian station of Vua, a
violent storm arose in the night. It tore away the awning and,
among other things, carried off Dr. Huber's coat. The English
sailors did all they possibly could for the Germans, who were
quite wet through.

On December 5th we arrived at Kigoma. The place was under
Belgian control, and the Belgians received us with a hospitality
which could not have been anticipated. They displayed a
tactful reserve to us which had never been shown before. Tables
covered with cloths had been set out for all the Europeans, a
sight we had not seen for years. Some red wine was produced.
The Belgian Governor had sent his orderly officer, who spoke
German fluently, to receive us officially, and I was glad to take
the opportunity, before we started on our railway journey, to
thank the Belgian commandant for the camaraderie shown us,
camaraderie which always exists among soldiers, even between
enemies, when they have a mutual regard for each other.

Among the English, too, examples of discourtesy on the part
of individual officers, who apparently had not been brought
up in the South, were absolutely exceptional. The senior men
immediately adopted a tactful attitude, whereas one or two

322

The Armistice and our Return Home

juniors did otherwise — for example, they were inconsiderate
enough to want to keep a German invalid out of the compartment.
We Europeans were very well looked after on the train, and it
was like peace time to get a good night's rest by letting down the
bunks and using a leather pillow.

There was quite a crowd of Germans on the station at Tabora.
They complained of many cases of theft on the part of the Bel-
gians and English. It is undoubtedly true that such outrages
had taken place. We stopped for the night at Dodoma and
next morning had an opportunity of fetching water and having
a bath.

The news of the approach of our train had reached Morogoro,
and when we arrived there in the afternoon we once more found
the German women whom we had left behind us in and about
Morogoro two years before. They had tea and coffee waiting
for us. They had arranged tables and baked plenty of rolls
and cakes. In addition they had got the finest fruit for us.
The English were almost as much interested as the Germans.
Besides a very amiable elderly medical officer I have a particularly
lively recollection of a tall, lanky corporal who had apparently
drunk a whole series of glasses to our health before our train
arrived. I managed to slip away from him at last.

We reached Dar-es-Salaam at seven o'clock on the morning of
December 8th. The Europeans were well housed in tents in a
camp within a barbed-wire fence. Food was good and plentiful,
and we were able to buy necessaries of all kinds cheaply from the
English canteen. Governor Schnee and I were received by the
Chief of Staff of the British commander, General Sheppard,
and conducted to our very pretty house outside the camp.
General van Deventer had very kindly sent a luncheon there
as a welcome to us. Major Kraut, Captain Spangenberg, and
Dr. Huber were all quartered here. We found General Wahle,
who had been left behind sick at Ubene and fallen into the enemy's
hands a few months back. He had quite recovered. We had a
common mess and our freedom of movement out of the house
was only limited to the extent that we had always to be accom-
panied by a British officer as escort. At the start these gentle-

323 21*

My Reminiscences of East Africa

men were very unpunctual, but gradually quite tolerable rela-
tions were established between us, and I had an opportunity of
visiting acquaintances in Dar-es-Salaam and arranging my per-
sonal affairs. A car was also usually placed at my disposal.
Major Hosken, the Commandant of the prison camp, who had
previously shown himself extremely considerate to the captured
German women and children in Tanga, now again devoted him-
self to preserve us from unnecessary annoyance.

On our railway journey we had already been surprised to find
almost more English Europeans at every station than we had in
the whole of the Protective Force. Dar-es-Salaam itself literally
swarmed with white troops. I estimated their number at not
less than five thousand, and hundreds and hundreds of motor
lorries and cars were awaiting repairs in the motor transport
park.

This close concentration of human beings revealed its dangers
when Spanish influenza made its appearance. Escort officers
told me that frequently five or seven English officers had died of
this disease at Dar-es-Salaam. We soon came across its traces
among ourselves. Infection had probably taken place while we
were on the ship on Lake Tanganyika, and subsequently on the
train. It spread from man to man in the concentration camps in
Dar-es-Salaam. Captain Spangenberg was going about with me
in the town shortly after his arrival at Dar-es-Salaam. Then he
felt ill, and though his iron constitution had successfully overcome
all the hardships of the campaign, he died in hospital on December
i8th of influenza and inflammation of the lungs.

Almost all the Europeans in our camp were attacked by it, and
it was very sad that in addition to Captain Spangenberg, nine
other Europeans, in all, therefore, ten per cent, of our strength,
succumbed. Numbers of our Askari interned at Tabora also died.

My comings and goings often took me to the Administration
Staff (corresponding more or less to our Commandant on the
Lines of Communication). After much questioning I had found
it in my old house which I had occupied before the war. Among
intelligent Englishmen I found the view prevailing that Germany
must have colonies on economic grounds, as well as on account

324

The Armistice and our Return Home

of her over-populousness. England was considered to have too
many colonies. For the time being, at any rate, she had not
sufficient suitable personnel to manage them.

If the English, when telling us of the armistice, insisted on our
coming to Dar-es-Salaam at once, in order that we should be trans-
ported punctually — that is, by the I2th December — they showed
no haste on their own part to carry out the terms of that armis-
tice. Our embarkation was continually postponed, and, finally,
it did not take place until the I7th January, 1919, five years to
the day after I had landed at Dar-es-Salaam.

To describe my return home in detail would furnish material
for a whole book and could hardly be excelled for tragi-comic
events. In addition to 114 German soldiers, we had 107 women
and 87 children on board, and an escort of 200 British soldiers.

Voyaging by Cape Town, we reached Rotterdam at the end of
February. The large crowd of Germans who turned up to meet
us at the quay showed me, to my surprise, that our East African
war had been watched very closely in the homeland. Many
Dutch also gave us proofs of goodwill.

In cold truth our small band, which at the most comprised
some 300 Europeans and about 11,000 Askari, had occupied a
very superior enemy force for the whole war. Accoiding to what
English officers told me, 137 Generals had been in the field, and
hi all about 300,000 men had been employed against us. The
enemy's losses in dead would not be put too high at 60,000, for
an English Press notice stated that about 20,000 Europeans and
Indians alone had died or been killed, and to that must be added
the large number of black soldiers who fell. The enemy had
left 140,000 horses and mules behind in the battle area. Yet in
spite of the enormously superior numbers at the disposal of the
enemy, our small force, the rifle strength of which was only about
1,400 at the time of the armistice, had remained in the field always
ready for action and possessed of the highest determination.

I believe it was the transparency of our aims, the love of GUI
Fatherland, the strong sense of duty and the spirit of self-sacri-
fice which animated each of our few Europeans and communi-

325

My Reminiscences of East Africa

cated themselves, consciously or unconsciously, to our brave black
soldiers that gave our operations that impetus which they pos-
sessed to the end. In addition there was a soldierly pride, a
feeling of firm mutual co-operation and a spirit of enterprise
without which military success is impossible in the long run.
We East Africans know only too well that our achievements
cannot be compared with the military deeds and devotion of those
in the homeland. No people in history has ever done more.

If we East Africans received so kindly a reception in the home-
land it was because everyone seemed to think that we had pre-
served some part of Germany's soldierly traditions, had come
back home unsullied, and that the Teutonic sense of loyalty
peculiar to us Germans had kept its head high even under the
conditions of war in the tropics.

It is true that that feeling has suffered eclipse in many of our
people under the impression of the present tribulations of our
Fatherland. But it is part of the flesh and blood of us all, and it
is just that enthusiastic welcome which hundreds of thousands
of our countrymen gave us that strengthens our conviction that,
in spite of the momentary distractions and perplexities, the
healthy spirit of our German people will prevail again and once
more tread the upward path.

326

INDEX

Adjutant (steamer), 85.
Adler, Captain, 35, 56.
Aeroplanes :

first appearance, 80 ;

brought down, 86.
Alto Moloque :

surprise, 263 ;

Portuguese officers taken pri-
soner, 263 ;

large supplies of food, 265.
Amaramba, Lake, 302.
Ambon i plantation, 62.
Armistice, first news of, 13 Nov.,

3i5-
Arrival of first store-ship, 67 ;

second ditto, 117.
Artillery, 38, 46.
Arusha :

cattle extensive, u ;

potentiality of the district, n,

29.
Askari :

native soldiers, 27 ;

training, 8 ;

old, well-to-do, 10 ;

back pay, 319 ;

women follow our force, 177.
Astrcea, English cruiser, 27.
Attendants reduced, 176.
Augar, Captain, 35.
Aumann, Captain, 84, 96, 100.
Auracher, District Commissioner,

35. 38.

BAGAMOYO :

bombarded, 31 ;

reconnoitre, 146 ;

falls into enemy hands, 148.
Bangweolo, Lake, 311.
Baron Dhanis, steamer (Belgian),

95-

Barrett, Lieutenant (English), 107.

Barton, Colonel (English), 251.

Bast, Sergt.-Major, killed, 87.

Batzner, Lieutenant, 214.

Baudouinville (Congo) :
White Fathers, 14 ;
French missionaries, 14 ;
native industry, 14.

Baumstark, Captain, 33, 36, 38.

Baziots, The, Administrator, 96.

Becker's post, 90.

Before the war, re-arming com-
panies, 13.

Behobeho :

field howitzer lost, 171 ;
heavy fighting and Selous killed,
171.

Belgian steamer Delcommune shot
to pieces, 29 ;

Belgian Commander-in-Chief at
Lake Kivu, 92.

Bergmann, Lieutenant, 39.

Besch, Lieutenant, 224, 246.

Beves, General (English), 212.

Bismarckburg-Langenburg opera-
tions, 96.

327

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Bleeck, Lieutenant, 56, 162, 200.
Bock, Lieut. -Colonel von, 8.'
Bock, Captain von, 89, 136.
Boell, Lieutenant, 138 ;

wounded, 301.
Boeraken, Major von, 159.
Bolles, Sergt.-Major, killed, 296.
Boot-making experiments, 194.
Botha, General, reported coming,

72.
Braunschweig, Captain, 82, 149,

182.

Bread without wheat flour, 193.
Bridge building, 71.
British North Lancashire Regiment,

42.
British Regular officers chivalrous,

107.
British treatment of German

prisoners, 221.
Brits, General, 147, 149.
Brucher, Lieutenant, 192.
Bueschel, Lieutenant, 87.
Buffaloes, best in East Africa, 12.
Buiko, 141.
Bukoba, 88, 91.
Buller, Major (English), wounded,

147.

Burungi Mountains, 134 ;
supplies plentiful, 134.

Camaraderie of escort, 322.
Carriers, numbers of, 22, 24.
Cecil Rhodes, steamer, sunk, 97.
Chalau taken, 287.
Chambesi depot, 314.
Chappuis, Lieutenant von, 31, 185.
Chirumba station, 241.
Chiulezi, 235.
Chiwata, position, 217 ;

ammunition shortage, 218.
Christiansen, Lieutenant, 68.
Cloth- making at Kilima Njaro, 70.
Coast towns defence, 63.
Command of Lake Tanganyika, 29.
Communications cut off, 34.
Concentration at Pugu, 21.

Congo Act, against England, 19.
Containing the enemy on Uganda,

77-
Cook, Lieutenant, loist Grenadier

Guards, 45.
Cotton spinning, 69.
Cutsch, Lieutenant, 221.
Cutting down rations, 176.

D

DAR-ES-SALAAM :

first action, artillery fire, 27 ;

negotiations for surrender, 28 ;

English ships appear, 52 ;

English Consul King, 20 ;

internment at, 323 ;

embarkation, 325.
Delcomntune, Belgian steamer, de-
stroyed, 29.

Delschitz, Lieutenant von, 97.
Dessel, Dr., 38.

Destructiveness of termites, 30.
Deventer, General van :

arrives, 138 ;

at Kondoa, 144 ;

at Kilossa, 146 ;

at Kilwa, 200 ;

calls for surrender, 235.

telegram of Armistice, 315 ;

conditions of Armistice, 317.
Dickinson, Colonel (English), 284,

318.

Discontent at Logeloge, 163.
District Commissioner, 6.
Dodoma, enemy reach, 145.
Dsalla, Lake, no.
Durr, Father, 10.
Dutumi action, 156 ;
abandoned, 157.

EDWARDS, GENERAL (English), 255,

262, 320.
Embarkation, January I7th, 1919,

Enemy. The :
vital point, 4 ;

328

Index

Enemy, The :

propaganda cap tared, 86 ;

scouts use poisoned arrows, 90 ;

advances north-west and south-
west, 140 ;

take a rest, 158.
Engare Len, 78.

England among our enemies, 18.
English Consul King, 20 ;

naval expedition, 97 ;

plans discovered, 290 ;

recruits make good, 104 ;

spies active, 99.
Enslin, General, 154.
Erdmann, Second Lieutenant,

killed, 63.

Erok Mountain ambush, 64.
Europeans and natives interned,

320.

FALKENSTEIN, CAPTAIN, 84.
Fate of German possessions, 3.
Feilke, Captain, 31, 51, 134, 174.
Field companies increased, 71.
Fife, enemy depots captured, 310.
First action, Dar-es-Salaam, 27.
First journey of inspection, 4.
First Masai :

pure Hamites, 10 ;

original Jews, 10 ;

characteristics, 10.
Fischer, Major, 119.
Franken, Lieutenant, 97, 186.
French missionary propaganda, 14.
Freund, Lieutenant, 291, 296.

GALULA, 307.

Gararagua encounters, no.

Garrod, Major (English), captured,

292.

Gerlich, Lieutenant, killed, 63.
German Fleet revolt, 318 ;

patrol rides into enemy camp,

144;
possessions, fate of, 3 ;

German prisoners, British treat-
ment of, 221 ;
Reservists mobilized, 22 ;
Revolution, 318 ;
settlers source of military power,

7-
Goering, Captain, 210 ;

wounded, 301.
Goetzcn, steamer :

building, 84 ;

completed, 96 ;

sunk, 1 86.
Gold Coast Hill, enemy grenade

attack, 169.
Gore-Brown, Major (English),

drowned, 276.

Gothein, Lieutenant Dr., 99.
Grabow, Master Butcher, 40.
Grawert, Major von, surrenders,

188.
Grote, Lieutenant, 75 ;

died, 121.
Gudovius, wounded and prisoner,

185-
Guerilla warfare imperative, 63 ;

commenced, 64.
Gwendoline, steamer, 99.

H

HAMMERSTEIN, CAPTAIN VON, 18
31, 38, 42, 44, 56, 58 ;

died of wounds, 63.
Handeni, collecting station, 130.
Hasslacher, Lieutenant, killed, 186.
Haun, Lieutenant, 96.
Haxthausen, Lieutenant von, 89.
Hedwig von Wissmann, steamer, 14 ;

captured, 28, 100.
Henneberger, Lieutenant, 86.
Hering's battery, 43.
Hiffmeister, Veterinary Officer, 12.
Himo, 32.
Hindenburg's name not heard of,

48.
Horn, Lieutenant, 28, 94 ;

builds cottages, 130
Hoskins, Major (English), 200
Huber, Dr., 323.

329

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Huebner, Lieutenant, surrenders,

186.

Hulua Mountain, 300.
Huttich, Sergt. -Major, 280.
Hyacinth, The, off Tanga, 86.

ILI, 266 ;

return to, 290 ;

English plans discovered, 290.
Imminence of universal war, 3.
Inagu, von Schroetter's escape, 261.
Indian Brigade, 42 ;

Expeditionary Force, 25, 44.
Influenza epidemic, 302, 324.
Insufficient interest of authorities,

10.
Internment of Europeans and

natives, 320.
Iringa, 15.
Irangi :

enemy shell headquarters, 138 ;

food in abundance, 139 ;

series of actions, 139 ;

enemy casualties heavy, 139 ;

general view of position, 140.

J

JANTZEN, LIEUTENANT, 207.

Jassini. See YASIN.

Jericho, 97.

Jews, first Masai the original, 10.

Jipe, Lake, 108, 125.

Johannes, Lieut. -Colonel, 10.

K

KAEMPFE, LIEUTENANT, 87.
Kahe, 121 ;

our retreat, 123.
Kaiser's, The, abdication, 318.
Kajambi Catholic Mission, 312.
Kaltenborn, Captain von, 130.
Kanene, 250, 302.

Kanga Mountain encounters, 142.
Karongo, 98.
Kasama captured, 313.
Kasigao Mountain action, 75.
Kauffman, Second Lieutenant,

killed, 63.
Kayense, 47.

Kempner, Lieutenant, 319.
Kepler, Major, 57 ;

killed, 63.
Kibata :
occupied, 167 ;
guns brought, up, 167 ;
congratulations of General Smuts,

170.

Kidodi heliograph station, 18.
Kifumbiro, 89.
Kigoma (Tanganyika), 13 ;

as naval base, 95.
Kilima Njaro :
supply depot, 32 ;
activities at, 68 ;
cotton shortage, 69 ;
making cloth, tyres, motor fuel

and boots, 70 ;
bridge building, 70.
Kilimatinde, best buffaloes in East

Africa, 12.
Kilossa, 145.
Kilwa :

demands attention, 159 ;
Commissioner taken prisoner,

159;

enemy dumps surprised, 192 ;
bombarding enemy transports,

193;

enemy's strong forces, 200.
Kimamba depot, 133.
King, English Consul, 7, 20.
Kingani, steamer, 95 ;

lost, 98.
Kirnamba, 31.
Kissaki :

stores destroyed, 152 ;

enemy defeated, 153, 155 ;

prisoners taken, 155.
Kissangire Station, 123 ;

minor engagements, 164.
Kissenyi fighting, 92.
Kissi Mountains, 173.

330

Index

Kissija :

capture of enemy propaganda,
86;

enemy driven out, 164.
Kitangari, 223.

Kitendu, enemy division sur-
rounded, 188.
Kituta, 96.

Kivu, Lake, 91. 98, 126, 140, 185.
Klein, Sergt.-Major, killed, 214.
Klinghardt, Captain, 93, 126, 134,

142, 144, 145.
Koehl, Captain, 68, 112, 179, 204 ;

transport surprised, 256.
Kokosani (Namacurra), 272 ;

Portuguese heavy losses, 273 ;

search for ammunition, 273 ;

large supplies captured, 276.
Kondoa :

occupied, 135 ;

fight in the dark, 137 ;

English civil administration, 137.
Kondoa-Irangi :

enemy shell Headquarters, 138 ;

food in abundance, 139 ;

series of actions, 139 ;

enemy heavy losses, 139 ;

general view of position, 140.
Konduchi, 27.
Konigsberg, The, 19 ;

puts to sea, 28 ;

destroys English cruiser Pegasus,

84;

concealed in Rufiji delta, 84 ;

blown up, 85 ;

ten guns salved, 85 ;

Adjutant recaptured, 85.
Koriwa, Wunderlich wounded, 251.
Korogwe, 31, 33, 36.
Kornatzki, Captain von, 33, 52.
Kraut, Major, 29, 182, 184, 323.
Kraut, Captain, 32, 47.
Krober, Railway Commissary, 36,

57. 79-

Kroeger, Lieutenant, killed, 214.
Kriiger, Secretary, 30.
Kuhlwein, Herr, 162.
Kungulio :

Enemy defeat, 172 ;

hippo shooting, 160.

Kurungu, our envelopment fails

205.
Kwiri, field hospital left behind, 259

LAKE AMARAMBA, 302.

,, Bangweolo, 311.

,, Dsalla, no.

,, Jipe, 108, 125.

„ Kivu, 91, 98, 126, 140, 185.

,, Moero, 322.

„ Nyassa, 98, 306.

,, Rukwa, 189, 306.

,, Tanganyika, 29, 52.

„ Tshahafi, 92.

,, Utungi, 174, 177, 1/9. 188.

„ Victoria, 47, 88.
Lang, Lieutenant, 92.
Langenburg :

fertility and native industries

15:

ours for eighteen months, 99.
Langenn, Major von, 96, 98, 185,
186;

division loses heavily, 187.
Ledebur, Freiherr von, 8.
Lembeni country, 124 ;

aeroplanes brought down, 140.
" Lettow Schnapps," 195.
Liebermann, Captain von, 164,

200, 202.
Ligonja, 282.
Lin eke, Captain, 136.
Lindi, 196.
Lioma :

retirement after heavy fighting.
296.

transport detachment lost, 299 ;

severe enemy losses, 299.
Logeloge discontent, 163.
Lolkisale Mountain :

28th Company surrender, 126 ;

Captain Rothert wounded, 126.
Longido Mountain :

English attack, 67 ;

enemy reinforced, 106.
Low level of musketry training, 9
Luambala, 242, 303.

331

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Lugella :

depot captured, 268 ;

no ammunition found, 270.

Lukuledi, 213 ;

conference on aspects, 216.

Lupembe, enemy retire, 187.

Luscheringe River, 304.

Lusinje, Captain Wienholt cap-
tured, 248.

Lutende :

enemy surprised and routed, 199 ;
English commanding officer
wounded, 199.

Luwungi, 92, 98.

Lyncker, Lieutenant von, 106.

M

MAFIA ISLAND, English take, 86.
Magad Railway, 65.
Mahenge country, 141.
Mahiwa :

flank surprise, 211 ;

severe fighting, 211 ;

enemy defeat absolute, 211 ;

guns and ammunition captured,

213.

Makatan, English defeat, 74.
Mahua, 246, 250.
Makima headquarters, 165.
Makoti, enemy retire with heavy

losses, 254.
Malangali action, 149, 182 ;

Wahehe chief rebels, 182.
Malaria, native immunity against,

24.
Malema :

fertility of, 261 ;

enemy advance, 262 ;

difficulties of bush tactics, 262 ;

Boma captured, 260.
Malleson, General (English), 74, 106.
Mara Bay, 90.
Masai, first, 10.
Marangu, 105.
Massako, 98.
Matendu floods, 197.
Matuschka, Lieutenant, 80.
Mawa action, 179.
Maximum strength, 72.

Mayita, 90.
Mbinji fruit, 241.
Mbizi depot, 307.
Mbosi Mission, 15 ;

reports of English intentions,
June, 1914, 15 ;

country, 96.
Mbuyuni, 73, 79.
Mechanical transport, 50.
Meda, 245.
Medical supplies, 195.
Meinhertshagen, Captain (English),

44-

Meixner, Dr., 259.
Merensky, Lieutenant, 36, 38.
Merker, M., and the Masai, 10.
Michels, District Commissioner, 146.
Mihambia, bombs dropped, 203.
Mirow, Sergt. -Major, killed, 168.
Mkulu Mountain, 239.
Mlali, enemy advance, 150.
Mletere, 299.

Mobilization, August, 1914-18, not
extended to overseas, 18 ;

Reservists, 22.
Moero, Lake, 312.
Moewe, steamer, 19, 28, 91, 94.
Mori Bay, 89.
Morogoro as base, 142 ;

headquarters, 146 ;

enemy converge on, 149.
Moshi, 52.
Mosquito, The, 25.
Moving forces to Northern Railway,

29.

Mpapua action, 145.
Mpili, 224.
Mpoororo, 91.
Mpotora base, 181.
Msalu river, 247.
Mtende, 246, 248.
Mujeba, 270.

Muanza, steamer, 47, 87, 88, 89.
Mujebain, 280.

Miiller, Staff Surgeon, 46, 196.
Musslin, Major-General, 248.
Musketry training low level, 9.
Musoma, 89.
Mwasge Mission, 96.
Mwernbe, 191, 242, 304

332

Index

Mwenzo Mission, 311.
Mwurnoni, 56.
My early experiences, 16.
Mzima Camp, 69.

N

NAGAWAMIRA, 304.
Namacurra. See KOKOSANI.
Nambindinga, 220 ;

reducing the strength, 220.
Namirrue :

enemy routed, 283 ;

Colonel Dickinson captured, 284 ;

Lieut. Ruckteschell wounded,
286 ;

Lieutenant Silke killed, 286 ;

enemy annihilated, 286.
Nampepo, roast pork and brawn,

267.

Namunu, 245.
Nangwale, 238.
Nanungu concentration, 242.
Narungombe :

enemy flee in disorder, 202 ;

Liebermann's great success, 202.
Narunyu, enemy attack, 205.
Native carrier difficulty, 24 ;

interchange of communications,

13 ;

method of warfare, 9 ;

immunity against malaria, 24 ;

industries, 15.

Naumann, Captain, 189, 221.
Naval guns salved from the Konigs-

berg, 85.

Ndanda Catholic Mission, 206.
Nevale, 224.
New Moshi, 32, 33, 36 ;

headquarters, 49 ;

pleasant times at, 59 ;

aeroplane drops bombs, 113 ;

abandoned, no.
New Steglitz headquarters, 116.
New supply detachment raised, 179.
News :

from home, 67 ;

of German Fleet revolt, 318 ;

German Revolution, Kaiser's ab-
dication, 318.

Ngaula, enemy routed, 193.
Ngomano action, 230.
Niemeyer, Commander, 7.
N'jango Camp, 204 ;

telegram from His Majesty, 204.
Nordenholz, Sergt. -Major. 291.
Northey, General, 140, 149-
North Pare Mountains, 125.
Numarroe, 291.

Nyanza hostile enterprises, 47.
Nyassa, Lake, 98.

0

OLD ASKARI, 10.
Old 1871 rifle, 8.
Oldorobo Mountain, 80 ;

enemy retreat in disorder, 104 ;

English recruiting bait, 104 ;

English orders, " Take no

prisoners," 104.
Old Utengule Mission, 307.
Oriva occupied, 280.
Ott, Lieutenant, wounded, 292.
Otto, Captain, 58, 145, 172. 179.
Our movements from North-West

to Central, 127.
Our departure from North final,

129.

PANGIRE MISSION, 305.

Pare Mountains, 125.

Pegasus, English cruiser, 27, 84.

Pekera captured, 287.

Peramiho Mission, 305.

Poisoned arrows used by enemy, 90.

Police Askari, 6.

Poppe, Captain, wounded, 295.

Pori (bush) difficulties, 12 ;

not easy to disappear in, 13.
Portuguese :

invade Makonde, 165 ;

driven into their territory, 166 ;

territory entered, 190.
President, steamer, 84, 198.
Prince, Captain von, 4, 32, 41, 45.
Protective Force, 6 ;

strength of, 19.
Pugu, concentration of troops, 21

333

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Q

QUELIMANE, 265.

Quinine production, 71.

R

RAS-KASONE, 36, 39.
Rations cut down, 176.
Reata-Kahe :

our withdrawal b)' night, 114 ;

evacuated, 116 ;

enemy occupy, 116.
Reata-Latima Mountain repulse,

114.

Reata-North defences, in.
Recke, Lieutenant, killed, 89.
Regone, 293.
Rentell, Engineer, 71.
Reservists mobilized, 22.
Revolt of German Fleet, 318.
Revolution in Germany, 318.
Rifle, old 1871, 8.
Rothe, Director of Postal Service,

30-

Rothert, Captain, 119, 125.
Rotterdam welcome, 325.
Ruckteschell, Lieutenant von, 75,

147, 286.
Rufiji, Delta, 84 ;

loss of the Konigsberg, 85 ;

enemy advance on, 160 ;

evacuated at rainy season, 180
Rugesi Passage, 89.
Ruhudje, fighting on the, 184.
Rukwa, Lake, 306.
Ruponda, we lose supplies, 208.
Russissi minor actions, 93.
Rwiba Mount, 308.

SAIDI, 251.
Salt supplies, 194.
Schaefer, Lieutenant, 57.
Schaefner, Lieutenant, 259.
Schimmer, Captain, 93.
Schleuntz, Colonel von, 8.

Schnee, Dr., 27.

Schmid, Captain, 31.

Schoenfeld, Lieut. -Commander, 7

85, 144.

Schottstaedt, Lieutenant, 45.
Schroetter, Lieutenant von, 5/1

260, 296.
Schulz, Captain, 33, 94, 98, 130

146, 163, 167.

Second store-ship arrives, 117.
Selke, Lieutenant, killed, 286.
Selous killed, 171.
" Shensi " spies, 108.
Shirarti, 89.
Singida stud farms, n.
Sisal plant, 56.
Smith-Dorrien, General, 104.
Smuts, General :

takes over command from
Smith-Dorrien, 104 ;

at Kitovo, no ;

at Handeni, 142 ;

calls for surrender at Uluguru
Mountains, 158 ;

congratulates Von Lettow on
decoration, 170 ;

operations wrecked on Rufiji,
172 ;

relieved by General Hoskins, 200.
South Pare Mountains, 76.
Spalding, Lieutenant, killed, 63.
Spangenberg, Captain, 323 ;

died, 324.

Sphinx Harbour, 100.
Ssongea, enemy at, 304.
Ssonyo treachery, 87.
Stemmermann, Captain, 113, 146,

153-

Sternheim, Lieutenant, 114.
Stewart, General (English), no.
Stolowsky, Staff Surgeon, 195.
Store-ships arrive, 67, 117.
Strength of Protective Force, 19.
Struwe, Sergt. -Major, 192.
Stud farms at Singida, n.
Stuemer, Major von, 87, 130, 134,

190, 207.

Supplies devoured at depots, 174.
Supply system, 23.
Supreme military power, 21

334

Index

Surgery under difficulties, 196.
Surrender :

Smuts calls for, 158 ;

Deventer calls for, 235.
Swahili, 15.
Sybil, steamer (English), 88, 90.

Tabora, hospital ship, 51.

Tabora retirement, 186.

Tafel, Captain, 22, 28, 33, 132, 178.

Tafeli surrender, 236.

" Take no prisoners," English order,

104.
Tanga :

hostile cruisers off, 35.

plans for defence, 36 ;

enemy attack, 41 ;

British North Lancashire Regi-
ment defeat, 42 ;

enemy mowed down, 42 ;

transfer of wounded, 44.
Tanganyika, Lake, command of, 29.

Railway, 52.
Taveta, 29, 33.
Termites, 30.
Thierf elder, Dr., 195.
Thurmann, Sergt. -Major, killed, 296.
Timbani Mountain, 256 ;

Koehl's transport surprised, 256.
Tipa, Boma, 282.
Tombeur, Belgian commander at

Kivu, 92.

Tombwe post captured, 95.
Tomondo, steamer, 159.
Treachery of Ssonyo, 87.
Trench mortar captured, 286.
Tse-tse fly, n ;

plague, 26.
Tshahan, Lake, 92.
Tuliani headquarters bombed, 143.
Tunduru district, 192.
Tunga :

enormous booty, 45 ;

our losses insignificant, 45.

UBEXA, 306.

Uganda Railway, containing the

enemy on, 4, 77.
Ukerewe, 89.
Unconditional " surrender " or

" evacuation, " 319.
Unindi, enemy repulsed, 200.
Universal war imminent, 3.
Unprepared for war, 10.
Unterrichter, Lieutenant von, 68.
Usambara country, 4 ;

volunteer rifle corps, 4.
Utengule (Old) Mission, 307.
Utungi, Lake, 172, 174, 177, 179,

188.

VICTORIA, LAKE, 47, 88 ;

in English hands, 87.
Volunteer Rifle Corps at Usambara,

4-

Vorbeck, General von Lettow- :
landing at Dar-es-Salaam, 3 ;
tour of inspection, 4 ;
buffalo hunting, 13 ;
water on the knee, 13 ;
a raw hand, 16 ;
early experiences, 16 ;
had malaria ten times, 25 ;
slightly wounded, 138 ;
congratulated by Smuts, 170 ;
experiments in bread-making.

193 ;

wireless from Kaiser, 204 ;
Deventer calls for surrender, 235.
hippo shooting, 240 ;
receives news of German offen

sive, Western Front, 248 ;
operation on toe, 249 ;
injury to eye, 249 ;
Deventer 's telegram of Armistice,

315;

and conditions of surrender, 317 ;

sends telegram to Kaiser, 317 ;

no reply from German Govern
ment, 319 ;

declines Colonel Hawkins' in-
vitation, 319 ;

Deventer' s reply to protest,
321

335

My Reminiscences of East Africa

Vorbeck, General von Lettow- :
at Kigoma, 322 ;
at Tabora and at Morogoro, 323 ;
at Dar-es-Salaam, December 8th,

1918. Embarked January

1919, 325 ;

reached Rotterdam, 325.

W

Wilhelmstal native police, 6.
Wintgens, Captain, 91, 185, 186 ;

division captures gun, 187 ;

taken prisoner, 189.
Winzer, Sergt.-Major, gets through,

188.

Wulfingen, Captain Bock von, 87.
Wunclerlich, Lieut. -Commander,

wounded, 251.

WAGANDA WARRIORS, 47.

Wahehe tribe, 32.

Wahle, Major-General, 23, 31, 51,

97, 140, 184 et seq., 323.
Waimi, steamer, 86 ;

blown up, 1 86.
Wajagga tribe, 24, 32.
Wamaka, 288.
Wangoni desertions, 305.
Wassukuma people, 91.
Water-finding, 80.
Welcome at Rotterdam, 325.
White Fathers, 14.
Wienholt, Lieutenant, capture and

escape, 143.
Wienholt, Captain, captured, 248.

YASIN. See JASSINI :
enemy advance, 30 ;
country, 34 ;

English concentration, 56 ;
our attack, 58 ;
enemy surrender, 61.

ZAMBESI FERRY, 314.
Zelewski's expedition, 15
Ziethen, steamer, 86.
Zimmer, Captain, 28, 82, 93, 94.

Printed at The Chapel River Prtss, Kingston, Surrey

CO

q

®i

ti

oj

1 1

s

•H

University of Toronto
Library

DO NOT

REMOVE

THE

CARD

FROM

THIS

POCKET

Acme Library Card Pocket

Under Pat. "Ref. Index File"

Made by LIBRARY BUREAU